Money Affects Theory of Mind Differently by Gender

Theory of Mind (ToM) ─ the ability to understand other’s thoughts, intentions, and emotions ─ is important for navigating interpersonal relationships, avoiding conflict, and empathizing. Prior research has identified many factors that affect one’s ToM ability, but little work has examined how different kinds of monetary incentives affect ToM ability. We ask: Does money affect ToM ability? If so, how does the effect depend on the structure of monetary incentives? How do the differences depend on gender? We hypothesize that money will affect ToM ability differently by gender: monetary rewards increase males’ motivation to express ToM ability while simultaneously crowding out females’ motivation. This prediction is confirmed in an experiment that varies the structure of monetary rewards for correct answers in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). RMET scores decrease for females and increase for males with individual payments, and this effect is stronger with competitively-structured payments. RMET scores do not significantly change when monetary earnings go to a charity. Whether money improves or hinders ToM ability, and, hence, success in social interactions, thus depends on the interaction of gender and monetary incentive structure.     

The economic approach to 'theory of mind'

Theory of mind (ToM) is a great evolutionary achievement. It is a special intelligence that can assess not only one's own desires and beliefs, but also those of others. Whether it is uniquely human or not is controversial, but it is clear that humans are, at least, significantly better at ToM than any other animal. Economists and game theorists have developed sophisticated and powerful models of ToM and we provide a detailed summary of this here. This economic ToM entails a hierarchy of beliefs. I know my preferences, and I have beliefs (a probabilistic distribution) about your preferences, beliefs about your beliefs about my preferences, and so on. We then contrast this economic ToM with the theoretical approaches of neuroscience and with empirical data in general. Although this economic view provides a benchmark and makes useful suggestions about empirical tendencies, it does not always generate a close fit with the data. This provides an opportunity for a synergistic interdisciplinary production of a falsifiable theory of bounded rationality. In particular, a ToM that is founded on evolutionary biology might well be sufficiently structured to have predictive power, while remaining quite general. We sketch two papers that represent preliminary steps in this direction.     

A Shared Neural Substrate for Mentalizing and the Affective Component of Sentence Comprehension

Using event-related fMRI in a sample of 42 healthy participants, we compared the cerebral activity maps obtained when classifying spoken sentences based on the mental content of the main character (belief, deception or empathy) or on the emotional tonality of the sentence (happiness, anger or sadness). To control for the effects of different syntactic constructions (such as embedded clauses in belief sentences), we subtracted from each map the BOLD activations obtained during plausibility judgments on structurally matching sentences, devoid of emotions or ToM. The obtained theory of mind (ToM) and emotional speech comprehension networks overlapped in the bilateral temporo-parietal junction, posterior cingulate cortex, right anterior temporal lobe, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and in the left inferior frontal sulcus. These regions form a ToM network, which contributes to the emotional component of spoken sentence comprehension. Compared with the ToM task, in which the sentences were enounced on a neutral tone, the emotional sentence classification task, in which the sentences were play-acted, was associated with a greater activity in the bilateral superior temporal sulcus, in line with the presence of emotional prosody. Besides, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was more active during emotional than ToM sentence processing. This region may link mental state representations with verbal and prosodic emotional cues. Compared with emotional sentence classification, ToM was associated with greater activity in the caudate nucleus, paracingulate cortex, and superior frontal and parietal regions, in line with behavioral data showing that ToM sentence comprehension was a more demanding task.     

Subthalamic Nucleus Stimulation Affects Theory of Mind Network: A PET Study in Parkinson's Disease

Background

There appears to be an overlap between the limbic system, which is modulated by subthalamic nucleus (STN) deep brain stimulation (DBS) in Parkinson''s disease (PD), and the brain network that mediates theory of mind (ToM). Accordingly, the aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of STN DBS on ToM of PD patients and to correlate ToM modifications with changes in glucose metabolism.

