Digit ratio (2D:4D) moderates the impact of sexual cues on men's decisions in ultimatum games

Three experimental studies demonstrate that 'sex-related cues' impact human decision-making in ultimatum games. In the ultimatum game, two individuals divide a sum of money. The proposer offers a portion of the money to the other player, the responder. If the responder accepts the offer, the money is distributed in agreement with the proposer's offer. If the responder rejects the offer, neither player receives anything. Our studies show that exposure to pictures of sexy women or lingerie increases the likelihood of accepting unfair offers. Digit ratios of responders are reliably associated with their behaviour: males with lower digit ratios are more likely to reject an unfair split in neutral contexts, but more likely to accept unfair offers in sex-related contexts.     

Empathy leads to fairness

In the Ultimatum Game, two players are asked to split a prize. The first player, the proposer, makes an offer of how to split the prize. The second player, the responder, either accepts the offer, in which case the prize is split as agreed, or rejects it, in which case neither player receives anything. The rational strategy suggested by classical game theory is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible positive share and for the responder to accept. Humans do not play this way, however, and instead tend to offer 50% of the prize and to reject offers below 20%. Here we study the Ultimatum Game in an evolutionary context and show that empathy can lead to the evolution of fairness. Empathy means that individuals make offers which they themselves would be prepared to accept.     

Heartbeat and Economic Decisions: Observing Mental Stress among Proposers and Responders in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game

The ultimatum bargaining game (UBG), a widely used method in experimental economics, clearly demonstrates that motives other than pure monetary reward play a role in human economic decision making. In this study, we explore the behaviour and physiological reactions of both responders and proposers in an ultimatum bargaining game using heart rate variability (HRV), a small and nonintrusive technology that allows observation of both sides of an interaction in a normal experimental economics laboratory environment. We find that low offers by a proposer cause signs of mental stress in both the proposer and the responder; that is, both exhibit high ratios of low to high frequency activity in the HRV spectrum.     

Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size

I formulate a simple model of the ultimatum game, in which a proposer and a responder can receive a reward if they agree on how to divide this reward between them. The model is easy to analyse and shows that strong tendencies to fair division are expected when evolution of strategy frequencies follow the traditional gradient dynamics assumed in evolutionary models. The mean stable offer is typically around 20-40% although this depends on the maximum payoff and if rejection thresholds can evolve independently from proposals. The stable proportion offered at evolutionary equilibrium increases with the maximum payoff, if proposal and acceptance thresholds are dictated by the same strategy and cannot evolve independently. If proposal and acceptance evolve independently, the stable proportion instead decreases with the maximum payoff. The stable outcome may also show substantial variation.     

Influences of State and Trait Affect on Behavior,Feedback-Related Negativity,and P3b in the Ultimatum Game

The present study investigates how different emotions can alter social bargaining behavior. An important paradigm to study social bargaining is the Ultimatum Game. There, a proposer gets a pot of money and has to offer part of it to a responder. If the responder accepts, both players get the money as proposed by the proposer. If he rejects, none of the players gets anything. Rational choice models would predict that responders accept all offers above 0. However, evidence shows that responders typically reject a large proportion of all unfair offers. We analyzed participants’ behavior when they played the Ultimatum Game as responders and simultaneously collected electroencephalogram data in order to quantify the feedback-related negativity and P3b components. We induced state affect (momentarily emotions unrelated to the task) via short movie clips and measured trait affect (longer-lasting emotional dispositions) via questionnaires. State happiness led to increased acceptance rates of very unfair offers. Regarding neurophysiology, we found that unfair offers elicited larger feedback-related negativity amplitudes than fair offers. Additionally, an interaction of state and trait affect occurred: high trait negative affect (subsuming a variety of aversive mood states) led to increased feedback-related negativity amplitudes when participants were in an angry mood, but not if they currently experienced fear or happiness. We discuss that increased rumination might be responsible for this result, which might not occur, however, when people experience happiness or fear. Apart from that, we found that fair offers elicited larger P3b components than unfair offers, which might reflect increased pleasure in response to fair offers. Moreover, high trait negative affect was associated with decreased P3b amplitudes, potentially reflecting decreased motivation to engage in activities. We discuss implications of our results in the light of theories and research on depression and anxiety.     

Emotional expressivity as a signal of cooperation

Previous research has suggested that the spontaneous display of positive emotion may be a reliable signal of cooperative tendency in humans. Consistent with this proposition, several studies have found that self-reported cooperators indeed display higher levels of positive emotions than non-cooperators. In this study, we defined cooperators and non-cooperators in terms of their behavior as the proposer in an ultimatum game, and video-taped their facial expressions as they faced unfair offers as a responder. A detailed analysis of the facial expressions displayed by participants revealed that cooperators displayed greater amounts of emotional expressions, not limited to positive emotional expression, when responding to unfair offers in the ultimatum game. These results suggest that cooperators may be more emotionally expressive than non-cooperators. We speculate that emotional expressivity can be a more reliable signal of cooperativeness than the display of positive emotion alone.     

