Recognising and Translating Knowledge: Navigating the Political,Epistemological, Legal and Ontological

What does it mean to call something ‘knowledge’ today? What does this recognition or translation require? And what does it entrain? This introduction makes a novel synthesis of contributions to the Special Issue and advances observations regarding the ‘mythic’ qualities of intellectual property law, the precipitation of ‘nature’, and the importance of attending to what is lost when things and practices are also called ‘knowledge’. The papers cohere around a timely set of observations and critiques: critiques of the way the knowledge economy makes demands and defines expectations about value; of how intellectual property law lies behind and shapes exclusions, inclusions, and inequalities; of the ‘mythic’ status of assumptions informing laws about ownership; and the implicit hierarchy contained within types of knowledge as understood through the categories of western epistemology. By taking up effect rather than veracity and certainty, contributors leave the definition of knowledge to ethnographic subjects. That is, they attend to where and how things come to be called knowledge, and for what reasons, noticing how equivalences across practices, made for the purpose of creating the possibility of exchange value (and thus of encouraging circulation) does its work at the expense of multiple aspects, values, and relations that are also discernable in social processes that produce ‘knowledge’.     

Welcome to the Club?: A response to The Cross -Border Connection by Roger Waldinger

Roger Waldinger's provocative book on migrants’ cross-border lives corroborates many insights already established by transnational migration scholarship. He makes a compelling case for the need to understand migration not just as assimilation – neo, segmented, or otherwise – but also as about how people continue to be simultaneously involved in their homelands, the countries where they settle, and other salient places. I am glad that Waldinger has lent his voice to correct the unproductive divide between immigration and emigration scholarship. But the ‘new’ path he charts forward to right what he sees as wrong with current scholarship is, at times, so selectively formulated and argued that it undercuts its effectiveness.     

Analogies and resonances in the process of ethnographic understanding

In this paper I explore the way in which anthropological understanding is engendered through analogies with an ethnographers experiential knowledge. This theme is addressed via an account of the development of my friendship with my ‘key informant,’ employing what Riesman (1977) calls a ‘disciplined introspection’ of what I as an ethnographer brought to the ethnographic encounter.     

The Anthropology of Personal Identity: Intellectual Property Rights Issues in Papua New Guinea,West Papua and Australia

This paper discusses large‐scale genealogical work at three projects in Papua New Guinea, West Papua and Australia and considers three questions: in what respects is genealogy intellectual property (IP) and, if so, who owns it; what were the regimes of permissions that permitted the collection of genealogical knowledge in each of the three cases; and what duty of care do collectors/curators of genealogical knowledge have in respect of preservation and safeguarding against improper use? It is argued that a new form of ‘emergent’ knowledge arises in which intellectual property rights (IPR) are unclear. What is more certain is that anthropologists owe a ‘cultural heritage duty of care’ towards genealogical information. The key criterion is that anthropologists must be in a position, and allowed by those who employ them, to guarantee ‘unbroken oversight’ of genealogical materials regardless of what media they are on or how they are stored.     

Epistemic artefacts: on the uses of complexity in anthropology

Distinctions between the ‘simple’ and the ‘complex’ have enjoyed a long and varied career in anthropology. Simplicity was once part of a collective fantasy about what life was like elsewhere, tingeing studies of tribal life with human longing for simpler ways of being. With the reflexive turn and the rise of cultural critique, simplicity has been all but excommunicated in favour of widespread diagnoses of complexity. In this article, I tease out some transformations in the uses of complexity in anthropology, and weave in some critical responses to these uses, spanning many decades, from within the discipline. I pay special attention to recent critiques by anthropologists who are beginning to grow weary of complexity as both an end‐in‐itself for scholarship and an empirical diagnosis. For these critics, complexity is deeply entwined with anthropological methods and knowledge practices. Drawing on these critical views, I suggest that complexity may be an epistemological artefact, rather than something that can be diagnosed ‘out there’, and offer a way of reframing complexity as a ‘dominant problematic’ in anthropology and beyond.     

