Behavioral Responses to Inequity in Reward Distribution and Working Effort in Crows and Ravens

Sensitivity to inequity is considered to be a crucial cognitive tool in the evolution of human cooperation. The ability has recently been shown also in primates and dogs, raising the question of an evolutionary basis of inequity aversion. We present first evidence that two bird species are sensitive to other individuals'' efforts and payoffs. In a token exchange task we tested both behavioral responses to inequity in the quality of reward (preferred versus non-preferred food) and to the absence of reward in the presence of a rewarded partner, in 5 pairs of corvids (6 crows, 4 ravens). Birds decreased their exchange performance when the experimental partner received the reward as a gift, which indicates that they are sensitive to other individuals'' working effort. They also decreased their exchange performance in the inequity compared with the equity condition. Notably, corvids refused to take the reward after a successful exchange more often in the inequity compared with the other conditions. Our findings indicate that awareness to other individuals'' efforts and payoffs may evolve independently of phylogeny in systems with a given degree of social complexity.     

Attending to the outcome of others: disadvantageous inequity aversion in male capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Brosnan and de Waal [Nature 425:297-299, 2003] reported that capuchin monkeys responded negatively to unequal reward distributions between themselves and another individual when comparing their own rewards with that of their partner. It was suggested that social emotions provided the underlying motivation for such behavior and that this inequity aversion is specific to the social domain. However, alternative hypotheses such as the "frustration effect" or the "food expectation hypothesis" may provide more parsimonious explanations for Brosnan and de Waal's [Nature 425:297-299] results, while others have argued that these findings are not congruent with the Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion model cited by the authors. The claim that inequity aversion behavior is specific to the social domain has also been questioned, as primates also develop expectations about rewards in the absence of partners, and react negatively when those expectations are violated. In this study, a modified Dictator game was used to investigate whether capuchins would exhibit either disadvantageous inequity aversion behavior or reference-dependent expectancy violation in social and nonsocial conditions, respectively. When given the choice between an equitable and an inequitable outcome, the subjects showed disadvantageous inequity aversion behavior, choosing the equitable outcome significantly more in the social condition. In the nonsocial condition, however, subjects did not show negative expectancy violation resulting from the formation of reference-dependent expectations, choosing the equitable outcome at chance levels. These results suggest that capuchins attend to differential payoffs and that they are averse to inequity, which is disadvantageous to themselves.     

Competing demands of prosociality and equity in monkeys

Prosocial decisions may lead to unequal payoffs among group members. Although an aversion to inequity has been found in empirical studies of both human and nonhuman primates, the contexts previously studied typically do not involve a trade-off between prosociality and inequity. Here we investigate the apparent coexistence of these two factors, specifically the competing demands of prosociality and equity. We directly compare the responses of brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) among situations where prosocial preferences conflict with equality, using a paradigm comparable to other studies of cooperation and inequity in this species. By choosing to pull a tray towards themselves, subjects rewarded themselves and/or another in conditions in which the partner either received the same or different rewards, or the subject received no reward. In unequal payoff conditions, subjects could obtain equality by choosing not to pull in the tray, so that neither individual was rewarded. The monkeys showed prosocial preferences even in situations of moderate disadvantageous inequity, preferring to pull in the tray more often when a partner was present than absent. However, when the discrepancy between rewards increased, prosocial behavior ceased.     

Human punishment is motivated by inequity aversion, not a desire for reciprocity

Humans involved in cooperative interactions willingly pay a cost to punish cheats. However, the proximate motives underpinning punitive behaviour are currently debated. Individuals who interact with cheats experience losses, but they also experience lower payoffs than the cheating partner. Thus, the negative emotions that trigger punishment may stem from a desire to reciprocate losses or from inequity aversion. Previous studies have not disentangled these possibilities. Here, we use an experimental approach to ask whether punishment is motivated by inequity aversion or by a desire for reciprocity. We show that humans punish cheats only when cheating produces disadvantageous inequity, while there is no evidence for reciprocity. This finding challenges the notion that punishment is motivated by a simple desire to reciprocally harm cheats and shows that victims compare their own payoffs with those of partners when making punishment decisions.     

