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1.
    
SCOTT WOODCOCK 《Bioethics》2011,25(9):495-504
An obstacle to abortion exists in the form of abortion ‘counselling’ that discourages women from terminating their pregnancies. This counselling involves providing information about the procedure that tends to create feelings of guilt, anxiety and strong emotional reactions to the recognizable form of a human fetus. Instances of such counselling that involve false or misleading information are clearly unethical and do not prompt much philosophical reflection, but the prospect of truthful abortion counselling draws attention to a delicate issue for healthcare professionals seeking to respect patient autonomy. This is the fact that even accurate information about abortion procedures can have intimidating effects on women seeking to terminate a pregnancy. Consequently, a dilemma arises regarding the information that one ought to provide to patients considering an abortion: on the one hand, the mere offering of certain types of information can lead to intimidation; on the other hand, withholding information that some patients would consider relevant to their decision‐making is objectionably paternalistic on any standard account of the physician‐patient relationship. This is an unsettling conclusion for the possibility of setting fixed professional guidelines regarding the counselling offered to women who are considering abortion. Thus, abortion ought to be viewed as an illuminating example of a procedure for which the process of securing informed consent ought to be highly context‐sensitive and responsive to the needs of each individual patient. This result underscores the need for health care professionals to cultivate trusting relationships with patients and to develop finely tuned powers of practical judgment.  相似文献   

2.
    
Perry A 《Bioethics》2012,26(5):236-241
Autism is a chronic neurodevelopmental disorder that presents unique challenges to bioethicists. In particular, bioethicists ought to reconsider pediatric consent in light of disparity between beliefs that are held about the disorder by parents and adults with autism. The neurodiverse community ought to be given some consideration in this debate, and, as such, there may be a role for autistic narratives in clarifying this problem.  相似文献   

3.
    
Broad genome‐wide testing is increasingly finding its way to the public through the online direct‐to‐consumer marketing of so‐called personal genome tests. Personal genome tests estimate genetic susceptibilities to multiple diseases and other phenotypic traits simultaneously. Providers commonly make use of Terms of Service agreements rather than informed consent procedures. However, to protect consumers from the potential physical, psychological and social harms associated with personal genome testing and to promote autonomous decision‐making with regard to the testing offer, we argue that current practices of information provision are insufficient and that there is a place – and a need – for informed consent in personal genome testing, also when it is offered commercially. The increasing quantity, complexity and diversity of most testing offers, however, pose challenges for information provision and informed consent. Both specific and generic models for informed consent fail to meet its moral aims when applied to personal genome testing. Consumers should be enabled to know the limitations, risks and implications of personal genome testing and should be given control over the genetic information they do or do not wish to obtain. We present the outline of a new model for informed consent which can meet both the norm of providing sufficient information and the norm of providing understandable information. The model can be used for personal genome testing, but will also be applicable to other, future forms of broad genetic testing or screening in commercial and clinical settings.  相似文献   

4.
    
Ruipeng Lei  Renzong Qiu 《Bioethics》2020,34(2):172-182
This article consists of four parts. In the first part it briefly describes the history of body-to-head transplantation (BHT) and the surgical plan proposed by Drs. Sergio Canavero and Ren Xiaoping on a human subject. In the second part it argues that the BHT procedure that they propose is scientifically invalid and technically infeasible so therefore would end in failure. In the third part it argues that the present conceivable procedure of BHT cannot be ethically justified because it would bring great harm to the human subject, it is uncertain who would be the possible beneficiary, and valid informed consent cannot be obtained. In the fourth part it argues that the action of performing the procedure of BHT might violate China’s current criminal and civil laws. The conclusion that follows from the arguments above is that BHT should be prohibited now and also in the near future. However, this conclusion does not preclude scientists, neurosurgeons and bioethicists doing research into scientific, technical, surgical and ethical issues raised by BHT.  相似文献   

5.
    
