The 'physical prophet' and the powers of the imagination. Part II: a case-study on dowsing and the naturalisation of the moral, 1685-1710

In the first paper of this pair, I argued the importance of theories of the imagination in debates on divination [Vermeir, K. (2004). The 'physical prophet' and the powers of the imagination. Part I: A case-study on prophecy, vapours and the imagination (1685-1710). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science C, 35, 561-591]. In the present article, I will rely on these results in order to unearth the role of the imagination in a discussion on dowsing. References to the imagination were often implicit because of its negative associations, but I show in detail how the imagination was used to negotiate between the material and the spiritual, and between the natural, the supernatural and the moral. Natural philosophers, theologians and moralists all struggled for authority over divinatory phenomena. The debate evolved around the questions whether moral states could be naturalised and whether subtle material vapours could have moral qualities.     

Moral concerns across the United States: associations with life-history variables,pathogen prevalence,urbanization, cognitive ability,and social class

This study evaluated the extent to which predictions derived from several theories could account for variability in human moral values across US states. We investigated moral values as conceptualized by Moral Foundations Theory, which argues that morality evolved in response to adaptive challenges in at least five domains: Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, Purity/sanctity ("binding" foundations) and Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity ("individualizing" foundations). We report correlations for measures of cognitive ability, social class, urbanization, pathogen prevalence, life expectancy, and teenage birth rates. Social class and educational attainment had fairly consistent but small effects across moral foundations (social class: positively associated with Ingroup/loyalty, negatively with individualizing foundations and Purity/sanctity; education: positively associated with individualizing foundations, negatively with binding foundations). We conducted multilevel regressions that were stratified for ethnicity. The most consistent state-level predictor of moral values was teenage birth rates (negatively associated with individualizing foundations, positively with binding foundations). This suggests that life-history theory may provide an explanation for individual differences in moral values, although the directions of effects for teenage birth rates diverged from predictions of life-history theory. We conclude that none of the tested theories provides a good explanation for the observed variability in moral values in the USA. We discuss how a life-history approach might account for the findings, and note the need for improved measurement of pathogen stress to better distinguish its effects from those of life-history variables.     

Science, sentience, and animal welfare

I sketch briefly some of the more influential theories concerned with the moral status of nonhuman animals, highlighting their biological/physiological aspects. I then survey the most prominent empirical research on the physiological and cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals, focusing primarily on sentience, but looking also at a few other morally relevant capacities such as self-awareness, memory, and mindreading. Lastly, I discuss two examples of current animal welfare policy, namely, animals used in industrialized food production and in scientific research. I argue that even the most progressive current welfare policies lag behind, are ignorant of, or arbitrarily disregard the science on sentience and cognition.     

Autism,theory of mind,and the reactive attitudes

Whether to treat autism as exculpatory in any given circumstance appears to be influenced both by models of autism and by theories of moral responsibility. This article looks at one particular combination of theories: autism as theory of mind challenges and moral responsibility as requiring appropriate experience of the reactive attitudes. In pursuing this particular combination of ideas, we do not intend to endorse them. Our goal is, instead, to explore the implications of this combination of especially prominent ideas about autism and about moral responsibility. These implications can be quite serious and practical for autists and those who interact directly with autists, as well as for broader communities as they attend to the fair, compassionate, and respectful treatment of increasing numbers of autistic adults. We find that these theories point to a limited range of situations in which autists should not be blamed for transgressive actions for which neurotypical individuals should be blamed. We build on what others have written on these issues by bringing in a recent cognitive model of the role theory of mind plays in empathy, by discussing the social implications of the theoretical findings, and by raising questions about the compatibility of reactive attitude theories of moral responsibility with the neurodiversity approach to autism.     

The acquisition of conscience and Developmental Systems Theory

Summary Proponents of Developmental Systems Theory (DST) argue that it offers an alternative to current research programs in biology that are built on the historic disjunction between evolutionary and developmental biology. In this paper I illustrate how DST can be used to account for the acquisition of an important component of moral agency, conscience. Susan Oyama, a major proponent of DST, has set moral issues outside the compass of DST. Thus, I examine her reasons for restricting DST to non-moral matters, and argue that they are not decisive. On the positive side, I argue that DST not only is compatible with attempts to describe and explain moral agency but also aids us in understanding it. In particular, I show how DST can provide a fruitful perspective for viewing some significant current findings and theories in moral developmental psychology about the acquisition of conscience. The familiar dichotomies resisted by DST, those between genes and environment, inherited and acquired, innate and learned, and biological and cultural, have also plagued human developmental psychology, including moral development. By bringing a DST perspective to the study of moral development, I illustrate how a DST perspective might offer a promising way to reconceive that phenomenon, and provide some insights into how further work in understanding the development of moral agency might proceed. Thus, I hope to contribute to the current efforts of proponents of DST to integrate developmental and evolutionary considerations.     