Emergent Dynamics of Fairness in the Spatial Coevolution of Proposer and Responder Species in the Ultimatum Game

While spatially local interactions are ubiquitous between coevolving species sharing recourses (e.g., plant-insect interactions), their effects on such coevolution processes of strategies involving the share of a resource are still not clearly understood. We construct a two-dimensional spatial model of the coevolution of the proposer and responder species in the ultimatum game (UG), in which a pair of proposer and responder individuals at each site plays the UG. We investigate the effects of the locality of interactions and the intensity of selection on the emergence of fairness between these species. We show that the lower intensity of selection favors fair strategies in general, and there are no significant differences in the evolution of fairness between the cases with local and global interactions when the intensity of selection is low. However, as the intensity of selection becomes higher, the spatially local interactions contribute to the evolution of fairer strategies more than the global interactions, even though fair strategies become more difficult to evolve. This positive effect of spatial interactions is expected to be due to the mutual benefit of fairness for both proposer and responder species in future generations, which brings about a dynamic evolution process of fairness.     

Local competition sparks concerns for fairness in the ultimatum game

Humans reject uneven divisions of resources, even at personal cost. This is observed in countless experiments using the ultimatum game, where a proposer offers to divide a resource with a responder who either accepts the division or rejects it (whereupon both earn zero). Researchers debate why humans evolved a psychology that is so averse to inequity within partnerships. We suggest that the scale of competition is crucial: under local competition with few competitors, individuals reject low offers, because they cannot afford to be disadvantaged relative to competitors. If one competes against the broader population (i.e. global competition), then it pays to accept low offers to increase one''s absolute pay-off. We support this intuition with an illustrative game-theoretical model. We also conducted ultimatum games where participants received prizes based on pay-offs relative to immediate partners (local competition) versus a larger group (global competition). Participants demanded higher offers under local competition, suggesting that local competition increases people''s demands for fairness and aversion to inequality.     

High-testosterone men reject low ultimatum game offers

The ultimatum game is a simple negotiation with the interesting property that people frequently reject offers of 'free' money. These rejections contradict the standard view of economic rationality. This divergence between economic theory and human behaviour is important and has no broadly accepted cause. This study examines the relationship between ultimatum game rejections and testosterone. In a variety of species, testosterone is associated with male seeking dominance. If low ultimatum game offers are interpreted as challenges, then high-testosterone men may be more likely to reject such offers. In this experiment, men who reject low offers ($5 out of $40) have significantly higher testosterone levels than those who accept. In addition, high testosterone levels are associated with higher ultimatum game offers, but this second finding is not statistically significant.     

Dopamine D4 receptor gene associated with fairness preference in ultimatum game

In experimental economics, the preference for reciprocal fairness has been observed in the controlled and incentivized laboratory setting of the ultimatum game, in which two individuals decide on how to divide a sum of money, with one proposing the share while the second deciding whether to accept. Should the proposal be accepted, the amount is divided accordingly. Otherwise, both would receive no money. A recent twin study has shown that fairness preference inferred from responder behavior is heritable, yet its neurogenetic basis remains unknown. The D4 receptor (DRD4) exon3 is a well-characterized functional polymorphism, which is known to be associated with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and personality traits including novelty seeking and self-report altruism. Applying a neurogenetic approach, we find that DRD4 is significantly associated with fairness preference. Additionally, the interaction among this gene, season of birth, and gender is highly significant. This is the first result to link preference for reciprocal fairness to a specific gene and suggests that gene × environment interactions contribute to economic decision making.     

Human economic and financial behavior: The serotonergic hypothesis

Recent advances in the field of neuroeconomics and behavioral finance have shed new light on the biological correlates of human economic and financial behavior. In this context, a reduced serotonergic activity has been consistently linked to an increased rate of rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game (UG), a simple two-person bargaining between a proposer and a responder. Besides serotonin, increased testosterone levels have been associated to rejections of unfair UG offers, as well as to higher financial gains among professional traders operating in the London stock market. Since low serotonin and high testosterone levels in the central nervous system may interact to exert significant effects on the neural mechanisms involved in the expression of impulsivity and aggressive behavior, it is feasible to hypothesize that serotonergic neurotransmission might exert an important influence on investors' choices in real-world financial markets. Future studies in this area should explore whether tryptophan depletion may actually improve (or diminish) investors' trading performance.     

