Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict

Understanding how societies resolve conflicts between individual and common interests remains one of the most fundamental issues across disciplines. The observation that humans readily incur costs to sanction uncooperative individuals without tangible individual benefits has attracted considerable attention as a proximate cause as to why cooperative behaviours might evolve. However, the proliferation of individually costly punishment has been difficult to explain. Several studies over the last decade employing experimental designs with isolated groups have found clear evidence that the costs of punishment often nullify the benefits of increased cooperation, rendering the strong human tendency to punish a thorny evolutionary puzzle. Here, we show that group competition enhances the effectiveness of punishment so that when groups are in direct competition, individuals belonging to a group with punishment opportunity prevail over individuals in a group without this opportunity. In addition to competitive superiority in between-group competition, punishment reduces within-group variation in success, creating circumstances that are highly favourable for the evolution of accompanying group-functional behaviours. We find that the individual willingness to engage in costly punishment increases with tightening competitive pressure between groups. Our results suggest the importance of intergroup conflict behind the emergence of costly punishment and human cooperation.     

Cooperation in humans: competition between groups and proximate emotions

Understanding the ultimate and proximate mechanisms that favour cooperation remains one of the greatest challenges in the biological and social sciences. A number of theoretical studies have suggested that competition between groups may have played a key role in the evolution of cooperation within human societies, and similar ideas have been discussed for other organisms, especially cooperative breeding vertebrates. However, there is a relative lack of empirical work testing these ideas. Our experiment found, in public goods games with humans, that when groups competed with other groups for financial rewards, individuals made larger contributions within their own groups. In such situations, participants were more likely to regard their group mates as collaborators rather than competitors. Variation in contribution among individuals, either with or without intergroup competition, was positively correlated with individuals' propensity to regard group mates as collaborators. We found that the levels of both guilt and anger individuals experienced were a function of their own contributions and those of their group mates. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that the level of cooperation can be influenced by proximate emotions, which vary with the degree of intergroup competition.     

No unique effect of intergroup competition on cooperation: non-competitive thresholds are as effective as competitions between groups for increasing human cooperative behavior

Explaining cooperation remains a central topic for evolutionary theorists. Many have argued that group selection provides such an explanation: theoretical models show that intergroup competition could have given rise to cooperation that is costly for the individual. Whether group selection actually did play an important role in the evolution of human cooperation, however, is much debated. Recent experiments have shown that intergroup competitions do increase human cooperation, which has been taken as evidence for group selection as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Here we challenge this standard interpretation. Competitions change the payoff structure by creating a threshold effect whereby the group that contributes more earns an additional prize, which creates some incentive for individuals to cooperate. We present four studies that disentangle competition and thresholds, and strongly suggest that it is thresholds – rather than competitions per se – that increase cooperation. Thus, prior intergroup competition experiments provide no evidence of a unique or special role for intergroup competition in promoting human cooperation, and shed no light on whether group selection shaped human evolution.     

Supernaturalizing Social Life

This paper examines three ancient traits of religion whose origins likely date back to the Upper Paleolithic: ancestor worship, shamanism, and the belief in natural and animal spirits. Evidence for the emergence of these traits coincides with evidence for a dramatic advance in human social cooperation. It is argued that these traits played a role in the evolution of human cooperation through the mechanism of social scrutiny. Social scrutiny is an effective means of reducing individualism and enhancing prosocial behavior. Religion’s most ancient traits represent an extension of the human social world into the supernatural, thus reinforcing within-group cooperation by means of ever-vigilant spiritual monitors. Believing that the spirits were always watching may have helped reduce the number of non-cooperators within a group while reinforcing group behavioral norms, thus allowing humanlike levels of cooperation to emerge.     

Social exchange and solidarity: in-group love or out-group hate?

Men exhibit a stronger tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group compared to women. We examined whether this male-specific “coalitional psychology” represents in-group love or out-group hate. One hundred thirty-three college freshmen played a prisoner's dilemma game with a member of their own group and a member of another group. Both groups consisted of same-sex participants. An in-group bias (cooperation with the in-group at a level higher than cooperation with the out-group) based on expectations of cooperation from the in-group was observed for both men and women. When such expectations were experimentally eliminated, women did not show any in-group bias, whereas men still exhibited an in-group bias. This male-specific in-group bias was found to be a product of intragroup cooperation (in-group love) rather than a product of intergroup competition (out-group hate). These findings suggest that the male-specific coalitional psychology caters more toward the promotion of within-group solidarity than aggression against the out-group.     

