Reproductive skew and the threat of eviction: a new perspective

Most recent models of the partitioning of reproduction attempt to explain patterns of skew on the assumption that dominant individuals have complete control over breeding opportunities within the group, but may nevertheless concede a share of direct reproduction to subordinates as an incentive to remain peacefully in the association. Although these models may be applicable to some animal societies, we argue that they fail to provide a comprehensive theory of skew. Instead, we suggest that subordinates may often be able to claim unsanctioned reproduction for themselves, but will be forced to exercise a degree of reproductive restraint lest they incite ejection by the dominant. Reproductive skew, in other words, may reflect the threat of ejection (inducing subordinate restraint) rather than the threat of subordinate departure (inducing reproductive concessions by dominants). We present a simple ESS model of reproductive skew under these circumstances, which demonstrates that a shift in emphasis from reproductive concessions by dominants to reproductive restraint on the part of subordinates, radically alters the predictions of skew models. High group productivity, high relatedness and (when group members are related) strong ecological constraints are all expected to lead to reduced skew (the opposite conclusions to those of previous, concession-based analyses). The reason is that these factors reduce the benefits (or increase the costs) of ejection to the dominant, who therefore does best to tolerate more subordinate reproduction.     

Genetic support for the evolutionary theory of reproductive transactions in social wasps

Recent evolutionary models of reproductive partitioning within animal societies (known as 'optimal skew', 'concessions' or 'transactional' models) predict that a dominant individual will often yield some fraction of the group's reproduction to a subordinate as an incentive to stay in the group and help rear the dominant's offspring. These models quantitatively predict how the magnitude of the subordinate's 'staying incentive' will vary with the genetic relatedness between dominant and subordinate, the overall expected group output and the subordinate's expected output if it breeds solitarily. We report that these predictions accord remarkably well with the observed reproductive partitioning between conesting dominant and subordinate queens in the social paper wasp Polistes fuscatus. In particular, the theory correctly predicts that (i) the dominant's share of reproduction, i.e. the skew, increases as the colony cycle progresses and (ii) the skew is positively associated both with the colony's productivity and with the relatedness between dominant and subordinate. Moreover, aggression between foundresses positively correlated with the skew, as predicted by transactional but not alternative tug-of-war models of societal evolution. Thus, our results provide the strongest (quantitative support yet for a unifying model of social evolution.     

Female control of the distribution of paternity in cooperative breeders

Models of reproductive skew have shed light on why animal societies vary in the partitioning of reproduction among group members. However, their application to cooperative vertebrate societies remains controversial. A particular problem is that previous models assume that skew in paternity is determined by interactions among males and males only. This conflicts with observations from many species that indicate that females exert control over the distribution of paternity. Here we address this shortfall in the current theory by developing two models to explore the expected patterns of skew in three member groups in which a female controls the allocation of paternity among two males. The first "staying incentive" model extends previous "transactional" (or "concession") models to examine the conditions where females will be willing to share reproduction among a dominant and a subordinate male to retain the subordinate in the group. The second "work incentive" model explores patterns of skew where females allocate paternity in order to maximize the amount of care their offspring receive. The models make contrasting predictions about the nature of male-female conflict over reproduction and also about the relationships between skew and relatedness, ecological constraints, the relative quality of the subordinate male, and the relative cost of care for the two males. These divergent predictions provide a schema by which the evolutionary causes of variation in skew among males can be evaluated.     

Reproductive skew in birds: models, problems and prospects

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in models to explain the partitioning of direct reproduction ('reproductive skew') among members of one sex within social groups. We review models of skew, identify problems of testing models, and consider how to make progress. One series of models assumes that dominants have complete control of subordinate reproduction, but may allow subordinates some reproduction as a way of enticing them to help or getting them to share the cost of reproduction. Another series of models assume that dominants have limited control of subordinate reproduction. Reproductive skew may also be affected by incest avoidance or control by the opposite sex. Models are largely untested because no study of birds has quantified all relevant parameters, and we see no prospect of this happening soon. A common simplifying approach is to test qualitative predictions about the effect on skew of relatedness among group members. However, these data alone cannot distinguish among models because models do not make unique predictions, partly because skew is also affected by other factors. A major problem in cooperatively-breeding birds is that any effect of relatedness will often be confounded by covariation with relatedness asymmetry and subordinate competitiveness. Progress can be made with the development of theory, controlling confounding variables through the choice of study species or types of social group, and, most importantly, testing assumptions underlying hypotheses.     

