The Pace of Cultural Evolution

Today, humans inhabit most of the world’s terrestrial habitats. This observation has been explained by the fact that we possess a secondary inheritance mechanism, culture, in addition to a genetic system. Because it is assumed that cultural evolution occurs faster than biological evolution, humans can adapt to new ecosystems more rapidly than other animals. This assumption, however, has never been tested empirically. Here, I compare rates of change in human technologies to rates of change in animal morphologies. I find that rates of cultural evolution are inversely correlated with the time interval over which they are measured, which is similar to what is known for biological rates. This correlation explains why the pace of cultural evolution appears faster when measured over recent time periods, where time intervals are often shorter. Controlling for the correlation between rates and time intervals, I show that (1) cultural evolution is faster than biological evolution; (2) this effect holds true even when the generation time of species is controlled for; and (3) culture allows us to evolve over short time scales, which are normally accessible only to short-lived species, while at the same time allowing for us to enjoy the benefits of having a long life history.     

PERSPECTIVE: IS HUMAN CULTURAL EVOLUTION DARWINIAN? EVIDENCE REVIEWED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES

The claim that human culture evolves through the differential adoption of cultural variants, in a manner analogous to the evolution of biological species, has been greeted with much resistance and confusion. Here we demonstrate that as compelling a case can now be made that cultural evolution has key Darwinian properties, as Darwin himself presented for biological evolution in The Origin of Species. Culture is shown to exhibit variation, competition, inheritance, and the accumulation of successive cultural modifications over time. Adaptation, convergence, and the loss or change of function can also be identified in culture. Just as Darwin knew nothing of genes or particulate inheritance, a case for Darwinian cultural evolution can be made irrespective of whether unitary cultural replicators exist or whether cultural transmission mechanisms are well understood.     

Variable cultural acquisition costs constrain cumulative cultural evolution

One of the hallmarks of the human species is our capacity for cumulative culture, in which beneficial knowledge and technology is accumulated over successive generations. Yet previous analyses of cumulative cultural change have failed to consider the possibility that as cultural complexity accumulates, it becomes increasingly costly for each new generation to acquire from the previous generation. In principle this may result in an upper limit on the cultural complexity that can be accumulated, at which point accumulated knowledge is so costly and time-consuming to acquire that further innovation is not possible. In this paper I first review existing empirical analyses of the history of science and technology that support the possibility that cultural acquisition costs may constrain cumulative cultural evolution. I then present macroscopic and individual-based models of cumulative cultural evolution that explore the consequences of this assumption of variable cultural acquisition costs, showing that making acquisition costs vary with cultural complexity causes the latter to reach an upper limit above which no further innovation can occur. These models further explore the consequences of different cultural transmission rules (directly biased, indirectly biased and unbiased transmission), population size, and cultural innovations that themselves reduce innovation or acquisition costs.     

The theory of everything and molecular evolution

The theory of everything is discussed in relationship to early bacterial molecular evolution. The emphasis is on time, space (or location at the molecular level), the universal construction kit (elements contained in periodic table) and change per units of time that were necessary for early bacterial molecular evolution to occur.     

The theory of everything and molecular evolution

The theory of everything is discussed in relationship to early bacterial molecular evolution. The emphasis is on time, space (or location at the molecular level), the universal construction kit (elements contained in periodic table) and change per units of time that were necessary for early bacterial molecular evolution to occur.     

Review. Studying cumulative cultural evolution in the laboratory

Cumulative cultural evolution is the term given to a particular kind of social learning, which allows for the accumulation of modifications over time, involving a ratchet-like effect where successful modifications are maintained until they can be improved upon. There has been great interest in the topic of cumulative cultural evolution from researchers from a wide variety of disciplines, but until recently there were no experimental studies of this phenomenon. Here, we describe our motivations for developing experimental methods for studying cumulative cultural evolution and review the results we have obtained using these techniques. The results that we describe have provided insights into understanding the outcomes of cultural processes at the population level. Our experiments show that cumulative cultural evolution can result in adaptive complexity in behaviour and can also produce convergence in behaviour. These findings lend support to ideas that some behaviours commonly attributed to natural selection and innate tendencies could in fact be shaped by cultural processes.     

