THE EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF SPITE IN FINITE POPULATIONS

Spite, the shady relative of altruism, involves paying a fitness cost to inflict a cost on some recipient. Here, we investigate a density dependent dynamic model for the evolution of spite in populations of changing size. We extend the model by introducing a dynamic carrying capacity. Our analysis shows that it is possible for unconditionally spiteful behavior to evolve without population structure in any finite population. In some circumstances spiteful behavior can contribute to its own stability by limiting population growth. We use the model to show that there are differences between spite and altruism, and to refine Hamilton’s original argument about the insignificance of spite in the wild. We also discuss the importance of fixing the measure of fitness to classify behaviors as selfish or spiteful.     

How life history and demography promote or inhibit the evolution of helping behaviours

In natural populations, dispersal tends to be limited so that individuals are in local competition with their neighbours. As a consequence, most behaviours tend to have a social component, e.g. they can be selfish, spiteful, cooperative or altruistic as usually considered in social evolutionary theory. How social behaviours translate into fitness costs and benefits depends considerably on life-history features, as well as on local demographic and ecological conditions. Over the last four decades, evolutionists have been able to explore many of the consequences of these factors for the evolution of social behaviours. In this paper, we first recall the main theoretical concepts required to understand social evolution. We then discuss how life history, demography and ecology promote or inhibit the evolution of helping behaviours, but the arguments developed for helping can be extended to essentially any social trait. The analysis suggests that, on a theoretical level, it is possible to contrast three critical benefit-to-cost ratios beyond which costly helping is selected for (three quantitative rules for the evolution of altruism). But comparison between theoretical results and empirical data has always been difficult in the literature, partly because of the perennial question of the scale at which relatedness should be measured under localized dispersal. We then provide three answers to this question.     

Socially mediated speciation

Abstract.— We employ a simple model to show that social selection can lead to prezygotic reproductive isolation. The evolution of social discrimination causes the congealing of phenotypically similar individuals into different, spatially distinct tribes. However, tribal formation is only obtained for certain types of social behavior: altruistic and selfish acts can produce tribes, whereas spiteful and mutualistic behaviors never do. Moreover, reduced hybrid fitness at tribal borders leads to the selection of mating preferences, which then spread to the core areas of the respective tribes. Unlike models of resource competition, our model generates reproductive isolation in an ecologically homogeneous environment. We elaborate on how altruistic acts can lead to reproductive isolation, but also predict that certain types of competition can lead to the speciation effect. Our theory provides a framework for how individual-level interactions mold lineage diversification, with parapatric speciation as a possible end product.     

Spite and the scale of competition in Pseudomonas aeruginosa

Scale of competition has been shown to be an important factor in shaping the evolution of social interactions. Although many theoretical and experimental studies have examined its effect on altruistic cooperation, relatively little research effort has been focused on spiteful behaviors--actions that harm both the actor and the recipient. In this study, we expand on existing theory by investigating the importance of the global frequency of spiteful alleles, and we determine experimentally how the scale of competition affects selection for spite in the bacterial pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa under high and intermediate spatial relatedness. Consistent with our theoretical results, we found in our experiments that spiteful genotypes are more favored under local (rather than global) competition and intermediate (rather than high) spatial relatedness, conditions that have been shown to select against indiscriminate altruism.     

Reproductive skew can provide a net advantage in both conditional and unconditional social interactions

We revisit a model for the evolution of costly social behaviour in the presence of reproductive skew. The model population is structured into groups, and reproductive skew is captured by assuming individuals adopt one of two social roles (dominant/subordinate). Unlike previous work, we adopt an ultimate perspective by tracking a mutant allele over the entire course of an invasion. Our main analysis applies the theory of branching processes, but a parallel analysis using the inclusive-fitness approach is also provided. Our first two results are modifications of known inequalities describing selective advantages for behaviours expressed conditional upon social status. We find that altruistic subordinate individuals are favoured more readily than previously thought; spiteful dominant individuals, however, are favoured less readily. Secondly, we identify the condition under which unconditional altruism (performed by both dominant and subordinate) will be adaptive. Our third main result shows that increasing the strength of selection can also change the range of parameters over which costly social behaviours are favoured. We find that stronger selection makes it relatively easier for subordinate altruism to emerge, but more difficult for dominant spite and unconditional altruism to occur. We discuss the possible implications of our results for human social evolution.     

