Treaty provisions concerning marine science research

Abstract

Under the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) schemes, the economic calculations fail to reflect a just distribution of wealth and results in deprivation of the public trust of fisheries. Some “neoclassic” economists claim that ITQs cost-efficiently eliminate the tragedy of the commons. However, Norwegian cost–benefit studies indicate a financial loss for second-generation ITQ owners due to the high price of tradable quotas. The financial burden caused by ITQs creates overfishing and pressure on the fishing stocks, which puts coastal municipalities at risk. If future fisheries are given legal protection, the losses due to hazardous fishing or overexploiting stocks is the fisherman's liability. Restoration schemes within the framework of total allowable catch (TAC) are an alternative to ITQs that may prevent resource depletion and the “tragedy of the commons.”     

A common evolutionary pathway for maintaining quorum sensing in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pseudomonas aeruginosa</Emphasis>

In the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, the synthesis and secretion of extracellular protease is a typical cooperative behavior regulated by quorum sensing. However, this type of cooperative behavior is easily exploited by other individuals who do not synthesize public goods, which is known as the “tragedy of the commons”. Here P. aeruginosa was inoculated into casein media with different nitrogen salts added. In casein broth, protease (a type of public good) is necessary for bacterial growth. After 30 days of sequential transfer, some groups propagated stably and avoided “tragedy of the commons”. The evolved cooperators who continued to synthesize protease were isolated from these stable groups. By comparing the characteristics of quorum sensing in these cooperators, an identical evolutionary pattern was found. A variety of cooperative behaviors regulated by quorum sensing, such as the synthesis and secretion of protease and signals, were significantly reduced during the process of evolution. Such reductions improved the efficiency of cooperation, helping to prevent cheating. In addition, the production of pyocyanin, which is regulated by the RhlIR system, increased during the process of evolution, possibly due to its role in stabilizing the cooperation. This study contributes towards our understanding of the evolution of quorum sensing of P. aeruginosa.     

Preventing the Tragedy of the Commons Through Punishment of Over-Consumers and Encouragement of Under-Consumers

The conditions that can lead to the exploitative depletion of a shared resource, i.e., the tragedy of the commons, can be reformulated as a game of prisoner’s dilemma: while preserving the common resource is in the best interest of the group, over-consumption is in the interest of each particular individual at any given point in time. One way to try and prevent the tragedy of the commons is through infliction of punishment for over-consumption and/or encouraging under-consumption, thus selecting against over-consumers. Here, the effectiveness of various punishment functions in an evolving consumer-resource system is evaluated within a framework of a parametrically heterogeneous system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). Conditions leading to the possibility of sustainable coexistence with the common resource for a subset of cases are identified analytically using adaptive dynamics; the effects of punishment on heterogeneous populations with different initial composition are evaluated using the reduction theorem for replicator equations. Obtained results suggest that one cannot prevent the tragedy of the commons through rewarding of under-consumers alone—there must also be an implementation of some degree of punishment that increases in a nonlinear fashion with respect to over-consumption and which may vary depending on the initial distribution of clones in the population.     

Sexual conflict and the tragedy of the commons

It is widely understood that the costs and benefits of mating can affect the fecundity and survival of individuals. Sexual conflict may have profound consequences for populations as a result of the negative effects it causes males and females to have on one another's fitness. Here we present a model describing the evolution of sexual conflict, in which males inflict a direct cost on female fitness. We show that these costs can drive the entire population to extinction. To males, females are an essential but finite resource over which they have to compete. Population extinction owing to sexual conflict can therefore be seen as an evolutionary tragedy of the commons. Our model shows that a positive feedback between harassment and the operational sex ratio is responsible for the demise of females and, thus, for population extinction. We further show that the evolution of female resistance to counter harassment can prevent a tragedy of the commons. Our findings not only demonstrate that sexual conflict can drive a population to extinction but also highlight how simple mechanisms, such as harassment costs to males and females and the coevolution between harassment and resistance, can help avert a tragedy of the commons caused by sexual conflict.     

Sex, death and tragedy

The population consequences of sexual conflict are relatively unexplored. In a recent paper, Le Galliard et al. now show that males of the common lizard Lacerta vivipara cause such damage to females that male-biased populations decrease in size, posing a real risk to the persistence of local lizard populations. Their study reveals surprising parallels between sexual conflict and the tragedy of the commons, where selfish competition over females destroys the very resource (i.e. the females) over which the males are fighting.     

