The biological roots of morality

The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to thecapacity for ethics (e.i., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moralnorms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. My theses are: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution.Humans exhibits ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup determines the presence of the three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgements; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequece of man's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection.Since Darwin's time there have been evolutionists proposing that the norms of morality are derived from biological evolution. Sociobiologists represent the most recent and most subtle version of that proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution. I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the naturalistic fallacy. The isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and those sanctioned by moral norms exist only with respect to the consequences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely disparate.This article is based on a paper presented at the International Symposium onBiological Models of Human Action, Palma de Mallorca, Spain, 16–18 December 1985.     

Darwin's beautiful notion: sexual selection and the plurality of moral codes

One of the explicit objectives of Darwin's Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex was to explain cultural differences seen in human beings. Such an explanation, Darwin believed, was to rest upon an understanding of sexual selection. I examine the role that the beautiful plays within the mechanism of sexual selection as it works to differentiate isolated groups. It is suggested that an examination of the relationship between sexual selection and artificial selection--a relationship mediated by the beautiful--will illuminate key issues of the Descent as well as contemporary debates regarding the relationship between evolution and ethics. The beautiful, originally rooted in sexual selection, can become de-coupled from sexual selection and utilized in some selective process which is conscious.     

The Fundamental Constraint on the evolution of culture

This paper argues that there is a general constraint on the evolution of culture. This constraint – what I am calling the Fundamental Constraint – must be satisfied in order for a cultural system to be adaptive. The Fundamental Constraint is this: for culture to be adaptive there must be a positive correlation between the fitness of cultural variants and their fitness impact on the organisms adopting those variants. Two ways of satisfying the Fundamental Constraint are introduced, structural solutions and evaluative solutions. Because of the limitations on these solutions, this constraint helps explain why there is not more culture in nature, why the culture that does exist has the form it has, and why complex, cumulative culture is restricted to the human species.     

Culture evolves

Culture pervades human lives and has allowed our species to create niches all around the world and its oceans, in ways quite unlike any other primate. Indeed, our cultural nature appears so distinctive that it is often thought to separate humanity from the rest of nature and the Darwinian forces that shape it. A contrary view arises through the recent discoveries of a diverse range of disciplines, here brought together to illustrate the scope of a burgeoning field of cultural evolution and to facilitate cross-disciplinary fertilization. Each approach emphasizes important linkages between culture and evolutionary biology rather than quarantining one from the other. Recent studies reveal that processes important in cultural transmission are more widespread and significant across the animal kingdom than earlier recognized, with important implications for evolutionary theory. Recent archaeological discoveries have pushed back the origins of human culture to much more ancient times than traditionally thought. These developments suggest previously unidentified continuities between animal and human culture. A third new array of discoveries concerns the later diversification of human cultures, where the operations of Darwinian-like processes are identified, in part, through scientific methods borrowed from biology. Finally, surprising discoveries have been made about the imprint of cultural evolution in the predispositions of human minds for cultural transmission.     

Runaway cultural niche construction

Cultural niche construction is a uniquely potent source of selection on human populations, and a major cause of recent human evolution. Previous theoretical analyses have not, however, explored the local effects of cultural niche construction. Here, we use spatially explicit coevolutionary models to investigate how cultural processes could drive selection on human genes by modifying local resources. We show that cultural learning, expressed in local niche construction, can trigger a process with dynamics that resemble runaway sexual selection. Under a broad range of conditions, cultural niche-constructing practices generate selection for gene-based traits and hitchhike to fixation through the build up of statistical associations between practice and trait. This process can occur even when the cultural practice is costly, or is subject to counteracting transmission biases, or the genetic trait is selected against. Under some conditions a secondary hitchhiking occurs, through which genetic variants that enhance the capability for cultural learning are also favoured by similar dynamics. We suggest that runaway cultural niche construction could have played an important role in human evolution, helping to explain why humans are simultaneously the species with the largest relative brain size, the most potent capacity for niche construction and the greatest reliance on culture.     

Cultural transmission and the evolution of cooperative behavior

Sociobiological theory predicts that humans should not cooperate with large groups of unrelated individuals. This prediction is based on genetic models that show that selection acting on variation between large unrelated groups will generally be much weaker than selection acting on variation between individuals. Recently, several authors have presented related models of human evolution that integrate cultural and genetic transmission of behavior. We show that in such models group selection is potentially a strong force. Data on ethnocentrism is examined in the context of these results.     

