Can the meaning of multiple words be integrated unconsciously?

What are the limits of unconscious language processing? Can language circuits process simple grammatical constructions unconsciously and integrate the meaning of several unseen words? Using behavioural priming and electroencephalography (EEG), we studied a specific rule-based linguistic operation traditionally thought to require conscious cognitive control: the negation of valence. In a masked priming paradigm, two masked words were successively (Experiment 1) or simultaneously presented (Experiment 2), a modifier (‘not’/‘very’) and an adjective (e.g. ‘good’/‘bad’), followed by a visible target noun (e.g. ‘peace’/‘murder’). Subjects indicated whether the target noun had a positive or negative valence. The combination of these three words could either be contextually consistent (e.g. ‘very bad - murder’) or inconsistent (e.g. ‘not bad - murder’). EEG recordings revealed that grammatical negations could unfold partly unconsciously, as reflected in similar occipito-parietal N400 effects for conscious and unconscious three-word sequences forming inconsistent combinations. However, only conscious word sequences elicited P600 effects, later in time. Overall, these results suggest that multiple unconscious words can be rapidly integrated and that an unconscious negation can automatically ‘flip the sign’ of an unconscious adjective. These findings not only extend the limits of subliminal combinatorial language processes, but also highlight how consciousness modulates the grammatical integration of multiple words.     

Fear Conditioning to Subliminal Fear Relevant and Non Fear Relevant Stimuli

A growing body of evidence suggests that conscious visual awareness is not a prerequisite for human fear learning. For instance, humans can learn to be fearful of subliminal fear relevant images – images depicting stimuli thought to have been fear relevant in our evolutionary context, such as snakes, spiders, and angry human faces. Such stimuli could have a privileged status in relation to manipulations used to suppress usually salient images from awareness, possibly due to the existence of a designated sub-cortical ‘fear module’. Here we assess this proposition, and find it wanting. We use binocular masking to suppress awareness of images of snakes and wallabies (particularly cute, non-threatening marsupials). We find that subliminal presentations of both classes of image can induce differential fear conditioning. These data show that learning, as indexed by fear conditioning, is neither contingent on conscious visual awareness nor on subliminal conditional stimuli being fear relevant.     

Offline perception: an introduction

Experiences that are self-generated and independent of sensory stimulations permeate our whole life. This theme issue examines their similarities and differences, systematizes the literature from an integrative perspective, critically discusses state-of-the-art empirical findings and proposes new theoretical approaches. The aim of the theme issue is to foster interaction between the different disciplines and research directions involved and to explore the prospects of a unificatory account of offline perception in general.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.     

Hippocampus Is Place of Interaction between Unconscious and Conscious Memories

Recent evidence suggests that humans can form and later retrieve new semantic relations unconsciously by way of hippocampus—the key structure also recruited for conscious relational (episodic) memory. If the hippocampus subserves both conscious and unconscious relational encoding/retrieval, one would expect the hippocampus to be place of unconscious-conscious interactions during memory retrieval. We tested this hypothesis in an fMRI experiment probing the interaction between the unconscious and conscious retrieval of face-associated information. For the establishment of unconscious relational memories, we presented subliminal (masked) combinations of unfamiliar faces and written occupations (“actor” or “politician”). At test, we presented the former subliminal faces, but now supraliminally, as cues for the reactivation of the unconsciously associated occupations. We hypothesized that unconscious reactivation of the associated occupation—actor or politician—would facilitate or inhibit the subsequent conscious retrieval of a celebrity’s occupation, which was also actor or politician. Depending on whether the reactivated unconscious occupation was congruent or incongruent to the celebrity’s occupation, we expected either quicker or delayed conscious retrieval process. Conscious retrieval was quicker in the congruent relative to a neutral baseline condition but not delayed in the incongruent condition. fMRI data collected during subliminal face-occupation encoding confirmed previous evidence that the hippocampus was interacting with neocortical storage sites of semantic knowledge to support relational encoding. fMRI data collected at test revealed that the facilitated conscious retrieval was paralleled by deactivations in the hippocampus and neocortical storage sites of semantic knowledge. We assume that the unconscious reactivation has pre-activated overlapping relational representations in the hippocampus reducing the neural effort for conscious retrieval. This finding supports the notion of synergistic interactions between conscious and unconscious relational memories in a common, cohesive hippocampal-neocortical memory space.     