Density-dependent cooperation as a mechanism for persistence and coexistence

To overcome stress, such as resource limitation, an organism often needs to successfully mediate competition with other members of its own species. This may favor the evolution of defective traits that are harmful to the species population as a whole, and that may lead to its dilution or even to its extinction (the tragedy of the commons). Here, we show that this phenomenon can be circumvented by cooperation plasticity, in which an individual decides, based on environmental conditions, whether to cooperate or to defect. Specifically, we analyze the evolution of density-dependent cooperation. In our model, the population is spatially subdivided, periodically remixed, and comprises several species. We find that evolution pushes individuals to be more cooperative when their own species is at lower densities, and we show that not only could this cooperation prevent the tragedy of the commons, but it could also facilitate coexistence between many species that compete for the same resource.     

Resolving the tragedy of the commons: the feedback between intraspecific conflict and population density

Competition and conflict among individuals can favour exploitative strategies that undermine the common good. Theory suggests that this can lead to a tragedy of the commons and ultimately population extinction, a phenomenon known as evolutionary suicide. Here, I present a model of the evolutionary tragedy of the commons that explicitly considers the population dynamics where individuals invest in individually costly competitive traits. In the simplest form, this supports the notion that selection for high levels of conflict can cause evolutionary suicide. However, as competition comes with survival and fecundity costs, a feedback between the investment in competition and population density can act to reduce the level of conflict and prevent the population from going extinct. This suggests that the interaction between population ecology and the evolution of competition and conflict among individuals may be an important mechanism in resolving the level of competition and conflict among individuals.     

Responsible resource management: the predicament and reform path for Chinese wetland conservation

Despite national conservation policies, international agreements and public support related to wetlands, a wide range of agricultural development and public works projects have resulted in the over-exploitation and degradation of wetlands during the past decades in China. The phenomenon of “the tragedy of the commons” in Chinese wetland conservation is recognized as an incentive problem provoked by a multi-stakeholder situation. This paper examines the governance of China’s wetlands and its hierarchical and functional–behavioral characteristics within the context of resource management. The results show that the administrative system in China wetland management depends on resource element-oriented legislation, in that various agencies managing different resources place various demands on wetland resources. This paper analyzes the responsibilities and incentives of various government administrators and other stakeholders as well as their behavioral logic and why such a multi-stakeholder mode fails to provide adequate wetland conservation. Using Heilongjiang Province as an example, it explains the conflicts between stakeholders within both the legislative system and those who administer wetland management. In addition, it suggests improvements, especially in the form of an integrated management system with an appropriate and unified system of administration.     

The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology

Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons is an analogy that shows how individuals driven by self-interest can end up destroying the resource upon which they all depend. The proposed solutions for humans rely on highly advanced skills such as negotiation, which raises the question of how non-human organisms manage to resolve similar tragedies. In recent years, this question has promoted evolutionary biologists to apply the tragedy of the commons to a wide range of biological systems. Here, we provide tools to categorize different types of tragedy and review different mechanisms, including kinship, policing and diminishing returns that can resolve conflicts that could otherwise end in tragedy. A central open question, however, is how often biological systems are able to resolve these scenarios rather than drive themselves extinct through individual-level selection favouring self-interested behaviours.     

Worker reproduction in Formica ants

A potential tragedy of the commons arises in social-insect colonies where workers are fertile if egg-laying workers decrease their contribution to other tasks. We studied worker ovary development and egg laying in relation to kin structure, colony size, and the presence of a queen in nine species (11 populations) of Formica ants. Workers were highly fertile and laid eggs in the presence of a queen in five out of the seven species where egg samples were obtained. Worker fertility correlated neither with colony size nor with kin structure, which suggests that colony-level costs and efficiency of policing precede relatedness as the most important conflict determinant. We conclude that careful quantification of the costs of worker reproduction and policing is essential for inferences about the tragedy of the commons.     