Social Influences on Inequity Aversion in Children

Adults and children are willing to sacrifice personal gain to avoid both disadvantageous and advantageous inequity. These two forms of inequity aversion follow different developmental trajectories, with disadvantageous inequity aversion emerging around 4 years and advantageous inequity aversion emerging around 8 years. Although inequity aversion is assumed to be specific to situations where resources are distributed among individuals, the role of social context has not been tested in children. Here, we investigated the influence of two aspects of social context on inequity aversion in 4- to 9-year-old children: (1) the role of the experimenter distributing rewards and (2) the presence of a peer with whom rewards could be shared. Experiment 1 showed that children rejected inequity at the same rate, regardless of whether the experimenter had control over reward allocations. This indicates that children’s decisions are based upon reward allocations between themselves and a peer and are not attempts to elicit more favorable distributions from the experimenter. Experiment 2 compared rejections of unequal reward allocations in children interacting with or without a peer partner. When faced with a disadvantageous distribution, children frequently rejected a smaller reward when a larger reward was visible, even if no partner would obtain the larger reward. This suggests that nonsocial factors partly explain disadvantageous inequity rejections. However, rejections of disadvantageous distributions were higher when the larger amount would go to a peer, indicating that social context enhances disadvantageous inequity aversion. By contrast, children rejected advantageous distributions almost exclusively in the social context. Therefore, advantageous inequity aversion appears to be genuinely social, highlighting its potential relevance for the development of fairness concerns. By comparing social and nonsocial factors, this study provides a detailed picture of the expression of inequity aversion in human ontogeny and raises questions about the function and evolution of inequity aversion in humans.     

Partner's behavior, not reward distribution, determines success in an unequal cooperative task in capuchin monkeys

It was recently demonstrated that capuchin monkeys notice and respond to distributional inequity, a trait that has been proposed to support the evolution of cooperation in the human species. However, it is unknown how capuchins react to inequitable rewards in an unrestricted cooperative paradigm in which they may freely choose both whether to participate and, within the bounds of their partner's behavior, which reward they will receive for their participation. We tested capuchin monkeys with such a design, using a cooperative barpull, which has been used with great success in the past. Contrary to our expectations, the equity of the reward distribution did not affect success or pulling behavior. However, the behavior of the partner in an unequal situation did affect overall success rates: pairs that had a tendency to alternate which individual received the higher-value food in unequal reward situations were more than twice as successful in obtaining rewards than pairs in which one individual dominated the higher-value food. This ability to equitably distribute rewards in inherently biased cooperative situations has profound implications for activities such as group hunts, in which multiple individuals work together for a single, monopolizable reward.     

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) tolerate some degree of inequity while cooperating but refuse to donate effort for nothing

In cooperative hunting, a carcass cannot be divided equally, and hunts may be unsuccessful. We studied how chimpanzees respond to these two variables, working for unequal rewards and no rewards, which have been rarely included in experimental cooperative tasks. We presented chimpanzees with a task requiring three chimpanzees to work together and varied the reward structure in two separate experiments. In Experiment 1, two individuals received more rewards than the third, making the outcome unequal. We wanted to know if cooperation would continue or break down, and what mechanisms might maintain performance. Experiment 2 used equal rewards, but this time one or more locations were left unbaited on a proportion of trials. Thus, there was a chance of individuals working to receive nothing. In Experiment 1, the chimpanzees worked at a high rate, tolerating the unequal outcomes, with rank appearing to determine who got access to the higher-value locations. However, equal outcomes (used as a control) enhanced cooperative performance, most likely through motivational processes rather than the absence of inequity aversion. In Experiment 2, performance dropped off dramatically when the chimpanzees were not rewarded on every trial. Their strategy was irrational as donating effort would have led to more rewards in the long run for each individual. Our results lead to a hierarchy of performances by condition with equity > inequity > donating effort. Chimpanzees therefore tolerate mild inequity, but cannot tolerate receiving nothing when others are rewarded.     

Crows and common ravens do not reciprocally exchange tokens with a conspecific to gain food rewards

