Parents’ Education Shapes,but Does Not Originate,the Disability Representations of Their Children

The present research tested whether children’s disability representations are influenced by cultural variables (e.g., social activities, parent education, custom complex variables) or by cognitive constraints. Four questionnaires were administered to a sample of 76 primary school aged children and one of their parents (n = 152). Questionnaires included both open-ended and closed-ended questions. The open-ended questions were created to collect uncensored personal explanations of disability, whereas the closed-ended questions were designed to elicit a response of agreement for statements built on the basis of the three most widespread disability models: individual, social, and biopsychosocial. For youngest children (6–8 years old), people with disabilities are thought of as being sick. This early disability representation of children is consistent with the individual model of disability and independent from parents’ disability explanations and representations. As children grow older (9–11 years old), knowledge regarding disability increases and stereotypical beliefs about disability decrease, by tending to espouse their parents representations. The individual model remains in the background for the adults too, emerging when the respondents rely on their most immediately available mental representation of disability such as when they respond to an open-ended question. These findings support that the youngest children are not completely permeable to social representations of disability likely due to cognitive constraints. Nevertheless, as the age grows, children appear educable on perspectives of disability adhering to a model of disability representation integral with social context and parent perspective.     

Frozen embryos, genetic information and reproductive rights

Recent ethical and legal challenges have arisen concerning the rights of individuals over their IVF embryos, leading to questions about how, when the wishes of parents regarding their embryos conflict, such situations ought to be resolved. A notion commonly invoked in relation to frozen embryo disputes is that of reproductive rights: a right to have (or not to have) children. This has sometimes been interpreted to mean a right to have, or not to have, one's own genetic children. But can such rights legitimately be asserted to give rise to claims over embryos? We examine the question of property in genetic material as applied to gametes and embryos, and whether rights over genetic information extend to grant control over IVF embryos. In particular we consider the purported right not to have one's own genetically related children from a property‐based perspective. We argue that even if we concede that such (property) rights do exist, those rights become limited in scope and application upon engaging in reproduction. We want to show that once an IVF embryo is created for the purpose of reproduction, any right not to have genetically‐related children that may be based in property rights over genetic information is ceded. There is thus no right to prevent one's IVF embryos from being brought to birth on the basis of a right to avoid having one's own genetic children. Although there may be reproductive rights over gametes and embryos, these are not grounded in genetic information.     

Questions of kinship and inheritance in pediatric genetics: substance and responsibility

Pediatric genetics is growing in significance as a tool to explain childhood illness and disability. Within both medical sociology and anthropology writers have explored whether investigating genetic inheritance can overemphasize biological connection over other versions of kinship and can also lead to new forms of responsibility being imposed on parents for being “guilty” of sharing problematic “substance” with their offspring. Such considerations are complicated by the fact that a child's genetic variation is not necessarily something they inherited from their parents. This paper explores how questions of inheritance and responsibility are brought into play by pediatric genetics. It does so by drawing on ethnographic research of a genetics service in the UK. In particular we highlight how understandings of kinship can be unsettled by genetic scrutiny, but that once unsettled are not resolved by establishing whether a child has or has not inherited a genetic condition from their parents. Instead existing cultural kinship understandings of the moral substance of kinship responsibility towards producing and raising the right kinds of children are of equal (if not more) importance.     

Ectogenesis,abortion and a right to the death of the fetus

Many people believe that the abortion debate will end when at some point in the future it will be possible for fetuses to develop outside the womb. Ectogenesis, as this technology is called, would make possible to reconcile pro‐life and pro‐choice positions. That is because it is commonly believed that there is no right to the death of the fetus if it can be detached alive and gestated in an artificial womb. Recently Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis defended this position, by arguing against three common arguments for a right to the death of the fetus. I claim that their arguments are mistaken. I argue that there is a right to the death of the fetus because gestating a fetus in an artificial womb when genetic parents refuse it violates their rights not to become a biological parent, their rights to genetic privacy and their property rights. The right to the death of the fetus, however, is not a woman's right but genetic parents’ collective right which only can be used together.     