30-year progress of membrane transport in plants

In the past 30 years enormous progress was made in plant membrane biology and transport physiology, a fact reflected in the appearance of textbooks. The first book dedicated to ‘Membrane Transport in Plants’ was published on the occasion of the ‘International Workshop on Membrane Transport in Plants’ held at the Nuclear Research Center, Jülich, Germany [Zimmermann and Dainty (eds) 1974] and was followed in 1976 by a related volume ‘Transport in plants II’ in the ‘Encyclopedia of plant physiology’ [Lüttge and Pitman (eds) 1976]. A broad spectrum of topics including thermodynamics of transport processes, water relations, primary reactions of photosynthesis, as well as more conventional aspects of membrane transport was presented. The aim of the editors of the first book was to bring advanced thermodynamical concepts to the attention of biologists and to show physical chemists and biophysicist what the more complex biological systems were like. To bundle known data on membrane transport in plants and relevant fields for mutual understanding, interdisciplinary research and clarification of problems were considered highly important for further progress in this scientific area of plant physiology. The present review will critically evaluate the progress in research in membrane transport in plants that was achieved during the past. How did ‘Membrane Transport in Plants’ progress within the 30 years between the publication of the first book about this topic (Zimmermann and Dainty 1974), a recent one with the same title (Blatt 2004), and today?     

Selfish altruism,fierce cooperation and the predator*

This paper suggests a new way to think about a famous question: what explains cooperation in nature and in particular in humans? I argue that, for an evolutionary biologist as well as a quantitative social scientist, the triangle of two ‘teammates’ in the presence of a predator (passing and shooting in two-on-one situations) is one of the fundamental conceptual building-blocks for understanding these phenomena because in such a situation the fact that life is packaged in many distinct enclosures (and not in one big monolithic blob) can unfold its comparative advantage. I show how, in the presence of a predator, cooperative equilibria emerge among entirely selfish teammates if we infinitesimally bias the lead player in the selfish direction or assign a computational burden on the predator due to the presence of a teammate. I argue that ‘predators’ are common in the biological jungle but also in everyday human settings. Intuitively, this paper builds on the simple idea – a familiar one to a biologist observing the natural world but perhaps less so to social scientists – that everybody has enemies.     

Forensic culture as epistemic culture: The sociology of forensic science

This paper explores whether we can interpret the notion of ‘forensic culture’ as something akin to what Knorr-Cetina called an ‘epistemic culture’. Can we speak of a ‘forensic culture’, and, if so, how is it similar to, or different from, other epistemic cultures that exist in what is conventionally called ‘science’? This question has important policy implications given the National Academy Science’s (NAS) recent identification of ‘culture’ as one of the problems at the root of what it identified as ‘serious deficiencies’ in U.S. forensic science and ‘scientific culture’ as an antidote to those problems. Finding the NAS’s characterisation of ‘scientific culture’ overly general and naïve, this paper offers a preliminary exploration of what might be called a ‘forensic culture’. Specifically, the paper explores the way in which few of the empirical findings accumulated by sociologists of science about research science seem to apply to forensic science. Instead, forensic science seems to have developed a distinct culture for which a sociological analysis will require new explanatory tools. Faithful sociological analysis of ‘forensic culture’ will be a necessary prerequisite for the kind of culture change prescribed by external reformist bodies like the NAS.     

