Flexible representations of dynamics are used in object manipulation

To manipulate an object skillfully, the brain must learn its dynamics, specifying the mapping between applied force and motion. A fundamental issue in sensorimotor control is whether such dynamics are represented in an extrinsic frame of reference tied to the object or an intrinsic frame of reference linked to the arm. Although previous studies have suggested that objects are represented in arm-centered coordinates [1-6], all of these studies have used objects with unusual and complex dynamics. Thus, it is not known how objects with natural dynamics are represented. Here we show that objects with simple (or familiar) dynamics and those with complex (or unfamiliar) dynamics are represented in object- and arm-centered coordinates, respectively. We also show that objects with simple dynamics are represented with an intermediate coordinate frame when vision of the object is removed. These results indicate that object dynamics can be flexibly represented in different coordinate frames by the brain. We suggest that with experience, the representation of the dynamics of a manipulated object may shift from a coordinate frame tied to the arm toward one that is linked to the object. The additional complexity required to represent dynamics in object-centered coordinates would be economical for familiar objects because such a representation allows object use regardless of the orientation of the object in hand.     

A multiscale dynamic routing circuit for forming size- and position-invariant object representations

We describe a neural model for forming size- and position-invariant representations of visual objects. The model is based on a previously proposed dynamic routing circuit that remaps selected portions of an input array into an object-centered reference frame. Here, we show how a multiscale representation may be incorporated at the input stage of the model, and we describe the control architecture and dynamics for a hierarchical, multistage routing circuit. Specific neurobiological substrates and mechanisms for the model are proposed, and a number of testable predictions are described.     

A computational basis to object?

To use an object, we must be able to perceive the spatial relationship between the object's parts. The accepted view of how the brain coherently encodes an object is that some neurons in the frontal cortex employ an object-centered coordinate frame. A new computational model challenges this view, using the rich conceptual framework of neural basis functions.     

Spatial modulation of primate inferotemporal responses by eye position

Background

A key aspect of representations for object recognition and scene analysis in the ventral visual stream is the spatial frame of reference, be it a viewer-centered, object-centered, or scene-based coordinate system. Coordinate transforms from retinocentric space to other reference frames involve combining neural visual responses with extraretinal postural information.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We examined whether such spatial information is available to anterior inferotemporal (AIT) neurons in the macaque monkey by measuring the effect of eye position on responses to a set of simple 2D shapes. We report, for the first time, a significant eye position effect in over 40% of recorded neurons with small gaze angle shifts from central fixation. Although eye position modulates responses, it does not change shape selectivity.

Conclusions/Significance

These data demonstrate that spatial information is available in AIT for the representation of objects and scenes within a non-retinocentric frame of reference. More generally, the availability of spatial information in AIT calls into questions the classic dichotomy in visual processing that associates object shape processing with ventral structures such as AIT but places spatial processing in a separate anatomical stream projecting to dorsal structures.     

An advantage for concavities in shape perception by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

The significance of concavity in object shape perception by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) was investigated in a matching-to-sample procedure. For the task, chimpanzees were required to choose a polygon stimulus that was identical in shape to a sample. The incorrect alternative was defined by the addition or subtraction of a concave or convex apex. Chimpanzees were more sensitive to the concave deformation than to the convex deformation. This tendency conforms to the theories of human visual perception that have treated concave features as important factors in reconstructing three-dimensional structures from two-dimensional images. Our results suggest that shape representation in chimpanzees is similar to that in humans and that chimpanzees visually process two-dimensional images in the same manner as humans.     

Subcortical discrimination of unperceived objects during binocular rivalry

Rapid identification of behaviorally relevant objects is important for survival. In humans, the neural computations for visually discriminating complex objects involve inferior temporal cortex (IT). However, less detailed but faster form processing may also occur in a phylogenetically older subcortical visual system that terminates in the amygdala. We used binocular rivalry to present stimuli without conscious awareness, thereby eliminating the IT object representation and isolating subcortical visual input to the amygdala. Functional magnetic resonance imaging revealed significant brain activation in the left amygdala but not in object-selective IT in response to unperceived fearful faces compared to unperceived nonface objects. These findings indicate that, for certain behaviorally relevant stimuli, a high-level cortical representation in IT is not required for object discrimination in the amygdala.     