The Effects of Within- and Between-Group Competition on Trust and Trustworthiness among Acquaintances

Several studies have indicated that between-group competition is a key stimulator of trust and trustworthiness. Another important but neglected type of competition may also affect trust and trustworthiness: within-group competition, especially competition among acquaintances. The present study investigated the effects of both within- and between-group competition on trust and trustworthiness, which were measured using an investment game played by acquaintances. We found that, compared to the participants'' performance in the non-competition condition, when individuals were motivated to compete with their in-group members or the other groups for financial rewards, they demonstrated more trust. When individuals were motivated to compete with their in-group members, they exhibited lower trustworthiness than in non-competition and between-group competition. In addition, within-group competition decreased the trustor''s payoff while both within- and between- group competition increased the trustee''s payoff. Finally, we found that males trusted their group members more than females.     

Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards

Unlike most species, humans cooperate extensively with group members who are not closely related to them, a pattern sustained in part by punishing non-cooperators and rewarding cooperators. Because internally cooperative groups prevail over less cooperative rival groups, it is thought that violent intergroup conflict played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation. Consequently, it is plausible that propensities to punish and reward will be elevated during intergroup conflict. Using experiments conducted before, during and after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, we show that, during wartime, people are more willing to pay costs to punish non-cooperative group members and reward cooperative group members. Rather than simply increasing within-group solidarity, violent intergroup conflict thus elicits behaviours that, writ large, enhance cooperation within the group, thereby making victory more likely.     

How cooperation became the norm

Most of the contributions to Cooperation and Its Evolution grapple with the distinctive challenges presented by the project of explaining human sociality. Many of these puzzles have a ‘chicken and egg’ character: our virtually unparalleled capacity for large-scale cooperation is the product of psychological, behavioural, and demographic changes in our recent evolutionary history, and these changes are linked by complex patterns of reciprocal dependence. There is much we do not yet understand about the timing of these changes, and about the order in which different aspects of human social psychology (co-)evolved. In this review essay, I discuss four such puzzles the volume raises. These concern punishment and norm-psychology, moral judgement and the moral emotions, hierarchy and top-down coercion, and property rights and legal systems.     

Relatedness facilitates cooperation in the subsocial spider, Stegodyphus tentoriicola

Background  

Cooperative hunting and foraging in spiders is rare and prone to cheating such that the actions of selfish individuals negatively affect the whole group. The resulting social dilemma may be mitigated by kin selection since related individuals lose indirect fitness benefits by acting selfishly. Indeed, cooperation with genetic kin reduces the disadvantages of within-group competition in the subsocial spider Stegodyphus lineatus, supporting the hypothesis that high relatedness is an important pre-adaptation in the transition to sociality in spiders. In this study we examined the consequences of group size and relatedness on cooperative feeding in the subsocial spider S. tentoriicola, a species suggested to be at the transition to permanent sociality.     

The evolution of competition and policing: opposing selection within and among groups

Background  

Although selection favors exploitative competition within groups, a group of hypercompetitive individuals may be less productive than a cooperative group. When competition is costly for group fitness, among-group selection can favor groups with 'policing' individuals who reduce within-group competition at a cost to their own fitness, or groups of individuals who restrain their competitive intensity ('self policing'). We examine these possibilities in a series of explicit population-genetic models.     

Group bias in cooperative norm enforcement

A hallmark of human social cognition is the tendency for both adults and children to favour members of their own groups. Critically, this in-group bias exerts a strong influence on cooperative decision-making: people (i) tend to share more with members of their in-group and (ii) differentially enforce fairness norms depending on the group membership of their interaction partners. But why do people show these group biases in cooperation? One possibility is that the enforcement of cooperative norm violations is an evolved mechanism supporting within-group cooperation (Norms-Focused Hypothesis). Alternatively, group bias in cooperation could be a by-product of more general affective preferences for in-group members (Mere Preferences Hypothesis). Here, we appraise evidence from studies of both adults and children with the goal of understanding whether one of these two accounts is better supported by existing data. While the pattern of evidence is complex, much of it is broadly consistent with the Mere Preferences Hypothesis and little is uniquely supportive of the Norms-Focused Hypothesis. We highlight possible reasons for this complexity and suggest ways that future work can continue to help us understand the important relationship between group bias and cooperation.     