Methodology/Principal Findings

To this end, we conducted ¹⁸FDG-PET scans in 13 PD patients in pre- and post-STN DBS conditions and correlated changes in their glucose metabolism with modified performances on the Eyes test, a visual ToM task requiring them to describe thoughts or feelings conveyed by photographs of the eye region. Postoperative PD performances on this emotion recognition task were significantly worse than either preoperative PD performances or those of healthy controls (HC), whereas there was no significant difference between preoperative PD and HC. Conversely, PD patients in the postoperative condition performed within the normal range on the gender attribution task included in the Eyes test. As far as the metabolic results are concerned, there were correlations between decreased cerebral glucose metabolism and impaired ToM in several cortical areas: the bilateral cingulate gyrus (BA 31), right middle frontal gyrus (BA 8, 9 and 10), left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), temporal lobe (fusiform gyrus, BA 20), bilateral parietal lobe (right BA 3 and right and left BA 7) and bilateral occipital lobe (BA 19). There were also correlations between increased cerebral glucose metabolism and impaired ToM in the left superior temporal gyrus (BA 22), left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 13 and BA 47) and right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47). All these structures overlap with the brain network that mediates ToM.

Conclusion/Significance

These results seem to confirm that STN DBS hinders the ability to infer the mental states of others and modulates a distributed network known to subtend ToM.     

Using Fiction to Assess Mental State Understanding: A New Task for Assessing Theory of Mind in Adults

Social functioning depends on the ability to attribute and reason about the mental states of others – an ability known as theory of mind (ToM). Research in this field is limited by the use of tasks in which ceiling effects are ubiquitous, rendering them insensitive to individual differences in ToM ability and instances of subtle ToM impairment. Here, we present data from a new ToM task – the Short Story Task (SST) - intended to improve upon many aspects of existing ToM measures. More specifically, the SST was designed to: (a) assess the full range of individual differences in ToM ability without suffering from ceiling effects; (b) incorporate a range of mental states of differing complexity, including epistemic states, affective states, and intentions to be inferred from a first- and second-order level; (c) use ToM stimuli representative of real-world social interactions; (d) require participants to utilize social context when making mental state inferences; (e) exhibit adequate psychometric properties; and (f) be quick and easy to administer and score. In the task, participants read a short story and were asked questions that assessed explicit mental state reasoning, spontaneous mental state inference, and comprehension of the non-mental aspects of the story. Responses were scored according to a rubric that assigned greater points for accurate mental state attributions that included multiple characters’ mental states. Results demonstrate that the SST is sensitive to variation in ToM ability, can be accurately scored by multiple raters, and exhibits concurrent validity with other social cognitive tasks. The results support the effectiveness of this new measure of ToM in the study of social cognition. The findings are also consistent with studies demonstrating significant relationships among narrative transportation, ToM, and the reading of fiction. Together, the data indicate that reading fiction may be an avenue for improving ToM ability.     

Investigating the Genetic Basis of Theory of Mind (ToM): The Role of Catechol-O-Methyltransferase (COMT) Gene Polymorphisms

The ability to deduce other persons'' mental states and emotions which has been termed ‘theory of mind (ToM)’ is highly heritable. First molecular genetic studies focused on some dopamine-related genes, while the genetic basis underlying different components of ToM (affective ToM and cognitive ToM) remain unknown. The current study tested 7 candidate polymorphisms (rs4680, rs4633, rs2020917, rs2239393, rs737865, rs174699 and rs59938883) on the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) gene. We investigated how these polymorphisms relate to different components of ToM. 101 adults participated in our study; all were genetically unrelated, non-clinical and healthy Chinese subjects. Different ToM tasks were applied to detect their theory of mind ability. The results showed that the COMT gene rs2020917 and rs737865 SNPs were associated with cognitive ToM performance, while the COMT gene rs5993883 SNP was related to affective ToM, in which a significant gender-genotype interaction was found (p = 0.039). Our results highlighted the contribution of DA-related COMT gene on ToM performance. Moreover, we found out that the different SNP at the same gene relates to the discriminative aspect of ToM. Our research provides some preliminary evidence to the genetic basis of theory of mind which still awaits further studies.     