Multi-scale lines and edges in V1 and beyond: Brightness,object categorization and recognition,and consciousness

In this paper we present an improved model for line and edge detection in cortical area V1. This model is based on responses of simple and complex cells, and it is multi-scale with no free parameters. We illustrate the use of the multi-scale line/edge representation in different processes: visual reconstruction or brightness perception, automatic scale selection and object segregation. A two-level object categorization scenario is tested in which pre-categorization is based on coarse scales only and final categorization on coarse plus fine scales. We also present a multi-scale object and face recognition model. Processing schemes are discussed in the framework of a complete cortical architecture. The fact that brightness perception and object recognition may be based on the same symbolic image representation is an indication that the entire (visual) cortex is involved in consciousness.     

Neural signatures for sustaining object representations attributed to others in preverbal human infants

A major feat of social beings is to encode what their conspecifics see, know or believe. While various non-human animals show precursors of these abilities, humans perform uniquely sophisticated inferences about other people''s mental states. However, it is still unclear how these possibly human-specific capacities develop and whether preverbal infants, similarly to adults, form representations of other agents'' mental states, specifically metarepresentations. We explored the neurocognitive bases of eight-month-olds'' ability to encode the world from another person''s perspective, using gamma-band electroencephalographic activity over the temporal lobes, an established neural signature for sustained object representation after occlusion. We observed such gamma-band activity when an object was occluded from the infants'' perspective, as well as when it was occluded only from the other person (study 1), and also when subsequently the object disappeared, but the person falsely believed the object to be present (study 2). These findings suggest that the cognitive systems involved in representing the world from infants'' own perspective are also recruited for encoding others'' beliefs. Such results point to an early-developing, powerful apparatus suitable to deal with multiple concurrent representations, and suggest that infants can have a metarepresentational understanding of other minds even before the onset of language.     

Word Generalization by a Dog (Canis familiaris): Is Shape Important?

We investigated the presence of a key feature of human word comprehension in a five year old Border Collie: the generalization of a word referring to an object to other objects of the same shape, also known as shape bias. Our first experiment confirmed a solid history of word learning in the dog, thus making it possible for certain object features to have become central in his word comprehension. Using an experimental paradigm originally employed to establish shape bias in children and human adults we taught the dog arbitrary object names (e.g. dax) for novel objects. Two experiments showed that when briefly familiarized with word-object mappings the dog did not generalize object names to object shape but to object size. A fourth experiment showed that when familiarized with a word-object mapping for a longer period of time the dog tended to generalize the word to objects with the same texture. These results show that the dog tested did not display human-like word comprehension, but word generalization and word reference development of a qualitatively different nature compared to humans. We conclude that a shape bias for word generalization in humans is due to the distinct evolutionary history of the human sensory system for object identification and that more research is necessary to confirm qualitative differences in word generalization between humans and dogs.     

Crisis of Meanings: Divergent Experiences and Perceptions of the Marine Environment in Victoria,Australia

The oceans of the world are regularly depicted as under threat from human exploitation with the problem portrayed as being of ‘global’ concern. In a world market characterised by the division of labour, many of those who eat fish do so without directly experiencing the ocean as a domain of productive utility. Rather, their encounters are with representations that depict the ‘natural’ world as an aesthetic object of contemplation, and environmentalist discourses that identify human activities as threatening marine ecosystems. So prevalent is this experience that tangible institutions, such as state fisheries management bodies, have emerged, acting to reinforce the ontology of this ‘contemplated’ ocean, giving weight to the illusion that humans can, and should, appreciate it only from afar. In this representation, commercial fishers are regularly depicted as transgressing a ‘natural’ boundary between humans and the environment. It is when the world is simultaneously encountered as an object of consumptive utility and aesthetic utility that the human role in the environment becomes ambiguous and a sense of crisis arises. This paper investigates disjunctions in experiences and understandings that contribute to environmental anxiety, and debates over the appropriate use of the ocean.     

PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF TIME-INTENSITY BITTERNESS CURVES1

Perceived bitterness in drinks is known to fade slowly over time. Time-Intensity curves are a means of studying this fading process. K subjects record the perceived bitterness intensity by moving a slider on a monitor using a mouse. Usually average TI-curves are calculated to give a representation of the TI-curve for one particular object. The problem is that there often are large individual differences, so the average TI-curve is not always a good representation. An alternative is to perform a Principal Component Analysis on the matrices of objects by individual TI-curves for each object. The resulting, so-called, Principal Time Intensity Curves (PTIC's) are better representations than the average curves. Often the PTIC's for the different products are hard to distinguish. In this case a noncentered PCA of the matrix with curves gives results which show more differences between the products.     

Representing occluded objects in the human infant brain

One of the most striking phenomena in cognitive development has been the apparent failure of infants to show 'object permanence' in manual reaching tasks although they show evidence for representing hidden objects in studies measuring looking times. We report a neural correlate of object permanence in six-month-old infants: a burst of gamma-band EEG activity over the temporal lobe that occurs during an occlusion event and when an object is expected to appear from behind an occluder. We interpret this burst as being related to the infants' mental representation of the occluded object.     

Online learning of objects in a biologically motivated visual architecture

We present a biologically motivated architecture for object recognition that is capable of online learning of several objects based on interaction with a human teacher. The system combines biological principles such as appearance-based representation in topographical feature detection hierarchies and context-driven transfer between different levels of object memory. Training can be performed in an unconstrained environment by presenting objects in front of a stereo camera system and labeling them by speech input. The learning is fully online and thus avoids an artificial separation of the interaction into training and test phases. We demonstrate the performance on a challenging ensemble of 50 objects.     

The relationship between visual working memory and attention: retention of precise colour information in the absence of effects on perceptual selection

We examined the conditions under which a feature value in visual working memory (VWM) recruits visual attention to matching stimuli. Previous work has suggested that VWM supports two qualitatively different states of representation: an active state that interacts with perceptual selection and a passive (or accessory) state that does not. An alternative hypothesis is that VWM supports a single form of representation, with the precision of feature memory controlling whether or not the representation interacts with perceptual selection. The results of three experiments supported the dual-state hypothesis. We established conditions under which participants retained a relatively precise representation of a parcticular colour. If the colour was immediately task relevant, it reliably recruited attention to matching stimuli. However, if the colour was not immediately task relevant, it failed to interact with perceptual selection. Feature maintenance in VWM is not necessarily equivalent with feature-based attentional selection.     

Computational object recognition: a biologically motivated approach

We propose a conceptual framework for artificial object recognition systems based on findings from neurophysiological and neuropsychological research on the visual system in primate cortex. We identify some essential questions, which have to be addressed in the course of designing object recognition systems. As answers, we review some major aspects of biological object recognition, which are then translated into the technical field of computer vision. The key suggestions are the use of incremental and view-based approaches together with the ability of online feature selection and the interconnection of object-views to form an overall object representation. The effectiveness of the computational approach is estimated by testing a possible realization in various tasks and conditions explicitly designed to allow for a direct comparison with the biological counterpart. The results exhibit excellent performance with regard to recognition accuracy, the creation of sparse models and the selection of appropriate features.     