Recent developments in the field of neurosurgery, specifically those dealing with the modification of mood and affect as part of psychiatric disease, have led some researchers to discuss the ethical implications of surgery to alter personality and personal identity. As knowledge and technology advance, discussions of surgery to alter undesirable traits, or possibly the enhancement of normal traits, will play an increasingly larger role in the ethical literature. So far, identity and enhancement have yet to be explored in a neurosurgical context, despite the fact that 1) neurological disease and treatment both potentially alter identity, and 2) that neurosurgeons will likely be the purveyors of future enhancement implantable technology. Here, we use interviews with neurosurgical patients to shed light on the ethical issues and challenges that surround identity and enhancement in neurosurgery. The results provide insight into how patients approach their identity prior to potentially identity-altering procedures and what future ethical challenges lay ahead for clinicians and researchers in the field of neurotherapeutics.  相似文献   

6.
Lucy Frith  Eric Blyth 《Bioethics》2019,33(6):637-643
This article discusses when it is ethically acceptable to withdraw consent for the storage and use of embryos and gametes. Currently, the law in the UK states that consent to use of a gamete or embryo can be withdrawn up to the point of the embryo's transfer to the recipient's uterus or when the gamete is used in providing treatment services; that is, the ‘point of no return’. In this article, we will consider other points of no return and argue that having a single point of no return, a one size fits all form of consent can, in some cases, lead to restrictions on individuals’ autonomy and cause particular types of harm. Therefore, having different points of no return that fit different circumstances could extend autonomy and allow people to enter into agreements that are tailored more to their own particular needs and circumstances.  相似文献   

7.
    
Buford C 《Bioethics》2008,22(8):423-430
A challenge has recently been levelled against the legal and/or moral legitimacy of some advance directives. It has been argued that in certain cases an advance directive carries no weight in a decision on whether to withhold treatment, since the individual in the debilitating state is not the same person as the person who created the advance directive. In the first section of this paper, I examine two formulations of the argument against the moral legitimacy of the advance directives under review. The second section reviews, and criticizes, an objection to such arguments. In the penultimate section, possible models supporting the viability of the advance directives are considered. The final section makes good on an obligation incurred by the title of the paper.  相似文献   

8.
    
Eric Vogelstein has defended Don Marquis' ‘future-like-ours' argument for the immorality of abortion against what is known as the Identity Objection, which contends that for a fetus to have a future like ours, it must be numerically identical to an entity like us that possesses valuable experiences some time in the future. On psychological accounts of personal identity, there is no identity relationship between the fetus and the entity with valuable experiences that it will become. Vogelstein maintains that a non-sentient fetus nonetheless has a future like ours because it is numerically identical with a future organism that has a mind that bears valuable experiences. Skott Brill, drawing on Jeff McMahan's embodied mind account, denies that human organisms directly have experiences, claiming that they only have experiences derivatively by virtue of their thinking part, and the loss of a future like ours is not transferred to the organism. I show that on McMahan's account, a strong case can be made for the organism having experiences directly, and the subject having these experiences derivatively. This negates Brill's reasoning, although it does imply that non-sentient fetuses do not have a future like ours in quite the same way as we do. I conclude that this is not problematic for Marquis' argument.  相似文献   

9.
    
Eugene Mills has recently argued that human organisms cannot begin to exist at fertilization because the evidence suggests that egg cells persist through fertilization and simply turn into zygotes. He offers two main arguments for this conclusion: that ‘fertilized egg’ commits no conceptual fallacy, and that on the face of it, it looks as though egg cells survive fertilization when the process is watched through a microscope. We refute these arguments and offer several reasons of our own to think that egg cells do not survive fertilization, appealing to various forms of essentialism regarding persons, fission cases, and a detailed discussion of the biological facts relevant to fertilization and genetics. We conclude that it is plausible, therefore, that human organisms begin to exist at fertilization – or, at the very least, that there are grounds for thinking that they existed as zygotes which do not apply to the prior egg cells. While this does not entail that human persons begin to exist at this point, it nevertheless has considerable significance for this latter question.  相似文献   

10.
    