Rhesus monkeys attribute perceptions to others

Paramount among human cognitive abilities is the capacity to reason about what others think, want, and see--a capacity referred to as a theory of mind (ToM). Despite its importance in human cognition, the extent to which other primates share human ToM capacities has for decades remained a mystery. To date, primates [1, 2] have performed poorly in behavioral tasks that require ToM abilities, despite the fact that some macaques are known to encode social stimuli at the level of single neurons [3-5]. Here, we presented rhesus macaques with a more ecologically relevant ToM task in which subjects could "steal" a contested grape from one of two human competitors. In six experiments, monkeys selectively retrieved the grape from an experimenter who was incapable of seeing the grape rather than an experimenter who was visually aware. These results suggest that rhesus macaques possess an essential component of ToM: the ability to deduce what others perceive on the basis of where they are looking. These results converge with new findings illustrating the importance of competitive paradigms in apes [6]. Moreover, they raise the possibility that, in primates, cortical cells thought to encode where others are looking [7] may encode what those individuals see as well.     

Neuroanatomical Correlates of Theory of Mind Deficit in Parkinson’s Disease: A Multimodal Imaging Study

BackgroundParkinson’s disease (PD) patients show theory of mind (ToM) deficit since the early stages of the disease, and this deficit has been associated with working memory, executive functions and quality of life impairment. To date, neuroanatomical correlates of ToM have not been assessed with magnetic resonance imaging in PD. The main objective of this study was to assess cerebral correlates of ToM deficit in PD. The second objective was to explore the relationships between ToM, working memory and executive functions, and to analyse the neural correlates of ToM, controlling for both working memory and executive functions.MethodsThirty-seven PD patients (Hoehn and Yahr median = 2.0) and 15 healthy controls underwent a neuropsychological assessment and magnetic resonance images in a 3T-scanner were acquired. T1-weighted images were analysed with voxel-based morphometry, and white matter integrity and diffusivity measures were obtained from diffusion weighted images and analysed using tract-based spatial statistics.ResultsPD patients showed impairments in ToM, working memory and executive functions; grey matter loss and white matter reduction compared to healthy controls. Grey matter volume decrease in the precentral and postcentral gyrus, middle and inferior frontal gyrus correlated with ToM deficit in PD. White matter in the superior longitudinal fasciculus (adjacent to the parietal lobe) and white matter adjacent to the frontal lobe correlated with ToM impairment in PD. After controlling for executive functions, the relationship between ToM deficit and white matter remained significant for white matter areas adjacent to the precuneus and the parietal lobe.ConclusionsFindings reinforce the existence of ToM impairment from the early Hoehn and Yahr stages in PD, and the findings suggest associations with white matter and grey matter volume decrease. This study contributes to better understand ToM deficit and its neural correlates in PD, which is a basic skill for development of healthy social relationships.     

Theory of mind and the social brain: implications for understanding the genetic basis of schizophrenia

Genome‐wide association studies in schizophrenia have recently made significant progress in our understanding of the complex genetic architecture of this disorder. Many genetic loci have been identified and now require functional investigation. One approach involves studying their correlation with neuroimaging and neurocognitive endophenotypes. Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits are well established in schizophrenia and they appear to fulfill criteria for being considered an endophenotype. We aim to review the behavioral and neuroimaging‐based studies of ToM in schizophrenia, assess its suitability as an endophenotype, discuss current findings, and propose future research directions. Suitable research articles were sourced from a comprehensive literature search and from references identified through other studies. ToM deficits are repeatable, stable, and heritable: First‐episode patients, those in remission and unaffected relatives all show deficits. Activation and structural differences in brain regions believed important for ToM are also consistently reported in schizophrenia patients at all stages of illness, although no research to date has examined unaffected relatives. Studies using ToM as an endophenotype are providing interesting genetic associations with both single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and specific copy number variations (CNVs) such as the 22q11.2 deletion syndrome. We conclude that ToM is an important cognitive endophenotype for consideration in future studies addressing the complex genetic architecture of schizophrenia, and may help identify more homogeneous clinical sub‐types for further study     

