A dynamic over games drives selfish agents to win–win outcomes

Understanding human institutions, animal cultures and other social systems requires flexible formalisms that describe how their members change them from within. We introduce a framework for modelling how agents change the games they participate in. We contrast this between-game ‘institutional evolution’ with the more familiar within-game ‘behavioural evolution’. We model institutional change by following small numbers of persistent agents as they select and play a changing series of games. Starting from an initial game, a group of agents trace trajectories through game space by navigating to increasingly preferable games until they converge on ‘attractor’ games. Agents use their ‘institutional preferences'' for game features (such as stability, fairness and efficiency) to choose between neighbouring games. We use this framework to pose a pressing question: what kinds of games does institutional evolution select for; what is in the attractors? After computing institutional change trajectories over the two-player space, we find that attractors have disproportionately fair outcomes, even though the agents who produce them are strictly self-interested and indifferent to fairness. This seems to occur because game fairness co-occurs with the self-serving features these agents do actually prefer. We thus present institutional evolution as a mechanism for encouraging the spontaneous emergence of cooperation among small groups of inherently selfish agents, without space, reputation, repetition, or other more familiar mechanisms. Game space trajectories provide a flexible, testable formalism for modelling the interdependencies of behavioural and institutional evolutionary processes, as well as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.     

Dynamics to Equilibrium in Network Games: Individual Behavior and Global Response

Various social contexts can be depicted as games of strategic interactions on networks, where an individual’s welfare depends on both her and her partners’ actions. Whereas much attention has been devoted to Bayes-Nash equilibria in such games, here we look at strategic interactions from an evolutionary perspective. To this end, we present the results of a numerical simulations program for these games, which allows us to find out whether Nash equilibria are accessible by adaptation of player strategies, and in general to identify the attractors of the evolution. Simulations allow us to go beyond a global characterization of the cooperativeness at equilibrium and probe into individual behavior. We find that when players imitate each other, evolution does not reach Nash equilibria and, worse, leads to very unfavorable states in terms of welfare. On the contrary, when players update their behavior rationally, they self-organize into a rich variety of Nash equilibria, where individual behavior and payoffs are shaped by the nature of the game, the social network’s structure and the players’ position within the network. Our results allow to assess the validity of mean-field approaches we use to describe the dynamics of these games. Interestingly, our dynamically-found equilibria generally do not coincide with (but show qualitatively the same features of) those resulting from theoretical predictions in the context of one-shot games under incomplete information.     

Mutualism and evolutionary multiplayer games: revisiting the Red King

Coevolution of two species is typically thought to favour the evolution of faster evolutionary rates helping a species keep ahead in the Red Queen race, where ‘it takes all the running you can do to stay where you are’. In contrast, if species are in a mutualistic relationship, it was proposed that the Red King effect may act, where it can be beneficial to evolve slower than the mutualistic species. The Red King hypothesis proposes that the species which evolves slower can gain a larger share of the benefits. However, the interactions between the two species may involve multiple individuals. To analyse such a situation, we resort to evolutionary multiplayer games. Even in situations where evolving slower is beneficial in a two-player setting, faster evolution may be favoured in a multiplayer setting. The underlying features of multiplayer games can be crucial for the distribution of benefits. They also suggest a link between the evolution of the rate of evolution and group size.     

What behaviour in economic games tells us about the evolution of non-human species' economic decision-making behaviour

In the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in using games derived from experimental economics to test decision-making behaviour across species. In most cases, researchers are using the games as a tool, for instance, to understand what factors influence decision-making, how decision-making differs across species or contexts, or to ask broader questions about species’ propensities to cooperate or compete. These games have been quite successful in this regard. To what degree, however, do these games tap into species'' economic decision-making? For the purpose of understanding the evolution of economic systems in humans, this is the key question. To study this, we can break economic decision-making down into smaller components, each of which is a potential step in the evolution of human economic behaviour. We can then use data from economic games, which are simplified, highly structured models of decision-making and therefore ideal for the comparative approach, to directly compare these components across species and contexts, as well as in relation to more naturalistic behaviours, to better understand the evolution of economic behaviour and the social and ecological contexts that influenced it. The comparative approach has successfully informed us about the evolution of other complex traits, such as language and morality, and should help us more deeply understand why and how human economic systems evolved.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates’.     