Human economic transactions are based on complex forms of reciprocity, which involve the capacities to share and to keep track of what was given and received over time. Animals too engage in reciprocal interactions, but mechanisms such as calculated reciprocity have only been shown experimentally in few species. Various forms of cooperation, for example food and information sharing, are frequently observed in corvids, and they can engage in exchange interactions with human experimenters and accept delayed rewards. Here, we tested whether crows and common ravens would reciprocally exchange tokens with a conspecific in an exchange task. Birds received a set of three different types of tokens, some valuable for themselves, that is, they could exchange them for a food reward with a human experimenter, some valuable for their partner and some without value. The valuable tokens differed between the birds, which means that each bird could obtain more self-value tokens from their partner's compartment. We did not observe any active transfers, that is one individual giving a token to the experimental partner by placing it in its beak. We only observed 6 indirect transfers, that is one individual transferring a token into the compartment of the partner (3 no-value, 1 partner-value and 2 self-value tokens) and 67 “passive” transfers, that is one subject taking the token lying in reach in the compartment of the partner. Individuals took significantly more self-value tokens compared with no-value and partner-value tokens. This indicates a preference for tokens valuable to focal individuals. Significantly more no-value tokens compared with partner-value tokens were taken, likely to be caused by experimental partners exchanging self-value tokens with the human experimenter, and therefore, more no-value tokens being available in the compartment. Our results presently do not provide empirical support for reciprocity in crows and ravens, most likely caused by them not understanding the potential roles of receiver and donor. We therefore suggest further empirical tests of calculated reciprocity to be necessary in corvids.     

Partner effects on food consumption in brown capuchin monkeys

It has been claimed that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) show inequity aversion in relation to food rewards for a simple exchange task. However, other factors may affect the willingness of a monkey to consume foods of high or low value in the presence of a conspecific. In this study, pairs of monkeys were presented with unequally valued foods, but without any task-performance: they simply received the food under four experimental conditions. By looking at the rate of collection and consumption of low-valued cucumber slices we expected to see variation dependent on whether the partner either had 1) cucumber (equity), 2) grape (inequity), 3) inaccessible cucumber or 4) inaccessible grape. Testing 12 adult capuchin monkeys, our findings differed from those of other authors in that the monkeys failed to show negative reactions to inequity, but rather responded with scramble competition (i.e., fast food collection) in the presence of a conspecific without access to food. They also showed facilitated consumption in the presence of a conspecific consuming high-valued food. Possibly, (in)equity plays a different role if food serves as a reward for a task rather than if it is simply made available for consumption.     

Behavioral and physiological response to inequity in bonobos (Pan paniscus)

Inequity aversion (IA), the affective, cognitive, and behavioral response to inequitable outcomes, allows individuals to avoid exploitation and therefore stabilizes cooperation. The presence of IA varies across animal species, which has stimulated research to investigate factors that might explain this variation, and to investigate underlying affective responses. Among great apes, IA is most often studied in chimpanzees. Here, we investigate IA in bonobos, a reputedly tolerant and cooperative species for which few IA studies are available. We describe how bonobos respond to receiving less preferred rewards than a partner in a token exchange task. We show that bonobos respond to receiving less preferred rewards by refusing tokens and rewards, and by leaving the experimental area. Bonobos never refused a trial when receiving preferred rewards, and thus showed no advantageous IA. We also investigate the variability in the disadvantageous IA response on a dyadic level, because the level of IA is expected to vary, depending on characteristics of the dyad. Like in humans and chimpanzees, we show that the tolerance towards inequity was higher in bonobo dyads with more valuable relationships. To study the affective component of IA, we included behavioral and physiological measures of arousal: a displacement behavior (rough self-scratching) and changes in salivary cortisol levels. Both measures of arousal showed large variability, and while analyses on rough self-scratching showed no significant effects, salivary cortisol levels seemed to be lower in subjects that received less than their partner, but higher in subjects that received more than their partner, albeit that both were not significantly different from the equity condition. This suggests that although overcompensated bonobos showed no behavioral response, they might be more aroused. Our data support the cooperation hypothesis on an interspecific and intraspecific level. They show inequity aversion in bonobos, a reputedly cooperative species, and suggest that the variability in IA in bonobos can be explained by their socioecology. Most successful cooperative interactions happen between mothers and their sons and among closely bonded females. The limited need to monitor the partners' investment within these dyads can result in a higher tolerance towards inequity. We therefore suggest future studies to consider relevant socioecological characteristics of the species when designing and analyzing IA studies.     

Squirrel monkeys' response to inequitable outcomes indicates a behavioural convergence within the primates

Although several primates respond negatively to inequity, it is unknown whether this results from homology or convergent processes. Behaviours shared within a taxonomic group are often assumed to be homologous, yet this distinction is important for a better understanding of the function of the behaviour. Previous hypotheses have linked cooperation and inequity responses. Supporting this, all species in which inequity responses have been documented are cooperative. In this study, we tested this hypothesis by investigating the response to inequity in squirrel monkeys, which share a phylogenetic family with capuchin monkeys, but do not cooperate extensively. Subjects exchanged tokens to receive food rewards in conditions in which the level of effort required and reward received varied. Squirrel monkeys did not respond negatively to inequity. However, the monkeys were sensitive to the variation present in the task; male subjects showed a contrast effect and, as in previous studies, subjects were more sensitive to differences in reward in the context of a task than when rewards were given for free. Taken with other results, these results support the hypothesis that a negative response to inequity evolved convergently in primates, probably as a mechanism for evaluating outcomes relative to one's partners in cooperative species.     