Unconscious mental imagery

Historically, mental imagery has been defined as an experiential state—as something necessarily conscious. But most behavioural or neuroimaging experiments on mental imagery—including the most famous ones—do not actually take the conscious experience of the subject into consideration. Further, recent research highlights that there are very few behavioural or neural differences between conscious and unconscious mental imagery. I argue that treating mental imagery as not necessarily conscious (as potentially unconscious) would bring much needed explanatory unification to mental imagery research. It would also help us to reassess some of the recent aphantasia findings inasmuch as at least some subjects with aphantasia would be best described as having unconscious mental imagery.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.     

Further Explorations of the Facing Bias in Biological Motion Perception: Perspective Cues,Observer Sex,and Response Times

The human visual system has evolved to be highly sensitive to visual information about other persons and their movements as is illustrated by the effortless perception of point-light figures or ‘biological motion’. When presented orthographically, a point-light walker is interpreted in two anatomically plausible ways: As ‘facing the viewer’ or as ‘facing away’ from the viewer. However, human observers show a ‘facing bias’: They perceive such a point-light walker as facing towards them in about 70-80% of the cases. In studies exploring the role of social and biological relevance as a possible account for the facing bias, we found a ‘figure gender effect’: Male point-light figures elicit a stronger facing bias than female point-light figures. Moreover, we also found an ‘observer gender effect’: The ‘figure gender effect’ was stronger for male than for female observers. In the present study we presented to 11 males and 11 females point-light walkers of which, very subtly, the perspective information was manipulated by modifying the earlier reported ‘perspective technique’. Proportions of ‘facing the viewer’ responses and reaction times were recorded. Results show that human observers, even in the absence of local shape or size cues, easily pick up on perspective cues, confirming recent demonstrations of high visual sensitivity to cues on whether another person is potentially approaching. We also found a consistent difference in how male and female observers respond to stimulus variations (figure gender or perspective cues) that cause variations in the perceived in-depth orientation of a point-light walker. Thus, the ‘figure gender effect’ is possibly caused by changes in the relative locations and motions of the dots that the perceptual system tends to interpret as perspective cues. Third, reaction time measures confirmed the existence of the facing bias and recent research showing faster detection of approaching than receding biological motion.     

Levels of processing during non-conscious perception: a critical review of visual masking

Understanding the extent and limits of non-conscious processing is an important step on the road to a thorough understanding of the cognitive and cerebral correlates of conscious perception. In this article, we present a critical review of research on subliminal perception during masking and other related experimental conditions. Although initially controversial, the possibility that a broad variety of processes can be activated by a non-reportable stimulus is now well established. Behavioural findings of subliminal priming indicate that a masked word or digit can have an influence on perceptual, lexical and semantic levels, while neuroimaging directly visualizes the brain activation that it evokes in several cortical areas. This activation is often attenuated under subliminal presentation conditions compared to consciously reportable conditions, but there are sufficiently many exceptions, in paradigms such as the attentional blink, to indicate that high activation, per se, is not a sufficient condition for conscious access to occur. We conclude by arguing that for a stimulus to reach consciousness, two factors are jointly needed: (i) the input stimulus must have enough strength (which can be prevented by masking) and (ii) it must receive top-down attention (which can be prevented by drawing attention to another stimulus or task). This view leads to a distinction between two types of non-conscious processes, which we call subliminal and preconscious. According to us, maintaining this distinction is essential in order to make sense of the growing neuroimaging data on the neural correlates of consciousness.     