Cultural niche construction and human evolution

Organisms frequently choose, regulate, construct and destroy important components of their environments, in the process changing the selection pressures to which they and other organisms are exposed. We refer to these processes as niche construction. In humans, culture has greatly amplified our capacity for niche construction and our ability to modify selection pressures. We use gene‐culture coevolutionary models to explore the evolutionary consequences of culturally generated niche construction through human evolution. Our analysis suggests that where cultural traits are transmitted in an unbiased fashion from parent to offspring, cultural niche construction will have a similar effect to gene‐based niche construction. However, cultural transmission biases favouring particular cultural traits may either increase or reduce the range of parameter space over which niche construction has an impact, which means that niche construction with biased transmission will either have a much smaller or a much bigger effect than gene‐based niche construction. The analysis also reveals circumstances under which cultural transmission can overwhelm natural selection, accelerate the rate at which a favoured gene spreads, initiate novel evolutionary events and trigger hominid speciation. Because cultural processes typically operate faster than natural selection, cultural niche construction probably has more profound consequences than gene‐based niche construction, and is likely to have played an important role in human evolution.     

A multilevel analytical framework for studying cultural evolution in prehistoric hunter–gatherer societies

Over the past decade, a major debate has taken place on the underpinnings of cultural changes in human societies. A growing array of evidence in behavioural and evolutionary biology has revealed that social connectivity among populations and within them affects, and is affected by, culture. Yet the interplay between prehistoric hunter–gatherer social structure and cultural transmission has typically been overlooked. Interestingly, the archaeological record contains large data sets, allowing us to track cultural changes over thousands of years: they thus offer a unique opportunity to shed light on long‐term cultural transmission processes. In this review, we demonstrate how well‐developed methods for social structure analysis can increase our understanding of the selective pressures underlying cumulative culture. We propose a multilevel analytical framework that considers finer aspects of the complex social structure in which regional groups of prehistoric hunter–gatherers were embedded. We put forward predictions of cultural transmission based on local‐ and global‐level network metrics of small‐scale societies and their potential effects on cumulative culture. By bridging the gaps between network science, palaeodemography and cultural evolution, we draw attention to the use of the archaeological record to depict patterns of social interactions and transmission variability. We argue that this new framework will contribute to improving our understanding of social interaction patterns, as well as the contexts in which cultural changes occur. Ultimately, this may provide insights into the evolution of human behaviour.     

Cultural theory and management of common property resources

Cultural theory utilizes concepts drawn from social anthropology, sociology, and organization theory to explain the social and cultural biases of policy actors and interest groups. Certain ideas of nature are associated with each cultural bias; these ideas of nature are in turn associated with types of resource management institutions. By identifying an actor or group's culture bias, analysts can explain the success or failure of different management activities. This paper explains the evolution of cultural theory from its anthropological roots to its applications in ecological management. It then applies cultural theory to a typology of common property resources and illustrates its usefulness by examining grazing subsidies in the American southwest.     

How Darwinian is cultural evolution?

Darwin-inspired population thinking suggests approaching culture as a population of items of different types, whose relative frequencies may change over time. Three nested subtypes of populational models can be distinguished: evolutionary, selectional and replicative. Substantial progress has been made in the study of cultural evolution by modelling it within the selectional frame. This progress has involved idealizing away from phenomena that may be critical to an adequate understanding of culture and cultural evolution, particularly the constructive aspect of the mechanisms of cultural transmission. Taking these aspects into account, we describe cultural evolution in terms of cultural attraction, which is populational and evolutionary, but only selectional under certain circumstances. As such, in order to model cultural evolution, we must not simply adjust existing replicative or selectional models but we should rather generalize them, so that, just as replicator-based selection is one form that Darwinian selection can take, selection itself is one of several different forms that attraction can take. We present an elementary formalization of the idea of cultural attraction.     

Great Apes Do Not Learn Novel Tool Use Easily: Conservatism,Functional Fixedness,or Cultural Influence?

Animal culture has been of interest for decades but the concept remains controversial. Many researchers feel that animal behavior should not be granted the label “culture” because the latter includes more than “simple” behavioral variation. In recent years, the study of animal culture has been concerned mainly with social learning mechanisms, often claimed to be human specific, which led to the uniqueness of human culture. In addition, failure to innovate novel cultural behavior as often as humans is usually explained by psychological mechanisms presented as more parsimonious, such as conservatism or functional fixedness. However, it is unclear how cognitively complex these mechanisms are in the first place. Here, I analyze recent data obtained with wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) and wild-born orangutans (Pongo abelii) using the honey-trap experiment, in which individuals must devise a solution to reach inaccessible honey. I compare behavior of apes that developed a tool-based solution in the task with those that did not, and test whether conservatism and functional fixedness can explain individual variation in ape behavior. I find evidence of conservatism, with apes relying on their existing knowledge, and evidence of functional fixedness, with this knowledge potentially preventing them from innovating. However, the apes showed large intraspecific variability. I discuss the two mechanisms through a representational perspective to tackle their cognitive complexity. Understanding how conservatism and functional fixedness interact with ape cultural knowledge to limit innovation of novel tool use appears necessary to understand the full extent of ape cultures and how they compare to human cultures.     