Resource and competitive dynamics shape the benefits of public goods cooperation in a plant pathogen

Cooperative benefits depend on a variety of ecological factors. Many cooperative bacteria increase the population size of their groups by making a public good available. Increased local population size can alleviate the constraints of kin competition on the evolution of cooperation by enhancing the between-group fitness of cooperators. The cooperative pathogenesis of Agrobacterium tumefaciens causes infected plants to exude opines--resources that provide a nearly exclusive source of nutrient for the pathogen. We experimentally demonstrate that opines provide cooperative A. tumefaciens cells a within-group fitness advantage over saprophytic agrobacteria. Our results are congruent with a resource-consumer competition model, which predicts that cooperative, virulent agrobacteria are at a competitive disadvantage when opines are unavailable, but have an advantage when opines are available at sufficient levels. This model also predicts that freeloading agrobacteria that catabolize opines but cannot infect plants competitively displace the cooperative pathogen from all environments. However, we show that these cooperative public goods also promote increased local population size. A model built from the Price Equation shows that this effect on group size can contribute to the persistence of cooperative pathogenesis despite inherent kin competition for the benefits of pathogenesis.     

Oxytocin modulates cooperation within and competition between groups: an integrative review and research agenda

The author reviews evidence that hypothalamic release (or infusion) of the neuropeptide oxytocin modulates the regulation of cooperation and conflict among humans because of three reasons. First, oxytocin enables social categorization of others into in-group versus out-group. Second, oxytocin dampens amygdala activity and enables the development of trust. Third, and finally, oxytocin up-regulates neural circuitries (e.g., inferior frontal gyrus, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, caudate nucleus) involved in empathy and other-concern. Consistent with an evolutionary perspective on the functionality of cooperation, it is concluded that oxytocin-motivated cooperation is mostly parochial-it motivates (i) in-group favoritism, (ii) cooperation towards in-group but not out-group members, and (iii) defense-motivated non-cooperation towards threatening outsiders. Thus, in addition to its well-known role in reproduction and pair-bond formation, oxytocin's primary functions include in-group "tend-and-defend." This review concludes with avenues for new research on oxytocin's functions in within-group cooperation and between-group competition. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled Oxytocin, Vasopressin, and Social Behavior.     

Hormonal responses differ when playing violent video games against an ingroup and outgroup

For 14 teams of three young men, salivary testosterone and cortisol were assessed twice before and twice after competing in within-group and between-group video games that simulated violent male–male competition. Men who contributed the most to their teams' between-group victory showed testosterone increases immediately after the competition, but only if this competition was played before the within-group tournament. High-scoring men on losing teams did not show this immediate effect, but they did show a delayed increase in testosterone. In contrast, high-ranking men tended to have lower testosterone and higher cortisol during within-group tournaments. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that men's competitive testosterone response varies across ingroup and outgroup competitions and is muted during the former. The testosterone response during the between-group competition also suggests that violent multiplayer video games may be appealing to young men because they simulate male–male coalitional competition.     

Costs and benefits of within-group spatial position: a feeding competition model

An animal's within-group spatial position has several important fitness consequences. Risk of predation, time spent engaging in antipredatory behavior and feeding competition can all vary with respect to spatial position. Previous research has found evidence that feeding rates are higher at the group edge in many species, but these studies have not represented the entire breadth of dietary diversity and ecological situations faced by many animals. In particular the presence of concentrated, defendable food patches can lead to increased feeding rates by dominants in the center of the group that are able to monopolize or defend these areas. To fully understand the tradeoffs of within-group spatial position in relation to a variety of factors, it is important to be able to predict where individuals should preferably position themselves in relation to feeding rates and food competition. A qualitative model is presented here to predict how food depletion time, abundance of food patches within a group, and the presence of prior knowledge of feeding sites affect the payoffs of different within-group spatial positions for dominant and subordinate animals. In general, when feeding on small abundant food items, individuals at the front edge of the group should have higher foraging success. When feeding on slowly depleted, rare food items, dominants will often have the highest feeding rates in the center of the group. Between these two extreme points of a continuum, an individual's optimal spatial position is predicted to be influenced by an additional combination of factors, such as group size, group spread, satiation rates, and the presence of producer-scrounger tactics.     