SPITE VERSUS CHEATS: COMPETITION AMONG SOCIAL STRATEGIES SHAPES VIRULENCE IN PSEUDOMONAS AERUGINOSA

Social interactions have been shown to play an important role in bacterial evolution and virulence. The majority of empirical studies conducted have only considered social traits in isolation, yet numerous social traits, such as the production of spiteful bacteriocins (anticompetitor toxins) and iron‐scavenging siderophores (a public good) by the opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa, are frequently expressed simultaneously. Crucially, both bacteriocin production and siderophore cheating can be favored under the same competitive conditions, and we develop theory and carry out experiments to determine how the success of a bacteriocin‐producing genotype is influenced by social cheating of susceptible competitors and the resultant impact on disease severity (virulence). Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that the spiteful genotype is favored at higher local frequencies when competing against public good cheats. Furthermore, the relationship between spite frequency and virulence is significantly altered when the spiteful genotype is competed against cheats compared with cooperators. These results confirm the ecological and evolutionary importance of considering multiple social traits simultaneously. Moreover, our results are consistent with recent theory regarding the invasion conditions for strong reciprocity (helping cooperators and harming noncooperators).     

Spiteful interactions between sympatric natural isolates of Xenorhabdus bovienii benefit kin and reduce virulence

Spite occurs when an individual harms itself in the act of harming others. Spiteful behaviour may be more pervasive in nature than commonly thought. One of the clearest examples of spite is the costly production and release of bacteriocins, antimicrobial toxins noted for their ability to kill conspecifics. A key question is to what extent these toxins provide a fitness advantage to kin of the producer cell, especially in natural communities. Additionally, when bacteria are involved in parasitic relationships, spiteful interactions are predicted to lower bacterial densities within a host, causing a reduction in parasite-induced virulence. Using five sympatric, field-collected genotypes of the insect pathogen Xenorhabdus bovienii, we experimentally demonstrate that bacteriocin production benefits kin within the host, and that it slows the mortality rate of the host. These results confirm that spite among naturally coexisting bacterial clones can be a successful kin-selected strategy that has emergent effects on virulence.     

Conditions for the evolution of altruism under darwinian selection

A model of population structure is discussed which under certain circumstances allows for evolution of altruistic traits, beyond the classical restrictions imposed by kin selection theory and related concepts such as reciprocal altruism. Essentially, the model sees a large population as socially subdivided into small groups without any barriers, however, to free random mating. An altruistic trait is defined as lowering, locally, the fitness of a carrier below that of noncarriers within the same group; but the local fitness of an individual randomly chosen in a group increases with the number of altruists. It is shown that altruism can evolve even if the groups are randomly formed. The conditions for such evolution are contrasted with those prevailing when the groups are formed either with some phenotypic assortment between the members or on the basis of kinship. It is shown that any possibility of evolution tends to rapidly disappear as groups become large, unless there is complete positive assortment or individuals in the groups are kin. The example of alarm calls is also considered, and the two extremes of random and sib-groups are contrasted, using a model by Maynard Smith. It is shown that alarm calls can evolve in small groups of unrelated individuals under conditions qualitatively similar but quantitatively more rigorous than those prevailing for sib-groups.     

"Runaway" social evolution: reinforcing selection for inbreeding and altruism.

Kin selection theory predicts that altruistic behaviors, those that decrease the fitness of the individual performing the behavior but increase the fitness of the recipient, can increase in frequency if the individuals interacting are closely related. Several studies have shown that inbreeding therefore generally increases the effectiveness of kin selection when fitnesses are linear, additive functions of the number of altruists in the family, although with extreme forms of altruism, inbreeding can actually retard the evolution of altruism. These models assume that a constant proportion of the population mates at random and a constant proportion practices some form of inbreeding. In order to investigate the effect of inbreeding on the evolution of altruistic behavior when the mating structure is allowed to evolve, we examined a two-locus model by computer simulation of a diploid case and illustrated the important qualitative features by mathematical analysis of a haploid case. One locus determines an individual's propensity to perform altruistic social behavior and the second locus determines the probability that an individual will mate within its sibship. We assumed positive selection for altruism and no direct selection at the inbreeding locus. We observed that the altruistic allele and the inbreeding allele become positively associated, even when the initial conditions of the model assume independence between these loci. This linkage disequilibrium becomes established, because the altruistic allele increases more rapidly in the inbreeding segment of the population. This association subsequently results in indirect selection on the inbreeding locus. However, the dynamics of this model go beyond a simple "hitch-hiking" effect, because high levels of altruism lead to increased inbreeding, and high degrees of inbreeding accelerate the rate of change of the altruistic allele in the entire population. Thus, the dynamics of this model are similar to those of "runaway" sexual selection, with gene frequency change at the two loci interactively causing rapid evolutionary change.     

How to distinguish altruism from spite (and why we should bother)

Social behaviour is often described as altruistic, spiteful, selfish or mutually beneficial. These terms are appealing, but it has not always been clear how they are defined and what purpose they serve. Here, I show that the distinctions among them arise from the ways in which fitness is partitioned: none can be drawn when the fitness consequences of an action are wholly aggregated, but they manifest clearly when the consequences are partitioned into primary and secondary (neighbourhood) effects. I argue that the primary interaction is the principal source of adaptive design, because (i) it is this interaction that determines the fit of an adaptation and (ii) it is the actor and primary recipients whom an adaptation foremost affects. The categories of social action are thus instrumental to any account of evolved function.     