Visual Cues Given by Humans Are Not Sufficient for Asian Elephants (Elephas maximus) to Find Hidden Food

Recent research suggests that domesticated species – due to artificial selection by humans for specific, preferred behavioral traits – are better than wild animals at responding to visual cues given by humans about the location of hidden food. \Although this seems to be supported by studies on a range of domesticated (including dogs, goats and horses) and wild (including wolves and chimpanzees) animals, there is also evidence that exposure to humans positively influences the ability of both wild and domesticated animals to follow these same cues. Here, we test the performance of Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) on an object choice task that provides them with visual-only cues given by humans about the location of hidden food. Captive elephants are interesting candidates for investigating how both domestication and human exposure may impact cue-following as they represent a non-domesticated species with almost constant human interaction. As a group, the elephants (n = 7) in our study were unable to follow pointing, body orientation or a combination of both as honest signals of food location. They were, however, able to follow vocal commands with which they were already familiar in a novel context, suggesting the elephants are able to follow cues if they are sufficiently salient. Although the elephants’ inability to follow the visual cues provides partial support for the domestication hypothesis, an alternative explanation is that elephants may rely more heavily on other sensory modalities, specifically olfaction and audition. Further research will be needed to rule out this alternative explanation.     

Functional equivalence in pigeons involving a four-member class

Research suggests that animals are capable of forming functional equivalence relations or stimulus classes of the kind usually demonstrated by humans (e.g., the class defined by an object and the word for that object). In pigeons, such functional equivalences are typically established using many-to-one matching-to-sample in which two samples are associated with one comparison stimulus and two different samples are associated with the other. Evidence for the establishment of functional equivalences between samples associated with the same comparison comes from transfer tests. In Experiment 1, we found that pigeons can form a single class consisting of four members (many-to-one matching) when the alternative class has only one member (one-to-one matching). In Experiment 2, we ruled out the possibility that the pigeons acquired the hybrid one-to-one/many-to-one task by developing a single-code/default coding strategy as earlier research suggested that it might. Thus, pigeons can develop a functional class consisting of as many as four members, with the alternative class consisting of a single member.     

Object-oriented echo perception and cortical representation in echolocating bats

Echolocating bats can identify three-dimensional objects exclusively through the analysis of acoustic echoes of their ultrasonic emissions. However, objects of the same structure can differ in size, and the auditory system must achieve a size-invariant, normalized object representation for reliable object recognition. This study describes both the behavioral classification and the cortical neural representation of echoes of complex virtual objects that vary in object size. In a phantom-target playback experiment, it is shown that the bat Phyllostomus discolor spontaneously classifies most scaled versions of objects according to trained standards. This psychophysical performance is reflected in the electrophysiological responses of a population of cortical units that showed an object-size invariant response (14/109 units, 13%). These units respond preferentially to echoes from objects in which echo duration (encoding object depth) and echo amplitude (encoding object surface area) co-varies in a meaningful manner. These results indicate that at the level of the bat's auditory cortex, an object-oriented rather than a stimulus-parameter-oriented representation of echoes is achieved.     

Distinct Visual Working Memory Systems for View-Dependent and View-Invariant Representation

Background

How do people sustain a visual representation of the environment? Currently, many researchers argue that a single visual working memory system sustains non-spatial object information such as colors and shapes. However, previous studies tested visual working memory for two-dimensional objects only. In consequence, the nature of visual working memory for three-dimensional (3D) object representation remains unknown.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Here, I show that when sustaining information about 3D objects, visual working memory clearly divides into two separate, specialized memory systems, rather than one system, as was previously thought. One memory system gradually accumulates sensory information, forming an increasingly precise view-dependent representation of the scene over the course of several seconds. A second memory system sustains view-invariant representations of 3D objects. The view-dependent memory system has a storage capacity of 3–4 representations and the view-invariant memory system has a storage capacity of 1–2 representations. These systems can operate independently from one another and do not compete for working memory storage resources.

Conclusions/Significance

These results provide evidence that visual working memory sustains object information in two separate, specialized memory systems. One memory system sustains view-dependent representations of the scene, akin to the view-specific representations that guide place recognition during navigation in humans, rodents and insects. The second memory system sustains view-invariant representations of 3D objects, akin to the object-based representations that underlie object cognition.