Professional Hubris and its Consequences: Why Organizations of Health‐Care Professions Should Not Adopt Ethically Controversial Positions

In this article, I argue that professional healthcare organizations such as the AMA and ANA ought not to take controversial stances on professional ethics. I address the best putative arguments in favor of taking such stances, and argue that none are convincing. I then argue that the sort of stance‐taking at issue has pernicious consequences: it stands to curb critical thought in social, political, and legal debates, increase moral distress among clinicians, and alienate clinicians from their professional societies. Thus, because there are no good arguments in favor of stance‐taking and at least some risks in doing so, professional organizations should refrain from adopting the sort of ethically controversial positions at issue.     

HIV testing of pregnant women: an ethical analysis

Recent global advances in available technology to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission necessitate a rethinking of contemporary and previous ethical debates on HIV testing as a means to preventing vertical transmission. In this paper, we will provide an ethical analysis of HIV-testing strategies of pregnant women. First, we argue that provider-initiated opt-out HIV testing seems to be the most effective HIV test strategy. The flip-side of an opt-out strategy is that it may end up as involuntary testing in a clinical setting. We analyse this ethical puzzle from a novel perspective, taking into account the moral importance of certain hypothetical preferences of the child, as well as the moral importance of certain actual preferences of the mother. Finally, we balance the conflicting concerns and try to arrive at an ethically sound solution to this dilemma. Our aim is to introduce a novel perspective from which to analyse testing strategies, and to explore the implications and possible benefits of our proposal. The conclusion from our analysis is that policies that recommend provider-initiated opt-out HIV testing of pregnant mothers, with a risk of becoming involuntary testing in a clinical setting, are acceptable. The rationale behind this is that the increased availability of very effective and inexpensive life-saving drugs makes the ethical problems raised by the possible intrusiveness of HIV testing less important than the child's hypothetical preferences to be born healthy. Health care providers, therefore, have a duty to offer both opt-out HIV testing and available PMTCT (preventing mother-to-child transmission) interventions.     

Inclusion of Residual Tissue in Biobanks: Opt-In or Opt-Out?

Residual samples are an important source of tissue for biobanks. They refer to leftover tissue that is obtained in the course of clinical care. Residual samples can be included through an opt-in method-that is, a person explicitly expresses consent to include residual tissue-or an opt-out method-that is, the tissue is stored unless a person explicitly refuses. At the moment there is a renewed interest in the appropriate method for the inclusion of residual samples in biobanks. The expansion of biobanks and rapid developments in biomedical research underscore the need to evaluate the proper procedure. In this article we revisit the arguments in favor and against opt-in and opt-out methods for residual tissue research. We conclude firstly that an opt-out method is only justifiable when certain conditions are met: (1) awareness has to be raised, (2) sufficient information has to be provided, and (3) a genuine possibility to object has to be offered. An opt-out procedure that fulfills these conditions can be called a "thick" opt-out method. As a consequence, the dichotomy between opt-in and opt-out is less stark than usually suggested, as both methods require a certain amount of effort. Secondly, we conclude that because of the diversity of tissue and research, not every situation can be treated alike. There are at least four situations that require opt-in procedures: (1) research with higher risks or increased burdens, (2) the use of controversial or high-impact techniques, (3) research on sensitive tissue types, and (4) research involving vulnerable patients. We suggest that further interdisciplinary debate should answer the question when to opt-in or when to opt-out.     

SHOULD RAPID TESTS FOR HIV INFECTION NOW BE MANDATORY DURING PREGNANCY? GLOBAL DIFFERENCES IN SCARCITY AND A DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE

Since testing for HIV infection became possible in 1985, testing of pregnant women has been conducted primarily on a voluntary, 'opt-in' basis. Faden, Geller and Powers, Bayer, Wilfert, and McKenna, among others, have suggested that with the development of more reliable testing and more effective therapy to reduce maternal-fetal transmission, testing should become either routine with 'opt-out' provisions or mandatory. We ask, in the light of the new rapid tests for HIV, such as OraQuick, and the development of antiretroviral treatment that can reduce maternal-fetal transmission rates to <2%, whether that time is now. Illustrating our argument with cases from the United States (US), Kenya, Peru, and an undocumented Mexican worker in the US, we show that when testing is accompanied by assured multi-drug therapy for the mother, the argument for opt-out or mandatory testing for HIV in pregnancy is strong, but that it is problematic where testing is accompanied by adverse events such as spousal abuse or by inadequate intrapartum or follow-up treatment. The difference is not a 'double standard', but reflects the presence of conflicts between the health interests of the mother and the fetus--conflicts that would be abrogated by the assurance of adequate, continuing multi-drug therapy. In light of these conflicts, where they still occur, careful processes of informed consent are appropriate, rather than opt-out or mandatory testing.     