Studying phenotypic plasticity: the advantages of a broad approach

Human evolution has clearly been shaped by gene–culture interactions, and there is growing evidence that similar processes also act on populations of non‐human animals. Recent theoretical studies have shown that culture can be an important evolutionary mechanism because of the ability of cultural traits to spread rapidly both vertically, obliquely, and horizontally, resulting in decreased within‐group variance and increased between‐group variance. Here, we collate the extensive literature on population divergence in killer whales (Orcinus orca), and argue that they are undergoing ecological speciation as a result of dietary specializations. Although we cannot exclude the possibility that cultural divergence pre‐dates ecological divergence, we propose that cultural differences in the form of learned behaviours between ecologically divergent killer whale populations have resulted in sufficient reproductive isolation even in sympatry to lead to incipient speciation. © 2012 The Linnean Society of London, Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 2012, 106 , 1–17.     

Hunting behavior and strategies of the Valley Bisa in Zambia

This article describes the hunting tactics and prey selection of the Valley Bisa, a matrilineal, subsistence-oriented society in the Luangwa Valley of Zambia. Although Valley Bisa hunters explain their behavior in their own idioms, many of their tactics, including the stimuli for and timing of hunts, the circular morphology of their hunting patterns, and randomized searches, appear functionally related to the behavior and ecology of their prey. The effects of outlawing traditional harvest techniques and the imposition and enforcement of external constraints on Valley Bisa hunting patterns are discussed. Data on habitats, density of cover, wind direction, species, and initial distance to prey from 50 hunts, in which 16 mammals were killed, are compared and related to success and failure of stalking attempts. Graphs, comparing the numbers of observations for each of four variables with the frequency of stalking attempts, illustrate the cultural style of predation for this group of hunters.This article was initially presented as part of my contribution to a graduate seminar, Public Management of the African Environment, African Studies Program, Indiana University, October 9, 1975. I wish to thank Professor J. Gus Liebenow for extending the invitation to participate in this program.     

Reasons to be fussy about cultural evolution

This discussion paper responds to two recent articles in Biology and Philosophy that raise similar objections to cultural attraction theory, a research trend in cultural evolution putting special emphasis on the fact that human minds create and transform their culture. Both papers are sympathetic to this idea, yet both also regret a lack of consilience with Boyd, Richerson and Henrich’s models of cultural evolution. I explain why cultural attraction theorists propose a different view on three points of concern for our critics. I start by detailing the claim that cultural transmission relies not chiefly on imitation or teaching, but on cognitive mechanisms like argumentation, ostensive communication, or selective trust, whose evolved or habitual function may not be the faithful reproduction of ideas or behaviours. Second, I explain why the distinction between context biases and content biases might not always be the best way to capture the interactions between culture and cognition. Lastly, I show that cultural attraction models cannot be reduced to a model of guided variation, which posits a clear separation between individual and social learning processes. With cultural attraction, the same cognitive mechanisms underlie both innovation and the preservation of traditions.     

The swashbuckling anthropologist: Henrich on The Secret of Our Success

In The Secret of Our Success, Joseph Henrich claims that human beings are unique—different from all other animals—because we engage in cumulative cultural evolution. It is the technological and social products of cumulative cultural evolution, not the intrinsic rationality or ‘smartness’ of individual humans, that enable us to live in a huge range of different habitats, and to dominate most of the creatures who share those habitats with us. We are sympathetic to this general view, the latest expression of the ‘California school’s’ view of cultural evolution, and impressed by the lively and interesting way that Henrich handles evidence from anthropology, economics, and many fields of biology. However, because we think it is time for cultural evolutionists to get down to details, this essay review raises questions about Henrich’s analysis of both the cognitive processes and the selection processes that contribute to cumulative cultural evolution. In the former case, we argue that cultural evolutionists need to make more extensive use of cognitive science, and to consider the evidence that mechanisms of cultural learning are products as well as processes of cultural evolution. In the latter case, we ask whether the California school is really serious about selection, or whether it is offering a merely ‘kinetic’ view of cultural evolution, and, assuming the former, outline four potential models of cultural selection that it would be helpful to distinguish more clearly.     

