Chimpanzees and bonobos distinguish between risk and ambiguity

Although recent research has investigated animal decision-making under risk, little is known about how animals choose under conditions of ambiguity when they lack information about the available alternatives. Many models of choice behaviour assume that ambiguity does not impact decision-makers, but studies of humans suggest that people tend to be more averse to choosing ambiguous options than risky options with known probabilities. To illuminate the evolutionary roots of human economic behaviour, we examined whether our closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus), share this bias against ambiguity. Apes chose between a certain option that reliably provided an intermediately preferred food type, and a variable option that could vary in the probability that it provided a highly preferred food type. To examine the impact of ambiguity on ape decision-making, we interspersed trials in which chimpanzees and bonobos had no knowledge about the probabilities. Both species avoided the ambiguous option compared with their choices for a risky option, indicating that ambiguity aversion is shared by humans, bonobos and chimpanzees.     

Neural signatures of economic preferences for risk and ambiguity

People often prefer the known over the unknown, sometimes sacrificing potential rewards for the sake of surety. Overcoming impulsive preferences for certainty in order to exploit uncertain but potentially lucrative options may require specialized neural mechanisms. Here, we demonstrate by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that individuals' preferences for risk (uncertainty with known probabilities) and ambiguity (uncertainty with unknown probabilities) predict brain activation associated with decision making. Activation within the lateral prefrontal cortex was predicted by ambiguity preference and was also negatively correlated with an independent clinical measure of behavioral impulsiveness, suggesting that this region implements contextual analysis and inhibits impulsive responses. In contrast, activation of the posterior parietal cortex was predicted by risk preference. Together, this novel double dissociation indicates that decision making under ambiguity does not represent a special, more complex case of risky decision making; instead, these two forms of uncertainty are supported by distinct mechanisms.     

The neural basis of financial risk taking

Investors systematically deviate from rationality when making financial decisions, yet the mechanisms responsible for these deviations have not been identified. Using event-related fMRI, we examined whether anticipatory neural activity would predict optimal and suboptimal choices in a financial decision-making task. We characterized two types of deviations from the optimal investment strategy of a rational risk-neutral agent as risk-seeking mistakes and risk-aversion mistakes. Nucleus accumbens activation preceded risky choices as well as risk-seeking mistakes, while anterior insula activation preceded riskless choices as well as risk-aversion mistakes. These findings suggest that distinct neural circuits linked to anticipatory affect promote different types of financial choices and indicate that excessive activation of these circuits may lead to investing mistakes. Thus, consideration of anticipatory neural mechanisms may add predictive power to the rational actor model of economic decision making.     

Optimal risky choice in humans: effects of amount of variability

The present study investigated whether the predictions of an optimal risk-sensitive foraging model (the energy-budget rule) would extend to humans’ choices between high- and low-variance monetary response options. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with repeated choices between two options that had the same mean values but different variances across positive- and negative-budget conditions. In Experiment 2, a within-subject comparison was conducted to investigate choice under positive- and negative-budget conditions when the options were either (a) a fixed option and a high-variance option, or (b) a low-variance option and a high-variance option. Session-wide choices were analyzed in relation to the predictions of the energy-budget rule and sequential choices were analyzed with dynamic optimization modeling. When both options were variable choice was generally consistent with predictions of the energy-budget rule and was more risk prone under negative-budget than positive-budget conditions. Sequential choices were sensitive to local budget conditions, but choices were less consistent with optimality when both options were variable, possibly because of the greater similarity in expected earnings for optimal and nonoptimal choices in these conditions. Overall, the results provide further evidence that the energy-budget rule may have broad applicability and that it can extend to human risky choice between multiple variable response options.     

Attenuated Neural Processing of Risk in Young Adults at Risk for Stimulant Dependence

Objective

Approximately 10% of young adults report non-medical use of stimulants (cocaine, amphetamine, methylphenidate), which puts them at risk for the development of dependence. This fMRI study investigates whether subjects at early stages of stimulant use show altered decision making processing.

Methods

158 occasional stimulants users (OSU) and 50 comparison subjects (CS) performed a “risky gains” decision making task during which they could select safe options (cash in 20 cents) or gamble them for double or nothing in two consecutive gambles (win or lose 40 or 80 cents, “risky decisions”). The primary analysis focused on risky versus safe decisions. Three secondary analyses were conducted: First, a robust regression examined the effect of lifetime exposure to stimulants and marijuana; second, subgroups of OSU with >1000 (n = 42), or <50 lifetime marijuana uses (n = 32), were compared to CS with <50 lifetime uses (n = 46) to examine potential marijuana effects; third, brain activation associated with behavioral adjustment following monetary losses was probed.

