“With AIDS I am happier than I have ever been before”

In her 2016 article Sherry Ortner discusses what she calls the rise of ‘dark anthropology’: that is, ethnographic work that analyses situations of domination, dispossession, and violence. She, like Joel Robbins ( 2013 ), posits as a counterpoint the emergence of ‘anthropologies of the good,’ which emphasise care and ethics. In this paper I put these two anthropological projects into generative tension through an analysis of HIV‐positive women's lives in Papua New Guinea. In the first part of the paper I demonstrate the ways in which resource extraction has created vulnerabilities to HIV—in part through the coerced marriages of women to powerful landowners. In the second, I discuss ways in which the antiretroviral era has made possible unexpected forms of kindness towards HIV‐positive women. I end the paper with a discussion of what HIV‐positive women mean when they claim that they are happier now than in their pre‐diagnosis lives.     

Two kinds of physician‐assisted death

I argue that the concept ‘physician‐assisted suicide’ covers two procedures that should be distinguished: giving someone access to humane means to end his own life, and taking co‐responsibility for the safe and effective execution of that plan. In the first section I explain the distinction, in the following sections I show why it is important. To begin with I argue that we should expect the laws that permit these two kinds of ‘assistance’ to be different in their justificatory structure. Laws that permit giving access only presuppose that the right to self‐determination implies a right to suicide, but laws that permit doctors to take co‐responsibility may have to appeal to a principle of mercy or beneficence. Actually this difference in justificatory structure can to some extent be found in existing regulatory systems, though far from consistently. Finally I argue that if one recognizes a right to suicide, as Oregon and other American states implicitly do, and as the European Court of Human Rights has recently done explicitly, one is committed to permit the first kind of ‘assistance’ under some conditions.     

Other‐than‐humans and the remaking of the social

This article takes its starting‐point from an elderly Bardi woman's observation that elders ‘used to frighten’ younger generations with stories about various spirit beings. The beings she referred to are a group of malevolent beings inhabiting particular locations in her country, located in the northwest Kimberley region of Western Australia. Beginning with her observation that this is something that ‘used’ to happen, I consider the relationship between persons and different kinds of spirit beings amidst historical impetus for change. Political, economic, ecological, technological, and other impacts have occurred within the shifting context of progressive engagements with Western colonialism, capitalism, and the market economy, with implications for local ontologies. I suggest that these spirit beings are becoming less differentiated and consider the implications of this in terms of personhood and the constitution of the social, arguing that the disappearance of some of these beings is suggestive of a contraction of temporal and spatial extensions of personhood, with implications for relations with country.     

On the Moral Acceptability of Physician‐Assisted Dying for Non‐Autonomous Psychiatric Patients

Several authors have recently suggested that the suffering caused by mental illness could provide moral grounds for physician‐assisted dying. Yet they typically require that psychiatric‐assisted dying could come to question in the cases of autonomous, or rational, psychiatric patients only. Given that also non‐autonomous psychiatric patients can sometimes suffer unbearably, this limitation appears questionable. In this article, I maintain that restricting psychiatric‐assisted dying to autonomous, or rational, psychiatric patients would not be compatible with endorsing certain end‐of‐life practices commonly accepted in current medical ethics and law, practices often referred to as ‘passive euthanasia’.     

The ‘Widow Effect’ and its Consequences for Reproduction in Burying Beetles,Nicrophorus vespilloides (Coleoptera: Silphidae)

