Virtue,foible, and practice--medicine's arduous moral triad

Moral distress is often discussed as a response to the moral dilemmas that professional and other caregivers encounter in their effort to balance competing moral principles, or to provide care in difficult cases, to difficult patients, in spite of difficult institutional requirements or policy. In this essay, a reforming ER clinician and teaching physician, offers a personal approach to moral distress. Assuming that a clinician's own foibles may sometimes contribute to another's distress, and that attempting to rationalize or subvert these foibles causes moral fatigue, he offers personal guidelines for healthcare providers--four strategies that less-than-perfect practitioners may use while striving to attain the ideal of the competent, compassionate, altruistic, calm, and wise clinician.     

Moral Distress,Workplace Health,and Intrinsic Harm

Moral distress is now being recognized as a frequent experience for many health care providers, and there's good evidence that it has a negative impact on the health care work environment. However, contemporary discussions of moral distress have several problems. First, they tend to rely on inadequate characterizations of moral distress. As a result, subsequent investigations regarding the frequency and consequences of moral distress often proceed without a clear understanding of the phenomenon being discussed, and thereby risk substantially misrepresenting the nature, frequency, and possible consequences of moral distress. These discussions also minimize the intrinsically harmful aspects of moral distress. This is a serious omission. Moral distress doesn't just have a negative impact on the health care work environment; it also directly harms the one who experiences it. In this paper, I claim that these problems can be addressed by first clarifying our understanding of moral distress, and then identifying what makes moral distress intrinsically harmful. I begin by identifying three common mistakes that characterizations of moral distress tend to make, and explaining why these mistakes are problematic. Next, I offer an account of moral distress that avoids these mistakes. Then, I defend the claim that moral distress is intrinsically harmful to the subject who experiences it. I conclude by explaining how acknowledging this aspect of moral distress should reshape our discussions about how best to deal with this phenomenon.     

Parental Moral Distress and Moral Schism in the Neonatal ICU

Ethical dilemmas in critical care may cause healthcare practitioners to experience moral distress: incoherence between what one believes to be best and what occurs. Given that paediatric decision-making typically involves parents, we propose that parents can also experience moral distress when faced with making value-laden decisions in the neonatal intensive care unit. We propose a new concept—that parents may experience “moral schism”—a genuine uncertainty regarding a value-based decision that is accompanied by emotional distress. Schism, unlike moral distress, is not caused by barriers to making and executing a decision that is deemed to be best by the decision-makers but rather an encounter of significant internal struggle. We explore factors that appear to contribute to both moral distress and “moral schism” for parents: the degree of available support, a sense of coherence of the situation, and a sense of responsibility. We propose that moral schism is an underappreciated concept that needs to be explicated and may be more prevalent than moral distress when exploring decision-making experiences for parents. We also suggest actions of healthcare providers that may help minimize parental “moral schism” and moral distress.     

Criticism and Depression among the Caregivers of At-Risk Mental State and First-Episode Psychosis Patients

Expressed emotion (EE), especially criticism, is an important predictor of outcomes for the patient for a wide range of mental health problems. To understand complex links between EE and various relevant variables in early phase psychosis, this study examined criticism, distress of caregivers, other patients’, and caregivers’ variables, and links between criticism and these variables in those with at-risk mental state (ARMS) for psychosis and first-episode psychosis (FEP). The participants were 56 patients (mean age 18.8 ± 4.2 years) with ARMS and their caregivers (49.4 ± 5.8 years) and 43 patients (21.7 ± 5.2 years) with FEP and their caregivers (49.3 ± 7.4 years). We investigated criticisms made by caregivers using the Japanese version of the Family Attitude Scale and caregiver depressive symptoms via the self-report Beck Depression Inventory. We also assessed psychiatric symptoms and functioning of the patients. Approximately one-third of caregivers of patients with ARMS or FEP had depressive symptoms, predominately with mild-to-moderate symptom levels, whereas only a small portion exhibited high criticism. The level of criticism and depression were comparable between ARMS and FEP caregivers. The link between criticism, caregivers’ depression, and patients’ symptoms were observed in FEP but not in ARMS caregivers. These findings imply that the interaction between criticism and caregivers’ and patients’ mental states may develop during or after the onset of established psychosis and interventions for the caregivers should be tailored to the patient’s specific stage of illness. Interventions for FEP caregivers should target their emotional distress and include education about patient’s general symptoms.     