Results

There were no behavioral differences between groups. OSU showed attenuated activation across risky and safe decisions in prefrontal cortex, insula, and dorsal striatum, exhibited lower anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dorsal striatum activation for risky decisions and greater inferior frontal gyrus activation for safe decisions. Those OSU with relatively more stimulant use showed greater dorsal ACC and posterior insula attenuation. In comparison, greater lifetime marijuana use was associated with less neural differentiation between risky and safe decisions. OSU who chose more safe responses after losses exhibited similarities with CS relative to those preferring risky options.

Discussion

Individuals at risk for the development of stimulant use disorders presented less differentiated neural processing of risky and safe options. Specifically, OSU show attenuated brain response in regions critical for performance monitoring, reward processing and interoceptive awareness. Marijuana had additive effects by diminishing neural risk differentiation.     

Temporal discounting predicts risk sensitivity in rhesus macaques

Humans and animals tend both to avoid uncertainty and to prefer immediate over future rewards. The comorbidity of psychiatric disorders such as impulsivity, problem gambling, and addiction suggests that a common mechanism may underlie risk sensitivity and temporal discounting. Nonetheless, the precise relationship between these two traits remains largely unknown. To examine whether risk sensitivity and temporal discounting reflect a common process, we recorded choices made by two rhesus macaques in a visual gambling task while we varied the delay between trials. We found that preference for the risky option declined with increasing delay between sequential choices in the task, even when all other task parameters were held constant. These results were quantitatively predicted by a model that assumed that the subjective expected utility of the risky option is evaluated based on the expected time of the larger payoff. The importance of the larger payoff in this model suggests that the salience of larger payoffs played a critical role in determining the value of risky options. These data suggest that risk sensitivity may be a product of other cognitive processes, and specifically that myopia for the future and the salience of jackpots control the propensity to take a gamble.     

Led into Temptation? Rewarding Brand Logos Bias the Neural Encoding of Incidental Economic Decisions

Human decision-making is driven by subjective values assigned to alternative choice options. These valuations are based on reward cues. It is unknown, however, whether complex reward cues, such as brand logos, may bias the neural encoding of subjective value in unrelated decisions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we subliminally presented brand logos preceding intertemporal choices. We demonstrated that priming biased participants' preferences towards more immediate rewards in the subsequent temporal discounting task. This was associated with modulations of the neural encoding of subjective values of choice options in a network of brain regions, including but not restricted to medial prefrontal cortex. Our findings demonstrate the general susceptibility of the human decision making system to apparently incidental contextual information. We conclude that the brain incorporates seemingly unrelated value information that modifies decision making outside the decision-maker's awareness.     

What Do I Want and When Do I Want It: Brain Correlates of Decisions Made for Self and Other

A number of recent functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies on intertemporal choice behavior have demonstrated that so-called emotion- and reward-related brain areas are preferentially activated by decisions involving immediately available (but smaller) rewards as compared to (larger) delayed rewards. This pattern of activation was not seen, however, when intertemporal choices were made for another (unknown) individual, which speaks to that activation having been triggered by self-relatedness. In the present fMRI study, we investigated the brain correlates of individuals who passively observed intertemporal choices being made either for themselves or for an unknown person. We found higher activation within the ventral striatum, medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex, pregenual anterior cingulate cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex when an immediate reward was possible for the observer herself, which is in line with findings from studies in which individuals actively chose immediately available rewards. Additionally, activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and precuneus was higher for choices that included immediate options than for choices that offered only delayed options, irrespective of who was to be the beneficiary. These results indicate that (1) the activations found in active intertemporal decision making are also present when the same decisions are merely observed, thus supporting the assumption that a robust brain network is engaged in immediate gratification; and (2) with immediate rewards, certain brain areas are activated irrespective of whether the observer or another person is the beneficiary of a decision, suggesting that immediacy plays a more general role for neural activation. An explorative analysis of participants’ brain activation corresponding to chosen rewards, further indicates that activation in the aforementioned brain areas depends on the mere presence, availability, or actual reception of immediate rewards.     

Cognitive mechanisms of risky choice: is there an evaluation cost?