Burying beetles tend their young on small vertebrate carcasses, which serve as the sole source of food for the developing larvae. Single females are as proficient at rearing offspring as male-female pairs, yet males opt to remain with their broods throughout most of the larval development. One potential benefit of a male's extended residency is that it affords him the opportunity of additional copulations with the female, which could ensure his paternity in a replacement brood should the female's first egg clutch fail to hatch. We tested this hypothesis by manipulating males' access to their mates during the production of replacement clutches, using genetic colour markers to determine the paternity of offspring. Females were induced to produce a replacement brood by removing their first clutch of eggs. In one experimental treatment, we removed the female's mate upon the removal of her first egg clutch (‘widowed’ females); in a second treatment, the female was permitted to retain her mate up until she produced a replacement clutch. There was no significant difference in paternity between males removed from females before the initiation of replacement clutches and those permitted to remain with their mates. However, widowed females produced fewer offspring in replacement broods than did females permitted to retain their mates. This difference occurred primarily because a significantly greater proportion of widowed females opted not to produce a replacement clutch, a result we refer to as the ‘widow effect’. This widow effect was further shown in those replicates in which females of both treatments produced replacement clutches: widowed females took significantly longer to produce a replacement clutch than did females permitted to retain their mates. The loss of her mate could be a signal to a female that a take-over of the carcass is imminent. Her reluctance to produce a replacement clutch under these circumstances might constitute a strategy by which she conserves carrion for a subsequent reproductive attempt with an intruding male successful at ousting her previous mate. Regardless of its functional significance, the widow effect favours the extended residency of males and therefore contributes to the selective maintenance of male parental care.     

The Consequences of Being a Gift

The issues of dislocated identity are epitomised in Mary's story. Brought from Papua New Guinea to Australia at a very young age as a ‘gift’, she grew up in a series of foster homes in Adelaide, South Australia. Now, as a teenager, Mary constitutes her identity through her body, emphasising her distinctive physical features, through idealised memories and through representations—photographs, cultural icons and people who ‘look like me’. The self she creates in this way sits uneasily along side another self; the Western adolescent self in trouble with the law, the self who struggles to be ‘one of the boys’ on the streets, one who ‘runs amuck’. This paper explores the process of ‘self-making’, the ‘serious play’ that Mary has employed to constitute her identity through her juggling of and reappropriation of cultural symbols. As a participant in a wider ethnographic study into Australian youth and representation, Mary portrayed the complexities of her growing up between worlds, embedded in neither and desperate to belong to her past.     

The Market Effect in the Wood Mouse, Apodemus sylvaticus:Selling Information on Reproductive Status

Grooming in the wood mouse is a means by which males obtain information about the reproductive state of females, as grooming creates a situation which allows the male to smell the groomed female’s anogenital area to ascertain her phase of oestrus. Although grooming is reciprocal in this species, it is asymmetrical in that males groom females more often than vice versa. This grooming asymmetry was studied using Markov chain analysis for grooming sequences in two captive wood mouse colonies, and transition rates were used to represent motivation in both sexes. Grooming sessions were often initiated by a male’s attempt to sniff an immobile female’s anogenital region, while the female would immediately react by avoiding or biting the male. In order to entice the female to remain, the male would begin grooming the female’s head and shoulder area, surreptitiously and consistently grooming downwards towards the female’s anogenital region, until she would again terminate such contact either by avoiding or biting the male. While, therefore, the male’s tendency to sniff the female’s anogenital region was stronger than his tendency to groom her, the female’s tendency to terminate the male’s naso-anal contact was much stronger than her tendency to terminate his grooming bouts. If the male did not initiate grooming after the female terminated naso-anal contact, she avoided further contacts and escaped. In mice, as in most mating systems, the demand for matings by males is far larger than the number of matings females offer. The mating market, therefore, is highly skewed, which gives females the opportunity to demand ‘commodities’ in return for allowing males to mate. This system allows females to ‘bargain’ with males to obtain grooming in return for anogenital contact. Females assess the length of time they receive grooming and will only allow males to attain anogenital contact after a certain threshold value has been passed. If anogenital contact provides the male with information about the female’s reproductive state and/or with sexual stimulation, then this process represents the first quantified example in short-lived mammals of females ‘selling sex’ in terms of the market effect. This paper therefore provides a new view of the regulation of grooming: grooming is not simply reciprocal with both participants concerned that the other does not ‘cheat’ (e.g. tit-for-tat (TFT)-like strategy), rather grooming is a commodity which can be bartered against female reproductive information or matings.     

