Neural correlates of the contents of visual awareness in humans

The immediacy and directness of our subjective visual experience belies the complexity of the neural mechanisms involved, which remain incompletely understood. This review focuses on how the subjective contents of human visual awareness are encoded in neural activity. Empirical evidence to date suggests that no single brain area is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. Instead, necessary and sufficient conditions appear to involve both activation of a distributed representation of the visual scene in primary visual cortex and ventral visual areas, plus parietal and frontal activity. The key empirical focus is now on characterizing qualitative differences in the type of neural activity in these areas underlying conscious and unconscious processing. To this end, recent progress in developing novel approaches to accurately decoding the contents of consciousness from brief samples of neural activity show great promise.     

The theory of multistage integration in the visual brain.

The theory of multistage integration is based on evidence that the visual brain consists of several parallel multistage processing systems, each specialized for a given attribute such as colour or motion. Each stage of a given system processes information at a distinct level of complexity. Our theory supposes that activity at any stage of a given multistage processing system is perceptually explicit--that is to say, it requires no further processing to generate a conscious experience. This activity can be integrated, or bound, with the perceptually explicit activity at any given stage of another or the same multistage processing system. Such binding is therefore not a process that generates a conscious experience, but rather one that brings different conscious experiences together. Many perceptual advantages result from such a flexible and dynamic integrative system. Conversely, there would be disadvantages to limiting perception and binding to hypothetical ''terminal'' stages of such processing systems or to hypothetical ''integrator'' areas. Although we formulate our hypothesis in terms of the visual brain, we believe it might form a general principle of brain functioning.     

Attention without awareness in blindsight.

The act of attending has frequently been equated with visual awareness. We examined this relationship in 'blindsight'--a condition in which the latter is absent or diminished as a result of damage to the primary visual cortex. Spatially selective visual attention is demonstrated when information that stimuli are likely to appear at a specific location enhances the speed or accuracy of detection of stimuli subsequently presented at that location. In a blindsight subject, we showed that attention can confer an advantage in processing stimuli presented at an attended location, without those stimuli entering consciousness. Attention could be directed both by symbolic cues in the subject's spared field of vision or cues presented in his blind field. Cues in his blind field were even effective in directing his attention to a second location remote from that at which the cue was presented. These indirect cues were effective whether or not they themselves elicited non-visual awareness. We concluded that the spatial selection of information by an attentional mechanism and its entry into conscious experience cannot be one and the same process.     

Multisensory constraints on awareness

Given that multiple senses are often stimulated at the same time, perceptual awareness is most likely to take place in multisensory situations. However, theories of awareness are based on studies and models established for a single sense (mostly vision). Here, we consider the methodological and theoretical challenges raised by taking a multisensory perspective on perceptual awareness. First, we consider how well tasks designed to study unisensory awareness perform when used in multisensory settings, stressing that studies using binocular rivalry, bistable figure perception, continuous flash suppression, the attentional blink, repetition blindness and backward masking can demonstrate multisensory influences on unisensory awareness, but fall short of tackling multisensory awareness directly. Studies interested in the latter phenomenon rely on a method of subjective contrast and can, at best, delineate conditions under which individuals report experiencing a multisensory object or two unisensory objects. As there is not a perfect match between these conditions and those in which multisensory integration and binding occur, the link between awareness and binding advocated for visual information processing needs to be revised for multisensory cases. These challenges point at the need to question the very idea of multisensory awareness.     

Believing is seeing: expectations alter visual awareness

Expectations have been shown to be powerful modulators of pain [1] and emotion [2] in placebo studies. In such experiments, expectations are induced by instructions combined with manipulation of the sensory experience that is unknown to the subjects. After an expectation learning phase where a painful stimulation is surreptitiously lowered following placebo application, the placebo effectively reduces subjective pain intensity in a subsequent test phase [3]. The strength of this placebo effect is closely related to the induced expectation [4]. Here, we asked whether this powerful cognitive bias reflects a general property of sensory information processing and tested whether the contents of visual awareness could be altered by a placebo-like expectation manipulation. We found a dramatic effect of experimentally induced expectations on the perception of an ambiguous visual motion stimulus. This shows that expectations have a strong and general influence on our experience of the sensory input independently of its specific type and content.     