Psychosis-Proneness and Neural Correlates of Self-Inhibition in Theory of Mind

Impaired Theory of Mind (ToM) has been repeatedly reported as a feature of psychotic disorders. ToM is crucial in social interactions and for the development of social behavior. It has been suggested that reasoning about the belief of others, requires inhibition of the self-perspective. We investigated the neural correlates of self-inhibition in nineteen low psychosis prone (PP) and eighteen high PP subjects presenting with subclinical features. High PP subjects have a more than tenfold increased risk of developing a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. Brain activation was measured with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging during a ToM task differentiating between self-perspective inhibition and belief reasoning. Furthermore, to test underlying inhibitory mechanisms, we included a stop-signal task. We predicted worse behavioral performance for high compared to low PP subjects on both tasks. Moreover, based on previous neuroimaging results, different activation patterns were expected in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in high versus low PP subjects in self-perspective inhibition and simple response inhibition. Results showed increased activation in left IFG during self-perspective inhibition, but not during simple response inhibition, for high PP subjects as compared to low PP subjects. High and low PP subjects showed equal behavioral performance. The results suggest that at a neural level, high PP subjects need more resources for inhibiting the self-perspective, but not for simple motor response inhibition, to equal the performance of low PP subjects. This may reflect a compensatory mechanism, which may no longer be available for patients with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders resulting in ToM impairments.     

Prey transport in "palatine-erecting" elapid snakes

Cobras and mambas are members of a group of elapid snakes supposedly united by the morphology and inferred behavior of their palatine bone during prey transport (palatine erectors). The palatine erectors investigated (Dendroaspis polylepis, Naja pallida, Ophiophagus hannah, Aspidelaps scutatus, A. lubricus) show differences in the morphology of their feeding apparatus that do not affect the overall behavior of the system. We delineated the structures directly involved in producing palatine erection during prey transport. Palatine erection can be achieved by a colubroid muscle contraction pattern acting on a palato-pterygoid bar with a movable palato-pterygoid joint and a palatine that is stabilized against the snout. The palatine characters originally proposed to cause palatine erection are not required to produce the behavior and actually impede it in Naja pallida. Palatine-erecting elapids share a fundamental design of the palato-maxillary apparatus with all higher snakes. A set of plesiomorphic core characters is functionally integrated to function in prey transport using the pterygoid walk. Variant characters are either part of a structural periphery unrelated to the core structures that define function or patterns of variation are subordinate character sets operating within functional thresholds of a single system.     

Reading the Mind in the Eyes or Reading between the Lines? Theory of Mind Predicts Collective Intelligence Equally Well Online and Face-To-Face

Recent research with face-to-face groups found that a measure of general group effectiveness (called “collective intelligence”) predicted a group’s performance on a wide range of different tasks. The same research also found that collective intelligence was correlated with the individual group members’ ability to reason about the mental states of others (an ability called “Theory of Mind” or “ToM”). Since ToM was measured in this work by a test that requires participants to “read” the mental states of others from looking at their eyes (the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test), it is uncertain whether the same results would emerge in online groups where these visual cues are not available. Here we find that: (1) a collective intelligence factor characterizes group performance approximately as well for online groups as for face-to-face groups; and (2) surprisingly, the ToM measure is equally predictive of collective intelligence in both face-to-face and online groups, even though the online groups communicate only via text and never see each other at all. This provides strong evidence that ToM abilities are just as important to group performance in online environments with limited nonverbal cues as they are face-to-face. It also suggests that the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test measures a deeper, domain-independent aspect of social reasoning, not merely the ability to recognize facial expressions of mental states.     