Reproductive ‘Surrogacy’ and Parental Licensing

A serious moral weakness of reproductive ‘surrogacy’ is that it can be harmful to the children who are created. This article presents a proposal for mitigating this weakness. Currently, the practice of commercial ‘surrogacy’ operates only in the interests of the adults involved (the gestator and the commissioning individuals who employ her), not in the interests of the child who is created. Whether ‘surrogacy’ is seen as the purchase of a baby, the purchase of parental rights, or the purchase of reproductive labor, all three views share the same significant flaws. They endorse the transfer, for a fee, of the infant from the woman who gestated it to those who commissioned it, but without justifying such a transfer; they fail to demonstrate that the commissioners have any entitlement to the infant, or, for that matter, suitability to be the infant's parents; and they fail to take any notice of the infant's needs, interests, and wellbeing. A mere genetic connection is not enough to establish that the commissioners are entitled to receive the baby or that they are competent to raise it. Their good intentions, however caring, are not enough. Therefore, just as in the practice of adoption, there should be a formal institutionalized system for screening and licensing the prospective social parents, which would make the infant's needs, interests, and wellbeing paramount. I reply to several potential objections to this proposal, including the objection that genetic parents who raise their own child are not screened and licensed.     

VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE SELECTION OF CHILDREN WITH IMPAIRMENTS: A REPLY TO ROSALIND MCDOUGALL

In ‘Parental Virtues: A New Way of Thinking about the Morality of Reproductive Actions’ Rosalind McDougall proposes a virtue‐based framework to assess the morality of child selection. Applying the virtue‐based account to the selection of children with impairments does not lead, according to McDougall, to an unequivocal answer to the morality of selecting impaired children. In ‘Impairment, Flourishing, and the Moral Nature of Parenthood,’ she also applies the virtue‐based account to the discussion of child selection, and claims that couples with an impairment are morally justified in selecting a child with the same impairment. This claim, she maintains, reveals that the flourishing of a child should be understood as requiring environment‐specific characteristics. I argue that McDougall's argument begs the question. More importantly, it does not do justice to virtue ethics. I also question to what extent a virtue ethics framework can be successfully applied to discussions about the moral permissibility of reproductive actions.     

The Disruption Hypothesis Does Not Explain Mate‐Choice Copying in the Guppy (Poecilia reticulata)

In some species, female mate choice is non‐independent as, under certain circumstances, females may copy the mate choice of other nearby females. One standard experimental protocol used to test for mate‐choice copying is the mate‐choice ‘reversal’ protocol. In this protocol, a focal female is allowed to choose between two males as potential mates and then is presented with an opportunity to see another female (i.e. the model female) choose the male that she did not initially choose. The focal is subsequently allowed to again choose between the same set of males. An observed reversal of her initial choice in this second preference test has been previously interpreted as evidence for mate‐choice copying. Alternatively, it has recently been proposed that environmental events, such as seeing the mate choice of nearby females that occur within the visual field of a female actively engaged in mate assessment, may ‘disrupt’ her decision‐making behavior and consequently alter the consistency of her mating preference, and may thus cause mate‐choice reversals. The disruption hypothesis predicts that if a model female is placed near the male that the focal female initially chose, the latter's mate preference would be disrupted and she would subsequently and consistently prefer the male that she initially rejected. Here we examined whether the disruption hypothesis explains mate‐choice copying in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata). Our results do not support this hypothesis, but rather provide further support for mate‐choice copying in the guppy.     

Epilogue: Luria's Psychological Symphony

A finely worked bronze dog has been standing on my desk for twenty years now. Aside from the books with their dedicatory signatures, it is the only material thing I have in memory of Aleksandr Romanovich Luria. A week after he died, Lana Pimenovna, his wife, asked if I could drop in to see her. I thought that the reason for her call—to ask me to enlarge, reproduce, and frame some photos she had made of Aleksandr Romanovich in various years during his lifetime—was only a pretext: the publisher's in-house photographer or any other photographer could have done this.     