Attentional load modulates responses of human primary visual cortex to invisible stimuli

Visual neuroscience has long sought to determine the extent to which stimulus-evoked activity in visual cortex depends on attention and awareness. Some influential theories of consciousness maintain that the allocation of attention is restricted to conscious representations [1, 2]. However, in the load theory of attention [3], competition between task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli for limited-capacity attention does not depend on conscious perception of the irrelevant stimuli. The critical test is whether the level of attentional load in a relevant task would determine unconscious neural processing of invisible stimuli. Human participants were scanned with high-field fMRI while they performed a foveal task of low or high attentional load. Irrelevant, invisible monocular stimuli were simultaneously presented peripherally and were continuously suppressed by a flashing mask in the other eye [4]. Attentional load in the foveal task strongly modulated retinotopic activity evoked in primary visual cortex (V1) by the invisible stimuli. Contrary to traditional views [1, 2, 5, 6], we found that availability of attentional capacity determines neural representations related to unconscious processing of continuously suppressed stimuli in human primary visual cortex. Spillover of attention to cortical representations of invisible stimuli (under low load) cannot be a sufficient condition for their awareness.     

Vision without knowledge.

A brain-damaged patient (D.F.) with visual form agnosia is described and discussed. D.F. has a profound inability to recognize objects, places and people, in large part because of her inability to make perceptual discriminations of size, shape or orientation, despite having good visual acuity. Yet she is able to perform skilled actions that depend on that very same size, shape and orientation information that is missing from her perceptual awareness. It is suggested that her intact vision can best be understood within the framework of a dual processing model, according to which there are two cortical processing streams operating on different coding principles, for perception and for action, respectively. These may be expected to have different degrees of dependence on top-down information. One possibility is that D.F.''s lack of explicit awareness of the visual cues that guide her behaviour may result from her having to rely on a processing system which is not knowledge-based in a broad sense. Conversely, it may be that the perceptual system can provide conscious awareness of its products in normal individuals by virtue of the fact that it does interact with a stored base of visual knowledge.     

Conscious awareness of flicker in humans involves frontal and parietal cortex

Even when confined to the same spatial location, flickering and steady light evoke very different conscious experiences because of their distinct temporal patterns. The neural basis of such differences in subjective experience remains uncertain . Here, we used functional MRI in humans to examine the neural structures involved in awareness of flicker. Participants viewed a single point source of light that flickered at the critical flicker fusion (CFF) threshold, where the same stimulus is sometimes perceived as flickering and sometimes as steady (fused) . We were thus able to compare brain activity for conscious percepts that differed qualitatively (flickering or fused) but were evoked by identical physical stimuli. Greater brain activation was observed on flicker (versus fused) trials in regions of frontal and parietal cortex previously associated with visual awareness in tasks that did not require detection of temporal patterns . In contrast, greater activation was observed on fused (versus flicker) trials in occipital extrastriate cortex. Our findings indicate that activity of higher-level cortical areas is important for awareness of temporally distinct visual events in the context of a nonspatial task, and they thus suggest that frontal and parietal regions may play a general role in visual awareness.     

Speeding up reaction time with invisible stimuli

Normal subjects react more quickly to a pair of visual stimuli than to a stimulus alone. This phenomenon is known as the redundant signal effect (RSE) and represents an example of divided visual attention in which signal processing is carried out in parallel to the advantage of response speed. A most interesting aspect of this phenomenon is that it can occur when one stimulus in a pair cannot be consciously detected because of hemianopia or unilateral extinction resulting from brain damage. Here, we report that a similar dissociation between visual awareness and visually guided behavior is present in normal subjects who show an RSE even when the luminance of one of a pair of stimuli is below detection threshold. The observed RSE cannot be attributed to probability summation because it violates Miller's race inequality and is likely to be related to neural summation between supra- and subthreshold stimuli. Given that a similar implicit RSE is present in hemispherectomy patients, we hypothesize that the site of this summation might be the superior colliculus (SC).     

Design and implementation of a qualitative simulation model of lambda phage infection

MOTIVATION: Molecular biology databases hold a large number of empirical facts about many different aspects of biological entities. That data is static in the sense that one cannot ask a database 'What effect has protein A on gene B?' or 'Do gene A and gene B interact, and if so, how?'. Those questions require an explicit model of the target organism. Traditionally, biochemical systems are modelled using kinetics and differential equations in a quantitative simulator. For many biological processes however, detailed quantitative information is not available, only qualitative or fuzzy statements about the nature of interactions. RESULTS: We designed and implemented a qualitative simulation model of lambda phage growth control in Escherichia coli based on the existing simulation environment QSim. Qualitative reasoning can serve as the basis for automatic transformation of contents of genomic databases into interactive modelling systems that can reason about the relations and interactions of biological entities.      