We contrast two classes of choice processes, those assuming time-consuming comparisons and those where stimuli for each option act independently, competing for expression by cross censorship. The Sequential Choice Model (SCM) belongs in the latter category, and has received empirical support in several procedures involving deterministic alternatives. Here we test this model in risky choices. In two treatments, each with five conditions, European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) faced choices between options with unpredictable outcomes and risk-free alternatives. In the delay treatment the five conditions involved choices between a variable option offering two equiprobable delays to reward and a fixed option with delay differing between conditions. The amount treatment was structurally similar, but amount of reward rather than delay was manipulated. As assumed (and required) by the SCM, latency to respond in no-choice trials reflected each option's richness with respect to the background alternatives, and, crucially, preferences in simultaneous choices were predictable from latencies to each option in forced trials. However, we did not detect reliable differences in response times between forced and choice trials, neither the lengthening expected from evaluation models nor the shortening expected from the SCM.     

Posterior cingulate cortex mediates outcome-contingent allocation of behavior

Adaptive decision making requires selecting an action and then monitoring its consequences to improve future decisions. The neuronal mechanisms supporting action evaluation and subsequent behavioral modification, however, remain poorly understood. To investigate the contribution of posterior cingulate cortex (CGp) to these processes, we recorded activity of single neurons in monkeys performing a gambling task in which the reward outcome of each choice strongly influenced subsequent choices. We found that CGp neurons signaled reward outcomes in a nonlinear fashion and that outcome-contingent modulations in firing rate persisted into subsequent trials. Moreover, firing rate on any one trial predicted switching to the alternative option on the next trial. Finally, microstimulation in CGp following risky choices promoted a preference reversal for the safe option on the following trial. Collectively, these results demonstrate that CGp directly contributes to the evaluative processes that support dynamic changes in decision making in volatile environments.     

Motor Preparatory Activity in Posterior Parietal Cortex is Modulated by Subjective Absolute Value

For optimal response selection, the consequences associated with behavioral success or failure must be appraised. To determine how monetary consequences influence the neural representations of motor preparation, human brain activity was scanned with fMRI while subjects performed a complex spatial visuomotor task. At the beginning of each trial, reward context cues indicated the potential gain and loss imposed for correct or incorrect trial completion. FMRI-activity in canonical reward structures reflected the expected value related to the context. In contrast, motor preparatory activity in posterior parietal and premotor cortex peaked in high “absolute value” (high gain or loss) conditions: being highest for large gains in subjects who believed they performed well while being highest for large losses in those who believed they performed poorly. These results suggest that the neural activity preceding goal-directed actions incorporates the absolute value of that action, predicated upon subjective, rather than objective, estimates of one''s performance.     

The Anterior Insula Tracks Behavioral Entropy during an Interpersonal Competitive Game

In competitive situations, individuals need to adjust their behavioral strategy dynamically in response to their opponent’s behavior. In the present study, we investigated the neural basis of how individuals adjust their strategy during a simple, competitive game of matching pennies. We used entropy as a behavioral index of randomness in decision-making, because maximizing randomness is thought to be an optimal strategy in the game, according to game theory. While undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), subjects played matching pennies with either a human or computer opponent in each block, although in reality they played the game with the same computer algorithm under both conditions. The winning rate of each block was also manipulated. Both the opponent (human or computer), and the winning rate, independently affected subjects’ block-wise entropy during the game. The fMRI results revealed that activity in the bilateral anterior insula was positively correlated with subjects’ (not opponent’s) behavioral entropy during the game, which indicates that during an interpersonal competitive game, the anterior insula tracked how uncertain subjects’ behavior was, rather than how uncertain subjects felt their opponent''s behavior was. Our results suggest that intuitive or automatic processes based on somatic markers may be a key to optimally adjusting behavioral strategies in competitive situations.     

Design and Analysis of Simple Choice Surveys for Natural Resource Management

Abstract: We used a simple yet powerful method for judging public support for management actions from randomized surveys. We asked respondents to rank choices (representing management regulations under consideration) according to their preference, and we then used discrete choice models to estimate probability of choosing among options (conditional on the set of options presented to respondents). Because choices may share similar unmodeled characteristics, the multinomial logit model, commonly applied to discrete choice data, may not be appropriate. We introduced the nested logit model, which offers a simple approach for incorporating correlation among choices. This forced choice survey approach provides a useful method of gathering public input; it is relatively easy to apply in practice, and the data are likely to be more informative than asking constituents to rate attractiveness of each option separately.     

