Certainty in Categorical Judgment of Size

The certainty of judgment (or self-confidence) has been traditionally studied in relation with the accuracy. However, from an observer''s viewpoint, certainty may be more closely related to the consistency of judgment than to its accuracy: consistent judgments are objectively certain in the sense that any external observer can rely on these judgments to happen. The regions of certain vs. uncertain judgment were determined in a categorical rating experiment. The participants rated the size of visual objects on a 5-point scale. There was no feedback so that there were no constraints of accuracy. Individual data was examined, and the ratings were characterized by their frequency distributions (or categories). The main result was that the individual categories always presented a core of certainty where judgment was totally consistent, and large peripheries where judgment was inconsistent. In addition, the geometry of cores and boundaries exhibited several phenomena compatible with the literature on visual categorical judgment. The ubiquitous presence of cores in absence of accuracy constraints provided insights about objective certainty that may complement the literature on subjective certainty (self-confidence) and the accuracy of judgment.     

The Curious Anomaly of Skewed Judgment Distributions and Systematic Error in the Wisdom of Crowds

Judgment distributions are often skewed and we know little about why. This paper explains the phenomenon of skewed judgment distributions by introducing the augmented quincunx (AQ) model of sequential and probabilistic cue categorization by neurons of judges. In the process of developing inferences about true values, when neurons categorize cues better than chance, and when the particular true value is extreme compared to what is typical and anchored upon, then populations of judges form skewed judgment distributions with high probability. Moreover, the collective error made by these people can be inferred from how skewed their judgment distributions are, and in what direction they tilt. This implies not just that judgment distributions are shaped by cues, but that judgment distributions are cues themselves for the wisdom of crowds. The AQ model also predicts that judgment variance correlates positively with collective error, thereby challenging what is commonly believed about how diversity and collective intelligence relate. Data from 3053 judgment surveys about US macroeconomic variables obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and the Wall Street Journal provide strong support, and implications are discussed with reference to three central ideas on collective intelligence, these being Galton''s conjecture on the distribution of judgments, Muth''s rational expectations hypothesis, and Page''s diversity prediction theorem.     

Action Possibility Judgments of People with Varying Motor Abilities Due to Spinal Cord Injury

Predictions about one''s own action capabilities as well as the action capabilities of others are thought to be based on a simulation process involving linked perceptual and motor networks. Given the central role of motor experience in the formation of these networks, one''s present motor capabilities are thought to be the basis of their perceptual judgments about actions. However, it remains unknown whether the ability to form these action possibility judgments is affected by performance related changes in the motor system. To determine if judgments of action capabilities are affected by long-term changes in one''s own motor capabilities, participants with different degrees of upper-limb function due to their level (cervical vs. below cervical) of spinal cord injury (SCI) were tested on a perceptual-motor judgment task. Participants observed apparent motion videos of reciprocal aiming movements with varying levels of difficulty. For each movement, participants determined the shortest movement time (MT) at which they themselves and a young adult could perform the task while maintaining accuracy. Participants also performed the task. Analyses of MTs revealed that perceptual judgments for participant''s own movement capabilities were consistent with their actual performance- people with cervical SCI had longer judged and actual MTs than people with below cervical SCI. However, there were no between-group differences in judged MTs for the young adult. Although it is unclear how the judgments were adjusted (altered simulation vs. threshold modification), the data reveal that people with different motor capabilities due to SCI are not completely biased by their present capabilities and can effectively adjust their judgments to estimate the actions of others.     

Hybridisation in a Case of Diamond Theft in Rural Sierra Leone

ABSTRACT

Drawing on cultural studies, the concept of hybridity has emerged in peace and conflict studies as an important critique of the fragile failed/state discourse, and the binaries whereby the modern state is often contrasted with traditional or non-state actors. The concept is also challenged for reproducing the very binaries that it seeks to overcome and lacking analytical vigour. The paper addresses these critiques by exploring a case of diamond theft in rural Sierra Leone. It suggests an analytical shift from interaction between state institutions (police) and non-state authorities (traditional leaders) to focusing on processes of hybridisation through the enactment and performativity of authority. This is an analytical move from preconceived cultural and political entities to the subject and the simultaneous quality of how he or she assembles and projects authority. It is in the subject’s strategies and practices at the micro level that we clearly see how hybridisation processes occur.     