A model of subjective report and objective discrimination as categorical decisions in a vast representational space

Subliminal perception studies have shown that one can objectively discriminate a stimulus without subjectively perceiving it. We show how a minimalist framework based on Signal Detection Theory and Bayesian inference can account for this dissociation, by describing subjective and objective tasks with similar decision-theoretic mechanisms. Each of these tasks relies on distinct response classes, and therefore distinct priors and decision boundaries. As a result, they may reach different conclusions. By formalizing, within the same framework, forced-choice discrimination responses, subjective visibility reports and confidence ratings, we show that this decision model suffices to account for several classical characteristics of conscious and unconscious perception. Furthermore, the model provides a set of original predictions on the nonlinear profiles of discrimination performance obtained at various levels of visibility. We successfully test one such prediction in a novel experiment: when varying continuously the degree of perceptual ambiguity between two visual symbols presented at perceptual threshold, identification performance varies quasi-linearly when the stimulus is unseen and in an ‘all-or-none’ manner when it is seen. The present model highlights how conscious and non-conscious decisions may correspond to distinct categorizations of the same stimulus encoded by a high-dimensional neuronal population vector.     

How Lateral Connections and Spiking Dynamics May Separate Multiple Objects Moving Together

Over successive stages, the ventral visual system of the primate brain develops neurons that respond selectively to particular objects or faces with translation, size and view invariance. The powerful neural representations found in Inferotemporal cortex form a remarkably rapid and robust basis for object recognition which belies the difficulties faced by the system when learning in natural visual environments. A central issue in understanding the process of biological object recognition is how these neurons learn to form separate representations of objects from complex visual scenes composed of multiple objects. We show how a one-layer competitive network comprised of ‘spiking’ neurons is able to learn separate transformation-invariant representations (exemplified by one-dimensional translations) of visual objects that are always seen together moving in lock-step, but separated in space. This is achieved by combining ‘Mexican hat’ functional lateral connectivity with cell firing-rate adaptation to temporally segment input representations of competing stimuli through anti-phase oscillations (perceptual cycles). These spiking dynamics are quickly and reliably generated, enabling selective modification of the feed-forward connections to neurons in the next layer through Spike-Time-Dependent Plasticity (STDP), resulting in separate translation-invariant representations of each stimulus. Variations in key properties of the model are investigated with respect to the network’s ability to develop appropriate input representations and subsequently output representations through STDP. Contrary to earlier rate-coded models of this learning process, this work shows how spiking neural networks may learn about more than one stimulus together without suffering from the ‘superposition catastrophe’. We take these results to suggest that spiking dynamics are key to understanding biological visual object recognition.     

Lesions to right posterior parietal cortex impair visual depth perception from disparity but not motion cues

The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is understood to be active when observers perceive three-dimensional (3D) structure. However, it is not clear how central this activity is in the construction of 3D spatial representations. Here, we examine whether PPC is essential for two aspects of visual depth perception by testing patients with lesions affecting this region. First, we measured subjects'' ability to discriminate depth structure in various 3D surfaces and objects using binocular disparity. Patients with lesions to right PPC (N = 3) exhibited marked perceptual deficits on these tasks, whereas those with left hemisphere lesions (N = 2) were able to reliably discriminate depth as accurately as control subjects. Second, we presented an ambiguous 3D stimulus defined by structure from motion to determine whether PPC lesions influence the rate of bistable perceptual alternations. Patients'' percept durations for the 3D stimulus were generally within a normal range, although the two patients with bilateral PPC lesions showed the fastest perceptual alternation rates in our sample. Intermittent stimulus presentation reduced the reversal rate similarly across subjects. Together, the results suggest that PPC plays a causal role in both inferring and maintaining the perception of 3D structure with stereopsis supported primarily by the right hemisphere, but do not lend support to the view that PPC is a critical contributor to bistable perceptual alternations.This article is part of the themed issue ‘Vision in our three-dimensional world’.     