Suppressed patterns alter vision during binocular rivalry

Binocular rivalry occurs when incongruent patterns are presented to corresponding regions of the retinas, leading to fluctuations of awareness between the patterns . One attribute of a stimulus may rival whereas another may combine between the eyes , but it is typically assumed that the dominant features are perceived veridically. Here, we show this is not necessarily the case and that a suppressed visual feature can alter dominant perception. The cortical representations of oriented gratings can interact even when one of them is perceptually suppressed, such that the perceived orientation of the dominant grating is systematically biased depending on the orientation of the suppressed grating. A suppressed inducing pattern has the same qualitative effect as a visible one, but suppression reduces effective contrast by a factor of around six. A simple neural model quantifies and helps explain these illusions. These results demonstrate that binocular rivalry suppression operates in a graded fashion across multiple sites in the visual hierarchy rather than truncating processing at a single site and that suppressed visual information can alter dominant vision in real-time.     

Overt visual attention as a causal factor of perceptual awareness

Our everyday conscious experience of the visual world is fundamentally shaped by the interaction of overt visual attention and object awareness. Although the principal impact of both components is undisputed, it is still unclear how they interact. Here we recorded eye-movements preceding and following conscious object recognition, collected during the free inspection of ambiguous and corresponding unambiguous stimuli. Using this paradigm, we demonstrate that fixations recorded prior to object awareness predict the later recognized object identity, and that subjects accumulate more evidence that is consistent with their later percept than for the alternative. The timing of reached awareness was verified by a reaction-time based correction method and also based on changes in pupil dilation. Control experiments, in which we manipulated the initial locus of visual attention, confirm a causal influence of overt attention on the subsequent result of object perception. The current study thus demonstrates that distinct patterns of overt attentional selection precede object awareness and thereby directly builds on recent electrophysiological findings suggesting two distinct neuronal mechanisms underlying the two phenomena. Our results emphasize the crucial importance of overt visual attention in the formation of our conscious experience of the visual world.     

Beware the serpent: the advantage of ecologically-relevant stimuli in accessing visual awareness

Snakes and spiders constitute fear-relevant stimuli for humans, as many species have deleterious and even fatal effects. However, snakes provoked an older and thus stronger evolutionary pressure than spiders, shaping the vision of earliest primates toward preferential visual processing, mainly in the most complex perceptual conditions. To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet directly assessed the role of ecologically-relevant stimuli in preferentially accessing visual awareness. Using continuous flash suppression (CFS), the present study assessed the role of evolutionary pressure in gaining a preferential access to visual awareness. For this purpose, we measured the time needed for three types of stimuli - snakes, spiders (matched with snakes for rated fear levels, but for which an influence on humans but not other primates is well grounded) and birds - to break the suppression and enter visual awareness in two different suppression intensity conditions. The results showed that in the less demanding awareness access condition (stimuli presented to the participants' dominant eye) both evolutionarily relevant stimuli (snakes and spiders) showed a faster entry into visual awareness than birds, whereas in the most demanding awareness access condition (stimuli presented to the participants' non-dominant eye) only snakes showed this privileged access. Our data suggest that the privileged unconscious processing of snakes in the most complex perceptual conditions extends to visual awareness, corroborating the proposed influence of snakes in primate visual evolution.     

Enhanced cortical excitability in grapheme-color synesthesia and its modulation

Synesthesia is an unusual condition characterized by the over-binding of two or more features and the concomitant automatic and conscious experience of atypical, ancillary images or perceptions. Previous research suggests that synesthetes display enhanced modality-specific perceptual processing, but it remains unclear whether enhanced processing contributes to conscious awareness of color photisms. In three experiments, we investigated whether grapheme-color synesthesia is characterized by enhanced cortical excitability in primary visual cortex and the role played by this hyperexcitability in the expression of synesthesia. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation, we show that synesthetes display 3-fold lower phosphene thresholds than controls during stimulation of the primary visual cortex. We next used transcranial direct current stimulation to discriminate between two competing hypotheses of the role of hyperexcitability in the expression of synesthesia. We demonstrate that synesthesia can be selectively augmented with cathodal stimulation and attenuated with anodal stimulation of primary visual cortex. A control task revealed that the effect of the brain stimulation was specific to the experience of synesthesia. These results indicate that hyperexcitability acts as a source of noise in visual cortex that influences the availability of the neuronal signals underlying conscious awareness of synesthetic photisms.     