Implicit and Explicit Representations of Hand Position in Tool Use

Understanding the interactions of visual and proprioceptive information in tool use is important as it is the basis for learning of the tool''s kinematic transformation and thus skilled performance. This study investigated how the CNS combines seen cursor positions and felt hand positions under a visuo-motor rotation paradigm. Young and older adult participants performed aiming movements on a digitizer while looking at rotated visual feedback on a monitor. After each movement, they judged either the proprioceptively sensed hand direction or the visually sensed cursor direction. We identified asymmetric mutual biases with a strong visual dominance. Furthermore, we found a number of differences between explicit and implicit judgments of hand directions. The explicit judgments had considerably larger variability than the implicit judgments. The bias toward the cursor direction for the explicit judgments was about twice as strong as for the implicit judgments. The individual biases of explicit and implicit judgments were uncorrelated. Biases of these judgments exhibited opposite sequential effects. Moreover, age-related changes were also different between these judgments. The judgment variability was decreased and the bias toward the cursor direction was increased with increasing age only for the explicit judgments. These results indicate distinct explicit and implicit neural representations of hand direction, similar to the notion of distinct visual systems.     

Managing alterity from within: the ontological turn in anthropology and indigenous efforts to shape shamanism

The ontological turn is gaining momentum among many anthropologists today, evidenced by multiple debates and symposia in recent years addressing the role of ontological approaches within the discipline. Equal to the force of the ontological turn are the growing number of passionate critiques that question everything from the ethnographic and historical integrity of this body of work to its intellectual motivations and political effects. This article commends ontologists for bringing greater attention to the crucial role of spirits in many people's lives and for their efforts to gain deeper understandings of different realities. Yet we also agree with critics in their identification of various troubling tendencies in prominent ontologists’ analyses. We highlight how many of these disturbing inclinations emerge through ontologists’ attempts to connect their ethnographic analyses to Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's theory of multinaturalist perspectivism. Finally, we analyse one of the favourite research topics of those associated with the ontological turn – shamanism – in one of the regions most often heralded as an oasis of radical alterity – the Amazon – in a way that specifically aims to avoid the problematic orientations we identify. Specifically, we describe a series of historical changes in the relationships between shamans and indigenous leaders to draw attention to how relationships to shamanic power/knowledge are unevenly distributed, actively debated, and co‐constructed through changing historical and political contexts.     

The sanctity of life as a sacred value

The doctrine of the sanctity of life has traditionally been characterised as a Judeo-Christian doctrine that has it that bodily human life is an intrinsic good and that it is always impermissible to kill an innocent human. Abortion and euthanasia are often assumed to violate the doctrine. The doctrine is usually understood as being derived from religious dogma and, as such, not amenable to debate. I show that this characterisation of the doctrine is problematic in a number of ways, and I go on to rethink the doctrine. In doing so I follow in the footsteps of Ronald Dworkin, who offered a characterisation of the doctrine in his 1993 Life's Dominion, drawing on a conceptualisation of sacredness that is radically different from standard ones and not dependent on religious dogma. I'll argue that although Dworkin's efforts have much to recommend, his conceptualisation of sacredness is inadequate. Dworkin attempted to reconceptualise sacredness ‘from the armchair’. Here I explain how sacred values are thought of in anthropology and psychology and argue that the sanctity of human life should be understood in the same way. I'll explain how doing so allows us to resolve a number of conceptual problems that bedevil standard characterisations of the doctrine of the sanctity of life. I'll also consider the possibility of a compromise over the sanctity of human life, and as a consequence, compromise over the permissibility of abortion and euthanasia. I'll argue that such compromise is possible, albeit difficult to achieve.     

Neural Substrates for Judgment of Self-Agency in Ambiguous Situations

The sense of agency is the attribution of oneself as the cause of one’s own actions and their effects. Accurate agency judgments are essential for adaptive behaviors in dynamic environments, especially in conditions of uncertainty. However, it is unclear how agency judgments are made in ambiguous situations where self-agency and non-self-agency are both possible. Agency attribution is thus thought to require higher-order neurocognitive processes that integrate several possibilities. Furthermore, neural activity specific to self-attribution, as compared with non-self-attribution, may reflect higher-order critical operations that contribute to constructions of self-consciousness. Based on these assumptions, the present study focused on agency judgments under ambiguous conditions and examined the neural correlates of this operation with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Participants performed a simple but demanding agency-judgment task, which required them to report on whether they attributed their own action as the cause of a visual stimulus change. The temporal discrepancy between the participant’s action and the visual events was adaptively set to be maximally ambiguous for each individual on a trial-by-trial basis. Comparison with results for a control condition revealed that the judgment of agency was associated with activity in lateral temporo-parietal areas, medial frontal areas, the dorsolateral prefrontal area, and frontal operculum/insula regions. However, most of these areas did not differentiate between self- and non-self-attribution. Instead, self-attribution was associated with activity in posterior midline areas, including the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex. These results suggest that deliberate self-attribution of an external event is principally associated with activity in posterior midline structures, which is imperative for self-consciousness.     

