Motor Cost Influences Perceptual Decisions

Perceptual decision making has been widely studied using tasks in which subjects are asked to discriminate a visual stimulus and instructed to report their decision with a movement. In these studies, performance is measured by assessing the accuracy of the participants’ choices as a function of the ambiguity of the visual stimulus. Typically, the reporting movement is considered as a mere means of reporting the decision with no influence on the decision-making process. However, recent studies have shown that even subtle differences of biomechanical costs between movements may influence how we select between them. Here we investigated whether this purely motor cost could also influence decisions in a perceptual discrimination task in detriment of accuracy. In other words, are perceptual decisions only dependent on the visual stimulus and entirely orthogonal to motor costs? Here we show the results of a psychophysical experiment in which human subjects were presented with a random dot motion discrimination task and asked to report the perceived motion direction using movements of different biomechanical cost. We found that the pattern of decisions exhibited a significant bias towards the movement of lower cost, even when this bias reduced performance accuracy. This strongly suggests that motor costs influence decision making in visual discrimination tasks for which its contribution is neither instructed nor beneficial.     

Delayed perceptual awareness in rapid perceptual decisions

The flourishing of studies on the neural correlates of decision-making calls for an appraisal of the relation between perceptual decisions and conscious perception. By exploiting the long integration time of noisy motion stimuli, and by forcing human observers to make difficult speeded decisions--sometimes a blind guess--about stimulus direction, we traced the temporal buildup of motion discrimination capability and perceptual awareness, as assessed trial by trial through direct rating. We found that both increased gradually with motion coherence and viewing time, but discrimination was systematically leading awareness, reaching a plateau much earlier. Sensitivity and criterion changes contributed jointly to the slow buildup of perceptual awareness. It made no difference whether motion discrimination was accomplished by saccades or verbal responses. These findings suggest that perceptual awareness emerges on the top of a developing or even mature perceptual decision. We argue that the middle temporal (MT) cortical region does not confer us the full phenomenic depth of motion perception, although it may represent a precursor stage in building our subjective sense of visual motion.     

Acquisition versus Consolidation of Auditory Perceptual Learning Using Mixed-Training Regimens

Learning is considered to consist of two distinct phases–acquisition and consolidation. Acquisition can be disrupted when short periods of training on more than one task are interleaved, whereas consolidation can be disrupted when a second task is trained after the first has been initiated. Here we investigated the conditions governing the disruption to acquisition and consolidation during mixed-training regimens in which primary and secondary amplitude modulation tasks were either interleaved or presented consecutively. The secondary task differed from the primary task in either task-irrelevant (carrier frequency) or task-relevant (modulation rate) stimulus features while requiring the same perceptual judgment (amplitude modulation depth discrimination), or shared both irrelevant and relevant features but required a different judgment (amplitude modulation rate discrimination). Based on previous literature we predicted that acquisition would be disrupted by varying the task-relevant stimulus feature during training (stimulus interference), and that consolidation would be disrupted by varying the perceptual judgment required (task interference). We found that varying the task-relevant or -irrelevant stimulus features failed to disrupt acquisition but did disrupt consolidation, whereas mixing two tasks requiring a different perceptual judgment but sharing the same stimulus features disrupted both acquisition and consolidation. Thus, a distinction between acquisition and consolidation phases of perceptual learning cannot simply be attributed to (task-relevant) stimulus versus task interference. We propose instead that disruption occurs during acquisition when mixing two tasks requiring a perceptual judgment based on different cues, whereas consolidation is always disrupted regardless of whether different stimulus features or tasks are mixed. The current study not only provides a novel insight into the underlying mechanisms of perceptual learning, but also has practical implications for the optimal design and delivery of training programs that aim to remediate perceptual difficulties.     

The Temporal Dynamics of Early Visual Cortex Involvement in Behavioral Priming

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) allows for non-invasive interference with ongoing neural processing. Applied in a chronometric design over early visual cortex (EVC), TMS has proved valuable in indicating at which particular time point EVC must remain unperturbed for (conscious) vision to be established. In the current study, we set out to examine the effect of EVC TMS across a broad range of time points, both before (pre-stimulus) and after (post-stimulus) the onset of symbolic visual stimuli. Behavioral priming studies have shown that the behavioral impact of a visual stimulus can be independent from its conscious perception, suggesting two independent neural signatures. To assess whether TMS-induced suppression of visual awareness can be dissociated from behavioral priming in the temporal domain, we thus implemented three different measures of visual processing, namely performance on a standard visual discrimination task, a subjective rating of stimulus visibility, and a visual priming task. To control for non-neural TMS effects, we performed electrooculographical recordings, placebo TMS (sham), and control site TMS (vertex). Our results suggest that, when considering the appropriate control data, the temporal pattern of EVC TMS disruption on visual discrimination, subjective awareness and behavioral priming are not dissociable. Instead, TMS to EVC disrupts visual perception holistically, both when applied before and after the onset of a visual stimulus. The current findings are discussed in light of their implications on models of visual awareness and (subliminal) priming.     