GROUP FORMATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIALITY

In spite of its intrinsic evolutionary instability, altruistic behavior in social groups is widespread in nature, spanning from organisms endowed with complex cognitive abilities to microbial populations. In this study, we show that if social individuals have an enhanced tendency to form groups and fitness increases with group cohesion, sociality can evolve and be maintained in the absence of actively assortative mechanisms such as kin recognition or nepotism toward other carriers of the social gene. When explicitly taken into account in a game‐theoretical framework, the process of group formation qualitatively changes the evolutionary dynamics with respect to games played in groups of constant size and equal grouping tendencies. The evolutionary consequences of the rules underpinning the group size distribution are discussed for a simple model of microbial aggregation by differential attachment, indicating a way to the evolution of sociality bereft of peer recognition.     

The co-evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping and cultural transmission under random group formation

Limited migration results in kin selective pressure on helping behaviors under a wide range of ecological, demographic and life-history situations. However, such genetically determined altruistic helping can evolve only when migration is not too strong and group size is not too large. Cultural inheritance of helping behaviors may allow altruistic helping to evolve in groups of larger size because cultural transmission has the potential to markedly decrease the variance within groups and augment the variance between groups. Here, we study the co-evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping behaviors and two alternative cultural transmission rules for such behaviors. We find that conformist transmission, where individuals within groups tend to copy prevalent cultural variants (e.g., beliefs or values), has a strong adverse effect on the evolution of culturally inherited helping traits. This finding is at variance with the commonly held view that conformist transmission is a crucial factor favoring the evolution of altruistic helping in humans. By contrast, we find that under one-to-many transmission, where individuals within groups tend to copy a “leader” (or teacher), altruistic helping can evolve in groups of any size, although the cultural transmission rule itself hitchhikes rather weakly with a selected helping trait. Our results suggest that culturally determined helping behaviors are more likely to be driven by “leaders” than by popularity, but the emergence and stability of the cultural transmission rules themselves should be driven by some extrinsic factors.     

Models for alarm call behaviour

The evolution of alarm call behaviour under individual selection is studied. Four mathematical models of increasing complexity are proposed and analysed. Theoretical conditions for the evolution of “selfish”, “mutualistic”, “altruistic” or “spiteful” alarm calls are established. The models indicate that the hypotheses of benefits of retaining group members or avoiding group detection are not sufficient to explain the evolution of alarm call behaviour, but serve as a complementary factor to facilitate its evolution in most cases. It is hypothesized that the evolution of alarm calls between non-kin should evolve probably when calls are mutualistic, mildly altruistic and there are beneficial group size effects against predation.     

Oh sister,where art thou? Spatial population structure and the evolution of an altruistic defence trait

The evolution of parasite virulence and host defences is affected by population structure. This effect has been confirmed in studies focusing on large spatial scales, whereas the importance of local structure is not well understood. Slavemaking ants are social parasites that exploit workers of another species to rear their offspring. Enslaved workers of the host species Temnothorax longispinosus have been found to exhibit an effective post‐enslavement defence behaviour: enslaved workers were observed killing a large proportion of the parasites’ offspring. As enslaved workers do not reproduce, they gain no direct fitness benefit from this ‘rebellion’ behaviour. However, there may be an indirect benefit: neighbouring host nests that are related to ‘rebel’ nests can benefit from a reduced raiding pressure, as a result of the reduction in parasite nest size due to the enslaved workers’ killing behaviour. We use a simple mathematical model to examine whether the small‐scale population structure of the host species could explain the evolution of this potentially altruistic defence trait against slavemaking ants. We find that this is the case if enslaved host workers are related to nearby host nests. In a population genetic study, we confirm that enslaved workers are, indeed, more closely related to host nests within the raiding range of their resident slavemaker nest, than to host nests outside the raiding range. This small‐scale population structure seems to be a result of polydomy (e.g. the occupation of several nests in close proximity by a single colony) and could have enabled the evolution of ‘rebellion’ by kin selection.     

