Saving the young before the old -- a reply to John Harris

For a distribution of health care resources to be fair, it should consider the consequences for the whole lives of the affected persons and not just how badly off they are at the present moment. Since, other things being equal, a person is worse off if he dies young than if he dies old, it is fair to give scarce vital health care resources to young rather than to old persons. In the paper this ageist view is restated and defended against a number of objections raised by John Harris. According to Harris' so-called anti-ageist argument the only relevant consideration in the distribution of vital health care resources is people's desire to go on living. On reflection, this is highly counterintuitive. Instead, it is argued that both present desires to go on living and possible future happiness should weigh together with considerations of fairness. Both fairness and possible future happiness will in most cases speak in favour of saving the young before the old. A number of other problems for the ageist view are discussed, and solutions are suggested.     

Desire-based and value-based normative reasons

This paper is a response to John Harris' provocative 'Justice and Equal Opportunities in Health Care'. The aim of this short response is to locate the difference between Harris and me within a broader debate about the nature of reasons for action. I argue that Harris is appealing to a desire-based conception of normative reasons. I highlight some of the deficiencies of a desire-based conception of reasons, and contrast it with a value-based account.     

PALLIATIVE CARE, PUBLIC HEALTH AND JUSTICE: SETTING PRIORITIES IN RESOURCE POOR COUNTRIES

Many countries have not considered palliative care a public health problem. With limited resources, disease-oriented therapies and prevention measures take priority. In this paper, I intend to describe the moral framework for considering palliative care as a public health priority in resource-poor countries. A distributive theory of justice for health care should consider integrative palliative care as morally required as it contributes to improving normal functioning and preserving opportunities for the individual. For patients requiring terminal care , we are guided less by principles of justice and more by the duty to relieve suffering and society's commitment to protecting the professional's obligation to uphold principles of beneficence, compassion and non-abandonment. A fair deliberation process is necessary to allow these strong moral commitments to serve as reasons when setting priorities in resource poor countries.     

Utilitarianism and the disabled: distribution of resources

Utilitarianism is more convincing than resource egalitarianism or welfare egalitarianism as a theory of how resources should be distributed between disabled people and nondisabled people. Unlike resource egalitarianism, utilitarianism can redistribute resources to the disabled when they would benefit more from those resources than nondisabled people. Unlike welfare egalitarianism, utilitarianism can halt redistribution when the disabled would no longer benefit more than the nondisabled from additional resources.
The author considers one objection to this view: it has been argued, by Sen and others, that there are circumstances under which utilitarianism would unfairly distribute fewer resources to the physically disabled than to nondisabled people, on the ground that the disabled would derive less benefit from those resources. In response, the author claims that critics of utilitarianism have fallaciously exaggerated the circumstances under which the disabled would benefit less than the nondisabled from additional resources. In those limited circumstances in which the disabled really would benefit less from resources, the author argues, it does not seem unfair to distribute fewer resources to them.     

Health, justice, and the environment

In this article, we argue that the scope of bioethical debate concerning justice in health should expand beyond the topic of access to health care and cover such issues as occupational hazards, safe housing, air pollution, water quality, food and drug safety, pest control, public health, childhood nutrition, disaster preparedness, literacy, and many other environmental factors that can cause differences in health. Since society does not have sufficient resources to address all of these environmental factors at one time, it is important to set priorities for bioethical theorizing and policy formation. Two considerations should be used to set these priorities: (1) the impact of the environmental factor on health inequality, and (2) the practicality of addressing the factor.     

Racist organ donors and saving lives

This paper considers what should be done about offers of organs for transplant that come with racist strings attached. Saving lives or improving their quality seem powerful reasons to accept the offer. Fairness, justice, and rejecting racism seem like powerful reasons against. This paper argues that conditional allocation should occur when it would provide access to organs for at least one person without costing others their access to organs. The bulk of the paper concentrates on defending this claim against these objections: (i) that the good that might come about through conditional allocation does so through wrongful complicity in the racist's wrongdoing; (ii) that conditional allocation symbolizes support for racism; and (iii) that conditional allocation is unjust or unfair and is, for that reason, impermissible. The final section, on conditional allocation as a policy, considers the speculative possibility that conditional allocation would reduce access to organs for some, but it argues that, even then, conditional allocation could be justified.     