Fair Innings and Time‐Relative Claims

Greg Bognar has recently offered a prioritarian justification for ‘fair innings’ distributive principles that would ration access to healthcare on the basis of patients' age. In this article, I agree that Bognar's principle is among the strongest arguments for age‐based rationing. However, I argue that this position is incomplete because of the possibility of ‘time‐relative' egalitarian principles that could complement the kind of lifetime egalitarianism that Bognar adopts. After outlining Bognar's position, and explaining the attraction of time‐relative egalitarianism, I suggest various ways in which these two kinds of principle could interact. Since various options have very different implications for age‐based rationing, proponents of such a rationing scheme must take a position on time‐relative egalitarianism to complement a lifetime prioritarian view like Bognar's.     

Solutions to the New Threats to Academic Freedom?

In my commentary on Francesca Minerva's article ‘New Threats to Academic Freedom’, I agree with her contention that the existence of the Internet has given rise to new and very serious threats to academic freedom. I think that it is crucial that we confront those threats, and find ways to eliminate them, which I believe can be done. The threats in question involve both authors and editors. In the case of authors, I argue that the best solution is not anonymous publication, but publication using pseudonyms, and I describe how that would work. In the case of editors, my proposal is a website that a number of journals would have access to, where papers that editors judge to be clearly worthy of publication, but whose publication seems likely to set off a firestorm of public and media protest, could be published without any indication of the journal that had accepted the paper for publication.     

Suffering at the end of life

In the end‐of‐life context, alleviation of the suffering of a distressed patient is usually seen as a, if not the, central goal for the medical personnel treating her. Yet it has also been argued that suffering should be seen as a part of good dying. More precisely, it has been maintained that alleviating a dying patient’s suffering can make her unable to take care of practical end‐of‐life matters, deprive her of an opportunity to ask questions about and find meaning in and for her existence, and detach her from reality. In this article, I argue that the aims referred to either do not support suffering or are better served by alleviating it. When the aims would be equally well served by enduring suffering and relieving it, the latter appears to be the preferable option, given that the distress a patient experiences has no positive intrinsic value. Indeed, as the suffering can be very distressing, it may not be worth bearing even if that was the best way to achieve the aims: the distress can sometimes be bad enough to outbalance the worth of achieving the goals. Having considered an objection to the effect that a patient can have a self‐regarding moral duty to endure the distress she faces at the end of life, I conclude that the burden of proof is on the side of those who maintain that the suffering experienced at the end of life ought to be endured as a part of dying well.     

Early Intervention in Psychosis: A Case Study on Normal and Pathological

Accumulating evidence suggests that delays in receiving treatment are associated with poorer prognosis and longer periods of unneeded suffering. The duration of untreated psychosis (DUP) is considered to be one of the most important determinants of outcome in the first episode of psychosis. However, the focus on decreasing the length of untreated illness tends to overlook the difficult task of making sense of psychotic experiences during a first episode. Using a qualitative analysis of narratives obtained from interviews with an individual and her husband, we examine what delayed her seeking help, how she became convinced that she needed treatment and what this meant for her and her husband. Additionally, we look at the five-year development of both a literal and a figurative space within which both the subject and her husband came to utilize, whether consciously or unconsciously, the ‘stories’ of her psychotic experiences to construct a shared and even ‘safe’ and familiar means of spousal connection. The exploration of this shared space reveals the normative and moral values embedded in the concept of DUP and suggests alternative ways of understanding the help-seeking behaviors in early psychosis.     

Postcoloniality,National Identity,Globalisation and the Simulacra of the Real

The focus of this paper is a famous boys' boarding school in the North Indian city of Dehra Dun. The Doon School was founded in 1935 and was soon hailed by a wide cross section of post-colonial Indian intelligentsia as the site for the production of the ‘modern’ Indian citizen. The discussion below suggests that contemporary social analysis needs to focus on specific sites of the production of the discourses of the nation and citizenship rather than simply announce their dissolution as an ‘inevitable’ by-product of ‘globalisation’; this seems to be the stand taken by certain strands of theorisation in the so-called globalisation debate and in particular versions of cultural studies. I argue that rather than having simply dissolved, the ‘national’ emotion, at least in the Indian context, may have been transformed into the production of ‘post-coloniality’ as a differentiating category to distinguish the ‘progressive’ populations of the nation-state from its ‘backward’ counterparts. I employ Baudrillard's concept of the ‘real’ in order to argue for situated analyses of the contemporary global condition where analyses of the relationship between nation-states and of the asymmetries within them continue to be important political tasks.     

