Social cognition: imitation, imitation, imitation

Monkeys recognize when they are being imitated, but they seem unable to learn by imitation. These facts make sense if imitation is seen as two different capacities: social mirroring, when actions are matched and have social benefits; and learning by copying, when new behavioural routines are acquired by observation.     

Automatic imitation in budgerigars

A fully automated procedure, involving computer-controlled stimulus presentation and computer-recorded response measurement, was used for the first time to study imitation in non-human animals. After preliminary training to peck and step on a manipulandum, budgerigars were given a discrimination task in which they were rewarded with food for pecking during observation of pecking and for stepping during observation of stepping (Compatible group), or for pecking while observing stepping and for stepping while observing pecking (Incompatible group). The Incompatible group, which had to counter-imitate for food reward, showed weaker discrimination performance than the Compatible group. This suggests that, like humans, budgerigars are subject to 'automatic imitation'; they cannot inhibit online the tendency to imitate pecking and/or stepping, even when imitation of these behaviours interferes with the performance of an ongoing task. The difference between the two groups persisted over 10 test sessions, but the Incompatible group eventually acquired the discrimination, making more counter-imitative than imitative responses in the final sessions. These results are consistent with the associative sequence learning model, which suggests that, across species, the development of imitation and the mirror system depends on sensorimotor experience and phylogenetically ancient mechanisms of associative learning.     

Automatic imitation in dogs

After preliminary training to open a sliding door using their head and their paw, dogs were given a discrimination task in which they were rewarded with food for opening the door using the same method (head or paw) as demonstrated by their owner (compatible group), or for opening the door using the alternative method (incompatible group). The incompatible group, which had to counterimitate to receive food reward, required more trials to reach a fixed criterion of discrimination performance (85% correct) than the compatible group. This suggests that, like humans, dogs are subject to ‘automatic imitation’; they cannot inhibit online the tendency to imitate head use and/or paw use. In a subsequent transfer test, where all dogs were required to imitate their owners'' head and paw use for food reward, the incompatible group made a greater proportion of incorrect, counterimitative responses than the compatible group. These results are consistent with the associative sequence learning model, which suggests that the development of imitation depends on sensorimotor experience and phylogenetically general mechanisms of associative learning. More specifically, they suggest that the imitative behaviour of dogs is shaped more by their developmental interactions with humans than by their evolutionary history of domestication.     

Neural mechanisms of imitation

Recent advances in our knowledge of the neural mechanisms of imitation suggest that there is a core circuitry of imitation comprising the superior temporal sulcus and the 'mirror neuron system', which consists of the posterior inferior frontal gyrus and adjacent ventral premotor cortex, as well as the rostral inferior parietal lobule. This core circuitry communicates with other neural systems according to the type of imitation performed. Imitative learning is supported by interaction of the core circuitry of imitation with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and perhaps motor preparation areas--namely, the mesial frontal, dorsal premotor and superior parietal areas. By contrast, imitation as a form of social mirroring is supported by interaction of the core circuitry of imitation with the limbic system.     

True imitation in marmosets

Marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, observed a demonstrator removing the lids from a series of plastic canisters to obtain a mealworm. When subsequently allowed access to the canisters, marmosets that observed a demonstrator using its hands to remove the lids used only their hands. In contrast, marmosets that observed a demonstrator using its mouth also used their mouth to remove the lids. Since hand and mouth demonstrators brought about identical changes in the canisters, the differential test behaviour of the observer groups suggests that they learned about the demonstrator's behaviour. Furthermore, marmosets that had not been given the opportunity to observe a demonstrator prior to testing had a low probability of mouth opening, even if the canisters were previously opened by a mouth-opening demonstrator in an olfactory control experiment. Corroborating Bugnyar & Huber's (1997, Animal Behaviour, 54, 817-831) earlier findings, our results provide further evidence that marmosets can imitate. Copyright 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.     

Dissecting the imitation faculty: The multiple imitation mechanisms (MIM) hypothesis

Is the imitation faculty one self-contained domain-general mechanism or an amalgamation of multiple content-specific systems? The multiple imitation mechanisms (MIM) hypothesis posits that the imitation faculty consists of distinct content-specific psychological systems that are dissociable both structurally and functionally. This hypothesis is supported by research in the developmental, cognitive, comparative and neural sciences. This body of work suggests that there are dissociable imitation systems that may be distinguished by unique behavioral and neurobiological profiles. The distribution of these different imitation skills in the animal kingdom further suggests a phylogenetic dissociation, whereby some animals specialized in some (but not all possible) imitation types; a reflection of specific selection pressures favoring certain imitation systems. The MIM hypothesis attempts to bring together these different areas of research into one theoretical framework that defines imitation both functionally and structurally.     

Selective imitation in domestic dogs

The transmission of cultural knowledge requires learners to identify what relevant information to retain and selectively imitate when observing others' skills. Young human infants--without relying on language or theory of mind--already show evidence of this ability. If, for example, in a communicative context, a model demonstrates a head action instead of a more efficient hand action, infants imitate the head action only if the demonstrator had no good reason to do so, suggesting that their imitation is a selective, interpretative process [1]. Early sensitivity to ostensive-communicative cues and to the efficiency of goal-directed actions is thought to be a crucial prerequisite for such relevance-guided selective imitation [2]. Although this competence is thought to be human specific [2], here we show an analog capacity in the dog. In our experiment, subjects watched a demonstrator dog pulling a rod with the paw instead of the preferred mouth action. In the first group, using the "inefficient" action was justified by the model's carrying of a ball in her mouth, whereas in the second group, no constraints could explain the demonstrator's choice. In the first trial after observation, dogs imitated the nonpreferred action only in the second group. Consequently, dogs, like children, demonstrated inferential selective imitation.     

The ethological analysis of imitation

Theorists and experimental researchers have long debated whether animals are able to imitate. A variety of definitions of imitation have been proposed to describe this complex form of social learning. Experimental research on imitation has often been hampered by either a too loose 'anthropomorphic' approach or by too narrow 'behaviourist' definitions. At present neither associative nor cognitive theories are able to offer an exhaustive explanation of imitation in animals. An ethological approach to imitation offers a different perspective. By integrating questions on function, mechanism, development and evolution one can identify possible directions for future research. At present, however, we are still far from developing a comprehensive theory of imitation. A functional approach to imitation shows that, despite some evidence for imitative learning in food processing in apes, such learning has not been shown to be involved in the social transmission of either tool-use skills or communicative signals. Recently developed procedures offer possible ways of clarifying the role of imitation in tool use and visual communication. The role of imitation in explorative play in apes is also investigated and the available data suggest that copying during play might represent a behavioural homologue of human imitation. It is proposed that the ability to copy the behaviour of a companion is under a strong genetic influence in many social species. Many important factors have not been examined experimentally, e.g. the effect of the demonstrator, the influence of attention and memory and the ability to generalize. The potential importance of reinforcement raises the possibility that copying abilities serving divergent functions might be partly under the control of different mechanisms.     

动物的模仿和玩耍学习行为

简要介绍了模仿和玩耍两种学习类型的基本概念、特点、类型和适应意义,提供了两张图片和大量实例。