An African theory of bioethics: reply to MacPherson and Macklin

In a prior issue of Developing World Bioethics, Cheryl Macpherson and Ruth Macklin critically engaged with an article of mine, where I articulated a moral theory grounded on indigenous values salient in the sub-Saharan region, and then applied it to four major issues in bioethics, comparing and contrasting its implications with those of the dominant Western moral theories, utilitarianism and Kantianism. In response to my essay, Macpherson and Macklin have posed questions about: whether philosophical justifications are something with which bioethicists ought to be concerned; why something counts as 'African'; how medicine is a moral enterprise; whether an individual right to informed consent is consistent with sub-Saharan values; and when thought experiments help to establish firm conclusions about moral status. These are important issues for the field, and I use this reply to take discussion of them a step or two farther, defending my initial article from Macpherson's and Macklin's critical questions and objections.     

Relative Fitness, Teleology, and the Adaptive Landscape

The metaphor of the adaptive landscape, introduced by Sewall Wright in 1932, has played, and continues to play, a central role in much evolutionary thought. I argue that the use of this metaphor is tied to a teleological view of the evolutionary process, in which natural selection directs evolution toward an improved future state. I argue further that the use of “relative fitnesses” standardized to an arbitrary value, which is closely connected with the metaphor of an adaptive landscape, produces a disconnect between the mean fitness of a population and any real property of that population. This allows for a vague and ill-defined improvement to occur under the influence of selection. Instead, I suggest that relative fitnesses should be standardized by the mean absolute fitness (expected population growth rate), so that they express the expected rate of increase in frequency, rather than number. Under this definition, the mean relative fitness of all populations is always 1.0, and never changes as long as the population continues to exist.     

Embryos,The Principle of Proportionality,and the Shaky Ground of Moral Respect

The debate concerning the moral permissibility of using human embryos in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research has long centred on the question of the embryo's supposed right to life. However, in focussing only on this question, many opponents to hESC research have escaped rigorous scrutiny by making vague and unfounded appeals to the concept of moral respect in order to justify their opposition to certain hESC practices. In this paper, I offer a critical analysis of the concept of moral respect, and its use to support the intuitively appealing principle of proportionality in hESC research. I argue that if proponents of this principle are to justify its adoption by appealing to the concept of moral respect, they must explain two things concerning the nature of the moral respect owed to embryos. First, they must explain which particular aspect of the embryo is morally relevant, and why. Second, they must explain why some uses of embryos in research fail to acknowledge what is morally relevant about the embryo, and thereby involve a violation of the moral respect that they are due. I shall show that providing such explanations may be more difficult than it first appears.     

The reflective peephole method: Ruralism and awkwardness in the ethnography of rural China

Starting with Arthur Smith’s metaphor of the ‘peephole method’, this article explores the issues of ruralism and awkwardness which underlie much ethnographic fieldwork in rural China. In the first part, the continuing influence of ruralism—the idea that the Chinese countryside represents the ‘real’ China—is discussed. This idea is based on a radical conceptual separation of the countryside and the city, which denies modern everydayness to the countryside. If we accept that the modern everyday is now present in rural China and that ordinary people are aware of ruralism and its opposites (urbanism and modernity), we need to find research methods suitable to address the entanglement and the social uses of ruralist and modernist representations in everyday life. In the second part of the article, I argue that the ‘reflective peephole method’ could be such a method. Starting from the awkwardness I felt in my own fieldwork in south‐western Hubei Province, I argue that the dilemmas of the ‘peephole method’ might be a good starting point for reflecting on the intensified ambiguity of moral discourse and action in contemporary rural China.     

Expertise, wisdom and moral philosophers: a response to Gesang

In a recent issue of Bioethics, Bernard Gesang asks whether a moral philosopher possesses greater moral expertise than a non-philosopher, and his answer is a qualified yes, based not so much on his infallible access to the truth, but on the quality of his theoretically-informed moral justifications. I reject Gesang's claim that there is such a thing as moral expertise, although the moral philosopher may well make a valid contribution to the ethics committee as a concerned and educated citizen. I suggest that wisdom is a lot more interesting to examine than moral expertise. Again, however, moral philosophers have no monopoly on wisdom, and the study of philosophy may even impede its cultivation.     