A Common Cortical Circuit Mechanism for Perceptual Categorical Discrimination and Veridical Judgment

Perception involves two types of decisions about the sensory world: identification of stimulus features as analog quantities, or discrimination of the same stimulus features among a set of discrete alternatives. Veridical judgment and categorical discrimination have traditionally been conceptualized as two distinct computational problems. Here, we found that these two types of decision making can be subserved by a shared cortical circuit mechanism. We used a continuous recurrent network model to simulate two monkey experiments in which subjects were required to make either a two-alternative forced choice or a veridical judgment about the direction of random-dot motion. The model network is endowed with a continuum of bell-shaped population activity patterns, each representing a possible motion direction. Slow recurrent excitation underlies accumulation of sensory evidence, and its interplay with strong recurrent inhibition leads to decision behaviors. The model reproduced the monkey's performance as well as single-neuron activity in the categorical discrimination task. Furthermore, we examined how direction identification is determined by a combination of sensory stimulation and microstimulation. Using a population-vector measure, we found that direction judgments instantiate winner-take-all (with the population vector coinciding with either the coherent motion direction or the electrically elicited motion direction) when two stimuli are far apart, or vector averaging (with the population vector falling between the two directions) when two stimuli are close to each other. Interestingly, for a broad range of intermediate angular distances between the two stimuli, the network displays a mixed strategy in the sense that direction estimates are stochastically produced by winner-take-all on some trials and by vector averaging on the other trials, a model prediction that is experimentally testable. This work thus lends support to a common neurodynamic framework for both veridical judgment and categorical discrimination in perceptual decision making.     

An initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases the likelihood and speed of subsequent changes of mind

We often need to rapidly change our mind about perceptual decisions in order to account for new information and correct mistakes. One fundamental, unresolved question is whether information processed prior to a decision being made (‘pre-decisional information’) has any influence on the likelihood and speed with which that decision is reversed. We investigated this using a luminance discrimination task in which participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli briefly remained on screen, and participants could change their response. Using psychophysical reverse correlation, we examined how moment-to-moment fluctuations in stimulus luminance affected participants’ decisions. This revealed that the strength of even the very earliest (pre-decisional) evidence was associated with the likelihood and speed of later changes of mind. To account for this effect, we propose an extended diffusion model in which an initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases ongoing evidence accumulation.     

The Effect of Self-Efficacy on Visual Discrimination Sensitivity

Can subjective belief about one''s own perceptual competence change one''s perception? To address this question, we investigated the influence of self-efficacy on sensory discrimination in two low-level visual tasks: contrast and orientation discrimination. We utilised a pre-post manipulation approach whereby two experimental groups (high and low self-efficacy) and a control group made objective perceptual judgments on the contrast or the orientation of the visual stimuli. High and low self-efficacy were induced by the provision of fake social-comparative performance feedback and fictional research findings. Subsequently, the post-manipulation phase was performed to assess changes in visual discrimination thresholds as a function of the self-efficacy manipulations. The results showed that the high self-efficacy group demonstrated greater improvement in visual discrimination sensitivity compared to both the low self-efficacy and control groups. These findings suggest that subjective beliefs about one''s own perceptual competence can affect low-level visual processing.     

How Recent History Affects Perception: The Normative Approach and Its Heuristic Approximation

There is accumulating evidence that prior knowledge about expectations plays an important role in perception. The Bayesian framework is the standard computational approach to explain how prior knowledge about the distribution of expected stimuli is incorporated with noisy observations in order to improve performance. However, it is unclear what information about the prior distribution is acquired by the perceptual system over short periods of time and how this information is utilized in the process of perceptual decision making. Here we address this question using a simple two-tone discrimination task. We find that the “contraction bias”, in which small magnitudes are overestimated and large magnitudes are underestimated, dominates the pattern of responses of human participants. This contraction bias is consistent with the Bayesian hypothesis in which the true prior information is available to the decision-maker. However, a trial-by-trial analysis of the pattern of responses reveals that the contribution of most recent trials to performance is overweighted compared with the predictions of a standard Bayesian model. Moreover, we study participants'' performance in a-typical distributions of stimuli and demonstrate substantial deviations from the ideal Bayesian detector, suggesting that the brain utilizes a heuristic approximation of the Bayesian inference. We propose a biologically plausible model, in which decision in the two-tone discrimination task is based on a comparison between the second tone and an exponentially-decaying average of the first tone and past tones. We show that this model accounts for both the contraction bias and the deviations from the ideal Bayesian detector hypothesis. These findings demonstrate the power of Bayesian-like heuristics in the brain, as well as their limitations in their failure to fully adapt to novel environments.     