ONTOLOGY OR PHENOMENOLOGY? HOW THE LVAD CHALLENGES THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE

This article deals with the euthanasia debate in light of new life‐sustaining technologies such as the left ventricular assist device (LVAD). The question arises: does the switching off of a LVAD by a doctor upon the request of a patient amount to active or passive euthanasia, i.e. to ‘killing’ or to ‘letting die’? The answer hinges on whether the device is to be regarded as a proper part of the patient's body or as something external. We usually regard the switching off of an internal device as killing, whereas the deactivation of an external device is seen as ‘letting die’. The case is notoriously difficult to decide for hybrid devices such as LVADs, which are partly inside and partly outside the patient's body. Additionally, on a methodological level, I will argue that the ‘ontological’ arguments from analogy given for both sides are problematic. Given the impasse facing the ontological arguments, complementary phenomenological arguments deserve closer inspection. In particular, we should consider whether phenomenologically the LVAD is perceived as a body part or as an external device. I will support the thesis that the deactivation of a LVAD is to be regarded as passive euthanasia if the device is not perceived by the patient as a part of the body proper.     

Reading and Time: Two Approaches to the Materiality of Scripture

In this article I examine Christian approaches to conceptions of time as expressed in approaches to reading the Bible. The first main focus in this effort is upon the work of Saint Augustine, whose arguments about the connections between reading and time have been, as I try to show, very influential. The second main focus is more ethnographic in nature, and comes from my work in Zimbabwe on a small group of apostolic Christians whose views differ significantly from Augustine. These two cases are framed by some more general remarks on Christian temporalities, as well as a call for the newly-emerging interest in the anthropology of Christianity to take note of more general work on literacy and the ethnography of reading.     

Does benefit justify research with children?

The inclusion of children in research gives rise to a difficult ethical question: What justifies children's research participation and exposure to research risks when they cannot provide informed consent? This question arises out of the tension between the moral requirement to obtain a subject's informed consent for research participation, on the one hand, and the limited capacity of most children to provide informed consent, on the other. Most agree that children's participation in clinical research can be justified. But the ethical justification for exposing children to research risks in the absence of consent remains unclear. One prevalent group of arguments aims to justify children's risk exposure by appealing to the concept of benefit. I call these ‘benefit arguments’. Prominent versions of this argument defend the idea that broadening our understanding of the notion of benefit to include non‐medical benefits (such as the benefit of a moral education) helps to justify children's research participation. I argue that existing benefit arguments are not persuasive and raise problems with the strategy of appealing to broader notions of benefit to justify children's exposure to research risk.     

Porter Physiology Development Program 1967-2001: a retrospective study

The Porter Physiology Development Program Fellowships have supported the predoctoral and postdoctoral studies of numerous minority students. All of the Fellows responding to the current survey continue to be involved in life sciences-related work, primarily as physiologists-in-training or as physiologists working in academia, government, or industry. Following receipt of their degree, the large majority of Fellows completed a single postdoctoral fellowship and entered their first professional position. Most employed past-Fellows spent at least part of their time engaged in research and were also involved in teaching, management, and administration. Respondents felt strongly that the Porter Fellowship had contributed to the quality of their pre/postdoctoral training. They felt it gave them intellectual freedom to select research advisors and topics or postdoctoral positions. They also felt the financial freedom provided by the Fellowship allowed them to concentrate on their research, contributing both to the quality of their work and to their overall career commitment. Fellows strongly recommended continuation of the program and offered suggestions for expansion and increased communication. Finally, one of the most powerful benefits of the program is in its longitudinal impact. Past Fellows now serve as role models for a new generation of minority students aspiring to careers in biomedical research. Some have their own graduate students who have received the Porter Fellowship. One such Fellow emphasized the importance of this aspect of the program: I was always told by my colleagues that I would be a good role model to minority students. Having Fellowships like the Porter Development Fellowship insures the training of minority professionals. Young minority students have hope of becoming scientists when they see those of us who have made it. I have graduate students who tell me that they want a laboratory and to do research like I am doing which makes me feel that I have accomplished something [important]. As stated earlier, the goal of the Porter Physiology Fellowship Program is to encourage diversity among students pursuing full-time studies toward the PhD (or DSc) in the physiological sciences, and to encourage their participation in the APS. The findings of this retrospective study suggest that the program has been highly successful in both of these aspects.     