Upregulation of Glyoxalase I fails to Normalize Methylglyoxal Levels: A Possible Mechanism for Biochemical Changes in Diabetic Mouse Lenses

Glyoxalase I is the first enzyme in a two-enzyme glyoxalase system that metabolizes physiological methylglyoxal (MGO). MGO reacts with proteins to form irreversible adducts that may lead to crosslinking and aggregation of lens proteins in diabetes. This study examined the effect of hyperglycemia on glyoxalase I activity and its mRNA content in mouse lens epithelial cells (mLE cells) and in diabetic mouse lenses and investigated the relationship between GSH and MGO in organ cultured lenses. mLE cells cultured with 25 mM D-glucose (high glucose) showed an upregulation of glyoxalase I activity and a higher content of glyoxalase I mRNA when compared with either cells cultured with 5 mM glucose (control) or with 20 mM L-glucose + 5 mM D-glucose. MGO concentration was significantly elevated in cells cultured with high D-glucose, but not in L-glucose. GSH levels were lower in cells incubated with high glucose compared to control cells. Glyoxalase I activity and mRNA levels were elevated in diabetic lenses compared to non-diabetic control mouse lenses. MGO levels in diabetic lenses were higher than in control lenses. Incubation of lenses with buthionine sulfoximine (BSO) resulted in a dramatic decline in GSH but the MGO levels were similar to lenses incubated without BSO. Our data suggest that in mouse lenses MGO accumulation may occur independent of GSH concentration and in diabetes there is an upregulation of glyoxalase I, but this upregulation is inadequate to normalize MGO levels, which could lead to MGO retention and chemical modification of proteins.     

DNA Polymerase, DNA Ligase, and Thymidine Kinase Activity in Chicken Lens, Related to DNA X-Ray Lesion Repair

The activity of DNA polymerases α, β, and γ; DNA ligases I and II; and thymidine kinase in chicken lenses is determined. These enzymes are present in embryonic intact lenses freshly isolated at 6 days and 11 days of development and in lenses isolated at 11 days of development and cultured for three days. They are also found in both epithelium and fibers when separated at 10 days of embryonic development and in the epithelium of 14½-month-old hen lenses. In the anucleate mature hen lens fibers, the only detected enzyme is thymidine kinase. Previous results showed that repair of X-ray irradiated DNA was total in 11-day-old embryonic lenses while repair was not detected at six days. On the other hand, repair was very much impaired when the 11-day-old lenses were cultured for three days. Enzymic analyses suggest that the defect in DNA repair and the spontaneous DNA degradation observed in chick lenses at certain embryonic stages, are not due to the absence of any of the above enzymic activities. Alternative explanations are discussed.     

Moral Distress,Workplace Health,and Intrinsic Harm

Moral distress is now being recognized as a frequent experience for many health care providers, and there's good evidence that it has a negative impact on the health care work environment. However, contemporary discussions of moral distress have several problems. First, they tend to rely on inadequate characterizations of moral distress. As a result, subsequent investigations regarding the frequency and consequences of moral distress often proceed without a clear understanding of the phenomenon being discussed, and thereby risk substantially misrepresenting the nature, frequency, and possible consequences of moral distress. These discussions also minimize the intrinsically harmful aspects of moral distress. This is a serious omission. Moral distress doesn't just have a negative impact on the health care work environment; it also directly harms the one who experiences it. In this paper, I claim that these problems can be addressed by first clarifying our understanding of moral distress, and then identifying what makes moral distress intrinsically harmful. I begin by identifying three common mistakes that characterizations of moral distress tend to make, and explaining why these mistakes are problematic. Next, I offer an account of moral distress that avoids these mistakes. Then, I defend the claim that moral distress is intrinsically harmful to the subject who experiences it. I conclude by explaining how acknowledging this aspect of moral distress should reshape our discussions about how best to deal with this phenomenon.     

Covert moral bioenhancement,public health,and autonomy

In a recent article in this journal, Parker Crutchfield argues that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, as some authors claim, then it ought to be covert, i.e., performed without the knowledge of the population that is being morally enhanced. Crutchfield argues that since the aim of compulsory moral bioenhancement is to prevent ultimate harm to the population, compulsory moral bioenhancement is best categorized as a public health issue, and should therefore be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. In this article, I argue for two related claims. First, I question the extent to which compulsory moral enhancement should be considered a public health issue that ought to be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. Second, I argue that Crutchfield's argument that covert moral bioenhancement would better respect people's autonomy than an overt program overlooks two important autonomy‐based reasons that, in fact, favor an overt moral enhancement program over a covert one.     