Predicting human perceptual decisions by decoding neuronal information profiles

Perception relies on the response of populations of neurons in sensory cortex. How the response profile of a neuronal population gives rise to perception and perceptual discrimination has been conceptualized in various ways. Here we suggest that neuronal population responses represent information about our environment explicitly as Fisher information (FI), which is a local measure of the variance estimate of the sensory input. We show how this sensory information can be read out and combined to infer from the available information profile which stimulus value is perceived during a fine discrimination task. In particular, we propose that the perceived stimulus corresponds to the stimulus value that leads to the same information for each of the alternative directions, and compare the model prediction to standard models considered in the literature (population vector, maximum likelihood, maximum-a-posteriori Bayesian inference). The models are applied to human performance in a motion discrimination task that induces perceptual misjudgements of a target direction of motion by task irrelevant motion in the spatial surround of the target stimulus (motion repulsion). By using the neurophysiological insight that surround motion suppresses neuronal responses to the target motion in the center, all models predicted the pattern of perceptual misjudgements. The variation of discrimination thresholds (error on the perceived value) was also explained through the changes of the total FI content with varying surround motion directions. The proposed FI decoding scheme incorporates recent neurophysiological evidence from macaque visual cortex showing that perceptual decisions do not rely on the most active neurons, but rather on the most informative neuronal responses. We statistically compare the prediction capability of the FI decoding approach and the standard decoding models. Notably, all models reproduced the variation of the perceived stimulus values for different surrounds, but with different neuronal tuning characteristics underlying perception. Compared to the FI approach the prediction power of the standard models was based on neurons with far wider tuning width and stronger surround suppression. Our study demonstrates that perceptual misjudgements can be based on neuronal populations encoding explicitly the available sensory information, and provides testable neurophysiological predictions on neuronal tuning characteristics underlying human perceptual decisions.     

The Visual Priming of Motion-Defined 3D Objects

The perception of a stimulus can be influenced by previous perceptual experience, a phenomenon known as perceptual priming. However, there has been limited investigation on perceptual priming of shape perception of three-dimensional object structures defined by moving dots. Here we examined the perceptual priming of a 3D object shape defined purely by motion-in-depth cues (i.e., Shape-From-Motion, SFM) using a classic prime-target paradigm. The results from the first two experiments revealed a significant increase in accuracy when a “cloudy” SFM stimulus (whose object structure was difficult to recognize due to the presence of strong noise) was preceded by an unambiguous SFM that clearly defined the same transparent 3D shape. In contrast, results from Experiment 3 revealed no change in accuracy when a “cloudy” SFM stimulus was preceded by a static shape or a semantic word that defined the same object shape. Instead, there was a significant decrease in accuracy when preceded by a static shape or a semantic word that defined a different object shape. These results suggested that the perception of a noisy SFM stimulus can be facilitated by a preceding unambiguous SFM stimulus—but not a static image or a semantic stimulus—that defined the same shape. The potential neural and computational mechanisms underlying the difference in priming are discussed.     

A Bayesian Attractor Model for Perceptual Decision Making

Even for simple perceptual decisions, the mechanisms that the brain employs are still under debate. Although current consensus states that the brain accumulates evidence extracted from noisy sensory information, open questions remain about how this simple model relates to other perceptual phenomena such as flexibility in decisions, decision-dependent modulation of sensory gain, or confidence about a decision. We propose a novel approach of how perceptual decisions are made by combining two influential formalisms into a new model. Specifically, we embed an attractor model of decision making into a probabilistic framework that models decision making as Bayesian inference. We show that the new model can explain decision making behaviour by fitting it to experimental data. In addition, the new model combines for the first time three important features: First, the model can update decisions in response to switches in the underlying stimulus. Second, the probabilistic formulation accounts for top-down effects that may explain recent experimental findings of decision-related gain modulation of sensory neurons. Finally, the model computes an explicit measure of confidence which we relate to recent experimental evidence for confidence computations in perceptual decision tasks.     