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) fail to show inequality aversion in a no-cost situation

Although humans show robust equality concerns across a variety of situations, there is ongoing debate regarding the extent to which any nonhuman species is inequality averse. In the current research, we test nonhuman primates' reactions to conspecifics receiving equal and unequal payoffs using a “no-cost” method in which subjects can respond to inequality without rejecting food. Specifically, we gave capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) the opportunity to trade with one of two experimenters, each of whom offered the subject an identical reward, but had different histories of trading with the subject and a conspecific partner. An “equal” experimenter had previously given a conspecific the same reward that the subject had received, whereas the other experimenter was either an “advantageous trader” for the subject (giving the conspecific an inferior reward) or a “disadvantageous trader” for the subject (giving the conspecific a superior reward). By offering subjects a choice between experimenters, we removed several competing demands that may have masked the expression of robust equality preferences in previous studies. Even though there was no cost associated with expressing an equality preference, we found no evidence that capuchins differentiated between equal and unequal experimenters.     

There Is No Joy like Malicious Joy: Schadenfreude in Young Children

Human emotions are strongly shaped by the tendency to compare the relative state of oneself to others. Although social comparison based emotions such as jealousy and schadenfreude (pleasure in the other misfortune) are important social emotions, little is known about their developmental origins. To examine if schadenfreude develops as a response to inequity aversion, we assessed the reactions of children to the termination of unequal and equal triadic situations. We demonstrate that children as early as 24 months show signs of schadenfreude following the termination of an unequal situation. Although both conditions involved the same amount of gains, the children displayed greater positive expressions following the disruption of the unequal as compared to the equal condition, indicating that inequity aversion can be observed earlier than reported before. These results support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion and indicate that schadenfreude has evolved as a response to unfairness.     

Inequity aversion in relation to effort and relationship quality in long-tailed Macaques (Macaca fascicularis)

Social animals may employ evolved implicit rules to maintain a balance between cooperation and competition. Inequity aversion (IA), the aversive reaction to an unequal distribution of resources, is considered such a rule to avoid exploitation between cooperating individuals. Recent studies have revealed the presence of IA in several nonhuman species. In addition, it has been shown that an effort is crucial for this behavior to occur in animals. Moreover, IA may well depend on the partner's identity. Although dominant individuals typically monopolize food, subordinate individuals obtain less preferred food and usually do not protest. Furthermore, "friends" may pay less attention to equity than "nonfriends." We tested whether long-tailed macaques show IA with different cost-benefit ratios. In addition, we determined whether IA depends on relationship quality (RQ). Dominant subjects expressed IA only when a small effort was required. At a very large effort, however, long-tailed macaques did not show IA, possibly owing to bottom effects on the number of rewards they aim to receive. Moreover, and contrary to our predictions, an individual's inequity response was similar when tested with a "friend" or a "nonfriend." Therefore, we conclude that long-tailed macaques show IA only in conditions of moderate effort, yet that IA seems independent of RQ. Furthermore, IA may not be domain specific. Altogether, IA may be a trait present in all species that habitually cooperate, independent of their social organization.     

Macaque Monkeys Can Learn Token Values from Human Models through Vicarious Reward

Monkeys can learn the symbolic meaning of tokens, and exchange them to get a reward. Monkeys can also learn the symbolic value of a token by observing conspecifics but it is not clear if they can learn passively by observing other actors, e.g., humans. To answer this question, we tested two monkeys in a token exchange paradigm in three experiments. Monkeys learned token values through observation of human models exchanging them. We used, after a phase of object familiarization, different sets of tokens. One token of each set was rewarded with a bit of apple. Other tokens had zero value (neutral tokens). Each token was presented only in one set. During the observation phase, monkeys watched the human model exchange tokens and watched them consume rewards (vicarious rewards). In the test phase, the monkeys were asked to exchange one of the tokens for food reward. Sets of three tokens were used in the first experiment and sets of two tokens were used in the second and third experiments. The valuable token was presented with different probabilities in the observation phase during the first and second experiments in which the monkeys exchanged the valuable token more frequently than any of the neutral tokens. The third experiments examined the effect of unequal probabilities. Our results support the view that monkeys can learn from non-conspecific actors through vicarious reward, even a symbolic task like the token-exchange task.     