Stocking the Genetic Supermarket: Reproductive Genetic Technologies and Collective Action Problems

Reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs) allow parents to decide whether their future children will have or lack certain genetic predispositions. A popular model that has been proposed for regulating access to RGTs is the ‘genetic supermarket’. In the genetic supermarket, parents are free to make decisions about which genes to select for their children with little state interference. One possible consequence of the genetic supermarket is that collective action problems will arise: if rational individuals use the genetic supermarket in isolation from one another, this may have a negative effect on society as a whole, including future generations. In this article we argue that RGTs targeting height, innate immunity, and certain cognitive traits could lead to collective action problems. We then discuss whether this risk could in principle justify state intervention in the genetic supermarket. We argue that there is a plausible prima facie case for the view that such state intervention would be justified and respond to a number of arguments that might be adduced against that view.     

Procreative beneficence: why we should select the best children

Eugenic selection of embryos is now possible by employing in vitro fertilization (IVF) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). While PGD is currently being employed for the purposes of detecting chromosomal abnormalities or inherited genetic abnormalities, it could in principle be used to test any genetic trait such as hair colour or eye colour.
Genetic research is rapidly progressing into the genetic basis of complex traits like intelligence and a gene has been identified for criminal behaviour in one family. Once the decision to have IVF is made, PGD has few 'costs' to couples, and people would be more inclined to use it to select less serious medical traits, such as a lower risk of developing Alzheimer Disease, or even for non-medical traits. PGD has already been used to select embryos of a desired gender in the absence of any history of sex-linked genetic disease.
I will argue that: (1) some non-disease genes affect the likelihood of us leading the best life; (2) we have a reason to use information which is available about such genes in our reproductive decision-making; (3) couples should select embryos or fetuses which are most likely to have the best life, based on available genetic information, including information about non-disease genes. I will also argue that we should allow selection for non-disease genes even if this maintains or increases social inequality. I will focus on genes for intelligence and sex selection.
I will defend a principle which I call Procreative Beneficence: couples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information.     

Orphaned at conception: the uncanny offspring of embryos

A number of advances in assisted reproduction have been greeted by the accusation that they would produce children 'without parents'. In this paper I will argue that while to date these accusations have been false, there is a limited but important sense in which they would be true of children born of a reproductive technology that is now on the horizon. If our genetic parents are those individuals from whom we have inherited 50% of our genes, then, unlike in any other reproductive scenario, children who were conceived from gametes derived from stem cell lines derived from discarded IVF embryos would have no genetic parents! This paper defends this claim and investigates its ethical implications. I argue that there are reasons to think that the creation of such embryos might be morally superior to the existing alternatives in an important set of circumstances.     

Accepting Adoption’s Uncertainty: The Limited Ethics of Pre-Adoption Genetic Testing

An increasing number of children are adopted in the United States from countries where both medical care and environmental conditions are extremely poor. In response to worries about the accuracy of medical histories, prospective adoptive parents increasingly request genetic testing of children prior to adoption. Though a general consensus on the ethics of pre-adoption genetic testing (PAGT) argues against permitting genetic testing on children available for adoption that is not also permitted for children in general, a view gaining traction argues for expanding the tests permitted. The reasoning behind this view is that the State has a duty to provide a child with parents who are the best “match,” and thus all information that advances this end should be obtained. While the matching argument aims to promote the best interests of children, I show how it rests on the claim that what is in the best interests of children available for adoption is for prospective adoptive parents to have their genetic preferences satisfied such that the “genetics” of the children they end up adopting accurately reflects those preferences. Instead of protecting a vulnerable population, I conclude, PAGT contributes to the risks of harm such children face as it encourages people with strong genetic preferences to adopt children whose genetic backgrounds will always be uncertain.     