Cultural Evolution: A Review of Theory,Findings and Controversies

The last two decades have seen an explosion in research analysing cultural change as a Darwinian evolutionary process. Here I provide an overview of the theory of cultural evolution, including its intellectual history, major theoretical tenets and methods, key findings, and prominent criticisms and controversies. ‘Culture’ is defined as socially transmitted information. Cultural evolution is the theory that this socially transmitted information evolves in the manner laid out by Darwin in The Origin of Species, i.e. it comprises a system of variation, differential fitness and inheritance. Cultural evolution is not, however, neo-Darwinian, in that many of the details of genetic evolution may not apply, such as particulate inheritance and random mutation. Following a brief history of this idea, I review theoretical and empirical studies of cultural microevolution, which entails both selection-like processes wherein some cultural variants are more likely to be acquired and transmitted than others, plus transformative processes that alter cultural information during transmission. I also review how phylogenetic methods have been used to reconstruct cultural macroevolution, including the evolution of languages, technology and social organisation. Finally, I discuss recent controversies and debates, including the extent to which culture is proximate or ultimate, the relative role of selective and transformative processes in cultural evolution, the basis of cumulative cultural evolution, the evolution of large-scale human cooperation, and whether social learning is learned or innate. I conclude by highlighting the value of using evolutionary methods to study culture for both the social and biological sciences.     

Grist and mills: on the cultural origins of cultural learning

Cumulative cultural evolution is what 'makes us odd'; our capacity to learn facts and techniques from others, and to refine them over generations, plays a major role in making human minds and lives radically different from those of other animals. In this article, I discuss cognitive processes that are known collectively as 'cultural learning' because they enable cumulative cultural evolution. These cognitive processes include reading, social learning, imitation, teaching, social motivation and theory of mind. Taking the first of these three types of cultural learning as examples, I ask whether and to what extent these cognitive processes have been adapted genetically or culturally to enable cumulative cultural evolution. I find that recent empirical work in comparative psychology, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience provides surprisingly little evidence of genetic adaptation, and ample evidence of cultural adaptation. This raises the possibility that it is not only 'grist' but also 'mills' that are culturally inherited; through social interaction in the course of development, we not only acquire facts about the world and how to deal with it (grist), we also build the cognitive processes that make 'fact inheritance' possible (mills).     

Replicate after reading: on the extraction and evocation of cultural information

Does cultural evolution happen by a process of copying or replication? And how exactly does cultural transmission compare with that paradigmatic case of replication, the copying of DNA in living cells? Theorists of cultural evolution are divided on these issues. The most important objection to the replication model has been leveled by Dan Sperber and his colleagues. Cultural transmission, they argue, is almost always reconstructive and transformative, while strict ‘replication’ can be seen as a rare limiting case at most. By means of some thought experiments and intuition pumps, I clear up some confusion about what qualifies as ‘replication’. I propose a distinction between evocation and extraction of cultural information, applying these concepts at different levels of resolution. I defend a purely abstract and information-theoretical definition of replication, while rejecting more material conceptions. In the end, even after taking Sperber’s valuable and important points on board, the notion of cultural replication remains a valid and useful one. This is fortunate, because we need it for certain explanatory projects (e.g., understanding cumulative cultural adaptations).     