Temporal expectancy in the context of a theory of visual attention

Temporal expectation is expectation with respect to the timing of an event such as the appearance of a certain stimulus. In this paper, temporal expectancy is investigated in the context of the theory of visual attention (TVA), and we begin by summarizing the foundations of this theoretical framework. Next, we present a parametric experiment exploring the effects of temporal expectation on perceptual processing speed in cued single-stimulus letter recognition with unspeeded motor responses. The length of the cue–stimulus foreperiod was exponentially distributed with one of six hazard rates varying between blocks. We hypothesized that this manipulation would result in a distinct temporal expectation in each hazard rate condition. Stimulus exposures were varied such that both the temporal threshold of conscious perception (t₀ ms) and the perceptual processing speed (v letters s⁻¹) could be estimated using TVA. We found that the temporal threshold t₀ was unaffected by temporal expectation, but the perceptual processing speed v was a strikingly linear function of the logarithm of the hazard rate of the stimulus presentation. We argue that the effects on the v values were generated by changes in perceptual biases, suggesting that our perceptual biases are directly related to our temporal expectations.     

Olfactory perception in honeybees: Concatenated and mixed odorant stimuli,concentration, and exposure effects

Summary Here we present results obtained from 7 different series of experiments, all employing odor conditioning of proboscis extension in worker honeybees and each designed to address a particular question involving olfactory perception. The questions relate to: temporal complexity of odor cues; effects of concentration, suppression, and/or potentiation in mixture perception; acquisition and extinction rates, as well as levels of generalization associated with aliphatic compounds that have the same functional groups or same alkyl radical length; and the effects of continuous exposure to odorants in the first several days of adult life on various learning and discrimination tasks involving olfactory perception. From the data obtained in these experiments we were able to conclude the following: First, worker honeybees have a limited ability to perceive complex temporal odor-quality patterns in olfactory stimuli — they learn to associate the quality of only the last part of the stimulus with a sucrose reward. Second, we confirm that citral is qualitatively different in several perceptual contexts involving odor learning and conditioning and our results help elucidate the nature of these differences as they relate to learning, discrimination, mixture perception, and continuous exposure to particular odorants. Third, we appear to have uncovered some important perceptual differences between functional groups attached to the first as opposed to the second carbon atom of alkyl radicals. Finally, we failed to uncover any significant effects relating to continuous exposure to odorants during the first several days of a worker's adult life, despite evidence that considerable sensory development takes place during this period. Thus ontogenetic changes to the peripheral system due to environmental effects appear to leave basic perceptual systems unaltered.     

Probability Matching as a Computational Strategy Used in Perception

The question of which strategy is employed in human decision making has been studied extensively in the context of cognitive tasks; however, this question has not been investigated systematically in the context of perceptual tasks. The goal of this study was to gain insight into the decision-making strategy used by human observers in a low-level perceptual task. Data from more than 100 individuals who participated in an auditory-visual spatial localization task was evaluated to examine which of three plausible strategies could account for each observer''s behavior the best. This task is very suitable for exploring this question because it involves an implicit inference about whether the auditory and visual stimuli were caused by the same object or independent objects, and provides different strategies of how using the inference about causes can lead to distinctly different spatial estimates and response patterns. For example, employing the commonly used cost function of minimizing the mean squared error of spatial estimates would result in a weighted averaging of estimates corresponding to different causal structures. A strategy that would minimize the error in the inferred causal structure would result in the selection of the most likely causal structure and sticking with it in the subsequent inference of location—“model selection.” A third strategy is one that selects a causal structure in proportion to its probability, thus attempting to match the probability of the inferred causal structure. This type of probability matching strategy has been reported to be used by participants predominantly in cognitive tasks. Comparing these three strategies, the behavior of the vast majority of observers in this perceptual task was most consistent with probability matching. While this appears to be a suboptimal strategy and hence a surprising choice for the perceptual system to adopt, we discuss potential advantages of such a strategy for perception.     

The Categorisation of Non-Categorical Colours: A Novel Paradigm in Colour Perception

In this paper, we investigate a new paradigm for studying the development of the colour ‘signal’ by having observers discriminate and categorize the same set of controlled and calibrated cardinal coloured stimuli. Notably, in both tasks, each observer was free to decide whether two pairs of colors were the same or belonged to the same category. The use of the same stimulus set for both tasks provides, we argue, an incremental behavioural measure of colour processing from detection through discrimination to categorisation. The measured data spaces are different for the two tasks, and furthermore the categorisation data is unique to each observer. In addition, we develop a model which assumes that the principal difference between the tasks is the degree of similarity between the stimuli which has different constraints for the categorisation task compared to the discrimination task. This approach not only makes sense of the current (and associated) data but links the processes of discrimination and categorisation in a novel way and, by implication, expands upon the previous research linking categorisation to other tasks not limited to colour perception.     