Neural Responses to Truth Telling and Risk Propensity under Asymmetric Information

Trust is multi-dimensional because it can be characterized by subjective trust, trust antecedent, and behavioral trust. Previous research has investigated functional brain responses to subjective trust (e.g., a judgment of trustworthiness) or behavioral trust (e.g., decisions to trust) in perfect information, where all relevant information is available to all participants. In contrast, we conducted a novel examination of the patterns of functional brain activity to a trust antecedent, specifically truth telling, in asymmetric information, where one individual has more information than others, with the effect of varying risk propensity. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and recruited 13 adults, who played the Communication Game, where they served as the “Sender” and chose either truth telling (true advice) or lie telling (false advice) regarding the best payment allocation for their partner. Our behavioral results revealed that subjects with recreational high risk tended to choose true advice. Moreover, fMRI results yielded that the choices of true advice were associated with increased cortical activation in the anterior rostral medial and frontopolar prefrontal cortices, middle frontal cortex, temporoparietal junction, and precuneus. Furthermore, when we specifically evaluated a role of the bilateral amygdala as the region of interest (ROI), decreased amygdala response was associated with high risk propensity, regardless of truth telling or lying. In conclusion, our results have implications for how differential functions of the cortical areas may contribute to the neural processing of truth telling.     

The relationship between amygdala activation and passive exposure time to an aversive cue during a continuous performance task

The allocation of attention modulates negative emotional processing in the amygdala. However, the role of passive exposure time to emotional signals in the modulation of amygdala activity during active task performance has not been examined. In two functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) experiments conducted in two different groups of healthy human subjects, we examined activation in the amygdala due to cued anticipation of painful stimuli while subjects performed a simple continuous performance task (CPT) with either a fixed or a parametrically varied trial duration. In the first experiment (N = 16), engagement in the CPT during a task with fixed trial duration produced the expected attenuation of amygdala activation, but close analysis suggested that the attenuation occurred during the period of active engagement in CPT, and that amygdala activity increased proportionately during the remainder of each trial, when subjects were passively exposed to the pain cue. In the second experiment (N = 12), the duration of each trial was parametrically varied, and we found that amygdala activation was linearly related to the time of passive exposure to the anticipatory cue. We suggest that amygdala activation during negative anticipatory processing depends directly on the passive exposure time to the negative cue.     

Explicit neural signals reflecting reward uncertainty

The acknowledged importance of uncertainty in economic decision making has stimulated the search for neural signals that could influence learning and inform decision mechanisms. Current views distinguish two forms of uncertainty, namely risk and ambiguity, depending on whether the probability distributions of outcomes are known or unknown. Behavioural neurophysiological studies on dopamine neurons revealed a risk signal, which covaried with the standard deviation or variance of the magnitude of juice rewards and occurred separately from reward value coding. Human imaging studies identified similarly distinct risk signals for monetary rewards in the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), thus fulfilling a requirement for the mean variance approach of economic decision theory. The orbitofrontal risk signal covaried with individual risk attitudes, possibly explaining individual differences in risk perception and risky decision making. Ambiguous gambles with incomplete probabilistic information induced stronger brain signals than risky gambles in OFC and amygdala, suggesting that the brain's reward system signals the partial lack of information. The brain can use the uncertainty signals to assess the uncertainty of rewards, influence learning, modulate the value of uncertain rewards and make appropriate behavioural choices between only partly known options.     

Decision-Making for Risky Gains and Losses among College Students with Internet Gaming Disorder

Individuals with Internet gaming disorder (IGD) tend to exhibit disadvantageous risky decision-making not only in their real life but also in laboratory tasks. Decision-making is a complex multifaceted function and different cognitive processes are involved in decision-making for gains and losses. However, the relationship between impaired decision-making and gain versus loss processing in the context of IGD is poorly understood. The main aim of the present study was to separately evaluate decision-making for risky gains and losses among college students with IGD using the Cups task. Additionally, we further examined the effects of outcome magnitude and probability level on decision-making related to risky gains and losses respectively. Sixty college students with IGD and 42 matched healthy controls (HCs) participated. Results indicated that IGD subjects exhibited generally greater risk taking tendencies than HCs. In comparison to HCs, IGD subjects made more disadvantageous risky choices in the loss domain (but not in the gain domain). Follow-up analyses indicated that the impairment was associated to insensitivity to changes in outcome magnitude and probability level for risky losses among IGD subjects. In addition, higher Internet addiction severity scores were associated with percentage of disadvantageous risky options in the loss domain. These findings emphasize the effect of insensitivity to losses on disadvantageous decisions under risk in the context of IGD, which has implications for future intervention studies.