The positive value of moral distress

Moral distress in healthcare has been an increasingly prevalent topic of discussion. Most authors characterize it as a negative phenomenon, while few have considered its potentially positive value. In this essay, I argue that moral distress can reveal and affirm some of our most important concerns as moral agents. Indeed, the experience of it under some circumstances appears to be partly constitutive of an honorable character and can allow for crucial moral maturation. The potentially positive value, then, is twofold; moral distress carries both aretaic and instrumental value. Granted, this position is not without its caveats, but by making these clear, I provide a novel framework for policy recommendations regarding when, if ever, we should work to reduce moral distress.     

Moral Distress Reexamined: A Feminist Interpretation of Nurses’ Identities, Relationships, and Responsibilites

Moral distress has been written about extensively in nursing and other fields. Often, however, it has not been used with much theoretical depth. This paper focuses on theorizing moral distress using feminist ethics, particularly the work of Margaret Urban Walker and Hilde Lindemann. Incorporating empirical findings, we argue that moral distress is the response to constraints experienced by nurses to their moral identities, responsibilities, and relationships. We recommend that health professionals get assistance in accounting for and communicating their values and responsibilities in situations of moral distress. We also discuss the importance of nurses creating “counterstories” of their work as knowledgeable and trustworthy professionals to repair their damaged moral identities, and, finally, we recommend that efforts toward shifting the goal of health care away from the prolongation of life at all costs to the relief of suffering to diminish the moral distress that is a common response to aggressive care at end-of-life.     

“Pensando Mucho” (“Thinking Too Much”): Embodied Distress Among Grandmothers in Nicaraguan Transnational Families

In this paper, I describe an embodied form of emotional distress expressed by Nicaraguan grandmothers caring for children of migrant mothers, “pensando mucho” (“thinking too much”). I draw on ethnographic fieldwork and semi-structured exploratory interviews about pensando mucho conducted with grandmother heads-of-household to show the cultural significance of this complaint within the context of women’s social roles as caregivers in transnational families. Adopting an interpretive and meaning-centered approach, I analyze the cultural significance of pensando mucho as expressed through women’s narratives about the impacts of mother outmigration on their personal and family lives. I show how women use pensando mucho to express the moral ambivalence of economic remittances and the uncertainty surrounding migration, particularly given cultural values for “unity” and “solidarity” in Nicaraguan family life. I also discuss the relationship between pensando mucho and dolor de cerebro (“brainache”) as a way of documenting the relationship between body/mind, emotional distress, and somatic suffering. The findings presented here suggest that further research on “thinking too much” is needed to assess whether this idiom is used by women of the grandmother generation in other cultural contexts to express embodied distress in relation to broader social transformations.     

REASONS TO REDEFINE MORAL DISTRESS: A FEMINIST EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS ANALYSIS

There has been increasing debate in recent years about the conceptualization of moral distress. Broadly speaking, two groups of scholars have emerged: those who agree with Jameton’s ‘narrow definition’ that focuses on constraint and those who argue that Jameton’s definition is insufficient and needs to be broadened. Using feminist empirical bioethics, we interviewed critical care nurses in the United Kingdom about their experiences and conceptualizations of moral distress. We provide our broader definition of moral distress and examples of data that both challenge and support our conceptualization. We pre‐empt and overcome three key challenges that could be levelled at our account and argue that there are good reasons to adopt our broader definition of moral distress when exploring prevalence of, and management strategies for, moral distress.     

Moral distress or moral comfort

Moral distress in healthcare results from a professional's inability to provide compassionate care to patients because of individual, organizational, or societal barriers. Research suggests that moral distress is a growing concern among nurses, and may be a major reason why nurses leave one job for another or abandon the profession of nursing. Some professionals, however, have identified strategies that help them work through their moral distress toward an experience of moral comfort. These strategies may be individual, organizational, or societal. The focus of this paper is to identify examples of strategies professionals have used to alleviate distressful feelings and enhance moral comfort.     