Population ecology, nonlinear dynamics, and social evolution. I. Associations among nonrelatives

Using an individual-based and genetically explicit simulation model, we explore the evolution of sociality within a population-ecology and nonlinear-dynamics framework. Assuming that individual fitness is a unimodal function of group size and that cooperation may carry a relative fitness cost, we consider the evolution of one-generation breeding associations among nonrelatives. We explore how parameters such as the intrinsic rate of growth and group and global carrying capacities may influence social evolution and how social evolution may, in turn, influence and be influenced by emerging group-level and population-wide dynamics. We find that group living and cooperation evolve under a wide range of parameter values, even when cooperation is costly and the interactions can be defined as altruistic. Greater levels of cooperation, however, did evolve when cooperation carried a low or no relative fitness cost. Larger group carrying capacities allowed the evolution of larger groups but also resulted in lower cooperative tendencies. When the intrinsic rate of growth was not too small and control of the global population size was density dependent, the evolution of large cooperative tendencies resulted in dynamically unstable groups and populations. These results are consistent with the existence and typical group sizes of organisms ranging from the pleometrotic ants to the colonial birds and the global population outbreaks and crashes characteristic of organisms such as the migratory locusts and the tree-killing bark beetles.     

Helping in cooperatively breeding long-tailed tits: a test of Hamilton's rule

Inclusive fitness theory provides the conceptual framework for our current understanding of social evolution, and empirical studies suggest that kin selection is a critical process in the evolution of animal sociality. A key prediction of inclusive fitness theory is that altruistic behaviour evolves when the costs incurred by an altruist (c) are outweighed by the benefit to the recipient (b), weighted by the relatedness of altruist to recipient (r), i.e. Hamilton''s rule rb > c. Despite its central importance in social evolution theory, there have been relatively few empirical tests of Hamilton''s rule, and hardly any among cooperatively breeding vertebrates, leading some authors to question its utility. Here, we use data from a long-term study of cooperatively breeding long-tailed tits Aegithalos caudatus to examine whether helping behaviour satisfies Hamilton''s condition for the evolution of altruism. We show that helpers are altruistic because they incur survival costs through the provision of alloparental care for offspring. However, they also accrue substantial benefits through increased survival of related breeders and offspring, and despite the low average relatedness of helpers to recipients, these benefits of helping outweigh the costs incurred. We conclude that Hamilton''s rule for the evolution of altruistic helping behaviour is satisfied in this species.     

Critical Social Learning: A Solution to Rogers's Paradox of Nonadaptive Culture

Alan Rogers (1988) presented a game theory model of the evolution of social learning, yielding the paradoxical conclusion that social learning does not increase the fitness of a population. We expand on this model, allowing for imperfections in individual and social learning as well as incorporating a "critical social learning" strategy that tries to solve an adaptive problem first by social learning, and then by individual learning if socially acquired behavior proves unsatisfactory. This strategy always proves superior to pure social learning and typically has higher fitness than pure individual learning, providing a solution to Rogers's paradox of nonadaptive culture. Critical social learning is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) unless cultural transmission is highly unfaithful, the environment is highly variable, or social learning is much more costly than individual learning. We compare the model to empirical data on social learning and on spatial variation in primate cultures and list three requirements for adaptive culture.     

Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games

Cooperation and spiteful behavior are still evolutionary puzzles. Costly punishment, for which the game payoff is the same as that of spiteful behavior, is one mechanism for promoting the evolution of cooperation. A spatially structured population facilitates the evolution of either cooperation or spite/punishment if cooperation is linked explicitly or implicitly with spite/punishment; a cooperator cooperates with another cooperator and punishes/spites the other type of player. Different updating rules in the evolutionary game produce different evolutionary outcomes: with one updating rule—the score-dependent viability model, in which a player dies with a probability inversely proportional to the game score and the resulting unoccupied site is colonized by one player chosen randomly—the evolution of spite/punishment is promoted more than with the other updating rule—the score-dependent fertility model, in which, after a player dies randomly, the site is colonized by a player with a higher game score. If the population has empty sites, spiteful players or punishers should have less chance to interact with others and then spite/punish others. Thus the presence of empty sites would affect the evolutionary dynamics of spite/punishment. Here, we investigated whether the presence of empty sites discourages the evolution of spite/punishment in both a lattice-structured population and a completely mixing population where players interact with others randomly, especially when the score-dependent viability model is adopted. In the lattice-structured population adopting this viability model, the presence of empty sites promoted the evolution of cooperation and did not reduce the effect of spite/punishment. In the completely mixing population, the presence of empty sites did not promote evolution of cooperation by punishment. The evolutionary dynamics of the score-dependent viability model with empty sites were close to those of the score-dependent fertility model.     

Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space

The replicator equation model for the evolution of individual behaviors in a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space is developed as a dynamics on the set of probability measures. Stability of monomorphisms in this model using the weak topology is compared to more traditional methods of adaptive dynamics. For quadratic fitness functions and initial normal trait distributions, it is shown that the multi-dimensional continuously stable strategy (CSS) of adaptive dynamics is often relevant for predicting stability of the measure-theoretic model but may be too strong in general. For general fitness functions and trait distributions, the CSS is related to dominance solvability which can be used to characterize local stability for a large class of trait distributions that have no gaps in their supports whereas the stronger neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) concept is needed if the supports are arbitrary.