Extrapolating Weak Selection in Evolutionary Games

In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By “qualitatively valid” we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies . In particular, rank changes are almost certain for , which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection.     

Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates

The classical setting of evolutionary game theory, the replicator equation, assumes uniform interaction rates. The rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. Here we extend this framework by allowing the interaction rates to depend on the strategies. This extension leads to non-linear fitness functions. We show that a strict Nash equilibrium remains uninvadable for non-uniform interaction rates, but the conditions for evolutionary stability need to be modified. We analyze all games between two strategies. If the two strategies coexist or exclude each other, then the evolutionary dynamics do not change qualitatively, only the location of the equilibrium point changes. If, however, one strategy dominates the other in the classical setting, then the introduction of non-uniform interaction rates can lead to a pair of interior equilibria. For the Prisoner's Dilemma, non-uniform interaction rates allow the coexistence between cooperators and defectors. For the snowdrift game, non-uniform interaction rates change the equilibrium frequency of cooperators.     

Stable equilibrium strategies and penalty functions in a game of attrition

Maynard-Smith (1974) has presented a game of attrition model for animal conflict. He assumed that the penalty function, giving the cost in terms of fitness, of displaying for a given time period, is a linear function of the time of display. Under this assumption he shows that an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) always exists: one such is a mixed strategy for which display times have a negative exponential distribution. Given the diversity of reproductive strategies and patterns of agonistic behavior in nature, it is reasonable to consider games with different types of cost functions. In this paper it is shown that if more general cost functions are allowed (not necessarily linear), then ESS's still exist and give a great variety of distributions of display time. Supporting data are presented to suggest that these distributions may be found in nature. It is suggested that the interrelations between an animal's fitness budget and the game's penalty function will determine the nature of an ESS for different kinds of games.     

Evolutionary stability of ideal free nonlocal dispersal

We study the evolutionary stability of nonlocal dispersal strategies that can produce ideal free population distributions, that is, distributions where all individuals have equal fitness and there is no net movement of individuals at equilibrium. We find that the property of producing ideal free distributions is necessary and often sufficient for evolutionary stability. Our results extend those already developed for discrete diffusion models on finite patch networks to the case of nonlocal dispersal models based on integrodifferential equations. The analysis is based on the use of comparison methods and the construction of sub- and supersolutions.     

Evolutionary stability of ideal free nonlocal dispersal

We study the evolutionary stability of nonlocal dispersal strategies that can produce ideal free population distributions, that is, distributions where all individuals have equal fitness and there is no net movement of individuals at equilibrium. We find that the property of producing ideal free distributions is necessary and often sufficient for evolutionary stability. Our results extend those already developed for discrete diffusion models on finite patch networks to the case of nonlocal dispersal models based on integrodifferential equations. The analysis is based on the use of comparison methods and the construction of sub- and supersolutions.     

Bet-hedging--a triple trade-off between means, variances and correlations

In unpredictably varying environments, strategies that have a reduced variance in fitness can invade a population consisting of individuals that on average do better. Such strategies 'hedge their evolutionary bets' against the variability of the environment. The idea of bet-hedging arises from the fact that appropriate measure of long-term fitness is sensitive to variance, leading to the potential for strategies with a reduced mean fitness to invade and increase in frequency. Our aim is to review the conceptual foundation of bet-hedging as a mechanism that influences short- and long-term evolutionary processes. We do so by presenting a general model showing how evolutionary changes are affected by variance in fitness and how genotypic variance in fitness can be separated into variance in fitness at the level of the individuals and correlations in fitness among them. By breaking down genotypic fitness variance in this way the traditional divisions between conservative and diversified strategies are more easily intuited, and it is also shown that this division can be considered a false dichotomy, and is better viewed as two extreme points on a continuum. The model also sheds light on the ideas of within- and between-generation bet-hedging, which can also be generalized to be seen as two ends of a different continuum. We use a simple example to illustrate the virtues of our general model, as well as discuss the implications for systems where bet-hedging has been invoked as an explanation.     

Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies

In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found for the Wright-Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/n, or than another strategy, in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization of n×n games in the limit of weak selection.     

A theory for the evolutionary game

We present an evolutionary game theory. This theory differs in several respects from current theories related to Maynard Smith's pioneering work on evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). Most current work deals with two person matrix games. For these games the strategy set is finite. We consider evolutionary games which are defined over a continuous strategy set and which permit any number of players. Matrix games are included as a bilinear continuous game. However, under our definition, such games will not posses an ESS on the interior of the strategy set. We extend previous work on continuous games by developing an ESS definition which permits the ESS to be composed of a coalition of several strategies. This definition requires that the coalition must not only be stable with respect to perturbations in strategy frequencies which comprise the coalition, but the coalition must also satisfy the requirement that no mutant strategies can invade. Ecological processes are included in the model by explicitly considering population size and density dependent selection.     

Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity

The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory.     

Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations

Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces.     

Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies

We develop a new method for studying stochastic evolutionary game dynamics of mixed strategies. We consider the general situation: there are n pure strategies whose interactions are described by an n×n payoff matrix. Players can use mixed strategies, which are given by the vector (p₁,…,p_n). Each entry specifies the probability to use the corresponding pure strategy. The sum over all entries is one. Therefore, a mixed strategy is a point in the simplex S_n. We study evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed population of finite size. Individuals reproduce proportional to payoff. We consider the case of weak selection, which means the payoff from the game is only a small contribution to overall fitness. Reproduction can be subject to mutation; a mutant adopts a randomly chosen mixed strategy. We calculate the average abundance of every mixed strategy in the stationary distribution of the mutation-selection process. We find the crucial conditions that specify if a strategy is favored or opposed by selection. One condition holds for low mutation rate, another for high mutation rate. The result for any mutation rate is a linear combination of those two. As a specific example we study the Hawk-Dove game. We prove general statements about the relationship between games with pure and with mixed strategies.     

Game theory and evolution: finite size and absolute fitness measures

This article is concerned with the characterization and existence of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in Games against Nature, a class of models described by finite size populations and absolute fitness measures. We address these problems in terms of a new formalism which revolves around the concept evolutionary entropy, a measure of the diversity of options associated with a strategy pure - strategies have zero entropy, mixed strategies positive entropy. We invoke this formalism to show that ESS are characterized by extremal states of entropy. We illustrate this characterization of ESS by an analysis of the evolution of the sex ratio and the evolution of seed size.     

The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provide a new framework for studying selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a "one-third law" of evolutionary dynamics has been described, which states that strategy A fixates in a B-population with selective advantage if the fitness of A is greater than that of B when A has a frequency 13. This relationship holds for all evolutionary processes examined so far, from the Moran process to games on graphs. However, the origin of the "number"13 is not understood. In this paper we provide an intuitive explanation by studying the underlying stochastic processes. We find that in one invasion attempt, an individual interacts on average with B-players twice as often as with A-players, which yields the one-third law. We also show that the one-third law implies that the average Malthusian fitness of A is positive.     

Natural selection on age-specific fertilities in human females: comparison of individual-level fitness measures.

Lifetime reproductive success and timing of reproduction are key components of life-history evolution. To understand the evolution of reproductive schedules, it is important to use a measure of fitness that is sensitive both to reproductive quantity and reproductive timing. There is a contradiction between the theory, which mainly focuses on the rate measures of fitness (r and lambda), and empirical studies, which mainly use lifetime reproductive success (LRS), or some of its correlates, as a fitness measure. We measured phenotypic selection on age-specific fertilities in three pre-modern human populations using individually estimated finite rate of increase, er (lambda). We found that lambda and lifetime reproductive success ranked individuals differently according to their fitness: for example, a female giving birth to four children at a young age may actually have a higher fitness than a female giving birth to six children at a greater age. Increase in fertility at the young age classes (15-19 years) was favoured by selection, but the intensity of selection on fertility was higher in the older age classes (20-30 years), where the variance in fertility was highest. Hence, variation in fertility in the older age classes (20-30) was actually responsible for most of the observed variation in fitness among the individuals. Additionally, more than 90% of variation in fitness (lambda) was attributable to individual differences in LRS, whereas only about 5% of all variation in fitness was due to differences in the reproductive schedule. The rate-sensitive fitness measure did not significantly challenge the importance of total fertility as a component of fitness in humans. However, the rate-sensitive measure clearly allowed more accurate estimation of individual fitness, which may be important for answering some more specific questions.     

The marginal valuation of fertility

Substantial theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrates that fertility entails economic, physiological, and demographic trade-offs. The existence of trade-offs suggests that fitness should be maximized by an intermediate level of fertility, but this hypothesis has not had much support in the human life-history literature. We suggest that the difficulty of finding intermediate optima may be a function of the way fitness is calculated. Evolutionary analyses of human behavior typically use lifetime reproductive success as their fitness criterion. This fitness measure implicitly assumes that women are indifferent to the timing of reproduction and that they are risk-neutral in their reproductive decision-making. In this paper, we offer an alternative, easily-calculated fitness measure that accounts for differences in reproductive timing and yields clear preferences in the face of risky reproductive decision-making. Using historical demographic data from a genealogically-detailed dataset from 19th century Utah, we show that this measure is highly concave with respect to reproductive effort. This result has three major implications: (1) if births are properly timed, a lower-fertility reproductive strategy can have the same fitness as a high-fertility strategy, (2) intermediate optima are far more likely using fitness measures that are strongly concave with respect to effort, (3) we expect mothers to have strong investment preferences with respect to the risk inherent in reproduction.     