Perceptual grouping of biological motion promotes binocular rivalry

Investigation of perceptual rivalry between conflicting stimuli presented one to each eye can further understanding of the neural underpinnings of conscious visual perception. During rivalry, visual awareness fluctuates between perceptions of the two stimuli. Here, we demonstrate that high-level perceptual grouping can promote rivalry between stimulus pairs that would otherwise be perceived as nonrivalrous. Perceptual grouping was generated with point-light walker stimuli that simulate human motion, visible only as lights placed on the joints. Although such walking figures are unrecognizable when stationary, recognition judgments as complex as gender and identity can accurately be made from animated displays, demonstrating the efficiency with which our visual system can group dynamic local signals into a globally coherent walking figure. We find that point-light walker stimuli presented one to each eye and in different colors and configurations results in strong rivalry. However, rivalry is minimal when the two walkers are split between the eyes or both presented to one eye. This pattern of results suggests that processing animated walker figures promotes rivalry between signals from the two eyes rather than between higher-level representations of the walkers. This leads us to hypothesize that awareness during binocular rivalry involves the integrated activity of high-level perceptual mechanisms in conjunction with lower-level ocular suppression modulated via cortical feedback.     

Neuroimaging of visual awareness in patients and normal subjects

The immediacy and directness of our visual experience belies the complexity of the underlying neural mechanisms, which remain incompletely understood. Recent neuroimaging studies suggest that activity in ventral visual cortex is necessary but not sufficient for visual awareness. Experiments in both patients and normal subjects indicate that parietal and frontal areas make an important contribution to visual awareness, suggesting that reciprocal interactions between dorsal frontoparietal areas and ventral visual cortex may provide a fundamental neural substrate for conscious visual experience.     

Non-Conscious Processing of Motion Coherence Can Boost Conscious Access

Research on the scope and limits of non-conscious vision can advance our understanding of the functional and neural underpinnings of visual awareness. Here we investigated whether distributed local features can be bound, outside of awareness, into coherent patterns. We used continuous flash suppression (CFS) to create interocular suppression, and thus lack of awareness, for a moving dot stimulus that varied in terms of coherence with an overall pattern (radial flow). Our results demonstrate that for radial motion, coherence favors the detection of patterns of moving dots even under interocular suppression. Coherence caused dots to break through the masks more often: this indicates that the visual system was able to integrate low-level motion signals into a coherent pattern outside of visual awareness. In contrast, in an experiment using meaningful or scrambled biological motion we did not observe any increase in the sensitivity of detection for meaningful patterns. Overall, our results are in agreement with previous studies on face processing and with the hypothesis that certain features are spatiotemporally bound into coherent patterns even outside of attention or awareness.     

Avoidance of obstacles in the absence of visual awareness

The spatial character of our reaching movements is extremely sensitive to potential obstacles in the workspace. We recently found that this sensitivity was retained by most patients with left visual neglect when reaching between two objects, despite the fact that they tended to ignore the leftward object when asked to bisect the space between them. This raises the possibility that obstacle avoidance does not require a conscious awareness of the obstacle avoided. We have now tested this hypothesis in a patient with visual extinction following right temporoparietal damage. Extinction is an attentional disorder in which patients fail to report stimuli on the side of space opposite a brain lesion under conditions of bilateral stimulation. Our patient avoided obstacles during reaching, to exactly the same degree, regardless of whether he was able to report their presence. This implicit processing of object location, which may depend on spared superior parietal-lobe pathways, demonstrates that conscious awareness is not necessary for normal obstacle avoidance.     

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures?in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.     

Subjective antedating of a sensory experience and mind-brain theories: reply to Honderich (1984)

Honderich claims that our "delay-and-antedating" hypothesis, of a delay in cerebral production combined with a subjective antedating of a conscious sensory experience, involves self-contradiction which may cast doubt on some of our experimental findings and on the hypothesis. This claim misses the distinction between the phenomenological subjective mental content of an experience and the physical-neuronal configuration that elicits the experience; also, it cannot explain the experimentally observed discrepancy, between subjective timing and the empirically delayed time for cerebral adequacy for eliciting the experience, found when stimulating a subcortical sensory pathway. Honderich usefully distinguishes between our stated (delay-and-antedating) hypothesis and a different though unacceptable one which would have serious implications for mind-brain theories. The delay-and-antedating hypothesis does not provide a formally definitive contradiction of monist-identity theory (of the mind-brain relationship). However, our experimentally based hypothesis does dissociate subjective/mental timing from the actual physical/neuronal time of an experience. This phenomenon, though conceptually strange, must be encompassed by any mind-brain theory.