Genes, language, cognition, and culture: towards productive inquiry

The Queen Mary conference on “Integrating Genetic and Cultural Evolutionary Approaches to Language,” and the papers in this special issue, clearly illustrate the excitement and potential of trans-disciplinary approaches to language as an evolved biological capacity (phylogeny) and an evolving cultural entity (glossogeny). Excepting the present author, the presenters/authors are mostly young rising stars in their respective fields, and include scientists with backgrounds in linguistics, animal communication, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, anthropology, and computer science. On display was a clear willingness to engage with different approaches and terminology and a commitment to shared standards of scientific rigor, empirically driven theory, and logical argument. Because the papers assembled here, together with the introduction, speak for themselves, I will focus in this “extro-duction” on some of the terminological and conceptual difficulties which threaten to block this exciting wave of scientific progress in understanding language evolution, in both senses of that term. In particular I will first argue against the regrettably widespread practice of opposing cultural and genetic explanations of human cognition as if they were dichotomous. Second, I will unpack the debate concerning “general-purpose” and “domain-specific” mechanisms, which masquerades as a debate about nativism but is nothing of the sort. I believe that framing discussions of language in these terms has generated more heat than light, and that a modern molecular understanding of genes, development, behavior, and evolution renders many of the assumptions underlying this debate invalid.     

Neurotransmitter release at central synapses

Our understanding of synaptic transmission has grown dramatically during the 15 years since the first issue of Neuron was published, a growth rate expected from the rapid progress in modern biology. As in all of biology, new techniques have led to major advances in the cell and molecular biology of synapses, and the subject has evolved in ways (like the production of genetically engineered mice) that could not even be imagined 15 years ago. My plan for this review is to summarize what we knew about neurotransmitter release when Neuron first appeared and what we recognized we did not know, and then to describe how our views have changed in the intervening decade and a half. Some things we knew about synapses--"knew" in the sense that the field had reached a consensus--are no longer accepted, but for the most part, impressive advances have led to a new consensus on many issues. What I find fascinating is that in certain ways nothing has changed--many of the old arguments persist or recur in a different guise--but in other ways the field would be unrecognizable to a neurobiologist time-transported from 1988 to 2003.     

CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF A CONSPECIFIC RECOGNITION SIGNAL FOLLOWING SERIAL TRANSLOCATIONS

The divergence of conspecific recognition signals (CRS) among isolated populations facilitates the evolution of behavioral barriers to gene flow. The influence of CRS evolution on signal effectiveness in isolated populations can be assessed by testing the salience of changes in CRS from surviving ancestral populations but founder events are rarely detected. The population history of the North Island (NI) saddleback Philesturnus rufusater is absolutely known following conservation translocations which increased the number of populations from 1 to 15. With one exception there is no gene flow between these populations. The translocations have generated interisland divergence of male rhythmical song (MRS), a culturally transmitted CRS. We conducted an experimental test of behavioral discrimination in NI saddlebacks exposed to familiar and unfamiliar MRS and found that responses were significantly stronger for familiar MRS, consistent with a model of contemporary cultural evolution leading to discrimination between geographic song variants. Significantly, this result demonstrates the rapid tempo with which discrimination of CRS might evolve within isolated populations and supports both bottleneck and cultural mutation hypotheses in CRS evolution. The evolutionary implications of contemporary cultural evolution in the production and perception of CRS merit debate on the time frames over which conservation management is evaluated.     

Growth strategies of passerine birds are related to brood parasitism by the brown-headed cowbird (Molothrus ater)

Sibling competition was proposed as an important selective agent in the evolution of growth and development. Brood parasitism by the brown-headed cowbird (Molothrus ater) intensifies sibling competition in the nests of its hosts by increasing host chick mortality and exposing them to a genetically unrelated nestmate. Intranest sibling competition for resources supplied by parents is size dependent. Thus, it should select for high development rates and short nestling periods, which would alleviate negative impacts of brood parasitic chicks on host young. I tested these predictions on 134 North American passerines by comparative analyses. After controlling for covariates and phylogeny, I showed that high parasitism rate was associated with higher nestling growth rate, lower mass at fledging, and shorter nestling periods. These effects were most pronounced in species in which sibling competition is most intense (i.e., weighing over about 30 g). When species were categorized as nonhosts versus old hosts (parasitized for thousands of years) versus new hosts (parasitized the last 100-200 years), there was a clear effect of this parasitism category on growth strategies. Nestling growth rate was the most evolutionarily flexible trait, followed by mass at fledging and nestling period duration. Adjustments during incubation (incubation period length, egg volume) were less pronounced and generally disappeared after controlling for phylogeny. I show that sibling competition caused by brood parasites can have strong effects on the evolution of host growth strategies and that the evolution of developmental traits can take place very rapidly. Human alteration of habitats causing spread of brood parasites to new areas thus cascades into affecting the evolution of life-history traits in host species.     