Parallel evolution and ecological selection: replicated character displacement in spadefoot toads

Ecological character displacement—trait evolution stemming from selection to lessen resource competition between species—is most often inferred from a pattern in which species differ in resource-use traits in sympatry but not in allopatry, and in which sympatric populations within each species differ from conspecific allopatric populations. Yet, without information on population history, the presence of a divergent phenotype in multiple sympatric populations does not necessarily imply that there has been repeated evolution of character displacement. Instead, such a pattern may arise if there has been character displacement in a single ancestral population, followed by gene flow carrying the divergent phenotype into multiple, derived, sympatric populations. Here, we evaluate the likelihood of such historical events versus ongoing ecological selection in generating divergence in trophic morphology between multiple populations of spadefoot toad (Spea multiplicata) tadpoles that are in sympatry with a heterospecific and those that are in allopatry. We present both phylogenetic and population genetic evidence indicating that the same divergent trait, which minimizes resource competition with the heterospecific, has arisen independently in multiple sympatric populations. These data, therefore, provide strong indirect support for competition''s role in divergent trait evolution.     

Stochastic stability in three-player games

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only recently were evolutionarily stable strategies defined for multi-player games and their properties analyzed [Broom, M., Cannings, C., Vickers, G.T., 1997. Multi-player matrix games. Bull. Math. Biol. 59, 931–952]. Here we study the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly matched individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze the stochastic stability of equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable strategies. We also show that, in some games, a population may not evolve in the long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.     

Individual consistency and flexibility in human social information use

Copying others appears to be a cost-effective way of obtaining adaptive information, particularly when flexibly employed. However, adult humans differ considerably in their propensity to use information from others, even when this ‘social information’ is beneficial, raising the possibility that stable individual differences constrain flexibility in social information use. We used two dissimilar decision-making computer games to investigate whether individuals flexibly adjusted their use of social information to current conditions or whether they valued social information similarly in both games. Participants also completed established personality questionnaires. We found that participants demonstrated considerable flexibility, adjusting social information use to current conditions. In particular, individuals employed a ‘copy-when-uncertain’ social learning strategy, supporting a core, but untested, assumption of influential theoretical models of cultural transmission. Moreover, participants adjusted the amount invested in their decision based on the perceived reliability of personally gathered information combined with the available social information. However, despite this strategic flexibility, participants also exhibited consistent individual differences in their propensities to use and value social information. Moreover, individuals who favoured social information self-reported as more collectivist than others. We discuss the implications of our results for social information use and cultural transmission.     

Furcation, field-splitting, and the evolutionary origins of novelty in arthropod photoreceptors

Arthropod photoreceptor evolution is a prime example of how evolution has used existing components in the origin of new structures. Here, we outline a comparative approach to understanding the mutational origins of novel structures, describing multiple examples from arthropod photoreceptor evolution. We suggest that developmental mechanisms have often split photoreceptors during evolution (field-splitting) and we introduce “co-duplication” as a null model for the mutational origins of photoreceptor components. Under co-duplication, gene duplication events coincide with the origin of a higher level structure like an eye. If co-duplication is rejected for a component, that component probably came to be used in a new photoreceptor through regulatory mutations. If not rejected, a gene duplication mutation may have allowed the component to be used in a new structure. In multiple case studies in arthropod photoreceptor evolution, we consistently reject the null hypothesis of co-duplication of genetic components and photoreceptors. Nevertheless, gene duplication events have in some cases occurred later, allowing divergence of photoreceptors. These studies provide a new perspective on the evolution of arthropod photoreceptors and provide a comparative approach that generalizes to the study of any evolutionary novelty.     

Asymmetric Evolutionary Games

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games.     

Reconstruction of Microbial Haplotypes by Integration of Statistical and Physical Linkage in Scaffolding

DNA sequencing technologies provide unprecedented opportunities to analyze within-host evolution of microorganism populations. Often, within-host populations are analyzed via pooled sequencing of the population, which contains multiple individuals or “haplotypes.” However, current next-generation sequencing instruments, in conjunction with single-molecule barcoded linked-reads, cannot distinguish long haplotypes directly. Computational reconstruction of haplotypes from pooled sequencing has been attempted in virology, bacterial genomics, metagenomics, and human genetics, using algorithms based on either cross-host genetic sharing or within-host genomic reads. Here, we describe PoolHapX, a flexible computational approach that integrates information from both genetic sharing and genomic sequencing. We demonstrated that PoolHapX outperforms state-of-the-art tools tailored to specific organismal systems, and is robust to within-host evolution. Importantly, together with barcoded linked-reads, PoolHapX can infer whole-chromosome-scale haplotypes from 50 pools each containing 12 different haplotypes. By analyzing real data, we uncovered dynamic variations in the evolutionary processes of within-patient HIV populations previously unobserved in single position-based analysis.     