ORPHANS BY DESIGN: THE FUTURE OF GENETIC PARENTHOOD

Establishing the nature of genetic parenthood is an important task. This is, firstly, because many people desire that relationship and it is in their interest to know what that is, and secondly, because there is a view that it may incur certain moral obligations between the genetic parent and their child. Many theorists have made attempts to define exactly what genetic parenthood is. I show that these definitions are deficient if they wish to fully capture all reproductive scenarios in ways that are intuitive and/or meaningful. Through a series of cases involving technologies such as cloning and genome editing, we see that in lieu of the traditional two parents, there are possible beings who have no genetic parents, one genetic parent, or many genetic parents. Establishing these cases complicates our understanding of genetic parenthood. From this, we must reconsider current definitions, as well as the usefulness of defining genetic parenthood in these complex cases. Here I do not aim to establish a new definition, but rather to suggest that this complexity makes it necessary to re‐assess the importance of the connection between genetic parenthood and parental obligations and authorities.     

Reconsidering cochlear implants: the lessons of Martha's Vineyard

I distinguish and assess three separate arguments utilized by the opponents of cochlear implants: that treating deafness as a medical condition is inappropriate since it is not a disability; that so treating it sends a message to the Deaf that they are of lesser worth; and that the use of such implants would signal the end of Deaf culture. I give some qualified support to the first and second claim, but find that the principal weight of the argument must be borne by the third argument: that use of the cochlear implants is impermissible because Deaf culture is intrinsically valuable. I show that this claim is, in practice, incompatible with the claim that deafness is not a disability: that the significant disadvantages suffered by the hearing impaired can only be corrected by measures that would end Deaf culture. Since the potential recipients of cochlear implants are, in the main, the prelingually deaf children of hearing parents, the burden of banning the implants would be borne by people who are not members of Deaf culture, and who owe that culture nothing over and above what we all owe cultures in general. I conclude that we cannot ask the parents of these children to sacrifice the interests of their children for the sake of Deaf culture.     

The Case for Conserving Disability

It is commonly believed that disability disqualifies people from full participation in or recognition by society. This view is rooted in eugenic logic, which tells us that our world would be a better place if disability could be eliminated. In opposition to this position, I argue that that disability is inherent in the human condition and consider the bioethical question of why we might want to conserve rather than eliminate disability from our shared world. To do so, I draw together an eclectic, rather than systematic, configuration of counter-eugenic arguments for conserving disability. The idea of preserving intact, keeping alive, and even encouraging to flourish denoted by conserve suggests that disabilities would be better understood as benefits rather than deficits. I present, then, a reading of disability as a potentially generative resource rather than unequivocally restrictive liability. In other words, what I consider here is the cultural and material contributions disability offers to the world.     

Assisted Dying & Disability

This article explores at least two dominant critiques of assisted dying from a disability rights perspective. In spite of these critiques, I conclude that assisted dying ought to be permissible. I arrive at the conclusion that if we respect and value people with disabilities, we ought to permit assisted dying. I do so in the following manner. First, I examine recent changes in legislation that have occurred since the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel on End‐of‐Life Decision‐Making report, published in this journal. I suggest that these changes are likely to only strengthen opposition to assisted dying from disability rights activists and people with disabilities. Second, I focus on respect for people with disabilities and in particular, respect for their autonomy and decision‐making abilities. Third, I explore the opposition to assisted dying that focuses on risk and the vulnerability of people with disabilities. Here I suggest that this risk ought not to be of special concern. Ultimately, I conclude that upholding respect for the disabled requires the legalization of assisted dying, rather than the denial of access in a misguided effort to protect people with disabilities.     

Body mass index and employment status: A new look

Earlier literature has usually modelled the impact of obesity on employment status as a binary choice (employed, yes/no). I provide new evidence on the impact of obesity on employment status by treating the dependent variable as a as a multinomial choice variable. Using data from a representative English survey, with measured height and weight on parents and children, I define employment status as one of four: working; looking for paid work; permanently not working due to disability; and, looking after home or family. I use a multinomial logit model controlling for a set of covariates. I also run instrumental variable models, instrumenting for Body Mass Index (BMI) based on genetic variation in weight. I find that BMI and obesity significantly increase the probability of “not working due to disability”. The results for the other employment outcomes are less clear. My findings also indicate that BMI affects employment through its effect on health. Factors other than health may be less important in explaining the impact of BMI/obesity on employment.     