Metacognitive Confidence Increases with,but Does Not Determine,Visual Perceptual Learning

While perceptual learning increases objective sensitivity, the effects on the constant interaction of the process of perception and its metacognitive evaluation have been rarely investigated. Visual perception has been described as a process of probabilistic inference featuring metacognitive evaluations of choice certainty. For visual motion perception in healthy, naive human subjects here we show that perceptual sensitivity and confidence in it increased with training. The metacognitive sensitivity–estimated from certainty ratings by a bias-free signal detection theoretic approach–in contrast, did not. Concomitant 3Hz transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) was applied in compliance with previous findings on effective high-low cross-frequency coupling subserving signal detection. While perceptual accuracy and confidence in it improved with training, there were no statistically significant tACS effects. Neither metacognitive sensitivity in distinguishing between their own correct and incorrect stimulus classifications, nor decision confidence itself determined the subjects’ visual perceptual learning. Improvements of objective performance and the metacognitive confidence in it were rather determined by the perceptual sensitivity at the outset of the experiment. Post-decision certainty in visual perceptual learning was neither independent of objective performance, nor requisite for changes in sensitivity, but rather covaried with objective performance. The exact functional role of metacognitive confidence in human visual perception has yet to be determined.     

Visual perception from the perspective of a representational,non-reductionistic,level-dependent account of perception and conscious awareness

This article proposes a new model to interpret seemingly conflicting evidence concerning the correlation of consciousness and neural processes. Based on an analysis of research of blindsight and subliminal perception, the reorganization of elementary functions and consciousness framework suggests that mental representations consist of functions at several different levels of analysis, including truly localized perceptual elementary functions and perceptual algorithmic modules, which are interconnections of the elementary functions. We suggest that conscious content relates to the ‘top level’ of analysis in a ‘situational algorithmic strategy’ that reflects the general state of an individual. We argue that conscious experience is intrinsically related to representations that are available to guide behaviour. From this perspective, we find that blindsight and subliminal perception can be explained partly by too coarse-grained methodology, and partly by top-down enhancing of representations that normally would not be relevant to action.     

Phonological representations are unconsciously used when processing complex, non-speech signals

Neuroimaging studies of speech processing increasingly rely on artificial speech-like sounds whose perceptual status as speech or non-speech is assigned by simple subjective judgments; brain activation patterns are interpreted according to these status assignments. The naïve perceptual status of one such stimulus, spectrally-rotated speech (not consciously perceived as speech by naïve subjects), was evaluated in discrimination and forced identification experiments. Discrimination of variation in spectrally-rotated syllables in one group of naïve subjects was strongly related to the pattern of similarities in phonological identification of the same stimuli provided by a second, independent group of naïve subjects, suggesting either that (1) naïve rotated syllable perception involves phonetic-like processing, or (2) that perception is solely based on physical acoustic similarity, and similar sounds are provided with similar phonetic identities. Analysis of acoustic (Euclidean distances of center frequency values of formants) and phonetic similarities in the perception of the vowel portions of the rotated syllables revealed that discrimination was significantly and independently influenced by both acoustic and phonological information. We conclude that simple subjective assessments of artificial speech-like sounds can be misleading, as perception of such sounds may initially and unconsciously utilize speech-like, phonological processing.     

Can binocular rivalry reveal neural correlates of consciousness?

This essay critically examines the extent to which binocular rivalry can provide important clues about the neural correlates of conscious visual perception. Our ideas are presented within the framework of four questions about the use of rivalry for this purpose: (i) what constitutes an adequate comparison condition for gauging rivalry''s impact on awareness, (ii) how can one distinguish abolished awareness from inattention, (iii) when one obtains unequivocal evidence for a causal link between a fluctuating measure of neural activity and fluctuating perceptual states during rivalry, will it generalize to other stimulus conditions and perceptual phenomena and (iv) does such evidence necessarily indicate that this neural activity constitutes a neural correlate of consciousness? While arriving at sceptical answers to these four questions, the essay nonetheless offers some ideas about how a more nuanced utilization of binocular rivalry may still provide fundamental insights about neural dynamics, and glimpses of at least some of the ingredients comprising neural correlates of consciousness, including those involved in perceptual decision-making.