Evidence for cognition without grammar from causal reasoning and 'theory of mind' in an agrammatic aphasic patient

Understanding the inter-relationship between language and thought is fundamental to the study of human cognition [1] [2] [3]. Some investigators have proposed that propositions in natural language serve to scaffold thinking, by providing, for example, a sequential structure to a massively parallel process [4]. Others have maintained that certain thoughts, such as inferring the mental states of others, termed 'theory of mind' (ToM) reasoning, and identifying causal relationships, necessarily involve language propositions [5]. It has been proposed that ToM reasoning depends upon the possession of syntactic structures such as those that permit the embedding of false propositions within true statements ('Mary knows that John (falsely) thinks chocolates are in the cupboard') [6]. The performance on reasoning tasks of individuals with severe agrammatic aphasia (an impairment of language following a lesion of the perisylvian areas of the language-dominant hemisphere) offers novel insights into the relation between grammar and cognition. We report the unusual case of a patient with agrammatic aphasia of such severity that language propositions were not apparently available at an explicit processing level in any modality of language use. Despite this profound impairment in grammar, he displayed simple causal reasoning and ToM understanding. Thus, reasoning about causes and beliefs involve processes that are independent of propositional language.     

Evidence of social understanding impairment in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis

The present study aims at clarifying the nature of the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits associated with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS). ToM is the ability to attribute mental states such as intentions and beliefs to others in order to understand and predict their behaviour and to behave accordingly. Several neuroimaging studies reported the prefrontal cortices as the brain region underlying a key ToM ability, i.e. the comprehension of social intentions. Dysfunction of the prefrontal cortices in patients with ALS has been indicated by a range of neuroimaging studies. The frontal syndrome that appears to characterize up to 50% of ALS has been noted to be similar to the profile that characterizes patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD), a neurodegenerative condition characterised by ToM deficits. In the present paper, we hypothesize that the performance of patients with ALS is significantly worse than healthy controls' performance on tasks requiring the comprehension of social contexts, whereas patients' performance is comparable to healthy controls' performance on tasks not requiring the comprehension of social contexts. To this end, we tested 15 patients with ALS with an experimental protocol that distinguishes between private (non-social) intentions and social intentions. The pattern of results followed the experimental hypothesis: the performance of patients with ALS and healthy controls significantly differed on the comprehension of social context only, with an impairment in patients with ALS. Single case analysis confirmed the findings at an individual level. The present study is the first which has examined and compared the understanding of social and non-social contexts in patients with ALS and shown a specific and selective deficit in the former only. The current findings further support the notion of a continuum of cognitive dysfunction ranging from ALS to FTD, with parallel cognitive profiles in both disorders.     

Oxytocin and vasopressin hormone genes in children's externalizing problems: A cognitive endophenotype approach

Externalizing problems are among the most common mental health problems of children. Research suggests that these problems are heritable, yet little is known about the specific genes involved in their pathophysiology. The current study examined a genotype-endophenotype-phenotype model of externalizing problems in 320 preschool-aged children. Markers of the oxytocin (OXT) and arginine vasopressin (AVP) hormone genes were selected as candidates owing to their known association with psychopathology in other domains. We tested whether OXT and AVP variants were related to children's externalizing problems, as well as two cognitive endophenotypes presumed to underlie these problems: theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF). Externalizing problems were assessed at age 4.5 using a previously-validated rating scale. ToM and EF were measured with age-appropriate tasks. Using a family-based association design and controlling for non-genomic confounds, support was found for an association between a two-marker OXT haplotype (rs2740210–rs2770378) and a two-marker AVP haplotype (rs1887854–rs3761249) and externalizing problems. Specific associations of these haplotypes with ToM and EF were also observed. Further, ToM and EF were shown to independently and jointly predict externalizing problems, and to partially mediate the effects of OXT and AVP on externalizing problems. This study provides the first evidence that genetic variation in OXT and AVP may contribute to individual differences in childhood externalizing problems, and that these effects may operate through emerging neurocognitive abilities in the preschool period.     

Is the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Necessary for Theory of Mind?