Reproductive competition triggers mass eviction in cooperative banded mongooses

In many vertebrate societies, forced eviction of group members is an important determinant of population structure, but little is known about what triggers eviction. Three main explanations are: (i) the reproductive competition hypothesis, (ii) the coercion of cooperation hypothesis, and (iii) the adaptive forced dispersal hypothesis. The last hypothesis proposes that dominant individuals use eviction as an adaptive strategy to propagate copies of their alleles through a highly structured population. We tested these hypotheses as explanations for eviction in cooperatively breeding banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), using a 16-year dataset on life history, behaviour and relatedness. In this species, groups of females, or mixed-sex groups, are periodically evicted en masse. Our evidence suggests that reproductive competition is the main ultimate trigger for eviction for both sexes. We find little evidence that mass eviction is used to coerce helping, or as a mechanism to force dispersal of relatives into the population. Eviction of females changes the landscape of reproductive competition for remaining males, which may explain why males are evicted alongside females. Our results show that the consequences of resolving within-group conflict resonate through groups and populations to affect population structure, with important implications for social evolution.     

One for all and breeding for one: Cooperation and competition as a tamarin reproductive strategy

In this paper I examine behavioral strategies used by male and female tamarins to increase individual reproductive opportunities while continuing to maintain a high level of group cohesion and social cooperation. Tamarins of the genus Saguinus are characterized by social groups generally composed of more than one adult of each sex, but a breeding system in which only a single female in each group gives birth. The breeding sovereignty of a single dominant female limits the reproductive opportunities of subordinate females as well as the reproductive opportunities of resident adult males.^1-3 Despite extreme variability in year-to-year reproductive success among members of the same social group, field studies indicate that within-group intrasexual aggression and fighting are rare, and that both breeding and nonbreeding individuals expend time and energy cooperatively caring for young, defending productive feeding sites, and assisting in food harvesting activities.^4-11 In fact, Caine¹² has argued that “co-operation, tolerance, and flexibility” are the primary themes of tamarin social interactions (p. 218). A major question that remains unanswered, however, is how such high levels of cooperation could have evolved in a social system characterized by emigration of both adult males and females from the natal group, polyandrous mating, and intense reproductive competition.     

Evolutionary precursors of social norms in chimpanzees: a new approach

Moral behaviour, based on social norms, is commonly regarded as a hallmark of humans. Hitherto, humans are perceived to be the only species possessing social norms and to engage in moral behaviour. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting their presence in chimpanzees, but systematic studies are lacking. Here, we examine the evolution of human social norms and their underlying psychological mechanisms. For this, we distinguish between conventions, cultural social norms and universal social norms. We aim at exploring whether chimpanzees possess evolutionary precursors of universal social norms seen in humans. Chimpanzees exhibit important preconditions for their presence and enforcement: tolerant societies, well-developed social-cognitive skills and empathetic competence. Here, we develop a theoretical framework for recognizing different functional levels of social norms and distinguish them from mere statistical behavioural regularities. Quasi social norms are found where animals behave functionally moral without having moral emotions. In proto social norms, moral emotions might be present but cannot be collectivized due to the absence of a uniquely human psychological trait, i.e. shared intentionality. Human social norms, whether they are universal or cultural, involve moral emotions and are collectivized. We will discuss behaviours in chimpanzees that represent potential evolutionary precursors of human universal social norms, with special focus on social interactions involving infants. We argue that chimpanzee infants occupy a special status within their communities and propose that tolerance towards them might represent a proto social norm. Finally, we discuss possible ways to test this theoretical framework.     

Subsistence and the Evolution of Religion

We present a cross-cultural analysis showing that the presence of an active or moral High God in societies varies generally along a continuum from lesser to greater technological complexity and subsistence productivity. Foragers are least likely to have High Gods. Horticulturalists and agriculturalists are more likely. Pastoralists are most likely, though they are less easily positioned along the productivity continuum. We suggest that belief in moral High Gods was fostered by emerging leaders in societies dependent on resources that were difficult to manage and defend without group cooperation. These leaders used the concept of a supernatural moral enforcer to manipulate others into cooperating, which resulted in greater productivity. Reproductive success would accrue most to such leaders, but the average reproductive success of all individuals in the society would also increase with greater productivity. Supernatural enforcement of moral codes maintained social cohesion and allowed for further population growth, giving one society an advantage in competition with others.