The neural subjective frame: from bodily signals to perceptual consciousness

The report ‘I saw the stimulus’ operationally defines visual consciousness, but where does the ‘I’ come from? To account for the subjective dimension of perceptual experience, we introduce the concept of the neural subjective frame. The neural subjective frame would be based on the constantly updated neural maps of the internal state of the body and constitute a neural referential from which first person experience can be created. We propose to root the neural subjective frame in the neural representation of visceral information which is transmitted through multiple anatomical pathways to a number of target sites, including posterior insula, ventral anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala and somatosensory cortex. We review existing experimental evidence showing that the processing of external stimuli can interact with visceral function. The neural subjective frame is a low-level building block of subjective experience which is not explicitly experienced by itself which is necessary but not sufficient for perceptual experience. It could also underlie other types of subjective experiences such as self-consciousness and emotional feelings. Because the neural subjective frame is tightly linked to homeostatic regulations involved in vigilance, it could also make a link between state and content consciousness.     

Electroencephalographic Variation during End Maintenance and Emergence from Surgical Anesthesia

The re-establishment of conscious awareness after discontinuing general anesthesia has often been assumed to be the inverse of loss of consciousness. This is despite the obvious asymmetry in the initiation and termination of natural sleep. In order to characterize the restoration of consciousness after surgery, we recorded frontal electroencephalograph (EEG) from 100 patients in the operating room during maintenance and emergence from general anesthesia. We have defined, for the first time, 4 steady-state patterns of anesthetic maintenance based on the relative EEG power in the slow-wave (<14 Hz) frequency bands that dominate sleep and anesthesia. Unlike single-drug experiments performed in healthy volunteers, we found that surgical patients exhibited greater electroencephalographic heterogeneity while re-establishing conscious awareness after drug discontinuation. Moreover, these emergence patterns could be broadly grouped according to the duration and rapidity of transitions amongst these slow-wave dominated brain states that precede awakening. Most patients progressed gradually from a pattern characterized by strong peaks of delta (0.5–4 Hz) and alpha/spindle (8–14 Hz) power (‘Slow-Wave Anesthesia’) to a state marked by low delta-spindle power (‘Non Slow-Wave Anesthesia’) before awakening. However, 31% of patients transitioned abruptly from Slow-Wave Anesthesia to waking; they were also more likely to express pain in the post-operative period. Our results, based on sleep-staging classification, provide the first systematized nomenclature for tracking brain states under general anesthesia from maintenance to emergence, and suggest that these transitions may correlate with post-operative outcomes such as pain.     

Plastid Proteomic Analysis in Tomato Fruit Development

To better understand the mechanism of plastid differentiation from chloroplast to chromoplast, we examined proteome and plastid changes over four distinct developmental stages of ‘Micro-Tom’ fruit. Additionally, to discover more about the relationship between fruit color and plastid differentiation, we also analyzed and compared ‘Micro-Tom’ results with those from two other varieties, ‘Black’ and ‘White Beauty’. We confirmed that proteins related to photosynthesis remain through the orange maturity stage of ‘Micro-Tom’, and also learned that thylakoids no longer exist at this stage. These results suggest that at a minimum there are changes in plastid morphology occurring before all related proteins change. We also compared ‘Micro-Tom’ fruits with ‘Black’ and ‘White Beauty’ using two-dimensional gel electrophoresis. We found a decrease of CHRC (plastid-lipid-associated protein) and HrBP1 (harpin binding protein-1) in the ‘Black’ and ‘White Beauty’ varieties. CHRC is involved in carotenoid accumulation and stabilization. HrBP1 in Arabidopsis has a sequence similar to proteins in the PAP/fibrillin family. These proteins have characteristics and functions similar to lipocalin, an example of which is the transport of hydrophobic molecules. We detected spots of TIL (temperature-induced lipocalin) in 2D-PAGE results, however the number of spots and their isoelectric points differed between ‘Micro-Tom’ and ‘Black’/‘White Beauty’. Lipocalin has various functions including those related to environmental stress response, apoptosis induction, membrane formation and fixation, regulation of immune response, cell growth, and metabolism adjustment. Lipocalin related proteins such as TIL and HrBP1 could be related to the accumulation of carotenoids, fruit color and the differentiation of chromoplast.     