Anonymity and informed consent in artificial procreation: a report from Denmark

The practice of informed consent in biomedicine is so widely spread that it must be considered the most important principle within bioethics, and the most universally appealed to within recent legislation. There seems to be a consensus as to its value in research on autonomous persons, but also a problem concerning its application when dealing with people having a serious mental, social or even physical disability.
Within the field of artificial procreation there are even more problems. Informed written consent is often demanded from anonymous donors of gametes in order to ensure their consent to the legal and moral consequences of their anonymity. The child resulting from the artificial procreation, on the contrary, cannot consent to, nor be informed before being conceived, of the secrecy laid on the identity of its genetic parents. Some countries resolve this problem by allowing the children, when they reach their majority, to obtain some information pertaining to the health or the identity of their genetic parents.
This presents ethical problems. It can be argued that the anonymity of the parents chiefly affects the children, so that an agreement on this point among parents, doctors and others must be regarded as invalid. The paper will argue that a law ensuring the complete anonymity of the parents is disregarding the informed consent and the interests of the children resulting from artificial procreation, and is thus doing more damage to society than good.     

Siblings with opposite chromosome constitutions,dup(2q)/del(7q) and del(2q)/dup(7q)

Chromosome 7q36 microdeletion syndrome is a rare genomic disorder characterized by underdevelopment of the brain, microcephaly, anomalies of the sex organs, and language problems. Developmental delay, intellectual disability, autistic spectrum disorders, BDMR syndrome, and unusual facial morphology are the key features of the chromosome 2q37 microdeletion syndrome. A genetic screening for two brothers with global developmental delay using high-resolution chromosomal analysis and subtelomeric multiplex ligation-dependent probe amplification revealed subtelomeric rearrangements on the same sites of 2q37.2 and 7q35, with reversed deletion and duplication. Both of them showed dysmorphic facial features, severe disability of physical and intellectual development, and abnormal genitalia with differential abnormalities in their phenotypes. The family did not have abnormal genetic phenotypes. According to the genetic analysis of their parents, adjacent-1 segregation from their mother's was suggested as a mechanism of their gene mutation. By comparing the phenotypes of our patients with previous reports on similar patients, we tried to obtain the information of related genes and their chromosomal locations.     

Anonymity and Informed Consent in Artificial Procreation

The practice of informed consent in biomedicine is so widely spread that it must be considered the most important principle within bioethics, and the most universally appealed to within recent legislation. There seems to be a consensus as to its value in research on autonomous persons, but also a problem concerning its application when dealing with people having a serious mental, social or even physical disability.
Within the field of artificial procreation there are even more problems. Informed written consent is often demanded from anonymous donors of gametes in order to ensure their consent to the legal and moral consequences of their anonymity. The child resulting from the artificial procreation, on the contrary, cannot consent to, nor be informed before being conceived, of the secrecy laid on the identity of its genetic parents. Some countries resolve this problem by allowing the children, when they reach their majority, to obtain some information pertaining to the health or the identity of their genetic parents.
This presents ethical problems. It can be argued that the anonymity of the parents chiefly affects the children, so that an agreement on this point among parents, doctors and others must be regarded as invalid. The paper will argue that a law ensuring the complete anonymity of the parents is disregarding the informed consent and the interests of the children resulting from artificial procreation, and is thus doing more damage to society than good.     

Paternal indirect genetic effects on offspring viability and the benefits of polyandry

Although females are expected to maximize their reproductive success with only one or a few matings, the females of many species mate with multiple partners. Experimental studies have found evidence for an increase in egg or embryo viability when females mate polyandrously. These studies have been interpreted in the context of genetic-benefit models that propose that multiple mating increases offspring viability because it allows females to select male genotypes that influence viability directly or because it allows females to avoid genetic incompatibility. However, no studies have examined directly the precise mechanisms by which parents influence embryo viability. Using a morphological marker that enabled us to determine paternity and survival of embryos sired by individual male crickets in both sperm-competitive and -noncompetitive situations, we show that males inducing high embryo viability enhance the viability of embryos sired by inferior males. These results indicate that paternal effects and interacting phenotypes determine embryo viability. They show that a male's reproductive success is modified by the interaction between indirect genetic effects of sperm competitors. Importantly, our findings show that the benefits accruing to offspring of multiply mated females need not be transmitted genetically.     