Background

Successful social interaction relies on the ability to attribute mental states to other people. Previous functional neuroimaging studies have shown that this process, described as Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalization, is reliably associated with activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). However, this study presents a novel and surprising finding that provides new insight into the role of the mPFC in mentalization tasks.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Twenty healthy individuals were recruited from a wide range of ages and social backgrounds. Participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while viewing a well-established ToM visual paradigm involving moving triangles. Functional MRI data were analyzed using a classical general linear model. No activation was detected in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) during movement patterns that typically elicit ToM. However, increased activity was observed in the right middle occipital gyrus, right temporoparietal junction (TPJ), left middle occipital gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus. No correlation was found between participants’ age and BOLD response.

Conclusions/Significance

In contrast with previous neuroimaging research, our findings support the notion that mPFC function is not critical for reasoning about the mental states of others; furthermore, our data indicate that the right TPJ and right inferior frontal gyrus are able to perform mentalization without any contributions from the mPFC.     

Cooperation and deception recruit different subsets of the theory-of-mind network

The term "theory of mind" (ToM) describes an evolved psychological mechanism that is necessary to represent intentions and expectations in social interaction. It is thus involved in determining the proclivity of others to cooperate or defect. While in cooperative settings between two parties the intentions and expectations of the protagonists match, they diverge in deceptive scenarios, in which one protagonist is intentionally manipulated to hold a false belief about the intention of the other. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm using cartoons showing social interactions (including the outcome of the interaction) between two or three story characters, respectively, we sought to determine those brain areas of the ToM network involved in reasoning about cooperative versus deceptive interactions. Healthy volunteers were asked to reflect upon the protagonists' intentions and expectations in cartoons depicting cooperation, deception or a combination of both, where two characters cooperated to deceive a third. Reasoning about the mental states of the story characters yielded substantial differences in activation patterns: both deception and cooperation activated bilateral temporoparietal junction, parietal and cingulate regions, while deception alone additionally recruited orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal regions. These results indicate an important role for prefrontal cortex in processing a mismatch between a character's intention and another's expectations as required in complex social interactions.     

An Investigation of Emotion Recognition and Theory of Mind in People with Chronic Heart Failure

Objectives

Cognitive deficits are common in patients with chronic heart failure (CHF), but no study has investigated whether these deficits extend to social cognition. The present study provided the first empirical assessment of emotion recognition and theory of mind (ToM) in patients with CHF. In addition, it assessed whether each of these social cognitive constructs was associated with more general cognitive impairment.

Methods

A group comparison design was used, with 31 CHF patients compared to 38 demographically matched controls. The Ekman Faces test was used to assess emotion recognition, and the Mind in the Eyes test to measure ToM. Measures assessing global cognition, executive functions, and verbal memory were also administered.

Results

There were no differences between groups on emotion recognition or ToM. The CHF group’s performance was poorer on some executive measures, but memory was relatively preserved. In the CHF group, both emotion recognition performance and ToM ability correlated moderately with global cognition (r = .38, p = .034; r = .49, p = .005, respectively), but not with executive function or verbal memory.

Conclusion

CHF patients with lower cognitive ability were more likely to have difficulty recognizing emotions and inferring the mental states of others. Clinical implications of these findings are discussed.     

The "other" circadian system: food as a Zeitgeber

It is not surprising that limiting food access to a particular time of day has profound effects on the behavior and physiology of animals. It has been clear for some time that pre-meal behavioral activation, a rise in core temperature, elevated serum corticosterone, and an increase in duodenal disaccharidases are under circadian control and that the observed circadian properties are not abolished by lesions of the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN), but the search for the locus of a separate food-entrainable oscillator (FEO) has not been successful. The cloning of circadian clock genes and the discovery that these genes are expressed in many central nervous system structures outside the SCN and in peripheral tissues have led to new strategies for investigating potential loci of an FEO. Recent findings concerning the entrainment of clock gene expression in the central nervous system and in peripheral tissues by periodic food access are presented, and the implications of these findings for a better understanding of a circadian system that entrains to meals, rather than to light, are discussed.