CARE ETHICS AND THE GLOBAL PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL SURROGACY

This essay will focus on the moral issues relating to surrogacy in the global context, and will critique the liberal arguments that have been offered in support of it. Liberal arguments hold sway concerning reproductive arrangements made between commissioning couples from wealthy nations and the surrogates from socioeconomically weak backgrounds that they hire to do their reproductive labor. My argument in this paper is motivated by a concern for controlling harms by putting the practice of globalized commercial surrogacy into the context of care ethics. As I will argue, the unstable situations into which children of global surrogacy arrangements are born is symbolic of the crisis of care that the practice raises. Using the Baby Manji case as my touch point, I will suggest that liberalism cannot address the harms experienced by Manji and children like her who are created through the global practice of assisted reproductive technology. I will argue that, if commissioning couples consider their proposed surrogacy contracts from a care ethics point of view, they will begin to think relationally about their actions, considering the practice from an ethical lens, not just an economic or contractual one.     

Illegitimate authorship and flawed procedures: Fundamental,formal criticisms of the Declaration of Helsinki

Some of the recent criticisms published during and after the last revision process of the Declaration of Helsinki are directed at its basic legitimacy. In this article we want to have a closer look at the two criticisms we consider to be the most fundamental. The first criticism questions the legitimate authorship of the World Medical Association to publish a document such as the Declaration. The second fundamental criticism we want to examine argues that the last revision process failed to meet the standards for fair, democratic procedures. Although both criticisms deny the formal legitimacy of the Declaration in the most fundamental way, they have never been addressed in detail in a single article. We refute most of the related arguments. However, acknowledging some of the points made, improvements for future revision processes and versions of the Declaration of Helsinki are outlined.     

Should human germ line editing be allowed? Some suggestions on the basis of the existing regulatory framework

The application of genetic editing techniques for the prevention or cure of disease is a highly promising tool for the future of humanity. However, its implementation contains a number of ethical and legal challenges that should not be underestimated. On this basis, some sectors have already asked for a veto on any intervention that modifies the human germ line, while supporting somatic line editing. In this paper, I will support that this suggestion makes no sense at all, because the somatic/germ line disjunctive has no moral relevance and, therefore, it should not play any role in legal terms. I will provide a number of reasons to hold this assumption, such as the non‐sacred nature of the germ line, the difference between germ line and human genome modification, or the moral importance of the presence of a will to create modified descendants. While doing so, I will provide some examples of the different approaches to germ line editing adopted by different regulations so as to demonstrate that, contrary to what is sometimes stated, a general ban on this practice is not the rule, but the exception. Additionally, I will show how alternative options which currently exist, such as a selective ban based on criteria different to the germ line/somatic line distinction, match better with the need to conciliate research needs and legitimate ethical concerns. Finally, I will introduce some further suggestions to this same purpose.     

Implications of Odera Oruka's ethics of consumerism for reducing globesity

In this paper, I advance Odera Oruka's insights on the ethics of consumerism in order to draw relevant implications of his thoughts on rethinking the problem of obesity. I argue that Oruka's ethics of consumerism and his right to human minimum theory entail some salient ideas that might serve as a better ethical model for reducing the global obesity prevalence. Though Oruka's African moral philosophy is yet to receive universal attention it arguably deserves, the interests of the international and ‘globesity’ community would be better served learning from the contributions of an African moral theory to contemporary bioethical discourse on obesity. Oruka's moral thoughts are by constitution, a deontological and cosmopolitan call for reducing hunger in globalized world, while also indirectly, addressing obesity of the poor. I show the limitations of his ethics of consumerism, and the shortcomings of such ethics in the context of obesity of the poor. Consequently, I develop a neo‐Orukan virtue based ethics that is worthy of attention in efforts towards addressing the obesity tide. No such perspective currently exists in the context of obesity; yet the exigent need for one is necessitated by the defects of the libertarian and harm principle approaches in Western bioethical discourse.     

DOES JUSTICE REQUIRE THAT WE BE AGEIST?

This paper restates some of the principal arguments against an automatic preference for the young as advocated by Kappel and Sandøe, arguments many of which have been extant for over a decade but which Kappel and Sandøe largely ignore. It then goes on to demonstrate that Kappel and Sandøe's "indifference test" fails to do the work required of it because it can be met by unacceptable conceptions of justice. The paper develops a number of new arguments against what I have called "ageist" preferences for the young or for those with long life expectancy. Finally I show that Kappel and Sandøe must believe that murdering older people is less morally wrong than murdering the young and that people relying on arguments such as theirs will have to accept the moral respectability of killing the innocent in order to maximise units of lifetime.     