Tissue culture‐induced genomic alteration in maize (Zea mays) inbred lines and F1 hybrids

Genomic alteration is a common phenomenon associated with plant tissue culture, which often encompasses genetic changes and epigenetic modifications (e.g. cytosine methylation). Here, we studied genomic alteration in maize by assessing calli and regenerated plants derived from three inbred lines (M17, J7 and JC) and two pairs of reciprocal F1 hybrids (pair I: M17/J7 and J7/M17 and pair II: M17/JC and JC/M17). By employing two molecular markers, the amplified fragment length polymorphism and methylation‐sensitive amplified polymorphism, we found that both types of genomic alterations occurred in calli and regenerated plants of all the studied maize inbred lines and F1 hybrids, but the extent and pattern of changes varied substantially across the genotypes. Among the three inbred lines, M17 showed markedly higher frequencies of both genetic (from 2.1% to 3.8%) and methylation alterations (from 6.5% to 9.9%, by adding up the various patterns) than the other two lines which showed similar frequencies for both types of alterations (genetic: 0.5–1.8%, methylation: 2.1–3.7%). Of the two F1 hybrid pairs, while pair I showed genetic variation frequencies similar to that of the inbred parent with lower changing frequency and pair II was intermediate of those of the parents, both pairs showed frequencies of methylation alteration more or less intermediate of those of their inbred parental lines. Parent‐of‐origin effects in both genetic and methylation changes were detected in only one of the hybrid pairs (primarily pair II) for a given changing pattern. Statistical testing confirmed the genotypic difference in both genetic and methylation (hypomethylation) alterations among the regenerants. Taken together, it could be concluded that the frequency and pattern of both genetic and cytosine methylation alterations in maize tissue culture were largely genetic context‐dependent traits, but stochasticity also played an important part. F1 hybrids were not significantly more stable than their inbred parental lines under tissue culture conditions.     

CHEAP LISTENING? – REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF WRONGFUL DISABILITY1

This paper investigates the concept of wrongful disability. That concept suggests that parents are morally obligated to prevent the genetic transmission of certain conditions and so, if they do not, any resulting disability is 'wrongful'. In their book From Chance to Choice, Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wikler defend the concept of wrongful disability using the principle of avoidability via substitution. That principle is scrutinised here. It is argued that the idea of avoidability via substitution is both conceptually problematic and rather insensitive. Instead, it is suggested that the question of whether or not bringing a particular disability about is wrongful does not simply hinge on whether or not substitution takes place. Rather, it involves an evaluation of parental aspirations and responsibilities. It is argued that the desire need not be responsible for creating challenges for others that lie outside what is perceived to be an acceptable range provides a justification for termination of pregnancy on the grounds of projected disability that neither commits one to wrongful life claim, nor requires that one substitute a non-disabled child instead. The ramifications of such an approach are explored. The paper concludes by suggesting that the question of what is considered to be an acceptable range of human capability is an increasingly important one. It is argued that, when addressing that question, we should be acutely aware of the social context that may go some way to define what we consider to be an acceptable range.     

GENETIC ENGINEERING TO AVOID GENETIC NEGLECT: FROM CHANCE TO RESPONSIBILITY

Currently our assessment of whether someone is a good parent depends on the environmental inputs (or lack of such inputs) they give their children. But new genetic intervention technologies, to which we may soon have access, mean that how good a parent is will depend also on the genetic inputs they give their children. Each new piece of available technology threatens to open up another way that we can neglect our children. Our obligations to our children and our susceptibilities to corresponding legal and moral sanctions may be about to explosively increase. In this paper I argue that we should treat conventional neglect and ‘genetic neglect’– failing to use genetic intervention technologies to prevent serious diseases and disabilities – morally consistently. I conclude that in a range of cases parents will have a moral obligation to use genetic treatments to prevent serious disabilities in their children. My particular focus is on prenatal interventions and their impact of the bodily integrity of expectant mothers. I conclude that although bodily integrity constrains moral obligations, it is outweighed in a range of cases.