Gene mobility and the concept of relatedness

Cooperation is rife in the microbial world, yet our best current theories of the evolution of cooperation were developed with multicellular animals in mind. Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness is an important case in point: applying the theory in a microbial setting is far from straightforward, as social evolution in microbes has a number of distinctive features that the theory was never intended to capture. In this article, I focus on the conceptual challenges posed by the project of extending Hamilton’s theory to accommodate the effects of gene mobility. I begin by outlining the basics of the theory of inclusive fitness, emphasizing the role that the concept of relatedness is intended to play. I then provide a brief history of this concept, showing how, over the past fifty years, it has departed from the intuitive notion of genealogical kinship to encompass a range of generalized measures of genetic similarity. I proceed to argue that gene mobility forces a further revision of the concept. The reason in short is that, when the genes implicated in producing social behaviour are mobile, we cannot talk of an organism’s genotype simpliciter; we can talk only of an organism’s genotype at a particular stage in its life cycle. We must therefore ask: with respect to which stage(s) in the life cycle should relatedness be evaluated? For instance: is it genetic similarity at the time of social interaction that matters to the evolution of social behaviour, or is it genetic similarity at the time of reproduction? I argue that, strictly speaking, it is neither of these: what really matters to the evolution of social behaviour is diachronic genetic similarity between the producers of fitness benefits at the time they produce them and the recipients of those benefits at the end of their life-cycle. I close by discussing the implications of this result. The main payoff is that it makes room for a possible new mechanism for the evolution of altruism in microbes that does not require correlated interaction among bearers of the genes for altruism. The importance of this mechanism in nature remains an open empirical question.     

Self domestication and the evolution of language

We set out an account of how self-domestication plays a crucial role in the evolution of language. In doing so, we focus on the growing body of work that treats language structure as emerging from the process of cultural transmission. We argue that a full recognition of the importance of cultural transmission fundamentally changes the kind of questions we should be asking regarding the biological basis of language structure. If we think of language structure as reflecting an accumulated set of changes in our genome, then we might ask something like, “What are the genetic bases of language structure and why were they selected?” However, if cultural evolution can account for language structure, then this question no longer applies. Instead, we face the task of accounting for the origin of the traits that enabled that process of structure-creating cultural evolution to get started in the first place. In light of work on cultural evolution, then, the new question for biological evolution becomes, “How did those precursor traits evolve?” We identify two key precursor traits: (1) the transmission of the communication system through learning; and (2) the ability to infer the communicative intent associated with a signal or action. We then describe two comparative case studies—the Bengalese finch and the domestic dog—in which parallel traits can be seen emerging following domestication. Finally, we turn to the role of domestication in human evolution. We argue that the cultural evolution of language structure has its origin in an earlier process of self-domestication.     

By genes alone: a model selectionist argument for genetical explanations of cooperation in non-human organisms

I distinguish two versions of kin selection theory—a purely genetic version (GKST) and a version that also appeals to cultural (i.e. non-genetically-derived) forms of cooperation (WKST)—and present an argument in favor of using the former when it comes to accounting for the evolution of cooperation in non-human organisms. Specifically, I first show that both GKST and WKST are equally mathematically coherent—they can both be derived from the Price equation—but not necessarily equally empirically plausible, as they are based on different assumptions about the inheritance system underlying the cooperative phenotype. Given this, I then, second, present a model selection theoretic argument in favor of GKST over WKST. This argument is based on the fact that, in non-human cases, the former theory is likely to be as empirically successful as WKST, while containing fewer degrees of freedom. I end by defending both the intrinsic importance of this argument and its relevance to the discussion surrounding the “gene’s eye view of evolution.”     