In this review I am summarizing the past and current progress in the field of pharmaceutical, diagnostic, therapeutic, and reproductive cloning in mammals. Several human gene products can be pharmaceutically explored in transgenic farm animals and employed for medical applications. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is utilizing modern molecular cloning techniques to detect genetic and chromosomal aberrations in early embryos originating from patients with inborn errors at risk for hereditary diseases or age-related risk for abnormal karyotype. Stem cell engineering from early human embryos is creating new and promising but also controversial applications for therapeutic and regenerative medicine. Potential risk factors for reproductive cloning are presented and discussed in the context of possible developmental malformations, frequently observed after embryo culture and cloning in farm animals. Future extension of biotechnology to human reproductive cloning is currently under worldwide dispute.  相似文献   

11.
    
Neil C. Manson 《Bioethics》2019,33(5):540-549
The biobank consent debate is one with deeply held convictions on both the ‘broad’ and ‘specific’ side with little sign of resolution. Recently, Thomas Ploug and Soren Holm have developed an alternative to both specific and broad consent: a meta‐consent framework. The aim here is to consider whether meta‐consent provides a ‘solution’ to the biobank consent debate. We clarify what ‘meta‐consent’ actually is (arguing that the label is a misnomer and ‘consent à la carte’ is more accurate). We identify problems with Ploug and Holm's arguments, and some challenges for meta‐consent. We focus on whether there is any ethical obligation to provide consent à la carte. There may seem to be so, especially if we draw upon an unclear appeal to the ethical significance of ‘respect for autonomy’. Similarly, there might seem to be an intuitive inference from the fact that ethically legitimate research requires informed consent to the conclusion that it thereby requires consent à la carte. It is shown that this line of inference is mistaken.  相似文献   

12.
In vitro gametogenesis (IVG) is believed to be the next big breakthrough in reproductive medicine. The prima facie acceptance of this possible future technology is notable when compared to the general prohibition on human reproductive cloning. After all, if safety is the main reason for not allowing reproductive cloning, one might expect a similar conclusion for the reproductive application of IVG, since both technologies hold considerable and comparable risks. However, safety concerns may be overcome, and are presumably not the sole reason why cloning is being condemned. We therefore assess the non‐safety arguments against reproductive cloning, yet most of these can also be held against IVG. The few arguments that cannot be used against IVG are defective. We conclude from this that it will be hard to defend a ban on reproductive cloning while accepting the reproductive use of IVG.  相似文献   

13.
    
The influence of the 2008 election of President Barack Obama on the naming of children born to African American mothers was investigated. Results indicated that children born after the election were given names that sounded more ‘African American’ than were children born before the election. In addition, African American mother’s Collective Self-Esteem scores were positively correlated with the ethnic sound of a child’s name. It was concluded that this difference in naming behaviour could be viewed through a social identity theory approach and might indicate a desire to ‘bask in the reflected glory’ of President Obama’s election.  相似文献   

14.
    
Strong C 《Bioethics》2008,22(2):130-136
In previous articles I discussed the ethics of human reproductive cloning, focusing on a possible future scenario in which reproductive cloning can be accomplished without an elevated risk of anomalies to the children who are created. I argued that in such a scenario it would be ethically permissible for infertile couples to use cloning as a way to have genetically related children and that such use should not be prohibited. In 'Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic Fallacy', Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz raise objections to my conclusions. They disagree with the view, for which I argued, that some couples can have defensible reasons for desiring genetically related children. They also offer several new arguments against reproductive cloning, including an argument that it would diminish the number of adoptions, thereby adversely affecting the welfare of children who need to be adopted. In this paper I point out that Levy and Lotz's criticisms misconstrue my arguments and that there are serious problems with their arguments for prohibiting infertile couples from using cloning, including their argument from adoption.  相似文献   

15.
    
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16.
    
Schloendorn J 《Bioethics》2006,20(4):191-202
In the close to medium future, the life sciences might permit a vast extension of the human life span. I will argue that this is a very desirable development for the individual person. The question whether death is a harm to the dying is irrelevant here. All it takes is that being alive is good for the living person and not being alive is not good for anyone. Thus, living persons who expect to live on happily are rationally required to want to stay alive. Eventual uncertainty whether it will be possible to be happy in the future provides no objection, but rather an incentive to try. This view, however, may be naive in assuming that persons are unchanging entities that exist separately from their psychological information. Objections have been derived from reductionistic views that value our future experiences in a way that declines with time, so that there will be a future point beyond which only negligible value accrues. If we adopt such a view, then we cannot now be concerned to have experiences beyond that point. I argue that these arguments fail to take into account all the reasons we might have to be concerned for the future and all kinds of such concern that come from them. The adoption of a plausible reductionistic account can arguably weaken our concern for the future and certainly change its quality in important ways. But this provides no objection to the desire to live forever, nor to live at all.  相似文献   

17.
    