What really is the nature of suffering? Three problems with Eric Cassell’s concept of distress

Eric Cassell famously defined suffering as a person’s severe distress at a threat to their personal integrity. This article draws attention to some problems with the concept of distress in this theory. In particular, I argue that Cassell’s theory turns on distress but does not define it, which, in light of the complexity of distress, problematizes suffering in three ways: first, suffering becomes too equivocal to apply in at least some cases that Cassell nevertheless identifies as suffering; second, Cassell’s account does not explain what sort of experience suffering is, resulting in theoretical and practical difficulties in distinguishing it from other medical conditions; third, there is good reason to believe that, in medical contexts, ‘distress’ just means ‘suffering’ or some cognate concept not yet distinguished from it, rendering Cassell’s theory circular. I consider a rebuttal to my objections and reply, concluding that Cassell’s theory of suffering needs a definition of distress to settle what the nature of suffering really is.     

Olive Pink and the Encounter with the Academy

Olive Pink studied anthropology at the University of Sydney under Professor A.P. Elkin. Although she did fieldwork among the Northern Aranda and Wailbri of Central Australia, she became disenchanted with anthropology and lived a reclusive life in Alice Springs. In this paper I present a brief outline of her life, particularly during the 1930's I point to the problems she encountered and suggested that she needs to be relocated within her discipline.     

Equivocal locations: being ‘red’ in ‘Red Bologna’

This article addresses a classic ethnographic problem in the study of Italy: how is it that people can subscribe simultaneously to seemingly contradictory ideologies, such as Catholicism and Communism? It does so by describing examples from Italy's ‘showcase city’ of the left, ‘Red Bologna’, in which to be ‘red’ is ubiquitous but each person's ‘red’ is a different thing: being ‘red’ (differently) is the idiom in which real political distinctions are expressed over issues like religion or immigration. In parallel, I discuss the relationship between the ‘field’ as a location and the ‘field’ as a conceptual topic. My account replicates internal ethnographic differences at the analytical level by highlighting the differences between being left‐wing in Bologna and its meaning as a concept in anthropology. Hence the ‘equivocal location’: a field‐site that is productively different, from what an inexperienced ethnographer expected from it, from conceptual discussions in anthropology, and from itself.     

‘EARLY TERMINAL SEDATION’ IS A DISTINCT ENTITY

There has been much discussion regarding the acceptable use of sedation for palliation. A particularly contentious practice concerns deep, continuous sedation given to patients who are not imminently dying and given without provision of hydration or nutrition, with the end result that death is hastened. This has been called ‘early terminal sedation’. Early terminal sedation is a practice composed of two legally and ethically accepted treatment options. Under certain conditions, patients have the right to reject hydration and nutrition, even if these are life‐sustaining. Patients are also entitled to sedation as palliation for intolerable, intractable suffering. Though early terminal sedation is thought to be rare at present, the changing nature of palliative medicine suggests its use will increase. Arguments regarding early terminal sedation have failed to recognize early terminal sedation as a distinct legal and ethical entity. It can be seen as both the simple sum of treatment refusal and sedation for palliation, analogous to terminal sedation. It can also be seen as an indivisible palliative treatment, more analogous to assisted suicide or euthanasia. But ultimately, it is wholly analogous neither to terminal sedation given when death is imminent, nor to assisted suicide or euthanasia. This paper contends that early terminal sedation should be considered as a distinct entity. Such a reconception promises to provide a way forward in the debate, practice and policy regarding this contentious area of palliative medicine.