Beauty Matters: Social Preferences in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

Preference for beauty is human nature, as previous behavior studies have supported the notion of “beauty premium” in which attractive people were more easily to get promoted and receive higher salaries. In the present study, 29 males were recruited to participate in a three-person ultimatum game (UG) including a proposer, a responder and a powerless third player. Each subject, playing as the responder, had to decide whether to accept an offer from the allocator both for himself and a female third person. We aimed to elucidate how the facial attractiveness of the female subject affected the male subjects’ fairness and decision-making in social exchanges. Frontal feedback-related negativity (FRN) in response to four offers in an attractive-face condition revealed no significant differences between offers; however, when the companion was an unattractive female, an “unfair/fair” offer, which assigned a lower share to the responder and a fair share to the third player, elicited the largest FRN. Furthermore, when the third player was offered the smallest amount (“fair/unfair” offer), a larger FRN was generated in an attractive-face condition than unattractive-face condition. In the “unfair/fair” offer condition in which subjects received a smaller allocation than the third person, the beauty of their female counterparts attenuated subjects’ aversion to inequality, resulting in a less negative FRN in the frontal region and an increased acceptance ratio. However, the influence of the third player’s facial attractiveness only affected the early evaluation stage: late P300 was found to be immune to the “beauty premium”. Under the two face conditions, P300 was smallest following an “unfair/fair” offer, whereas the amplitudes in the other three offer conditions exhibited no significant differences. In addition, the differentiated neural features of processing facial attractiveness were also determined and indexed by four event-related potentials (ERP) components: N170, frontal N1, N2 and late positive potentials (LPPs).     

Fluctuating Asymmetry of Responders Affects Offers in the Ultimatum Game Oppositely According to Attractiveness or Need as Perceived by Proposers

The Ultimatum Game (UG) measures cooperative tendencies in humans. A proposer offers to split a given sum of money between self and a responder, who may accept or reject the offer. If accepted, each receives the proposed split; if rejected, nobody receives anything. We studied the effect of the putative responder's degree of facial symmetry (fluctuating asymmetry, FA) on the offer he/she received in opposite-sexed UGs. Symmetry is an important measure of biological quality so subjects were expected to receive higher offers when symmetrical than asymmetrical. In a sample of Jamaicans, individuals played two UGs with opposite-sexed responders, a symmetrical photo of a Lebanese and an asymmetrical one. Individuals do indeed give more to symmetrical responders (p = 0.032). When subjects are asked their motivation, a striking dichotomy emerges: those who cite 'attractiveness' as a motive, give strongly to symmetrical responders while those citing 'need' invariably give more to asymmetrical ones (p < 0.0001). Females also show a nearly significant tendency to cite need as a motive more often than do males.     

Fluctuating asymmetry and behavior in the ultimatum game in Jamaica

The ultimatum game measures cooperative tendencies in humans under experimental conditions. One individual can split money between oneself and another, while the other has the option of accepting or rejecting the offer, with each player receiving the accepted split or nothing if the split is rejected. We studied the association of players' degree of symmetry [fluctuating asymmetry (FA)] with behavior in the ultimatum game. Symmetrical males were expected to be less cooperative and, thus, make lower offers (while being more likely to reject unfair offers). In a population of young adult Jamaicans, who are well-characterized for bodily symmetry, we found that symmetrical males made significantly lower offers than asymmetrical ones (p<.001), but found no effect on rejection rates (perhaps due to a very small sample size). No significant association of symmetry and game playing was found in women, but women with a higher body mass index made less generous offers (p<.05).     

Testosterone administration does not affect men's rejections of low ultimatum game offers or aggressive mood

Correlative evidence suggests that testosterone promotes dominance and aggression. However, causal evidence is scarce and offers mixed results. To investigate this relationship, we administered testosterone for 48 h to 41 healthy young adult men in a within-subjects, double-blind placebo-controlled balanced crossover design. Subjects played the role of responders in an ultimatum game, where rejecting a low offer is costly, but serves to destroy the proposer's profit. Such action can hence be interpreted as non-physical aggression in response to social provocation. In addition, subjects completed a self-assessed mood questionnaire. As expected, self-reported aggressiveness was a key predictor of ultimatum game rejections. However, while testosterone affected subjective ratings of feeling energetic and interested, our evidence strongly suggests that testosterone had no effect on ultimatum game rejections or on aggressive mood. Our findings illustrate the importance of using causal interventions to assess correlative evidence.     

Exaggerated envy and guilt measured by economic games in Japanese women with anorexia nervosa

Background

Anorexia nervosa (AN) patients are assumed to express high levels of guilt and envy. Ultimatum game (UG) is a standard behavioral task that focuses on interpersonal behavior when splitting a sum of money between two players. UG studies consistently demonstrate that people tend to decrease their inequity in outcomes, one explanation being that economically irrational decision-making may partly arise from the emotions guilt and envy. We assumed that AN patients would perform excessively fair in UG, reflecting high guilt and envy.