Reproduction in foundress associations of the social wasp, Polistes carolina: conventions, competition, and skew

Who reproduces in colonies of social insects is determined bysome combination of direct competition and more peaceful convention.We studied these two alternatives in foundresses of the paperwasp, Polistes carolina, by examining two different contexts:what determines who becomes the dominant reproductive and whatdetermines the amount of reproduction obtained by subordinates.The dominant queen on most nests was the foundress to arrivefirst, rather than the largest foundress, expected to be bestat fighting. This suggests that dominance is initially determinedby convention, although the persistence of some aggressiveconflict throughout the foundress period suggests that thisconvention is not absolute. Attempts to explain the divisionof reproduction using several skew theories were generallyunsuccessful. Skew was not correlated with relatedness, size differences, colony productivity, and challenges by the subordinate.P. carolina showed high constraints against solitary nesting,with a minority of females attempting to nest alone, and nonesucceeding. In this situation, most skew theories predict thatgroup stability will be independent of relatedness, yet nearlyall collected subordinates were full sisters to the queen.Reproductive partitioning in early P. carolina colonies may have more to do with enhancing worker production than with conflictover direct fitness.     

A Transactional Theory of Within-Group Conflict

Transactional models of social evolution emphasize that dominant members of the society can be favored to donate parcels of reproduction to subordinate members in return for cooperation. I construct a formal theory of intragroup conflict within the framework of transactional models by determining the maximum extent to which colony members can be selfish without destabilizing the group. The difference between the maximum value of the subordinate's fraction of group reproduction that the dominant can tolerate before ejecting the subordinate and the minimum value required by the subordinate to stay and cooperate peacefully in the group defines the "window of selfishness," which in turn predicts the frequency of within-group conflict. The window of selfishness tends to increase with increasing group reproductive output, increasingly harsh ecological constraints on solitary breeding, and, counterintuitively, increasing relatedness between subordinate and dominant. Increasing fighting ability of the subordinate can either widen or narrow the window of selfishness, the latter being most likely when ecological constraints on group living are strong. Although increasing relatedness is predicted to increase the rate of within-group aggression, the mean intensity of an aggressive act should decline, as predicted by the general theory of honest signaling between relatives and the tug-of-war models of within-group selfishness. In the bidding game, in which multiple dominants bid for the services of a subordinate, the window of selfishness is predicted to have zero width. A zero-width window of selfishness and low conflict also are predicted for saturated N-person groups, that is, groups whose total output is a concave function of group size and in which the dominant is not favored to admit additional subordinates. The model's predictions are compared to empirical evidence and to predictions of alternative models of intragroup aggression, including the value-aggression model and the pure tug-of-war model.     

Tug-of-war has no borders: it is the missing model in reproductive skew theory

Cooperative breeding often results in unequal reproduction between dominant and subordinate group members. Transactional skew models attempt to predict how unequal reproduction can be before the groups themselves become unstable. A number of variants of transactional models have been developed, with a key difference being whether reproduction is controlled by one party or contested by all. It is shown here that ESS solutions for all situations of contested control over reproduction are given by the original tug-of-war model (TOW). Several interesting results follow. First, TOW can escalate enough to destabilize some types of groups. Particularly vulnerable are those that have low relatedness and gain little from cooperative breeding relative to solitary reproduction. Second, TOW can drastically reduce group productivity and especially the inclusive fitness of dominant individuals. Third, these results contrast strongly with those from variants of TOW models that include concessions to maintain group stability. Such models are shown to be special cases of the general and simpler TOW framework, and to have assumptions that may be biologically suspect. Finally, the overall analysis suggests that there is no mechanism within existing TOW framework that will prevent a costly struggle for reproductive control. Because social species rarely exhibit the high levels of aggression predicted by TOW models, alternative evolutionary mechanisms are considered that can limit conflict and produce more mutually beneficial outcomes. The further development of alternative models to predict patterns of reproductive skew are highly recommended.     

Social and genetic structure of paper wasp cofoundress associations: tests of reproductive skew models

Recent models postulate that the members of a social group assess their ecological and social environments and agree a "social contract" of reproductive partitioning (skew). We tested social contracts theory by using DNA microsatellites to measure skew in 24 cofoundress associations of paper wasps, Polistes bellicosus. In contrast to theoretical predictions, there was little variation in cofoundress relatedness, and relatedness either did not predict skew or was negatively correlated with it; the dominant/subordinate size ratio, assumed to reflect relative fighting ability, did not predict skew; and high skew was associated with decreased aggression by the rank 2 subordinate toward the dominant. High skew was associated with increased group size. A difficulty with measuring skew in real systems is the frequent changes in group composition that commonly occur in social animals. In P. bellicosus, 61% of egg layers and an unknown number of non-egg layers were absent by the time nests were collected. The social contracts models provide an attractive general framework linking genetics, ecology, and behavior, but there have been few direct tests of their predictions. We question assumptions underlying the models and suggest directions for future research.     

