Complexity,adaptive complexity and the Creative View of natural selection

In this paper, I respond to arguments proposed by Brunnander in this journal issue concerning my position regarding the Creative View of natural selection (Razeto-Barry & Frick, 2011). Brunnander argues that (i) the Creative View we defend does not serve to answer William Paley’s question because (ii) Paley’s question is “why there are complex things rather than simple ones” and (iii) natural selection cannot answer this question. Brunnander’s arguments for (iii) defend a Non-creative View of natural selection (sensu Razeto-Barry & Frick, 2011). Here I claim that Brunnander’s arguments for (iii) are mistaken and I also argue that even accepting (iii) we do not have to accept (i), given that statement (ii) is historically and conceptually flawed. Thus here I analyze Paley’s question from a historical point of view and from a contemporary perspective in a quest for the potential conceptual relevance of Paley’s question today. In this vein I argue that from a contemporary point of view statement (iii) may be correct but for different reasons than those adduced by Brunnander.     

The Argument from Design: A Guided Tour of William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802)

According to the classic “argument from design,” observations of complex functionality in nature can be taken to imply the action of a supernatural designer, just as the purposeful construction of human artifacts reveals the hand of the artificer. The argument from design has been in use for millennia, but it is most commonly associated with the nineteenth century English theologian William Paley and his 1802 treatise Natural Theology, or Evidence of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature. The book remains relevant more than 200 years after it was written, in large part because arguments very similar to Paley’s underlie current challenges to the teaching of evolution (indeed, his name arises with considerable frequency in associated discussions). This paper provides an accessible overview of the arguments presented by Paley in Natural Theology and considers them both in their own terms and in the context of contemporary issues.     

Interdisciplinary integration in biology? An overview

Philosophical theories about reduction and integration in science are at variance with what is happenign in science. A realistic approach to science show that possibilities for reduction and integration are limited. The classical ideal of a unified science has since long been rejected in philosophy. But the current emphasis on interdisciplinary integration in philosophy and in science shows that it survives in a different guise. It is necessary to redress the balance, specifically in biology. Methodological analysis shows that many of the grand interdisciplinary theories involving biology actually represent pseudo-integration covered up by inappropriate, overgeneral concepts. Integrationism is not bad, but it must be kept within reasonable bounds. If the present analysis is appropriate, there will have to be fundamental changes in research strategy both in science and in the philosophy of science.     

Darwin's laws

There is widespread agreement among contemporary philosophers of biology and philosophically-minded biologists that Darwin's insights about the intrusion of chance processes into biological regularities undermines the possibility of there being biological laws. Darwin made references to "designed laws." He also freely described some laws as having exceptions. This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the notion of scientific laws that was dominant in Darwin's time, and in all probability the one which he inherited. The analysis of laws is then used to show how it could have been natural for Darwin to believe in designed laws that had exceptions, and to highlight the continuity between the metaphysics of pre-Darwinian, Darwinian, and contemporary biological science. One important result is the removal of one motivation for the anti-laws sentiment in philosophy and biology.     

On microRNA and the need for exploratory experimentation in post-genomic molecular biology

This paper is devoted to an examination of the discovery, characterization, and analysis of the functions of microRNAs, which also serves as a vehicle for demonstrating the importance of exploratory experimentation in current (post-genomic) molecular biology. The material on microRNAs is important in its own right: it provides important insight into the extreme complexity of regulatory networks involving components made of DNA, RNA, and protein. These networks play a central role in regulating development of multicellular organisms and illustrate the importance of epigenetic as well as genetic systems in evolution and development. The examination of these matters yields principled arguments for the historicity of the functions of key biological molecules and for the indispensability of exploratory experimentation in contemporary molecular biology as well as some insight into the complex interplay between exploratory experimentation and hypothesis-driven science. This latter result is not only important for philosophy of science, but also of practical importance for the evaluation of grant proposals, although the elaboration of this latter claim must be left for another occasion.     