Knowing Right From Wrong In Mental Arithmetic Judgments: Calibration Of Confidence Predicts The Development Of Accuracy

Does knowing when mental arithmetic judgments are right—and when they are wrong—lead to more accurate judgments over time? We hypothesize that the successful detection of errors (and avoidance of false alarms) may contribute to the development of mental arithmetic performance. Insight into error detection abilities can be gained by examining the “calibration” of mental arithmetic judgments—that is, the alignment between confidence in judgments and the accuracy of those judgments. Calibration may be viewed as a measure of metacognitive monitoring ability. We conducted a developmental longitudinal investigation of the relationship between the calibration of children''s mental arithmetic judgments and their performance on a mental arithmetic task. Annually between Grades 5 and 8, children completed a problem verification task in which they rapidly judged the accuracy of arithmetic expressions (e.g., 25+50 = 75) and rated their confidence in each judgment. Results showed that calibration was strongly related to concurrent mental arithmetic performance, that calibration continued to develop even as mental arithmetic accuracy approached ceiling, that poor calibration distinguished children with mathematics learning disability from both low and typically achieving children, and that better calibration in Grade 5 predicted larger gains in mental arithmetic accuracy between Grades 5 and 8. We propose that good calibration supports the implementation of cognitive control, leading to long-term improvement in mental arithmetic accuracy. Because mental arithmetic “fluency” is critical for higher-level mathematics competence, calibration of confidence in mental arithmetic judgments may represent a novel and important developmental predictor of future mathematics performance.     

Kinship intensity and the use of mental states in moral judgment across societies

Decades of research conducted in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic (WEIRD) societies have led many scholars to conclude that the use of mental states in moral judgment is a human cognitive universal, perhaps an adaptive strategy for selecting optimal social partners from a large pool of candidates. However, recent work from a more diverse array of societies suggests there may be important variation in how much people rely on mental states, with people in some societies judging accidental harms just as harshly as intentional ones. To explain this variation, we develop and test a novel cultural evolutionary theory proposing that the intensity of kin-based institutions will favor less attention to mental states when judging moral violations. First, to better illuminate the historical distribution of the use of intentions in moral judgment, we code and analyze anthropological observations from the Human Area Relations Files. This analysis shows that notions of strict liability—wherein the role for mental states is reduced—were common across diverse societies around the globe. Then, by expanding an existing vignette-based experimental dataset containing observations from 321 people in a diverse sample of 10 societies, we show that the intensity of a society's kin-based institutions can explain a substantial portion of the population-level variation in people's reliance on intentions in three different kinds of moral judgments. Together, these lines of evidence suggest that people's use of mental states has coevolved culturally to fit their local kin-based institutions. We suggest that although reliance on mental states has likely been a feature of moral judgment in human communities over historical and evolutionary time, the relational fluidity and weak kin ties of today's WEIRD societies position these populations' psychology at the extreme end of the global and historical spectrum.     

Explicit Logic Circuits Discriminate Neural States

The magnitude and apparent complexity of the brain''s connectivity have left explicit networks largely unexplored. As a result, the relationship between the organization of synaptic connections and how the brain processes information is poorly understood. A recently proposed retinal network that produces neural correlates of color vision is refined and extended here to a family of general logic circuits. For any combination of high and low activity in any set of neurons, one of the logic circuits can receive input from the neurons and activate a single output neuron whenever the input neurons have the given activity state. The strength of the output neuron''s response is a measure of the difference between the smallest of the high inputs and the largest of the low inputs. The networks generate correlates of known psychophysical phenomena. These results follow directly from the most cost-effective architectures for specific logic circuits and the minimal cellular capabilities of excitation and inhibition. The networks function dynamically, making their operation consistent with the speed of most brain functions. The networks show that well-known psychophysical phenomena do not require extraordinarily complex brain structures, and that a single network architecture can produce apparently disparate phenomena in different sensory systems.     

Your unconscious knows your name

One''s own name constitutes a unique part of conscious awareness – but does this also hold true for unconscious processing? The present study shows that the own name has the power to bias a person''s actions unconsciously even in conditions that render any other name ineffective. Participants judged whether a letter string on the screen was a name or a non-word while this target stimulus was preceded by a masked prime stimulus. Crucially, the participant''s own name was among these prime stimuli and facilitated reactions to following name targets whereas the name of another, yoked participant did not. Signal detection results confirmed that participants were not aware of any of the prime stimuli, including their own name. These results extend traditional findings on “breakthrough” phenomena of personally relevant stimuli to the domain of unconscious processing. Thus, the brain seems to possess adroit mechanisms to identify and process such stimuli even in the absence of conscious awareness.     