Evans D 《Bioethics》2012,26(4):182-190
This paper provides part of an analysis of the use of the Maori term whakapapa in a study designed to test the compatibility and commensurability of views of members of the indigenous culture of New Zealand with other views of genetic technologies extant in the country. It is concerned with the narrow sense of whakapapa as denoting biological ancestry, leaving the wider sense of whakapapa as denoting cultural identity for discussion elsewhere. The phenomenon of genetic curiosity is employed to facilitate this comparison. Four levels of curiosity are identified, in the Maori data, which penetrate more or less deeply into the psyche of individuals, affecting their health and wellbeing. These phenomena are compared with non-Maori experiences and considerable commonalities are discovered together with a point of marked difference. The results raise important questions for the ethical application of genetic technologies.  相似文献   

18.
乔中东  王莲芸 《生命科学》2012,(11):1302-1307
自从克隆羊多莉诞生以来,有关克隆人的伦理学争论就一直喋喋不休。世界上的各种政治组织和各国政府都明确反对生殖性克隆,而科学家们则对克隆技术的不完善心存疑虑。为了克服克隆过程中的伦理学障碍和技术缺陷,科学家们在核移植技术的基础上,又发展了异种核移植技术、诱导多能干细胞技术等。诱导的多能干细胞可以分化成各种组织,甚至能发育成个体,这些方法使克隆技术不再破坏胚胎,避免了伦理学纠纷。尽管科学技术在进步,但是人们对克隆人仍有很多不解和困惑。从自主、不伤害、行善和公正等四大生命伦理学原则着手,在技术层面上提出了尽管克隆人不会搞乱人际关系,不会减少人类基因多样性,也不会克隆出类似希特勒的战争狂人,但是,人类的生殖性克隆却剥夺了克隆人的自主性,对克隆人的生理和心理都有所伤害,违反了公正和行善的原则。因此,是否可以克隆人在伦理上仍然是需要长期讨论的问题。  相似文献   

19.
    
Proponents of human reproductive cloning do not dispute that cloning may lead to violations of clones' right to self-determination, or that these violations could cause psychological harms. But they proceed with their endorsement of human reproductive cloning by dismissing these psychological harms, mainly in two ways. The first tactic is to point out that to commit the genetic fallacy is indeed a mistake; the second is to invoke Parfit's non-identity problem. The argument of this paper is that neither approach succeeds in removing our moral responsibility to consider and to prevent psychological harms to cloned individuals. In fact, the same commitment to personal liberty that generates the right to reproduce by means of cloning also creates the need to limit that right appropriately. Discussion of human reproductive cloning ought to involve a careful and balanced consideration of both the relevant aspects of personal liberty – the parents' right to reproductive freedom and the cloned child's right to self-determination.  相似文献   

20.
Recent disputes about human population genetics research have been provoked by the field's political vulnerability (the historic imbalance of power between the geneticists and the people they study) and conceptual vulnerability (the mismatch between scientific and popular understandings of the genetic basis of collective identity). The small, isolated groups often studied by this science are now mobilizing themselves as political subjects, pressing sovereignty claims, and demanding control over the direction and interpretation of research. Negotiations between the geneticists and the people asked to donate DNA have resulted not only in explicit bioethics protocols but also in diffuse anxiety over the incommensurability between expert and non-expert views about genetic evidence for identity claims. This article compares two disputes over genetics research: the Human Genome Diversity Project and the use of genetics to prove identity claims among the Melungeons of Tennessee. The case studies illustrate “bioethics in action”: how particular controversies and interests drive the production of bioethics discourses and techniques (such as informed consent protocols). They also illustrate some limits on the usual apparatus of bioethics in overcoming this science's multiple vulnerabilities.  相似文献   

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