Karl Popper,Forensic Science,and Nested Codes

This paper utilizes the framework of Karl Popper’s 3-world ontology to make the case that forensic science is a specialized coding system that establishes meaningful connections between the world of biology (world 1) and the world of human society (world 3). Forensic science is a cross-disciplinary endeavor that uses scientific methods to determine what transpired in a crime so the legal system can determine how to prosecute the offender(s). On a Popperian analysis of forensic science, world 1 consists of evidence gathered at the crime scene, which enables investigators to develop a detailed reconstruction of the incident for consideration under the legal and ethical codes of society, which are products of world 3. Understanding forensic science in this way serves two purposes: first, it extends Marcello Barbieri’s code biology into the realm of philosophical considerations in science, law and ethics; and second, it situates forensic science within the larger context of debates in contemporary philosophy of science.     

The Medawar Lecture 2004 the truth about science

The attitudes of scientists towards the philosophy of science is mixed and includes considerable indifference and some hostility. This may be due in part to unrealistic expectation and to misunderstanding. Philosophy is unlikely directly to improve scientific practices, but scientists may find the attempt to explain how science works and what it achieves of considerable interest nevertheless. The present state of the philosophy of science is illustrated by recent work on the 'truth hypothesis', according to which, science is generating increasingly accurate representations of a mind-independent and largely unobservable world. According to Karl Popper, although truth is the aim of science, it is impossible to justify the truth hypothesis. According to Thomas Kuhn, the truth hypothesis is false, because scientists can only describe a world that is partially constituted by their own theories and hence not mind-independent. The failure of past scientific theories has been used to argue against the truth hypothesis; the success of the best current theories has been used to argue for it. Neither argument is sound.     

Checks and balances: the welcomed tension between philosophy and science

There is a tension between science and philosophy, but this tension need not engender enmity or derision. Scientists and philosophers can work together, and we argue that working together is beneficial to both, even if it is sometimes uncomfortable. We offer examples of how philosophy can autonomously and effectively inform scientific practice. Science and philosophy share certain methodological concerns and practices; therefore, scientists who disregard philosophy are vulnerable to critical conceptual mistakes. If our arguments are correct, and if it can also be shown that science informs philosophy, then, while it is possible for both disciplines to operate autonomously, each should welcome the checks and balances that each provides for one another in the investigation and explanation of reality.     

Towards disciplinary disintegration in biology

Interdisciplinary integration has fundamental limitations. This is not sufficiently realized in science and in philosophy. Concerning scientific theories there are many examples of pseudo-integration which should be unmasked by elementary philosophical analysis. For example, allegedly over-arching theories of stress which are meant to unite biology and psychology, upon analysis, turn out to represent terminological rather than substantive unity. They should be replaced by more specific, local theories. Theories of animal orientation, likewise, have been formulated in unduly general terms. A natural history approach is more suitable for the study of animal orientation. The tendency to formulate overgeneral theories is also present in evolutionary biology. Philosophy of biology can only deal with these matters if it takes a normative turn. Undue emphasis on interdisciplinary integration is a modern variant of the old unity of science ideal. The replacement of the ideal by a better one is an important challenge for the philosophy of science.     

The Function Debate in Philosophy

This paper reviews the debate on the notion of biological function and on functional explanation as this takes place in philosophy. It describes the different perspectives, issues, intuitions, theories and arguments that have emerged. The author shows that the debate has been too heavily influenced by the concerns of a naturalistic philosophy of mind and argues that in order to improve our understanding of biology the attention should be shifted from the study of intuitions to the study of the actual practice of biological inquiry.     

In pursuit of formaldehyde: causally explanatory models and falsification

Falsification no longer is the cornerstone of philosophy of science; but it still looms widely that scientists ought to drop an explanatory hypothesis in view of negative results. We shall argue that, to the contrary, negative empirical results are unable to disqualify causally explanatory hypotheses—not because of the shielding effect of auxiliary assumptions but because of the fact that the causal irrelevance of a factor cannot empirically be established. This perspective is elaborated at a case study taken from the history of plant physiology: the formaldehyde model of photosynthesis, which for about sixty years (1870s to 1930s) dominated the field—despite the fact that in these sixty years all the attempts to conclusively demonstrate even the presence of formaldehyde in plants failed.     