Methods

We utilized UG to investigate the characteristics of guilt and envy among 24 Japanese AN patients and 22 age-matched healthy controls (HC). The relation between the outcome of UG and decision strategy confirmed by post-experimental questionnaires was analyzed.

Results

As proposer, AN offered a larger amount to the responder compared with HC (p?=?0.002) while, on the other hand, as responder, AN demanded much higher allocation to accept the offer compared with HC (p?=?0.026). Regarding the strategy as responder, AN put more emphasis on fairness and less emphasis on monetary reward compared with HC (p?=?0.046, p?=?0.042, respectively).

Conclusions

The results indicate that Japanese AN patients demonstrate strong preference for fairness, with high guilt and high envy. High sensitivity to guilt and envy of AN patients can affect not only their own behavior concerning eating attitude and body shape, but also decision-making in interpersonal situations. Behavioral experimental settings among social situations will enable us to evaluate and help actual decision-making in the real life of patients.

     

Exaggerated Intergroup Bias in Economical Decision Making Games: Differential Effects of Primary and Secondary Psychopathic Traits

Psychopathic personality traits are linked with selfish and non-cooperative responses during economical decision making games. However, the possibility that these responses may vary when responding to members of the in-group and the out-group has not yet been explored. We aimed to examine the effects of primary (selfish, uncaring) and secondary (impulsive, irresponsible) psychopathic personality traits on the responses of non-offending participants to the in-group and the out-group (defined in terms of affiliation to a UK University) across a series of economical decision making games. We asked a total of 60 participants to act as the proposer in both the dictator game and the ultimatum game. We found that across both tasks, those who scored highly for secondary psychopathic traits showed an elevated intergroup bias, making more generous offers toward members of the in-group relative to the out-group. An exaggerated intergroup bias may therefore represent a motivational factor for the antisocial behavior of those with elevated secondary psychopathic traits.     

Statistical fluctuations in population bargaining in the ultimatum game: Static and evolutionary aspects

We explore the emergent behavior in heterogeneous populations where players negotiate via an ultimatum game: two players are offered a gift, one of them (the proposer) suggests how to divide the offer while the other player (the responder) can either accept or reject the deal. Rejection is detrimental to both players as it results in no earnings. In this context, our contribution is twofold: (i) we consider a population where the distribution of used strategies is constant over time and properties of the random payoff received by the players (average and higher moments) are reported from simple exact methods and corroborated by computer simulations; (ii) the evolution of a population is analyzed via Monte Carlo simulations where agents may change independently the proposing and accepting parameters of their strategy depending on received payoffs. Our results show that evolution leads to a stationary state in which wealth (accumulated payoff) is fairly distributed. As time evolves, an increase in average payoff and a simultaneous variance decrease is observed when we use a dynamics based on a probabilistic version of the saying: “One should not comply with small earnings, but one's greed must be limited.”     

Mathematically gifted adolescents have deficiencies in social valuation and mentalization

Many mathematically gifted adolescents are characterized as being indolent, underachieving and unsuccessful despite their high cognitive ability. This is often due to difficulties with social and emotional development. However, research on social and emotional interactions in gifted adolescents has been limited. The purpose of this study was to observe differences in complex social strategic behaviors between gifted and average adolescents of the same age using the repeated Ultimatum Game. Twenty-two gifted adolescents and 24 average adolescents participated in the Ultimatum Game. Two adolescents participate in the game, one as a proposer and the other as a responder. Because of its simplicity, the Ultimatum Game is an apt tool for investigating complex human emotional and cognitive decision-making in an empirical setting. We observed strategic but socially impaired offers from gifted proposers and lower acceptance rates from gifted responders, resulting in lower total earnings in the Ultimatum Game. Thus, our results indicate that mathematically gifted adolescents have deficiencies in social valuation and mentalization.     

Theft in an ultimatum game: chimpanzees and bonobos are insensitive to unfairness

Humans, but not chimpanzees, punish unfair offers in ultimatum games, suggesting that fairness concerns evolved sometime after the split between the lineages that gave rise to Homo and Pan. However, nothing is known about fairness concerns in the other Pan species, bonobos. Furthermore, apes do not typically offer food to others, but they do react against theft. We presented a novel game, the ultimatum theft game, to both of our closest living relatives. Bonobos and chimpanzee ‘proposers’ consistently stole food from the responders'' portions, but the responders did not reject any non-zero offer. These results support the interpretation that the human sense of fairness is a derived trait.