LIBRARY LETTERS

Lampert, W. & Sommer, U. (1997) Limnoecology: the ecology of lakes and streams. Oxford University Press, Oxford. xiv+382 pp., figs, tables, index. Hardback: Price £37.50. ISBN 0-19-509592-8. This book is an English translation of a volume that was first published in German in 1992 and is the result of a collaboration between Winfried Lampert, Director at the Max Planck Institute for Limnology at Plon, and Ulrich Sommer, Professor of Biological Oceanography at the University of Kiel. The book was written in response to the criticism that most textbooks in ecology use examples that are drawn, almost exclusively, from terrestrial systems. The authors’ intention was to produce a book on limnology that would highlight fundamental principles and would thus be of interest to a much wider audience. The first chapter, ‘Ecology and evolution’, develops the theme by explaining that one of the main aims of ecology is to investigate not only how organisms are adapted to their environment but also why they have developed particular adaptations. A number of important concepts, such as the difference between proximate and ultimate factors, are discussed and illustrated with examples drawn from the aquatic literature. The second chapter, ‘Methods of ecological research’, describes some of the methods used to test hypotheses and includes advice on the design of laboratory and field experiments. Some of this advice may appear elementary, but experienced researchers would do well to remember that ‘correlation analysis can be used to draw numerical, but not functional, relationships.’ Chapter 3, ‘Special features of aquatic habitats’, has clearly been included for the sake of completeness. The basic physical and chemical characteristics of lakes are discussed in time-honoured fashion and a few pages devoted to the special characteristics of running waters. The organization of Chapter 4, ‘The individual in its habitat’, is rather unbalanced and clearly reflects the authors’ areas of special interest. The best sections in the chapter are those devoted to the functional responses of aquatic organisms and the feeding mechanisms of the microcrustacea. Chapter 5, ‘Populations’, combines an introduction to the basic principles of population ecology with a review of more recent issues, such as the concept of r and K selected organisms. The factors that control population size are discussed in a simple but informative way, and are illustrated with examples drawn from studies of phytoplankton and zooplankton. Chapter 6, ‘Interactions’, is the longest in the book and clearly reflects the author's interest in the temporal dynamics of planktonic crustacea. The chapter starts in a fairly traditional way by reviewing the competition models of Lotka-Volterra and Tilman but then pursues a number of specialist issues, such the impact of chemical signals (kairomones) on the growth of rotifers. Chapter 7, ‘Communities’, is largely devoted to a discussion of the ‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ controversy that has preoccupied plankton ecologists for several decades. The authors provide a commendably dispassionate overview of the historical argument and highlight some recent studies that try to reconcile these opposing views. The chapter includes a brief discussion of the causes and maintenance of diversity and ends with a somewhat displaced account of the river continuum concept. Chapter 8, ‘Ecosystem perspectives’, is another chapter that appears to have been written as a matter of duty. The carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus and silica cycles are, however, described before the authors return to the terra firma of plankton succession and the ‘climax’ concept. Chapter 9, ‘Final remarks’, is only three pages long but leaves the reader in no doubt as to why this book was written. The authors clearly view the recent trend towards more marketable ‘applied’ research with considerable concern: ‘The objective of this applied ecology is not the development of generalized theories, but the optimization of human living conditions.’ In a concluding paragraph, they point out that the relationship between ecology and environmental science can be compared to the relationship between physics and engineering. ‘Physics provides the fundamental materials from which the engineers make products.’ This is not a new definition of ecology, but we are left with the clear implication that this book would not have been written if the authors had spent most of their time working in the ‘engineering’ department! Like any book, its structure and content is strongly influenced by the specialist knowledge of the writers. The authors are at their best when they describe recent developments in their own fields of interest. The least satisfactory sections are the chapters and sections devoted to lake physics, chemistry and the spatial organization of limnetic systems. For example, in Chapter 3 the authors include a figure that purports to show that small vertical variations in water temperature can produce micro-layers of phytoplankton in the near-surface ‘mixed zone’. Thermally induced layers of this kind are periodically recorded in lakes, but in this example there is no evidence of any physical discontinuities. In 1892, Forel, a Swiss Professor, defined limnology as ‘the oceanography of lakes’. This book has not been designed as a textbook in that classical sense but provides an excellent introduction to those aspects of limnology that have a strong ecological bias. The book is well produced with clear line drawings and includes boxed sections of text that explain some technical issues in more detail. The translater should be congratulated for producing a text that reads very well in English and, as far as I can judge, conveys the philosophical as well as the factual message of the original text. Overall, it is a valuable, indeed elegant, addition to the existing English texts, which I would also recommend to those interested in general ecological theory.     