John Harris' argument for a duty to research

John Harris suggests that partcipation in or support research, particularly medical research, is a moral duty. One kind of defence of this position rests on an appeal to the past, and produces two arguments. The first of these arguments is that it is unfair to accept the benefits of research without contributing something back in the form of support for, or participation in, research. A second argument is that we have a social duty to maintain those practices and institutions that sustain us, such as those which contribute to medical knowledge. This argument is related to the first, but it does not rely so heavily on fairness. Another kind of defence of the duty to research rests on an appeal to the future benefits of research: research is an effective way to discharge a duty to rescue others from serious illness or death, therefore we have a duty to research. I suggest that all three of Harris' lines fail to provide a compelling duty to research and spell out why. Moreover, not only do the lines of argument fail in their own terms: in combination, they turn out to be antagonistic to the very position that Harris wants to defend. While it is not my intention here to deny that there might be a duty to research, I claim that Harris' argument for the existence of such a duty is not the best way to establish it.     

Rawlsian Justice and Palliative Care

Palliative care serves both as an integrated part of treatment and as a last effort to care for those we cannot cure. The extent to which palliative care should be provided and our reasons for doing so have been curiously overlooked in the debate about distributive justice in health and healthcare. We argue that one prominent approach, the Rawlsian approach developed by Norman Daniels, is unable to provide such reasons and such care. This is because of a central feature in Daniels' account, namely that care should be provided to restore people's opportunities. Daniels' view is both unable to provide pain relief to those who need it as a supplement to treatment and, without justice‐based reasons to provide palliative care to those whose opportunities cannot be restored. We conclude that this makes Daniels' framework much less attractive.     

HOW TO CONNECT BIOETHICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: HEALTH, SUSTAINABILITY, AND JUSTICE

In this paper, I explore one way to bring bioethics and environmental ethics closer together. I focus on a question at the interface of health, sustainability, and justice: How well does a society promote health with the use of no more than a just share of environmental capacity? To address this question, I propose and discuss a mode of assessment that combines a measurement of population health, an estimate of environmental sustainability, and an assumption about what constitutes a fair or just share. This mode of assessment provides an estimate of the just and sustainable life expectancy of a population. It could be used to monitor how well a particular society promotes health within just environmental limits. It could also serve as a source of information that stakeholders use when they deliberate about programs, policies, and technologies. The purpose of this work is to focus attention on an ethical task: the need to fashion institutions and forms of life that promote health in ways that recognize the claims of sustainability and justice.     

IMPROVING GLOBAL HEALTH: COUNTING REASONS WHY

This paper examines cumulative ethical and self-interested reasons why wealthy developed nations should be motivated to do more to improve health care in developing countries. Egalitarian and human rights reasons why wealthy nations should do more to improve global health are that doing so would (1) promote equality of opportunity, (2) improve the situation of the worst-off, (3) promote respect of the human right to have one's most basic needs met, and (4) reduce undeserved inequalities in well-being. Utilitarian reasons for improving global health are that this would (5) promote the greater good of humankind, and (6) achieve enormous benefits while requiring only small sacrifices. Libertarian reasons are that this would (7) amend historical injustices and (8) meet the obligation to amend injustices that developed world countries have contributed to. Self-interested reasons why wealthy nations should do more to improve global health are that doing so would (9) reduce the threat of infectious diseases to developed countries, (10) promote developed countries' economic interests, and (11) promote global security. All of these reasons count, and together they add up to make an overwhelmingly powerful case for change. Those opposed to wealthy government funding of developing world health improvement would most likely appeal, implicitly or explicitly, to the idea that coercive taxation for redistributive purposes would violate the right of an individual to keep his hard-earned income. The idea that this reason not to improve global health should outweigh the combination of rights and values embodied in the eleven reasons enumerated above, however, is implausibly extreme, morally repugnant and perhaps imprudent.     