Nodes Having a Major Influence to Break Cooperation Define a Novel Centrality Measure: Game Centrality

Cooperation played a significant role in the self-organization and evolution of living organisms. Both network topology and the initial position of cooperators heavily affect the cooperation of social dilemma games. We developed a novel simulation program package, called ‘NetworGame’, which is able to simulate any type of social dilemma games on any model, or real world networks with any assignment of initial cooperation or defection strategies to network nodes. The ability of initially defecting single nodes to break overall cooperation was called as ‘game centrality’. The efficiency of this measure was verified on well-known social networks, and was extended to ‘protein games’, i.e. the simulation of cooperation between proteins, or their amino acids. Hubs and in particular, party hubs of yeast protein-protein interaction networks had a large influence to convert the cooperation of other nodes to defection. Simulations on methionyl-tRNA synthetase protein structure network indicated an increased influence of nodes belonging to intra-protein signaling pathways on breaking cooperation. The efficiency of single, initially defecting nodes to convert the cooperation of other nodes to defection in social dilemma games may be an important measure to predict the importance of nodes in the integration and regulation of complex systems. Game centrality may help to design more efficient interventions to cellular networks (in forms of drugs), to ecosystems and social networks.     

Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups

Indirect reciprocity is considered as a key mechanism for explaining the evolution of cooperation in situations where the same individuals interact only a few times. Under indirect reciprocity, an individual who helps others gets returns indirectly from others who know her good reputation. Recently, many studies have discussed the effect of reputation criteria based only on the former actions of the others (first-order information) and of those based also on the former reputation of opponents of the others (second-order information) on the evolution of indirect reciprocity. In this study, we investigate the evolutionary stability of the indirectly reciprocal strategy (discriminating strategy: DIS), which cooperates only with opponents who have good reputations, in -person games where more than two individuals take part in a single group (interaction). We show that in n-person games, DIS is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) even under the image-scoring reputation criterion, which is based only on first-order information and where cooperations (defections) are judged to be good (bad). This result is in contrast to that of 2-person games where DIS is not an ESS under reputation criteria based only on first-order information.     

Darwinian evolution in games with perfect information

We consider a model of Darwinian evolution in games with perfect information like chess or checkers. The evolution is viewed as a sequence of strategies, each of which wins over its immediate predecessor. We argue that the intelligence level of strategies need not necessarily increase during this type of evolution.     

HIV Evolution in Early Infection: Selection Pressures,Patterns of Insertion and Deletion,and the Impact of APOBEC

The pattern of viral diversification in newly infected individuals provides information about the host environment and immune responses typically experienced by the newly transmitted virus. For example, sites that tend to evolve rapidly across multiple early-infection patients could be involved in enabling escape from common early immune responses, could represent adaptation for rapid growth in a newly infected host, or could represent reversion from less fit forms of the virus that were selected for immune escape in previous hosts. Here we investigated the diversification of HIV-1 env coding sequences in 81 very early B subtype infections previously shown to have resulted from transmission or expansion of single viruses (n = 78) or two closely related viruses (n = 3). In these cases, the sequence of the infecting virus can be estimated accurately, enabling inference of both the direction of substitutions as well as distinction between insertion and deletion events. By integrating information across multiple acutely infected hosts, we find evidence of adaptive evolution of HIV-1 env and identify a subset of codon sites that diversified more rapidly than can be explained by a model of neutral evolution. Of 24 such rapidly diversifying sites, 14 were either i) clustered and embedded in CTL epitopes that were verified experimentally or predicted based on the individual''s HLA or ii) in a nucleotide context indicative of APOBEC-mediated G-to-A substitutions, despite having excluded heavily hypermutated sequences prior to the analysis. In several cases, a rapidly evolving site was embedded both in an APOBEC motif and in a CTL epitope, suggesting that APOBEC may facilitate early immune escape. Ten rapidly diversifying sites could not be explained by CTL escape or APOBEC hypermutation, including the most frequently mutated site, in the fusion peptide of gp41. We also examined the distribution, extent, and sequence context of insertions and deletions, and we provide evidence that the length variation seen in hypervariable loop regions of the envelope glycoprotein is a consequence of selection and not of mutational hotspots. Our results provide a detailed view of the process of diversification of HIV-1 following transmission, highlighting the role of CTL escape and hypermutation in shaping viral evolution during the establishment of new infections.     