Goffin's cockatoos discriminate objects based on weight alone

Paying attention to weight is important when deciding upon an object''s efficacy or value in various contexts (e.g. tool use, foraging). Proprioceptive discrimination learning, with objects that differ only in weight, has so far been investigated almost exclusively in primate species. Here, we show that while Goffin''s cockatoos learn faster when additional colour cues are used, they can also quickly learn to discriminate between objects on the basis of their weight alone. Ultimately, the birds learned to discriminate between visually identical objects on the basis of weight much faster than primates, although methodological differences between tasks should be considered.     

Responses to a simple barter task in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) frequently participate in social exchange involving multiple goods and services of variable value, yet they have not been tested in a formalized situation to see whether they can barter using multiple tokens and rewards. We set up a simple barter economy with two tokens and two associated rewards and tested chimpanzees on their ability to obtain rewards by returning the matching token in situations in which their access to tokens was unlimited or limited. Chimpanzees easily learned to associate value with the tokens, as expected, and did barter, but followed a simple strategy of favoring the higher-value token, regardless of the reward proffered, instead of a more complex but more effective strategy of returning the token that matched the reward. This response is similar to that shown by capuchin monkeys in our previous study. We speculate that this response, while not ideal, may be sufficient to allow for stability of the social exchange system in these primates, and that the importance of social barter to both species may have led to this convergence of strategies.     

Are kea prosocial?

Prosocial behaviour is widespread in humans, but evidence for its occurrence in other species is mixed. We presented a parrot species, the kea (Nestor notabilis) with a series of experiments to test whether they exhibit prosocial tendencies. Across the first round of testing, in our first condition, two of the four kea acted prosocially, as they preferred to choose a prosocial token which rewarded both themselves and a partner, rather than a token that rewarded only themselves. Three of the four kea then showed a preference for the prosocial token in a second condition where they alternated taking turns with a partner. However, no kea showed a decrease in the third yoked control condition in which the experimenter replicated the token choice made by the partner in the previous alternating trials. This yoked condition was used to dissociate truly reciprocal behaviour, whereby the actor made choices based on their partner's choices, from a response to the amount of rewards conferred to the partner. Finally, three of the four kea continued to choose the prosocial token in the fourth asocial control condition where no partner was present. However, in round two of testing, one kea changed its token choices to a similar pattern to that expected if kea are prosocial, in that it preferred the prosocial token in the initial condition, showed a trend for the prosocial token when turns were alternated, but chose at chance in the yoked and asocial conditions. This study therefore found no evidence of spontaneous reciprocity in kea but further testing is required before we can conclude that kea are not capable of prosocial behaviour at all.     

Local competition sparks concerns for fairness in the ultimatum game

Humans reject uneven divisions of resources, even at personal cost. This is observed in countless experiments using the ultimatum game, where a proposer offers to divide a resource with a responder who either accepts the division or rejects it (whereupon both earn zero). Researchers debate why humans evolved a psychology that is so averse to inequity within partnerships. We suggest that the scale of competition is crucial: under local competition with few competitors, individuals reject low offers, because they cannot afford to be disadvantaged relative to competitors. If one competes against the broader population (i.e. global competition), then it pays to accept low offers to increase one''s absolute pay-off. We support this intuition with an illustrative game-theoretical model. We also conducted ultimatum games where participants received prizes based on pay-offs relative to immediate partners (local competition) versus a larger group (global competition). Participants demanded higher offers under local competition, suggesting that local competition increases people''s demands for fairness and aversion to inequality.     

Responding to inequities: gorillas try to maintain their competitive advantage during play fights

Humans respond to unfair situations in various ways. Experimental research has revealed that non-human species also respond to unequal situations in the form of inequity aversions when they have the disadvantage. The current study focused on play fights in gorillas to explore for the first time, to our knowledge, if/how non-human species respond to inequities in natural social settings. Hitting causes a naturally occurring inequity among individuals and here it was specifically assessed how the hitters and their partners engaged in play chases that followed the hitting. The results of this work showed that the hitters significantly more often moved first to run away immediately after the encounter than their partners. These findings provide evidence that non-human species respond to inequities by trying to maintain their competitive advantages. We conclude that non-human primates, like humans, may show different responses to inequities and that they may modify them depending on if they have the advantage or the disadvantage.