Reassessing insurers' access to genetic information: genetic privacy, ignorance, and injustice

Many countries have imposed strict regulations on the genetic information to which insurers have access. Commentators have warned against the emerging body of legislation for different reasons. This paper demonstrates that, when confronted with the argument that genetic information should be available to insurers for health insurance underwriting purposes, one should avoid appeals to rights of genetic privacy and genetic ignorance. The principle of equality of opportunity may nevertheless warrant restrictions. A choice-based account of this principle implies that it is unfair to hold people responsible for the consequences of the genetic lottery, since we have no choice in selecting our genotype or the expression of it. However appealing, this view does not take us all the way to an adequate justification of inaccessibility of genetic information. A contractarian account, suggesting that health is a condition of opportunity and that healthcare is an essential good, seems more promising. I conclude that if or when predictive medical tests (such as genetic tests) are developed with significant actuarial value, individuals have less reason to accept as fair institutions that limit access to healthcare on the grounds of risk status. Given the assumption that a division of risk pools in accordance with a rough estimate of people's level of (genetic) risk will occur, fairness and justice favour universal health insurance based on solidarity.     

Global Health Care Justice,Delivery Doctors and Assisted Reproduction: Taking a Note From Catholic Social Teachings

This article will examine the Catholic concept of global justice within a health care framework as it relates to women's needs for delivery doctors in the developing world and women's demands for assisted reproduction in the developed world. I will first discuss justice as a theory, situating it within Catholic social teachings. The Catholic perspective on global justice in health care demands that everyone have access to basic needs before elective treatments are offered to the wealthy. After exploring specific discrepancies in global health care justice, I will point to the need for delivery doctors in the developing world to provide basic assistance to women who hazard many pregnancies as a priority before offering assisted reproduction to women in the developed world. The wide disparities between maternal health in the developing world and elective fertility treatments in the developed world are clearly unjust within Catholic social teachings. I conclude this article by offering policy suggestions for moving closer to health care justice via doctor distribution.     

Justice and equal opportunities in health care

The principle that each individual is entitled to an equal opportunity to benefit from any public health care system, and that this entitlement is proportionate neither to the size of their chance of benefitting, nor to the quality of the benefit, nor to the length of lifetime remaining in which that benefit may be enjoyed, runs counter to most current thinking about the allocation of resources for health care. It is my contention that any system of prioritisation of the resources available for healthcare or of rationing such resources must be governed by this principle.
This can have apparently paradoxical conclusions in that it can seem wasteful to give someone with a very slim chance of a lifesaving treatment the same priority as someone with a much better chance. In an important and thoughtful recent paper, Julian Savulescu has concentrated on this apparent weakness and has argued for a particular conception of the good or benefit to be achieved by a healthcare system which purports to demonstrate the inadequacies of an equal opportunities approach to prioritisation and to replace it with an altogether better account. This paper will show that a rational 'reasons based consequentialism' is more in line with the equal opportunities approach, which I defended some time ago in these pages, than with that of Savulescu. I shall then examine more closely the conception of equal opportunities in health care and show that if we give weight to an individual's reasons, and what is expected to be good for them, we will opt for exactly the equality based account of distributive justice that I have recommended.     

Decisionmaking competence and risk

Mark Wicclair criticizes Allen Buchanan's and my claim that determining an appropriate level of competence (Wicclair substitutes "decisional capacity" for "competence", the import of which I note briefly below) for health care treatment decisionmaking involves balancing respecting a patient's self-determination and protecting his or her well-being. The most important implication of this balancing is that a standard of competence should vary in significant part with the effects for the patient's well-being of accepting his or her choice. Wicclair's criticisms take two main forms. First, he considers and rejects four of the positive reasons we offer in support of a risk-related standard. Second, in rejecting our fourth reason he argues that a risk-related standard leads to faulty competence determinations -- too high a standard in some cases and too low a standard in others. If he is correct, there are no positive reasons for adopting a risk-related standard and there are as well specific reasons not to adopt such a standard in order to avoid mistaken competence determinations. My response will address both sorts of criticisms in turn.     