Moral fatigue--a nursing perspective

It is perhaps inevitable that a phenomenon called moral fatigue would be labeled, described, and applied to nurses, whose working environment has more than its share of moral conflicts. When professionals' duties to patients and their families--duties that are caught up in uncertainty and fast-paced institutional and cultural change--are made to seem irrelevant to the patients' real needs, the resulting discomfort of professionals is generally called moral distress. This article explores the dimensions of moral distress among nurses and presents moral fatigue as a holistic experience with both personal and institutional consequences.     

A Reflection on Moral Distress in Nursing Together With a Current Application of the Concept

The concept of moral distress can be extended from clinical settings to larger environmental concerns affecting health care. Moral distress—a common experience in complex societies—arises when individuals have clear moral judgments about societal practices, but have difficulty in finding a venue in which to express concerns. Since health care is large in scale and climate change is proving to be a major environmental problem, scaling down health care is inevitably a necessary element for mitigating climate change. Because it is extremely challenging to discuss these concerns in health care settings, those concerned about climate change and health care experience distress. This article outlines some philosophical concepts and perspectives that may be useful in mitigating this distress.     

Psychological and Physical Co-Morbidity among Urban South African Women

Objectives

There is substantial evidence for the links between poverty and both physical and mental health; but limited research on the relationship of physical and mental health problems exists in low- and middle-income countries. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the prevalence and co-morbidity of psychological distress among women with common physical diseases in a socio-economically disadvantaged urban area of South Africa.

Methods

Women enrolled in the Birth to twenty (Bt20) cohort study were evaluated for this paper. Bt20 was founded in 1990 and has followed more than 3,000 children and their caregivers since birth; this study evaluates the health of the caregivers (average age 44) of these children. Psychological distress was evaluated by administering the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-28) and we evaluated the presence of physical disease by self-report.

Results

Forty percent of the sample presented with psychological distress using the GHQ scoring method. More than half of the women who reported a history of a physical disease, including diabetes, heart attack, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, epilepsy, and tuberculosis, reported psychological disorder. Presence of one physical disease was not associated with increased rates of psychological distress. However, women who reported two diseases had increased rates of psychological symptoms, and this upward trend continued with each additional physical disease reported (measured to five).

Conclusions

These data indicate high prevalence rates of co-morbid psychological distress among women with physical disease. This argues for the need of greater mental health support for women living with physical diseases.     

Respiratory function of people with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis and caregiver distress level: a correlational study

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) is a rare, fatal neurodegenerative disorder with no curative treatment characterized by degeneration of motor neurons involving a progressive impairment of motor and respiratory functions. Most patients die of ventilator respiratory failure. Caregivers have a great influence on the patient"s quality of life as well as on the quality of care. Home influence of the caregiver on patient care is notable. To date, no study has investigated how psychological issues of caregivers would influence respiratory variables of ALS patients. The study aimed at finding out if there is a relationship between the respiratory function of ALS patients and the level of distress of their caregivers. METHODS: A cross-sectional study was conducted to investigate respiratory issues (PCF and FVC) and the perception of social support of ALS patients. Caregivers filled questionnaires about trait anxiety, depression, and burden of care. Forty ALS patients and their caregivers were recruited. RESULTS: FVC and PCF were positively related to patient perception of social support and negatively related to caregiver anxiety, depression, and burden. DISCUSSION: The distress of ALS caregivers is related to patient respiratory issues. The first and more intuitive explanation emphasizes the impact that the patient's clinical condition has with respect to the caregiver. However, it is possible to hypothesize that if caregivers feel psychologically better, their patient's quality of life improves and that a condition of greater well-being and relaxation could also increase ventilatory capacity. Furthermore, care management could be carried out more easily by caregivers who pay more attention to the patient's respiratory needs. CONCLUSION: Patient perception of social support and caregiver distress are related to respiratory issues in ALS.     