Combined Analysis of Variation in Core,Accessory and Regulatory Genome Regions Provides a Super-Resolution View into the Evolution of Bacterial Populations

The use of whole-genome phylogenetic analysis has revolutionized our understanding of the evolution and spread of many important bacterial pathogens due to the high resolution view it provides. However, the majority of such analyses do not consider the potential role of accessory genes when inferring evolutionary trajectories. Moreover, the recently discovered importance of the switching of gene regulatory elements suggests that an exhaustive analysis, combining information from core and accessory genes with regulatory elements could provide unparalleled detail of the evolution of a bacterial population. Here we demonstrate this principle by applying it to a worldwide multi-host sample of the important pathogenic E. coli lineage ST131. Our approach reveals the existence of multiple circulating subtypes of the major drug–resistant clade of ST131 and provides the first ever population level evidence of core genome substitutions in gene regulatory regions associated with the acquisition and maintenance of different accessory genome elements.     

Old World monkeys are more similar to humans than New World monkeys when playing a coordination game

There is much debate about how humans' decision-making compares with that of other primates. One way to explore this is to compare species' performance using identical methodologies in games with strategical interactions. We presented a computerized Assurance Game, which was either functionally simultaneous or sequential, to investigate how humans, rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys used information in decision-making. All species coordinated via sequential play on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating that information about the partner's choice improved decisions. Furthermore, some humans and rhesus monkeys found the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game, even when it was the first condition presented. Thus, Old World primates solved the task without any external cues to their partner's choice. Finally, when not explicitly prohibited, humans spontaneously used language to coordinate on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating an alternative mechanism for converting a simultaneous move game into a sequential move game. This phylogenetic distribution implies that no single mechanism drives coordination decisions across the primates, while humans' ability to spontaneously use language to change the structure of the game emphasizes that multiple mechanisms may be used even within the same species. These results provide insight into the evolution of decision-making strategies across the primates.     

Psychological Traces of China's Socio-Economic Reforms in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games

Can traces of rapid socio-economic changes within a society be reflected in experimental games? The post-Mao reforms in China provide a unique natural quasi-experiment to study people from the same society who were raised with radically different values about distribution of wealth and altruistic behavior. We tested whether the size of offers in the ultimatum and dictator games are an increasing function of the number of years Chinese citizens experienced of the Mao era (“planned economy”). For the cohort that lived throughout the entire Mao era, we found that mean offers in the two games were substantially higher than what is typically offered in laboratory studies. These offers were also higher than those of two younger Chinese cohorts. In general, the amount offered decreased with less time spent under Mao, while in the oldest group in which every member spent the same amount of time under Mao, the younger members tended to offer more, suggesting an additional effect of early education under Mao and contradicting the alternative hypothesis that generosity increases with age. These results suggest that some of the observed individual differences in the offers made in experimental games can be traced back to the values of the socio-economic era in which individuals grew up.     

Recombination Rate and Selection Strength in HIV Intra-patient Evolution

The evolutionary dynamics of HIV during the chronic phase of infection is driven by the host immune response and by selective pressures exerted through drug treatment. To understand and model the evolution of HIV quantitatively, the parameters governing genetic diversification and the strength of selection need to be known. While mutation rates can be measured in single replication cycles, the relevant effective recombination rate depends on the probability of coinfection of a cell with more than one virus and can only be inferred from population data. However, most population genetic estimators for recombination rates assume absence of selection and are hence of limited applicability to HIV, since positive and purifying selection are important in HIV evolution. Yet, little is known about the distribution of selection differentials between individual viruses and the impact of single polymorphisms on viral fitness. Here, we estimate the rate of recombination and the distribution of selection coefficients from time series sequence data tracking the evolution of HIV within single patients. By examining temporal changes in the genetic composition of the population, we estimate the effective recombination to be ρ = 1.4±0.6×10⁻⁵ recombinations per site and generation. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the selection coefficients of at least 15% of the observed non-synonymous polymorphisms exceed 0.8% per generation. These results provide a basis for a more detailed understanding of the evolution of HIV. A particularly interesting case is evolution in response to drug treatment, where recombination can facilitate the rapid acquisition of multiple resistance mutations. With the methods developed here, more precise and more detailed studies will be possible as soon as data with higher time resolution and greater sample sizes are available.     

Incentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick

Cooperation in public good games is greatly promoted by positive and negative incentives. In this paper, we use evolutionary game dynamics to study the evolution of opportunism (the readiness to be swayed by incentives) and the evolution of trust (the propensity to cooperate in the absence of information on the co-players). If both positive and negative incentives are available, evolution leads to a population where defectors are punished and players cooperate, except when they can get away with defection. Rewarding behaviour does not become fixed, but can play an essential role in catalysing the emergence of cooperation, especially if the information level is low.