Cultural transmission and the evolution of human behaviour: a general approach based on the Price equation

Transmitted culture can be viewed as an inheritance system somewhat independent of genes that is subject to processes of descent with modification in its own right. Although many authors have conceptualized cultural change as a Darwinian process, there is no generally agreed formal framework for defining key concepts such as natural selection, fitness, relatedness and altruism for the cultural case. Here, we present and explore such a framework using the Price equation. Assuming an isolated, independently measurable culturally transmitted trait, we show that cultural natural selection maximizes cultural fitness, a distinct quantity from genetic fitness, and also that cultural relatedness and cultural altruism are not reducible to or necessarily related to their genetic counterparts. We show that antagonistic coevolution will occur between genes and culture whenever cultural fitness is not perfectly aligned with genetic fitness, as genetic selection will shape psychological mechanisms to avoid susceptibility to cultural traits that bear a genetic fitness cost. We discuss the difficulties with conceptualizing cultural change using the framework of evolutionary theory, the degree to which cultural evolution is autonomous from genetic evolution, and the extent to which cultural change should be seen as a Darwinian process. We argue that the nonselection components of evolutionary change are much more important for culture than for genes, and that this and other important differences from the genetic case mean that different approaches and emphases are needed for cultural than genetic processes.     

Interactions of genetic and cultural evolution: Models and examples

This paper proposes models and examples of five principal modes of interaction between genes and culture in human evolution. Because genes and culture ultimately interact in the minds of individuals, the models are focused on individual level processes of constrained microevolution. The central hypotheses are (1) that cultural evolution as well as genetic evolution commonly proceeds by the differential transmission of alternative instructions among individuals, (2) that genetic and cultural processes directly interact through mutual influence on each other's differentials of transmission in a population, (3) that the cultural process is often self-selecting by its own criteria, and (4) that these criteria generally operate to enhance rather than oppose human adaptation. Evolutionary change at higher levels, which is particularly important in sociocultural evolution, is interpreted as restructuring the nature and extent of the variability available at the individual level. To clarify the conceptual differences of the models and hopefully to stimulate related analyses in other areas, I discuss selected examples of each of these interactions. I conclude with some remarks on the relative importance of the models to human ecology and evolution.     

Does Biology Constrain Culture?

Most social scientists would agree that the capacity for human culture was probably fashioned by natural selection, but they disagree about the implications of this supposition. Some believe that natural selection imposes important constraints on the ways in which culture can vary, while others believe that any such constraints must be negligible. This article employs a "thought experiment" to demonstrate that neither of these positions can be justified by appeal to general properties of culture or of evolution. Natural selection can produce mechanisms of cultural transmission that are neither adaptive nor consistent with the predictions of acultural evolutionary models (those ignoring cultural evolution). On the other hand, natural selection can also produce mechanisms of cultural transmission that are highly consistent with acultural models. Thus, neither side of the sociobiology debate is justified in dismissing the arguments of the other. Natural selection may impose significant constraints on some human behaviors, but negligible constraints on others. Models of simultaneous genetic/cultural evolution will be useful in identifying domains in which acultural evolutionary models are, and are not, likely to be useful.     

Review. The multiple roles of cultural transmission experiments in understanding human cultural evolution

In this paper, we explore how experimental studies of cultural transmission in adult humans can address general questions regarding the 'who, what, when and how' of human cultural transmission, and consequently inform a theory of human cultural evolution. Three methods are discussed. The transmission chain method, in which information is passed along linear chains of participants, has been used to identify content biases in cultural transmission. These concern the kind of information that is transmitted. Several such candidate content biases have now emerged from the experimental literature. The replacement method, in which participants in groups are gradually replaced or moved across groups, has been used to study phenomena such as cumulative cultural evolution, cultural group selection and cultural innovation. The closed-group method, in which participants learn in groups with no replacement, has been used to explore issues such as who people choose to learn from and when they learn culturally as opposed to individually. A number of the studies reviewed here have received relatively little attention within their own disciplines, but we suggest that these, and future experimental studies of cultural transmission that build on them, can play an important role in a broader science of cultural evolution.     

Perceive, Co-opt, Modify, and Live! Organism as a Centre of Experience

Organic appearances are largely neglected by contemporary biology; partly because they are regarded as superficial effects of causes concealed beneath the surface. The persuasion that everything what does exist is existent for some immediately non-apparent reasons belongs to a general belief of modern science. All organisms are of the same evolutionary origin and of the same world wherein appearance coincides with existence. In this study, living beings are approached as appearing centers of experience that reflects their evolutionary history. From biohermeneutic point of view the evolution of organisms, interactions between organisms, and their relationships to environment is understood as “evolution of interpretations”. I use simple conceptual framework of perception, semiotic co-option, and modification to explain the evolution of semantic organs, i.e. organs that operate through the meaning that was given to them by an animal interpreter.