Kant’s concept of natural purpose and the reflecting power of judgement

This paper examines how in the ‘Critique of teleological judgment’ Kant characterized the concept of natural purpose in relation to and in distinction from the concepts of nature and the concept of purpose he had developed in his other critical writings. Kant maintained that neither the principles of mechanical science nor the pure concepts of the understanding through which we determine experience in general provide adequate conceptualizations of the unique capacities of organisms. He also held that although the concept of natural purpose was derived through reflection upon an analogy to human purposive activity in artistic production and moral action, it articulates a unique notion of intrinsic purposiveness. Kant restricted his critical reflections on organisms to phenomena that can be given to us in experience, criticizing speculations on their first origins or final purpose. But I argue that he held that the concept of natural purpose is a product of the reflecting power of judgment, rather than an empirical concept, and represents only the relation of things to our power of judgment. Yet it is necessary for the identification of organisms as organized and self-organizing, and as subject to unique norms and causal relations between parts and whole.     

Experiencing Physical Pain Leads to More Sympathetic Moral Judgments

Previous studies have shown that observing another’s pain can evoke other-oriented emotions, which instigate empathic concern for another’s needs. It is not clear whether experiencing first-hand physical pain may also evoke other-oriented emotion and thus influence people’s moral judgment. Based on the embodied simulation literature and neuroimaging evidence, the present research tested the idea that participants who experienced physical pain would be more sympathetic in their moral judgments. Study 1 showed that ice-induced physical pain facilitated higher self-assessments of empathy, which motivated participants to be more sympathetic in their moral judgments. Study 2 confirmed findings in study 1 and also showed that State Perspective Taking subscale of the State Empathy Scale mediated the effects of physical pain on moral judgment. These results provide support for embodied view of morality and for the view that pain can serve a positive psychosocial function.     

The Marriage of Psychoanalytic Methodology with the Biosemiotic Agenda

An overview of core phenomena and processes leading to Freud’s establishing his psycho-analytic method and early metatheoretical concepts is followed by the author’s revision of his topographical model into a seamless biosemiotic theory of mind and human communication. A careful methodological analysis of the semantic/referential scope; speech/listening processes, and semiotic features, of a dialogue designed to make the unconscious conscious, reveals an epistemological bridge between psychoanalytic methodology and the biosemiotic agenda within a unifying inter-penetrative paradigm.     

‘Keeping silent’: the problem of citizenship for Lilian Thuram

Abstract

Drawing upon translations of the football player Lilian Thuram's critiques of French racism and immigration, as well as other English language sources on the condition of banlieue life in France, this essay explores the relationship between citizenship and representation. Rather than merely reading Thuram as an athlete, I situate him as a political figure. The essay reads Thuram philosophically: as a figure who is familiar with and thinks the French and European political through its philosophical history. It is argued that Thuram's critiques are inexplicable unless they are understood as a redress to the very philosophical core of European modernity. Instead of presuming an inevitable relationship between citizenship and representation, this essay seeks to understand how representation works in relation to questions of citizenship and the limits of citizenship in contemporary Europe for those who are defined as Berber, black or Arab.     

Experimental Subjectification:The Pursuit of Human Embryonic Stem Cells in India

Drawing on Foucault's notion of subject formation or subjectification, this article shows how a process of experimental subjectification, a wilful submission and participation in seemingly experimental treatments, produces both empowering and life-affirming experiences as well as a critique of established scientific norms and practices. The article examines processes of experimental subjectification in the narratives of patients pursuing clinical application of human embryonic stem cells in India to treat chronic spinal cord injury and in the narrative of the director of the clinic providing the treatment. The article addresses how the clinic's director and patients from around the globe continue to successfully pursue embryonic stem cell therapies, despite intense media speculation and scientific scrutiny labelling the clinic as a maverick experimental site.     

Kant's concept of natural purpose and the reflecting power of judgement

This paper examines how in the 'Critique of teleological judgment' Kant characterized the concept of natural purpose in relation to and in distinction from the concepts of nature and the concept of purpose he had developed in his other critical writings. Kant maintained that neither the principles of mechanical science nor the pure concepts of the understanding through which we determine experience in general provide adequate conceptualizations of the unique capacities of organisms. He also held that although the concept of natural purpose was derived through reflection upon an analogy to human purposive activity in artistic production and moral action, it articulates a unique notion of intrinsic purposiveness. Kant restricted his critical reflections on organisms to phenomena that can be given to us in experience, criticizing speculations on their first origins or final purpose. But I argue that he held that the concept of natural purpose is a product of the reflecting power of judgment, rather than an empirical concept, and represents only the relation of things to our power of judgment. Yet it is necessary for the identification of organisms as organized and self-organizing, and as subject to unique norms and causal relations between parts and whole.