Genes and social justice: a Rawlsian reply to Moore

In this article I critically examine Adam Moore's claim that the threshold for overriding intangible property rights and privacy rights is higher, in relation to genetic enhancement techniques and sensitive personal information, than is commonly suggested. I argue that Moore fails to see how important advances in genetic research are to social justice. Once this point is emphasised one sees that the issue of how formidable overriding these rights are is open to much debate. There are strong reasons, on grounds of social justice, for thinking the importance of such rights is likely to be diminished in the interests of ensuring a more just distribution of genes essential to pursuing what John Rawls calls a person's 'rational plan of life'.     

Caring for identified versus statistical lives: An evolutionary view of medical distributive justice

A central medical ethical concern is distributive justice, which may be framed as a problem in valuing identified lives versus statistical lives. Framing the issue in this way is important for two reasons. First, the growth of medical costs has been fueled and will continue to be fueled primarily by the growth of medical technology focused intensively, and often with little benefit for cost, on the care of identified lives. Second, there is some evidence that less expensive primary care, as opposed to high-tech medicine, is positively correlated with improved life expectancy, decreased infant and neonatal mortality, and fewer cases of low birth weight. However, shifting resources from high-tech medicine to primary care will be difficult because people find it psychologically painful to deny care to identified lives. People value identified lives more than statistical lives because we are influenced by certain cognitive preferences inherent to human nature. Natural selection has primed these cognitive preferences. There are no easy solutions to the profound problems facing healthcare systems. However, evolutionary insights can help us understand these problems and could productively inform attempts to promote primary care as opposed to high-tech medicine, thereby improving benefit for cost and enhancing social welfare.     

Parallel structures in professional and folk health care: A model applied to rural Hati

The paper argues that professional and folk sectors of pluralistic health care systems share certain structural features that in some respects have equal or greater importance than obvious differences. A model based on the concepts of primary, secondary and tertiary care is adapted to an analysis of both folk and professional domains of the rural Haitian health care system. Ethnographic and survey data are presented to support the position that underlying similarities are evident in patterns of cost, accessibility, specialization, recruitment and training of practitioners in both health sectors. The level of care model provides an analytic framework which gives proper attention to diversity in traditional healing, which is applicable to other health care systems, and which has relevance for the development of primary care resources in developing areas.     

CLINICAL ETHICS AND NURSING: "YES" TO CARING, BUT "NO" TO A FEMALE ETHICS OF CARE

According to a contemporary school of thought there is a specific female approach to ethics which is based not on abstract "male" ethical principles or rules, but on "care". Nurses have taken a keen interest in these female approaches to ethics. Drawing on the views expounded by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, nurses claim that a female "ethics of care" better captures their moral experiences than a traditional male "ethics of justice". This paper argues that "care" is best understood in a dispositional sense, that is, as sensitivity and responsiveness to the particularities of a situation and the needs of "concrete" others. While "care", in this sense, is necessary for ethics, it is not sufficient. Ethics needs "justice" as well as "care". If women and nurses excessively devalue principles and norms, they will be left without the theoretical tools to condemn some actions or practices, and to defend others. They will, like generations of nurses before them, be condemned to silence.     

Clinical ethics and nursing: "yes" to caring, but "no" to a female ethics of care

According to a contemporary school of thought there is a specific female approach to ethics which is based not on abstract "male" ethical principles or rules, but on "care". Nurses have taken a keen interest in these female approaches to ethics. Drawing on the views expounded by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, nurses claim that a female "ethics of care" better captures their moral experiences than a traditional male "ethics of justice". This paper argues that "care" is best understood in a dispositional sense, that is, as sensitivity and responsiveness to the particularities of a situation and the needs of "concrete" others. While "care", in this sense, is necessary for ethics, it is not sufficient. Ethics needs "justice" as well as "care". If women and nurses excessively devalue principles and norms, they will be left without the theoretical tools to condemn some actions or practices, and to defend others. They will, like generations of nurses before them, be condemned to silence.