Out of the blue: understanding abrupt and wayward transitions in thought using probability and predictive processing

Thoughts that appear to come to us ‘out of the blue’ or ‘out of nowhere’ are a familiar aspect of mental experience. Such thoughts tend to elicit feelings of surprise and spontaneity. Although we are beginning to understand the neural processes that underlie the arising of such thoughts, little is known about what accounts for their peculiar phenomenology. Here, we focus on one central aspect of this phenomenology—the experience of surprise at their occurrence, as it relates to internal probabilistic predictions regarding mental states. We introduce a distinction between two phenomenologically different types of transitions in thought content: (i) abrupt transitions, which occur at surprising times but lead to unsurprising thought content, and (ii) wayward transitions, which occur at surprising times and also lead to surprising thought content. We examine these two types of transitions using a novel approach that combines probabilistic and predictive processing concepts and principles. We employ two different probability metrics—transition and occurrence probability—to characterize and differentiate between abrupt and wayward transitions. We close by discussing some potentially beneficial ways in which these two kinds of transitions in thought content may contribute to mental function, and how they may be implemented at the neural level.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.     

Beyond a Dichotomous View of the Concepts of ‘Sex’ and ‘Gender’ Focus Group Discussions among Gender Researchers at a Medical Faculty

Introduction

The concepts of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are both of vital importance in medicine and health sciences. However, the meaning of these concepts has seldom been discussed in the medical literature. The aim of this study was to explore what the concepts of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ meant for gender researchers based in a medical faculty.

Methods

Sixteen researchers took part in focus group discussions. The analysis was performed in several steps. The participating researchers read the text and discussed ideas for analysis in national and international workshops. The data were analysed using qualitative content analysis. The authors performed independent preliminary analyses, which were further developed and intensively discussed between the authors.

Results

The analysis of meanings of the concepts of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ for gender researchers based in a medical faculty resulted in three categories; “Sex as more than biology”, with the subcategories ‘sex’ is not simply biological, ‘sex’ as classification, and ‘sex’ as fluid and changeable; ”Gender as a multiplicity of power-related constructions”, with the subcategories: ‘gender’ as constructions, ‘gender’ power dimensions, and ‘gender’ as doing femininities and masculinities; “Sex and gender as interwoven”, with the subcategories: ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ as inseparable and embodying ‘sex’ and ‘gender’.

Conclusions

Gender researchers within medicine pointed out the importance of looking beyond a dichotomous view of the concepts of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. The perception of the concepts was that ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ were intertwined. Further research is needed to explore how ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ interact.     

Hallucinations on demand: the utility of experimentally induced phenomena in hallucination research

Despite the desire to delve deeper into hallucinations of all types, methodological obstacles have frustrated development of more rigorous quantitative experimental techniques, thereby hampering research progress. Here, we discuss these obstacles and, with reference to visual phenomena, argue that experimentally induced phenomena (e.g. hallucinations induced by flickering light and classical conditioning) can bring hallucinations within reach of more objective behavioural and neural measurement. Expanding the scope of hallucination research raises questions about which phenomena qualify as hallucinations, and how to identify phenomena suitable for use as laboratory models of hallucination. Due to the ambiguity inherent in current hallucination definitions, we suggest that the utility of phenomena for use as laboratory hallucination models should be represented on a continuous spectrum, where suitability varies with the degree to which external sensory information constrains conscious experience. We suggest that existing strategies that group pathological hallucinations into meaningful subtypes based on hallucination characteristics (including phenomenology, disorder and neural activity) can guide extrapolation from hallucination models to other hallucinatory phenomena. Using a spectrum of phenomena to guide scientific hallucination research should help unite the historically separate fields of psychophysics, cognitive neuroscience and clinical research to better understand and treat hallucinations, and inform models of consciousness.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.     