The evolution of parental and alloparental effort in cooperatively breeding groups: when should helpers pay to stay?

We used a reproductive skew framework to consider the evolutionof parental and alloparental effort in cooperatively breedinggroups. The model provides the first theoretical treatmentof rent payment (the "pay-to-stay" hypothesis) for the evolutionof helping behavior of subordinates. According to this hypothesis,not all helping behavior is kin selected, but group membershelp in order to be allowed to stay in the group and potentiallygain breeding positions later in life. We show that reproductiveconcessions may be replaced by complete skew and voluntary,costly alloparental effort by subordinates once future prospectsare included in fitness calculations. This suggests that incompleteskew observed in long-lived species is not due to dominantcontrol over reproduction. Rent payment is predicted to occurwhen relatedness between subordinate and dominant is low, survivalis high, ecological constraints are at least moderately tight,and retaining nonhelping subordinates harms the dominant'sfitness. Rent may also be required from related subordinatesif helping is very costly (leading to low voluntary helpingeffort) and ecological constraints are moderately tight. However, related subordinates do not need to have a positive net effecton the dominant's direct fitness to be accepted as group members.We also consider compensatory responses of dominant group membersas a potential threat to the stability of renting behavior.If dominants trade off parental effort against their own survival,they may selfishly reduce their own parental effort as a responseto increased help. As this improves their own survival, theprospects of territorial inheritance diminish for the subordinate,and subordinates should hence be less willing to accept therent agreement. However, we show that compensatory responsesby "lazy" parents prevent group formation only in borderlinecases.     

Costly young and reproductive skew in animal societies

Many recent models of reproductive skew explain subordinatereproduction as a staying incentive offered by dominants, whocan produce more young with a helper present than without. Here,we present a new, alternative explanation for subordinate reproduction,which applies whenever the fitness cost to a parent of producingyoung is an accelerating function of the number produced (ascommonly assumed in optimal clutch size theory). Under these circumstances,a dominant individual may be selected to offer a share of reproductionto a related subordinate, not as an incentive to stay, but becauseadditional offspring that would be expensive for the dominantto produce are cheap for the subordinate. "Beneficial sharing"of this kind is more likely the more closely related the subordinateis to the dominant, so that the model predicts a negative relationshipbetween skew and relatedness. This result runs directly counterto the positive relationship predicted by previous incentive-basedmodels. We explore the interaction of these contrasting effectsby developing an integrated model that allows for both beneficialsharing and staying incentives. When offspring are cheap to produce,this integrated model predicts that the incentive effect will dominate,and skew will increase with relatedness. When young are costly,in contrast, beneficial sharing will be of greater importance,and skew will decrease with relatedness.     

High reproductive skew in tropical hover wasps.

A plethora of recent models examines how genetic and environmental factors might influence partitioning of reproduction ('skew') in animal societies, but empirical data are sparse. We used three microsatellite loci to estimate skew on 13 nests of the Malaysian hover wasp, Liostenogaster flavolineata. Groups are small in L. flavolineata (1-10 females) and all females are capable of mating and laying eggs. Despite considerable variation between nests in parameters expected to influence skew, skew was uniformly high. On 11 of the 13 nests, all female eggs had been laid by a single dominant female. A second female had laid one to two out of 5-10 eggs respectively on the two remaining nests. A likelihood analysis suggested that on average, 90% of the male eggs had also been laid by the dominant. The slightly lower skew among male eggs might reflect the lower average relatedness of subordinates to male versus female offspring of the dominant. We suggest that high skew in L. flavolineata may result from strong ecological constraints and a relatively high probability that a subordinate will eventually inherit the dominant, egg-laying position.     

Reproductive skew, costs, and benefits of cooperative breeding in female wood mice (Apodemus sylvaticus)

Two current models seek to explain reproduction of subordinatesin social groups: incentives given by dominants for peacefullyremaining in the group (reproductive skew model) or incompletecontrol by dominants. These models make different predictionsconcerning genetic relatedness between individuals for thedistribution of reproduction and the stability of cooperativebreeding associations. To test these models and to furtherexplore the relationships between reproductive skew, geneticrelatedness, and investment of each participant, we performedbehavioral observations of female wood mice (Apodemus sylvaticus)raising pups communally. Our results do not support previousmodels. Differences in lifetime reproductive success were significantlygreater within mother—daughter pairs than within pairsof sisters or unrelated females. Subordinate females of eitherbreeding unit did not differ in their direct reproduction.Calculations of inclusive fitness based on our results leadto the following predictions: (1) Communal nests should occuronly when ecological circumstances prevent solitary breeding.(2) Subordinate females gain the highest inclusive fitnessjoining their mothers; they also show the highest nursing investment.(3) Mothers should accept daughters, who have no opportunityfor solitary breeding. (4) Dominant sisters and unrelated femalesshould reject subordinate females because cooperative breedingreduces their reproductive success. However, breeding unitsof dominant sisters and unrelated females nevertheless occurand can be explained by our finding that such females significantlyreduce nursing time, which may help them save energy for futurebreeding cycles. Our data demonstrate that both genetic relatednessand investment skew are important in the complex evolutionof reproductive skew in cooperative breeding.     