Troubled landscapes,troubling anthropology: co‐presence,necessity, and the making of ethnographic knowledge

If ‘co‐presence is a condition of [anthropological] inquiry’ (Fabian), what sort of knowledge does it produce? I explore this question through an ethnography of a ‘troubled landscape’ in Malaysian Borneo: a lush, hilly region that has been the site of a dam construction and resettlement project since the late 2000s. My article uses the notion of co‐presence as both a lens through which to explore the predicaments of the four small communities affected by the scheme and a reflexive device that underscores the embeddedness of the ethnographic encounter in a larger relational field – one characterized as much by chance and necessity as it is by anthropologists’ intellectual agendas. In the process, I seek to trouble some of the methodological and ethical issues posed by anthropology's recent ‘ontological turn’, notably the long‐standing questions of what it means to ‘take seriously’ and how ethnography and the ethnographer are implicated in this project.     

Wild justice and fair play: cooperation,forgiveness, and morality in animals

In this paper I argue that we can learn much about ‘wild justice’ and the evolutionary origins of social morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living animals, and that interdisciplinary cooperation will help immensely. In our efforts to learn more about the evolution of morality we need to broaden our comparative research to include animals other than non-human primates. If one is a good Darwinian, it is premature to claim that only humans can be empathic and moral beings. By asking the question ‘What is it like to be another animal?’ we can discover rules of engagement that guide animals in their social encounters. When I study dogs, for example, I try to be a ‘dogocentrist’ and practice ‘dogomorphism.’ My major arguments center on the following ‘big’ questions: Can animals be moral beings or do they merely act as if they are? What are the evolutionary roots of cooperation, fairness, trust, forgiveness, and morality? What do animals do when they engage in social play? How do animals negotiate agreements to cooperate, to forgive, to behave fairly, to develop trust? Can animals forgive? Why cooperate and play fairly? Why did play evolve as it has? Does ‘being fair’ mean being more fit – do individual variations in play influence an individual's reproductive fitness, are more virtuous individuals more fit than less virtuous individuals? What is the taxonomic distribution of cognitive skills and emotional capacities necessary for individuals to be able to behave fairly, to empathize, to behave morally? Can we use information about moral behavior in animals to help us understand ourselves? I conclude that there is strong selection for cooperative fair play in which individuals establish and maintain a social contract to play because there are mutual benefits when individuals adopt this strategy and group stability may be also be fostered. Numerous mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the initiation and maintenance of social play to keep others engaged, so that agreeing to play fairly and the resulting benefits of doing so can be readily achieved. I also claim that the ability to make accurate predictions about what an individual is likely to do in a given social situation is a useful litmus test for explaining what might be happening in an individual's brain during social encounters, and that intentional or representational explanations are often important for making these predictions.     

Can there be a truly systematic and comprehensive theory of race?

ABSTRACT

In this ambitious new book, Mustafa Emirbayer and Matthew Desmond contend that there has never been a truly comprehensive and systematic theory of race. They go on to argue that ‘Much of our best work no longer tells us how to understand or reconstruct racial dynamics but simply gives us concrete proof of their continuing significance’ (3). To what extent does The Racial Order theoretically advance existing theorizing of race? An important contribution – and a central plank in the book – is the way in which a wide variety of cultural and social phenomena is discussed and interwoven into the analysis. The authors draw most heavily on Bourdieu, Dewey, and Durkheim, in their elaboration of the racial order.     

Evolution Versus Creationism: A matter of acceptance versus belief

Scientists are often challenged about their ‘belief’ in evolution. Many creationists try to convince people that evolution is more of a ‘faith-based’ position or belief system than ‘real science’. This article examines the notion of acceptance versus belief and the relationship between knowledge, understanding and belief. It argues that adopting the acceptance of evolution over belief in evolution will help teachers deal with the challenges that inevitably arise in lessons on evolution in high school. Studies in philosophy show beliefs are often held without evidence, may be illogical and are difficult to change. Acceptance of a scientific explanation for a natural phenomenon, however, is based on evidence and allows for a change in disposition should new evidence come to light. With this in mind, removing the idea of ‘belief’ in evolution and talking about acceptance provides a sensible way to manage talk of creationism versus evolution, if and when it arises in the classroom.     