How deep is the rift between conscious states in sleep and wakefulness? Spontaneous experience over the sleep–wake cycle

Whether we are awake or asleep is believed to mark a sharp divide between the types of conscious states we undergo in either behavioural state. Consciousness in sleep is often equated with dreaming and thought to be characteristically different from waking consciousness. Conversely, recent research shows that we spend a substantial amount of our waking lives mind wandering, or lost in spontaneous thoughts. Dreaming has been described as intensified mind wandering, suggesting that there is a continuum of spontaneous experience that reaches from waking into sleep. This challenges how we conceive of the behavioural states of sleep and wakefulness in relation to conscious states. I propose a conceptual framework that distinguishes different subtypes of spontaneous thoughts and experiences independently of their occurrence in sleep or waking. I apply this framework to selected findings from dream and mind-wandering research. I argue that to assess the relationship between spontaneous thoughts and experiences and the behavioural states of sleep and wakefulness, we need to look beyond dreams to consider kinds of sleep-related experience that qualify as dreamless. I conclude that if we consider the entire range of spontaneous thoughts and experiences, there appears to be variation in subtypes both within as well as across behavioural states. Whether we are sleeping or waking does not appear to strongly constrain which subtypes of spontaneous thoughts and experiences we undergo in those states. This challenges the conventional and coarse-grained distinction between sleep and waking and their putative relation to conscious states.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.     

Dynamics of Trimming the Content of Face Representations for Categorization in the Brain

To understand visual cognition, it is imperative to determine when, how and with what information the human brain categorizes the visual input. Visual categorization consistently involves at least an early and a late stage: the occipito-temporal N170 event related potential related to stimulus encoding and the parietal P300 involved in perceptual decisions. Here we sought to understand how the brain globally transforms its representations of face categories from their early encoding to the later decision stage over the 400 ms time window encompassing the N170 and P300 brain events. We applied classification image techniques to the behavioral and electroencephalographic data of three observers who categorized seven facial expressions of emotion and report two main findings: (1) over the 400 ms time course, processing of facial features initially spreads bilaterally across the left and right occipito-temporal regions to dynamically converge onto the centro-parietal region; (2) concurrently, information processing gradually shifts from encoding common face features across all spatial scales (e.g., the eyes) to representing only the finer scales of the diagnostic features that are richer in useful information for behavior (e.g., the wide opened eyes in ‘fear’; the detailed mouth in ‘happy’). Our findings suggest that the brain refines its diagnostic representations of visual categories over the first 400 ms of processing by trimming a thorough encoding of features over the N170, to leave only the detailed information important for perceptual decisions over the P300.     

What aspects of autism predispose to talent?

In this paper, we explore the question, why are striking special skills so much more common in autism spectrum conditions (ASC) than in other groups? Current cognitive accounts of ASC are briefly reviewed in relation to special skills. Difficulties in ‘theory of mind’ may contribute to originality in ASC, since individuals who do not automatically ‘read other minds’ may be better able to think outside prevailing fashions and popular theories. However, originality alone does not confer talent. Executive dysfunction has been suggested as the ‘releasing’ mechanism for special skills in ASC, but other groups with executive difficulties do not show raised incidence of talents. Detail-focused processing bias (‘weak coherence’, ‘enhanced perceptual functioning’) appears to be the most promising predisposing characteristic, or ‘starting engine’, for talent development. In support of this notion, we summarize data from a population-based twin study in which parents reported on their 8-year-olds'' talents and their ASC-like traits. Across the whole sample, ASC-like traits, and specifically ‘restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests’ related to detail focus, were more pronounced in children reported to have talents outstripping older children. We suggest that detail-focused cognitive style predisposes to talent in savant domains in, and beyond, autism spectrum disorders.