FITNESS TRADE-OFFS MEDIATED BY IMMUNOSUPPRESSION COSTS IN A SMALL MAMMAL

Trade-offs are widespread between life-history traits, such as reproduction and survival. However, their underlying physiological and behavioral mechanisms are less clear. One proposed physiological factor involves the trade-off between investment in male reproductive effort and immunity. Based on this hypothesis, we investigated differences in fitness between artificially selected immune response bank vole groups, Myodes glareolus . Significant heritability of immune response was found and a correlated response in testosterone levels to selection on immune function. Male reproductive effort, reproductive success, and survival of first generation offspring were assessed and we demonstrate a relationship between laboratory measured immune parameters and fitness parameters in field enclosures. We identify a trade-off between reproductive effort and survival with immune response and parasites as mediators. However, this trade-off results in equal male fitness in natural conditions, potentially demonstrating different male signaling strategies for either reproductive effort or survival. Females gain indirect genetic benefits for either genetic disease resistance or male reproductive effort, but not both. Immune response is genetically variable, genetically linked to testosterone and may indirectly maintain genetic variation for sexually selected traits. Evidence for both a genetic and a field trade-off between reproductive effort and survival indicates an evolutionary constraint on fitness traits.     

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games

Evolutionary game dynamics of two-player asymmetric games in finite populations is studied. We consider two roles in the game, roles α and β. α-players and β-players interact and gain payoffs. The game is described by a pair of matrices, which is called bimatrix. One's payoff in the game is interpreted as its fecundity, thus strategies are subject to natural selection. In addition, strategies can randomly mutate to others. We formulate a stochastic evolutionary game dynamics of bimatrix games as a frequency-dependent Moran process with mutation. We analytically derive the stationary distribution of strategies under weak selection. Our result provides a criterion for equilibrium selection in general bimatrix games.     

The different limits of weak selection and the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations

Evolutionary theory often resorts to weak selection, where different individuals have very similar fitness. Here, we relate two ways to introduce weak selection. The first considers evolutionary games described by payoff matrices with similar entries. This approach has recently attracted a lot of interest in the context of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. The second way to introduce weak selection is based on small distances in phenotype space and is a standard approach in kin-selection theory. Whereas both frameworks are interchangeable for constant fitness, frequency-dependent selection shows significant differences between them. We point out the difference between both limits of weak selection and discuss the condition under which the differences vanish. It turns out that this condition is fulfilled by the popular parametrization of the prisoner's dilemma in benefits and costs. However, for general payoff matrices differences between the two frameworks prevail.     

When does reproductive interference occur? Predictions and data

Reproductive interference is interspecific sexual interactions that are costly to at least one species involved. Although many studies have reported a substantial fitness cost associated with reproductive interference, suggesting its ecological significance, others have not observed reproductive interference in study species. Reproductive interference that incurs a large fitness cost is more likely to occur during secondary contacts than between long-coexisting species. I first explain the rationale underlying this prediction using existing literature. Next, I present a conceptual framework to classify pairs of interacting species into one of four states, defined by the ecological and evolutionary stabilities of the species pairs. I discuss how the stability states of species pairs are likely to change over time, along with changes in the demographic and evolutionary role of reproductive interference. I then perform literature survey to test the prediction that reproductive interference should be more prevalent in secondary contact. Finally, I discuss the implications of the proposed conceptual framework and literature survey result.     

Fitness in stratified societies

When wealth or social status can be transmitted from parents to offspring and when fitness depends on wealth or social status, evolutionary consequences of individual transmission strategies can be described by a parameter, called long-term fitness by Rogers (1990), which is the expected relative contribution of an individual to the gene pool in the long-term future. We show how to measure and use this parameter in two models of general interest in sociobiology. First, we construct a system with social classes and hypergynous marriage. Our treatment includes a method for computing the fitnesses of the two sexes separately. As expected, upper-class males have the highest long-term fitness in this kind of social structure, followed by lower-class females, then lower-class males and upper-class females. Upper-class preference for sons would be favored by selection in this system, but not female unwillingness to marry down—in this sense such systems do not conform to a Darwinian model. We then study a system with one sex and three social classes, the poorest of which has very low single generation fitness. In this system, the class with the highest single generation fitness does not have the highest long-term fitness. We suggest that this system is a useful model for understanding the changes in reproductive behavior that occured during the demographic transition in Europe. We suggest that the absence of a destitute lower class in Africa may help explain the failure, so far, for signs of demographic transition to appear in Africa.