Beyond Anthropology,Towards Actuality1

Anthropology in Australia is at a critical juncture. This paper discusses the way in which the discipline has been challenged at the institutional level, in part due to pressures arising from economic rationalisation within universities. Anthropology, however, must take some responsibility for its condition. Psychology has established itself as the primary ‘human’ discipline to provide qualifications appropriate for professional employment. At a more scholarly level, anthropology's traditional zones of concern have been taken over by others, including history and cultural studies. Can we, and should we, demystify anthropology and its practices? Can we reposition anthropology with a broader vision of the human experience, and what will happen if we cannot?     

Do ‘we’ ‘do’ God? Linda Woodhead & Rebecca Catto (eds), Religion and change in modern Britain. London: Routledge.

What does it mean to talk of the religion ‘of’ a given country? I reflect on an edited volume dealing with religion in Britain and consider two related themes: the secular considered as ‘absence’ or ‘presence’, and the siting of religion not in conventional denominations or ritual practices but in spaces of encounter between religions, and between the so‐called ‘religious’ and ‘secular’.     

ENHANCING EVOLUTION AND ENHANCING EVOLUTION

It has been claimed in several places that the new genetic technologies allow humanity to achieve in a generation or two what might take natural selection hundreds of millennia in respect of the elimination of certain diseases and an increase in traits such as intelligence. More radically, it has been suggested that those same technologies could be used to instil characteristics that we might reasonably expect never to appear due to natural selection alone. John Harris, a proponent of this genomic optimism, claims in his book Enhancing Evolution that we not only have it in our power to enhance evolution, but that we also have a duty to do so. In this paper, I claim that Harris' hand is strong but that he overplays it nevertheless. He is correct to dismiss the arguments of the anti‐enhancement lobby and correct to say that enhancement is permissible; but ‘good’ is different from ‘permissible’ and his argument for the goodness of enhancement is less convincing. Moreover, he is simply wrong to claim that it generates a duty to enhance.     

Ectogenesis and gender-based oppression: Resisting the ideal of assimilation

In a recent article in this journal, Kathryn MacKay advances a defence of ectogenesis that is grounded in this technology’s potential to end—or at least mitigate the effects of—gender-based oppression. MacKay raises important issues concerning the socialization of women as ‘mothers’, and the harms that this socialization causes. She also considers ectogenesis as an ethically preferable alternative to gestational surrogacy and uterine transplantation, one that is less harmful to women and less subject to being co-opted to further oppressive ends. In this article, I challenge some of the assumptions that underlie MacKay’s case in favour of ectogenesis by questioning whether the relationship between women’s capacity to gestate and birth children and gender-based oppression is as strong as MacKay makes it out to be. I subsequently argue that—even if MacKay’s reading of this relationship is accurate—ectogenesis is not a desirable means to end gender-based oppression. It embodies a strategy that could be used to pursue liberating projects that follow what Iris Marion Young defines as ‘the ideal of assimilation’, but that must be resisted. I then concur with MacKay’s contention that ectogenesis is better than gestational surrogacy and uterine transplantation. My argument is that many of the problematic issues that MacKay herself sees as features of these practices will not disappear with ectogenesis. Finally, I conclude that MacKay’s narrow focus on women’s biology and ectogenesis as a solution to gender-based oppression results in the overlooking of broader systemic issues that contribute to the upholding of oppressive norms.     

Pro‐Life Arguments Against Infanticide and Why they are Not Convincing

Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article ‘After‐Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ has received a lot of criticism since its publishing. Part of the recent criticism has been made by pro‐life philosopher Christopher Kaczor, who argues against infanticide in his updated book ‘Ethics of Abortion’. Kaczor makes four arguments to show where Giubilini and Minerva's argument for permitting infanticide goes wrong. In this article I argue that Kaczor's arguments, and some similar arguments presented by other philosophers, are mistaken and cannot show Giubilini and Minerva's view to be flawed. I claim that if one wants to reject the permissibility of infanticide, one must find better arguments for doing so.