Open Access, Open Systems: Pastoral Management of Common-Pool Resources in the Chad Basin

The discussion about the impact of pastoralists on ecosystems has been profoundly shaped by Hardin’s tragedy of the commons that held pastoralists responsible for overgrazing the range. Research has shown that grazing ecosystems are much more complex and dynamic than was previously assumed and that they can be managed adaptively as commons. However, proponents and critics of Hardin’s thesis continue to argue that open access to common-pool resources inevitably leads to a tragedy of the commons. A longitudinal study that we conducted of pastoral mobility and primary production in the Logone floodplain in the Far North Region of Cameroon suggest that open access does not have to lead to a tragedy of the commons. We argue that this pastoral system is best conceptualized as an open system, in which a combination of individual decision-making and coordination of movements leads to an ideal-free type of distribution of mobile pastoralists. We explain how this self-organizing system of open access works and its implications for theories of management of common-pool resources and our understanding of pastoral systems.     

Exacerbating the Tragedy of the Commons: Private Inefficient Outcomes and Peer Effect in Experimental Games with Fishing Communities

Economic Experimental Games have shown that individuals make decisions that deviate down from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have analyzed the case when deviation is above the Nash equilibrium. Extracting from above the Nash equilibrium is inefficient not only socially but also privately and it would exacerbate the tragedy of the commons. That would be the case of a race to the fish when stocks are becoming depleted or driver behavior on a highly congested road. The objective of this study is to analyze private inefficient extraction behavior in experimental games and to associate the type of player and the type of player group with such inefficient outcomes. To do this, we carried out economic experimental games with local coastal fishermen in Colombia, using a setting where the scarcity of the resource allows for an interior Nash equilibrium and inefficient over-extraction is possible. The state of the resource, the type of player and the composition of the group explain, in part, this inefficient behavior.     

Fragmentation,Cooperation and Power: Institutional Dynamics in Natural Resource Governance in North-Western Namibia

Contemporary theoretical accounts of common pool resource management assume that communities are able to develop institutions for sustainable resource management if they are given security of access and appropriate rights of management. In recent years comprehensive legal reforms of communal rural resource management in Namibia have sought to create an institutional framework linking the sustainable use of natural resources (game, water, forest) and rural development. The state, however, ceded rights to rural communities in an ambiguous and fragmented manner, creating a number of instances of overlapping property rights and different legal conditions for different natural resources. Nowadays communities grapple with the challenge of developing institutions for these resource-centered “new commons”. This paper describes the process of local institutional development, focusing on the challenges arising from the necessity to define group boundaries, the issues arising from monitoring and sanctioning within newly defined institutions, and the ideological underpinnings of different trajectories of communal resource management.     

“Realism” and “relevance” in gaming simulations

How useful are gaming simulations for the study of problems that interest human ecologists? Anatol Rapoport, a principal contributor to the development of game theory, raised this issue with the editors of Human Ecology,who in turn invited him to express his views in print. In brief, Dr. Rapoport calls into question the real-world applicability of gaming simulations, and explores its limitations. The educational function of simulation, he argues, should not be confused with the research aims of laboratory experimentation. The addition of “realistic” conditions in a gaming simulation merely complicates the experiment and reduces its theoretical significance. It does, however, have some pedagogical utility, whose implications have not yet been adequately taken into account. Dr. Rapoport considers this matter with reference to the problem of “social traps,” such as the “tragedy of the commons,” an issue which concerns many human-ecology researchers.     

Tragedy of the commons among antibiotic resistance plasmids

As social interactions are increasingly recognized as important determinants of microbial fitness, sociobiology is being enlisted to better understand the evolution of clinically relevant microbes and, potentially, to influence their evolution to aid human health. Of special interest are situations in which there exists a "tragedy of the commons," where natural selection leads to a net reduction in fitness for all members of a population. Here, I demonstrate the existence of a tragedy of the commons among antibiotic resistance plasmids of bacteria. In serial transfer culture, plasmids evolved a greater ability to superinfect already-infected bacteria, increasing plasmid fitness when evolved genotypes were rare. Evolved plasmids, however, fell victim to their own success, reducing the density of their bacterial hosts when they became common and suffering reduced fitness through vertical transmission. Social interactions can thus be an important determinant of evolution for the molecular endosymbionts of bacteria. These results also identify an avenue of evolution that reduces proliferation of both antibiotic resistance genes and their bacterial hosts.     