Mode and tempo in the evolution of socio-political organization: reconciling 'Darwinian' and 'Spencerian' evolutionary approaches in anthropology

Traditional investigations of the evolution of human social and political institutions trace their ancestry back to nineteenth century social scientists such as Herbert Spencer, and have concentrated on the increase in socio-political complexity over time. More recent studies of cultural evolution have been explicitly informed by Darwinian evolutionary theory and focus on the transmission of cultural traits between individuals. These two approaches to investigating cultural change are often seen as incompatible. However, we argue that many of the defining features and assumptions of 'Spencerian' cultural evolutionary theory represent testable hypotheses that can and should be tackled within a broader 'Darwinian' framework. In this paper we apply phylogenetic comparative techniques to data from Austronesian-speaking societies of Island South-East Asia and the Pacific to test hypotheses about the mode and tempo of human socio-political evolution. We find support for three ideas often associated with Spencerian cultural evolutionary theory: (i) political organization has evolved through a regular sequence of forms, (ii) increases in hierarchical political complexity have been more common than decreases, and (iii) political organization has co-evolved with the wider presence of hereditary social stratification.     

The evolution of the “Con Artist”

A series of game-theoretical models for the evolution of, what in the folk literature has become known as, the “Confidence Artist” is presented. Con artists are assumed to be noncooperators who move between groups and “prey” on naive cooperators. Cooperators learn about con artists by either direct experience or via cultural transmission about the identity (or behavior) of such individuals. Three types of transmission rules about con artists are modeled: 1) transmission rate that is independent of the frequency of con artists in the metapopulation; 2) transmission such that cooperators, with some probability, can learn about particular con artists who have entered their group; and 3) a type of frequency dependent transmission such that cooperators can identify con artists in proportion to their frequency in the metapopulation.In general, cultural transmission works against con artists by 1) decreasing the critical between travel patch travel time to invade a metapopulation of cooperators or 2) decreasing the equilibrial frequency of con artists (compared to the case of no cultural transmission). Depending on the mode of cultural transmission, con artists may exist at relatively high or low frequencies.     

Social Learning and the Maintenance of Cultural Variation: An Evolutionary Model and Data from East Africa

Human societies maintain between-group variation despite mixing of people and ideas. In order for variation to remain, migrants or their children must preferentially adopt local norms, customs, and beliefs. Yet the details of how cultural variation is maintained, despite mixing, remain unknown. This article addresses this problem by using a simple model of the evolution of cultural learning to interpret the results of a study of cultural variation in a small region of East Africa. I argue that the manner in which migrants of two diverse regions adapt to local beliefs and behavior depends on the costs and accuracy of learning in each domain. Observational studies are never definitive tests of any hypothesis, but these results suggest that conclusions about the significance of cultural learning for understanding individual attitudes and behavior depend strongly upon the domain of investigation.     

Modelling the evolution and diversity of cumulative culture

Previous work on mathematical models of cultural evolution has mainly focused on the diffusion of simple cultural elements. However, a characteristic feature of human cultural evolution is the seemingly limitless appearance of new and increasingly complex cultural elements. Here, we develop a general modelling framework to study such cumulative processes, in which we assume that the appearance and disappearance of cultural elements are stochastic events that depend on the current state of culture. Five scenarios are explored: evolution of independent cultural elements, stepwise modification of elements, differentiation or combination of elements and systems of cultural elements. As one application of our framework, we study the evolution of cultural diversity (in time as well as between groups).