What history tells us

The history of science was long considered to be something peripheral to science itself. By supplying interesting stories and gossip, it seemed, at best, to provide material for enlivening lectures. In general, it was deemed a suitable activity for retired scientists. This view has been revised considerably in the past years and indeed, today seems hopelessly out of date. History and philosophy of science are increasingly held to be an essential component of the education of scientists. By becoming acquainted with these areas, practicing scientists — and in particular biologists — can better appreciate the significance of the models and theories that underpin their research, especially with the accelerating succession of one idea by the next. The present series, of which the article that follows is the first, aims to give historical glimpses that bear on contemporary biology. The hope is that these glimpses will be both a source of inspiration and of help in resisting useless fashions.     

The role of values in scientific theory selection and why it matters to medical education

In this paper, I argue that the role of values in theory selection is an important issue within medical education. I review the underdetermination argument, which is the idea within philosophy of science that the data serving as evidence for theories are by themselves not sufficient to support a theory to the exclusion of alternatives. There are always various explanations compatible with the data, and we ultimately appeal to certain values as our grounds for choosing one theory over another. I explore some of the ways contemporary feminist philosophers have chosen to grapple with the problem of underdetermination and proposed solutions to systematize how values might be incorporated into theory choice, drawing primarily from the work of Helen Longino and Elizabeth Anderson. I conclude by discussing how value‐laden inquiry should be incorporated within medical education to promote reflection towards medicine’s normative underpinnings.     

Invasive species denialism: a reply to Ricciardi and Ryan

This paper offers a defense against ad hominem aspersions cast in this journal by Ricciardi and Ryan (Biol Invasions 20(3):549–553, 2018) who allege that several articles I wrote represent “invasive species denialism” and “science denialism.” I summarize the arguments found in those articles. They are (1) science cannot define ecological “harm” and thus cannot measure its risk; (2) invasion biologists rely on tautologies, i.e., definitions of concepts like “biodiversity” and “ecosystem intactness,” that exclude exotic species; (3) no empirical evidence shows that introduced plants have been significant causes of extinction; (4) biologists cannot tell by observing a species whether it is native or a naturalized alien; and (5) debates over the meanings and measurements of key concepts in invasion biology have passed the point of diminishing returns. These arguments may be wrong but none is “similar to the denialism that has affected climate science and medical science” as Ricciardi and Ryan aver.     

There May be Strict Empirical Laws in Biology, after All

This paper consists of four parts. Part 1 is an introduction. Part 2 evaluates arguments for the claim that there are no strict empirical laws in biology. I argue that there are two types of arguments for this claim and they are as follows: (1) Biological properties are multiply realized and they require complex processes. For this reason, it is almost impossible to formulate strict empirical laws in biology. (2) Generalizations in biology hold contingently but laws go beyond describing contingencies, so there cannot be strict laws in biology. I argue that both types of arguments fail. Part 3 considers some examples of biological laws in recent biological research and argues that they exemplify strict laws in biology. Part 4 considers the objection that the examples in part 3 may be strict laws but they are not distinctively biological laws. I argue that given a plausible account of what distinctively biological means, such laws are distinctively biological.     

Nietzsche's aesthetic critique of Darwin

Despite his position as one of the first philosophers to write in the "post-Darwinian" world, the critique of Darwin by Friedrich Nietzsche is often ignored for a host of unsatisfactory reasons. I argue that Nietzsche's critique of Darwin is important to the study of both Nietzsche's and Darwin's impact on philosophy. Further, I show that the central claims of Nietzsche's critique have been broadly misunderstood. I then present a new reading of Nietzsche's core criticism of Darwin. An important part of Nietzsche's response can best be understood as an aesthetic critique of Darwin, reacting to what he saw as Darwin having drained life of an essential component of objective aesthetic value. For Nietzsche, Darwin's theory is false because it is too intellectual, because it searches for rules, regulations, and uniformity in a realm where none of these are to be found - and, moreover, where they should not be found. Such a reading goes furthest toward making Nietzsche's criticism substantive and relevant. Finally, I attempt to relate this novel explanation of Nietzsche's critique to topics in contemporary philosophy of biology, particularly work on the evolutionary explanation of culture.