On cloning human beings

The purpose of this paper is to show that arguments for and against cloning fail to make their case because of one or both of the following reasons: 1) they take for granted customary beliefs and assumptions that are far from being unquestionable; 2) they tend to ignore the context in which human cloning is developed. I will analyze some of the assumptions underlying the main arguments that have been offered for and against cloning. Once these assumptions are critically analyzed, arguments both rejecting and supporting human cloning seem to lose weight. I will first briefly present the main arguments that have been proposed against cloning and I will argue that they fail to establish their case. In the next section I will evaluate some of the positive arguments that have been offered supporting such technology. This analysis will show that the case for cloning also fails. Finally, I will maintain that because critics and especially supporters of this technology neglect the context in which human cloning is developed and might be implemented, their arguments are far from compelling.     

Cloning and adoption: a reply to Levy and Lotz

In previous articles I discussed the ethics of human reproductive cloning, focusing on a possible future scenario in which reproductive cloning can be accomplished without an elevated risk of anomalies to the children who are created. I argued that in such a scenario it would be ethically permissible for infertile couples to use cloning as a way to have genetically related children and that such use should not be prohibited. In 'Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic Fallacy', Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz raise objections to my conclusions. They disagree with the view, for which I argued, that some couples can have defensible reasons for desiring genetically related children. They also offer several new arguments against reproductive cloning, including an argument that it would diminish the number of adoptions, thereby adversely affecting the welfare of children who need to be adopted. In this paper I point out that Levy and Lotz's criticisms misconstrue my arguments and that there are serious problems with their arguments for prohibiting infertile couples from using cloning, including their argument from adoption.     

Mandatory sex selection and mitochondrial transfer

The Institute of Medicine has recently endorsed arguments put forward by John Appleby calling for mandatory sex selection against female offspring in the initial trials of mitochondrial replacement techniques. In this paper I argue that, despite this endorsement, the reasons offered by Appleby for mandatory sex selection are inadequate. I further argue that plausible revisions to Appleby's arguments still fail to convincingly defend such an intrusive policy. While I remain neutral about whether intending parents making use of mitochondrial replacement techniques ought to have access to sex selection, I conclude that to date the case for mandatory sex selection has not been satisfactorily made.     

Conscientious Refusals and Reason‐Giving

Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason‐giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly considering whether a version of the reason‐giving requirement can be salvaged despite this important difficulty.     

There May be Strict Empirical Laws in Biology, after All

This paper consists of four parts. Part 1 is an introduction. Part 2 evaluates arguments for the claim that there are no strict empirical laws in biology. I argue that there are two types of arguments for this claim and they are as follows: (1) Biological properties are multiply realized and they require complex processes. For this reason, it is almost impossible to formulate strict empirical laws in biology. (2) Generalizations in biology hold contingently but laws go beyond describing contingencies, so there cannot be strict laws in biology. I argue that both types of arguments fail. Part 3 considers some examples of biological laws in recent biological research and argues that they exemplify strict laws in biology. Part 4 considers the objection that the examples in part 3 may be strict laws but they are not distinctively biological laws. I argue that given a plausible account of what distinctively biological means, such laws are distinctively biological.     

The Vulnerability of Study Participants in the Context of Transnational Biomedical Research: From Conceptual Considerations to Practical Implications

Outsourcing clinical trials sponsored by pharmaceutical companies from industrialized countries to low‐ (middle)‐income countries – summarized as transnational biomedical research (TBR) – has lead to many concerns about ethical standards. Whether study participants are particularly vulnerable is one of those concerns. However, the concept of vulnerability is still vague and varies in its definition. Despite the fact that important international ethical guidelines such as the Declaration of Helsinki by the World Medical Association or the Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects by the Council of International Organizations of Medical Sciences refer to vulnerability as ethical principle, each of their approaches are different. To overcome these shortcomings, we analyze and unite different approaches of vulnerability and develop practical criteria in order to operationalize the concept especially for the context of TBR. These criteria refer to the context of a study as well as the characteristics and the current living situation of study participants. Based on a case study of an HIV‐vaccine‐trial conducted in India we demonstrate how those criteria can be applied in a retrospective way to identify potential ethical conflicts. The criteria can also indicate a prospective function for ethical pre‐assessment. For this, we provide an outlook for three major topics: 1. Vulnerability as a normative concept: Different ways of protection; 2. The relevance of transparency and 3. Vulnerability as an instrument to increase decision participation of human subjects.     

A leukocyte culture and chromosome preparation technique for avian species

Summary A technique for avian leukocyte culture and chromosome analysis is described. The method is simple and allows karyotypic analysis by a variety of chromosome banding methods. It is applicable to a wide variety of species and may be useful in determining the genetic sex of monotypic species in captivity or for population studies of specimens in the wild. This work was supported by Medical Research Council (Canada) Grant MA-4655. B. M. B. is a recipient of a Medical Research Council Fellowship.