Impact of Psychopathy on Moral Judgments about Causing Fear and Physical Harm

Psychopathy is a personality variable associated with persistent immoral behaviors. Despite this, attempts to link moral reasoning deficits to psychopathic traits have yielded mixed results with many findings supporting intact moral reasoning in individuals with psychopathic traits. Abundant evidence shows that psychopathy impairs responses to others’ emotional distress. However, most studies of morality and psychopathy focus on judgments about causing others physical harm. Results of such studies may be inconsistent because physical harm is an imperfect proxy for emotional distress. No previous paradigm has explicitly separated judgments about physical harm and emotional distress and assessed how psychopathy affects each type of judgment. In three studies we found that psychopathy impairs judgments about causing others emotional distress (specifically fear) but minimally affects judgments about causing physical harm and that judgments about causing fear predict instrumental aggression in psychopathy. These findings are consistent with reports linking psychopathy to insensitivity to others’ fear, and suggest that sensitivity to others’ fear may play a fundamental role in the types of moral decision-making impaired by psychopathy.     

Moral Distress and its Interconnection with Moral Sensitivity and Moral Resilience: Viewed from the Philosophy of Viktor E. Frankl

The interconnection between moral distress, moral sensitivity, and moral resilience was explored by constructing two hypothetical scenarios based on a recent Swedish newspaper report. In the first scenario, a 77-year-old man, rational and awake, was coded as “do not resuscitate” (DNR) against his daughter’s wishes. The patient died in the presence of nurses who were not permitted to resuscitate him. The second scenario concerned a 41-year-old man, who had been in a coma for three weeks. He was also coded as “do not resuscitate” and, when he stopped breathing, was resuscitated by his father. The nurses persuaded the physician on call to resume life support treatment and the patient recovered. These scenarios were analyzed using Viktor Frankl’s existential philosophy, resulting in a conceivable theoretical connection between moral distress, moral sensitivity, and moral resilience. To substantiate our conclusion, we encourage further empirical research.     

Family solidarity and informal care: the case of care for people with dementia

According to Bayertz the core meaning of solidarity is the perception of mutual obligations between the members of a community. This definition leaves open the various ways solidarity is perceived by individuals in different communities and how it manifests itself in a particular community. This paper explores solidarity as manifested in the context of families in respect of caregiving for a family member who has become dependent because of disease or illness. Though family caregiving is based on the same perception of mutual obligation as the solidarity that supports welfare arrangements in society, the manifestation of solidarity in families is different. Solidarity that underpins welfare arrangements is based on a perception of mutual obligation towards an anonymous dependent other and is enforced by the government. Solidarity in families is directed towards a concrete other and is based on free choice, albeit often accompanied by a strong sense of personal duty. In this paper we try to distinguish between solidarity as a sociological concept and as a moral concept. An important moral element of solidarity, as expressed in families, is the need for recognition of family caregivers, not only of their concrete practical efforts, but also of their own identity as caregivers and as individuals. We illustrate this argument by referring to examples in the Nuffield Council on Bioethics report Dementia: ethical issues, about the experiences of family caregivers in dementia care and the importance for them of recognition of their role.     

Problemen en wensen van mantelzorgers van mensen met dementie: een vergelijking tussen de beginfase en latere fasen in het ziekteproces

This paper investigates whether informal caregivers of persons who have had symptoms of dementia for less than a year, differ from informal caregivers of persons in subsequent stages of dementia. Differences will be investigated in (a) problems experienced in the provision of informal care, (b) the use of ambulatory types of professional support, and (c) the need for additional professional support. Results are based on a survey among 1494 Dutch informal caregivers. Almost all informal caregivers experience problems in caring for a person with dementia, irrespective of the stage of the illness process. Their main problems concern dealing with changes in the behaviour of the person with dementia and dreading the person's admission to a nursing home. Informal caregivers of persons who have had symptoms of dementia for a longer period of time (> 1 year) also experience limitations in their social network. Most persons with dementia receive some kind of professional support. Still, the majority of informal caregivers indicate a need for additional professional support, mainly concerning advice and information. Limiting the available support options for persons with initial symptoms of dementia and their informal caregivers is therefore undesirable. Considering the need for additional support in the initial stage of dementia as well as in subsequent stages, persons with dementia and their informal caregivers should be supported during the entire illness process.