Root proliferation in response to neighbouring roots in wheat (Triticum aestivum)

It has been hypothesized that plants compete actively by allocating more resources to competitive organs and activities in response to neighbours, and this can reduce population performance, such as yield in crops. Root proliferation and reduced aboveground growth in response to the presence of roots of a neighbouring plant in experiments with vs. without root dividers between pairs of plants has been reported in several studies, but this result has been criticized as a possible artefact resulting from differences in soil volume available to roots in the two treatments. To address this possible confounding effect, we conducted a pot experiment with a traditional landrace and a modern cultivar of wheat (Triticum aestivum). Pairs of spring wheat plants were grown in pots with two types of root dividers (a) film, which completely divides the soil into two volumes, and (b) fine nylon net, through which roots cannot grow but chemical cues can move. We hypothesized that the root proliferation in response to root interactions would reduce aboveground growth. Wheat plants produced significantly more belowground and less aboveground biomass when interacting through the net dividers than when roots were completely separated. This effect was smaller, but still significant, in the modern cultivar. Our results confirm neighbour-induced root proliferation resulting in a so-called “tragedy of the commons” in an important crop species. The results also suggest that this response has decreased over the course of crop breeding, due to inadvertent “group selection”, and that there is further potential to increase yields by reducing or eliminating this response.     

Diminishing returns in social evolution: the not-so-tragic commons

A challenge for evolutionary theory is to understand how cooperation can occur in the presence of competition and cheating, a problem known as the tragedy of commons. Here I examine how varying the fitness returns from reproductive competition or cooperation affects the negative impact of competition on a social group. Varying linear returns does not affect the impact of competition. However, diminishing returns, where additional investments in either competition or cooperation give smaller and smaller rewards, reduce the effects of competition on the group. I show that diminishing returns are common in many systems, including social vertebrates, microbes, social insects and mutualisms among species. This suggests that the tragedy of the commons is not so tragic and that the disruptive effects of competition upon social life will often be minor.     

The evolutionary palaeoecology of species and the tragedy of the commons

The fossil record presents palaeoecological patterns of rise and fall on multiple scales of time and biological organization. Here, we argue that the rise and fall of species can result from a tragedy of the commons, wherein the pursuit of self-interests by individual agents in a larger interactive system is detrimental to the overall performance or condition of the system. Species evolving within particular communities may conform to this situation, affecting the ecological robustness of their communities. Results from a trophic network model of Permian-Triassic terrestrial communities suggest that community performance on geological timescales may in turn constrain the evolutionary opportunities and histories of the species within them.     

Working with,not against,coral-reef fisheries

The fisheries policies of some Pacific island nations are more appropriate to the biology of their resources than are some of the fisheries policies of more industrialized countries. Exclusive local ownership of natural resources in Palau encourages adjustive management on biologically relevant scales of time and space and promotes responsibility by reducing the tragedy of the commons. The presence of large individuals in fish populations and adequate size of spawning aggregations are more efficient and meaningful cues for timely management than are surveys of abundance or biomass. Taking fish from populations more than halfway to their carrying capacity is working favorably with the fishery because removing fish potentially increases resource stability by negative feedback between stock size and population production. Taking the same amount of fish from a population below half its carrying capacity is working against the fishery, making the population unstable, because reducing the reproductive stock potentially accelerates reduction of the population production by positive feedback. Reef fish are consumed locally, while Palauan laws ban the export of reef resources. This is consistent with the high gross primary production with little excess net production from undisturbed coral-reef ecosystems. The relatively rapid growth rates, short life spans, reliable recruitment and wide-ranging movements of open-ocean fishes such as scombrids make them much more productive than coral-reef fishes. The greater fisheries yield per square kilometer in the open ocean multiplied by well over a thousand times the area of the exclusive economic zone than that of Palau’s coral reefs should encourage Palauans to keep reef fishes for subsistence and to feed tourists open-ocean fishes. Fisheries having only artisanal means should be encouraged to increase the yield and sustainability by moving away from coral reefs to bulk harvesting of nearshore pelagics.     

Prayer,Silence, and Psychotherapy

A new interpretation of L.S. Vygotsky's “The Tragedy of Hamlet, the Prince of Denmark” and his little-known publication “Traurnye stroki-Den' 9 ava.” An essential question (object) of these texts is the secret of genuine human overcoming of suffering. This is also the main problem of psychotherapy. Vygotsky's answer has both psychological and religious sgnificance: the experience of a tragedy is mediated by prayer. Vygotsky's idea creates the basis for religiously oriented, “synergetic” psychotherapy where the main process will be spiritual, including prayer.