Categorical inequality,institutional ambivalence,and permanently failing institutions: the case of immigrants and barriers to health care in America

Abstract

I draw on the theories of Charles Tilly, Robert K. Merton, Eleanor Barber, Marshall Meyer, and Lynne Zucker to develop a three-part framework for understanding the organizational and institutional interface between social services like health care and disadvantaged minorities like immigrants. Tilly's theory of durable inequality is transposed to categorical inequalities in organizations and law. His vocabulary of motives is expanded to include categorical entrenchment, restitution, and compensation. These embedded inequalities lead to institutional ambivalence in the provision of services and to permanently failing institutions that work poorly, waste resources, or provide uneven quality, yet do not collapse but endure while resisting reform. One rationale for resistance is ‘moral hazard’ by individuals; but the theory of moral hazard is biased and partial, because provider moral hazard and insurer moral hazard are more prevalent. The specific manifestations of these concepts and dynamics between them warrant further research in different contexts.     

Moral philosophy and public policy: the case of NRTs

In this paper, I will express some reservations about the usefulness of moral philosophy for the analysis of public policy issues.... My question is whether taking morality seriously requires taking moral philosophy seriously. This paper focuses on one particular public policy context -- namely, government commissions into new reproductive technologies, such as Britain's Warnock Committee, Australia's Waller and Michael Committees, Canada's Baird Commission, and many others.... Moral philosophers are sometimes asked to participate in these commissions, either as Commissioners, staff, or expert advisers. How can moral philosophers contribute to the analysis of public policy recommendations on NRTs? A survey of the literature suggests that there are two main views on this question, one of which is ambitious, the other more modest. The ambitious view says that moral philosophers should attempt to persuade Commissioners to adopt the right comprehensive moral theory (e.g. adopt a deontological theory, rather than utilitarianism or contractarianism), and then apply this theory to particular policy questions. The more modest view shies away from promoting a particular moral theory, given that the relative merits of different moral theories are a subject of dispute even amongst moral philosophers. Instead, it says that moral philosophers should attempt to ensure that the Commission's arguments are clear and consistent. On this view, philosophers should focus on identifying conceptual confusions or logical inconsistencies within the Commission's arguments without seeking to influence its choice of the underlying theory.     

A critique of the innovation argument against a national health program

President Bush and his Council of Economic Advisors have claimed that the US shouldn't adopt a national health program because doing so would slow innovation in health care. Some have attacked this argument by challenging its moral claim that innovativeness is a good ground for choosing between health care systems. This reply is misguided. If we want to refute the argument from innovation, we have to undercut the premise that seems least controversial--the premise that our current system produces more innovation than a national health program would. I argue that this premise is false. The argument requires clarifying the concept 'national health program' and examining various theories of human well-being.     

AFRICAN AND WESTERN MORAL THEORIES IN A BIOETHICAL CONTEXT

The field of bioethics is replete with applications of moral theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism. For a given dilemma, even if it is not clear how one of these western philosophical principles of right (and wrong) action would resolve it, one can identify many of the considerations that each would conclude is relevant. The field is, in contrast, largely unaware of an African account of what all right (and wrong) actions have in common and of the sorts of factors that for it are germane to developing a sound response to a given bioethical problem. My aim is to help rectify this deficiency by first spelling out a moral theory grounded in the mores of many sub-Saharan peoples, and then applying it to some major bioethical issues, namely, the point of medical treatment, free and informed consent, standards of care and animal experimentation. For each of these four issues, I compare and contrast the implications of the African moral theory with utilitarianism and Kantianism, my overall purposes being to highlight respects in which the African moral theory is distinct and to demonstrate that the field should take it at least as seriously as it does the Western theories.     

The moral foundation of the clinical duties of care: needs,duties and human rights

It has become fashionable to question attempts to derive internationally agreed duties of clinical care from more general theories of human rights. For example, some argue that such attempts risk moral abstraction through their neglect for the importance of culture and community in shaping moral consciousness and are thus often unhelpful in the resolution of concrete moral dilemmas within medicine. Others denounce the importance of general moral principles altogether in bioethics and attempt to articulate what are claimed to be more practical approaches to resolving moral conflict. This paper challenges such arguments.
It does so through arguing that: i) all humans everywhere have the same basic human needs; ii) the satisfaction of these needs varies with culture; iii) the imputation of moral duties on others entails respect for their right to basic need satisfaction, including the right to choose between cultures; iv) internationally accepted clinical duties of care embrace presumptions about the duties and rights of patients which follow from these more general principles and v) problems of moral indeterminacy that arise from putting these principles into practice can be resolved through associated procedural policies of rational negotiation and compromise.
The moral importance and practicality of respect for individual human rights within the practice of medicine is thus defended. Indeed, the paper concludes by arguing that without belief in human rights linked to a theory of basic human needs, communitarian theories of morality are incoherent.