Reproductive skew and the origin of sterile castes

Reproductive skew theory has not heretofore formally addressed one of the most important questions in evolutionary biology: How can whole-life sterile castes evolve? We construct a transactional skew model investigating under what conditions a subordinate in a multimember group is favored to develop into a morphologically specialized worker caste. Our model demonstrates that, contrary to former expectations, the ecological and genetic conditions favoring caste differentiation are far more restrictive than those favoring high skew. Caste differentiation cannot be selected in saturated, symmetrical relatedness groups unless the genetic relatedness among group members is extremely high. In contrast, it can be selected in the saturated, asymmetrical relatedness (parent-offspring) groups with complete skew. If we also consider the future reproduction of subordinates, caste differentiation is possible only after the group size reaches a certain critical point. Most importantly, caste differentiation in a parent-offspring group increases its saturated group size. The positive feedback between group size and the degree of caste differentiation can continue in principle until completely sterile worker castes emerge. Thus, at least in the case of parent-offspring groups, group size but not the degree of reproductive skew may be a better index of the level of social complexity. A scheme for the evolution of sterile worker castes that integrates the role of group size into the framework of reproductive skew theory is proposed.     

Sex differences in the drivers of reproductive skew in a cooperative breeder

Many cooperatively breeding societies are characterized by high reproductive skew, such that some socially dominant individuals breed, while socially subordinate individuals provide help. Inbreeding avoidance serves as a source of reproductive skew in many high‐skew societies, but few empirical studies have examined sources of skew operating alongside inbreeding avoidance or compared individual attempts to reproduce (reproductive competition) with individual reproductive success. Here, we use long‐term genetic and observational data to examine factors affecting reproductive skew in the high‐skew cooperatively breeding southern pied babbler (Turdoides bicolor). When subordinates can breed, skew remains high, suggesting factors additional to inbreeding avoidance drive skew. Subordinate females are more likely to compete to breed when older or when ecological constraints on dispersal are high, but heavy subordinate females are more likely to successfully breed. Subordinate males are more likely to compete when they are older, during high ecological constraints, or when they are related to the dominant male, but only the presence of within‐group unrelated subordinate females predicts subordinate male breeding success. Reproductive skew is not driven by reproductive effort, but by forces such as intrinsic physical limitations and intrasexual conflict (for females) or female mate choice, male mate‐guarding and potentially reproductive restraint (for males). Ecological conditions or “outside options” affect the occurrence of reproductive conflict, supporting predictions of recent synthetic skew models. Inbreeding avoidance together with competition for access to reproduction may generate high skew in animal societies, and disparate processes may be operating to maintain male vs. female reproductive skew in the same species.     

Queen–worker ratio affects reproductive skew in a socially polymorphic ant

The partitioning of reproduction among individuals in communally breeding animals varies greatly among species, from the monopolization of reproduction (high reproductive skew) to similar contribution to the offspring in others (low skew). Reproductive skew models explain how relatedness or ecological constraints affect the magnitude of reproductive skew. They typically assume that individuals are capable of flexibly reacting to social and environmental changes. Most models predict a decrease of skew when benefits of staying in the group are reduced. In the ant Leptothorax acervorum, queens in colonies from marginal habitats form dominance hierarchies and only the top‐ranking queen lays eggs (“functional monogyny”). In contrast, queens in colonies from extended coniferous forests throughout the Palaearctic rarely interact aggressively and all lay eggs (“polygyny”). An experimental increase of queen:worker ratios in colonies from low‐skew populations elicits queen–queen aggression similar to that in functionally monogynous populations. Here, we show that this manipulation also results in increased reproductive inequalities among queens. Queens from natural overwintering colonies differed in the number of developing oocytes in their ovaries. These differences were greatly augmented in queens from colonies with increased queen:worker ratios relative to colonies with a low queen:worker ratio. As assumed by models of reproductive skew, L. acervorum colonies thus appear to be capable of flexibly adjusting reproductive skew to social conditions, yet in the opposite way than predicted by most models.     

Patterns of reproductive skew in the polygynandrous acorn woodpecker

We compared observed levels of reproductive skew in the cooperatively breeding acorn woodpecker (Melanerpes formicivorus) with those predicted by two alternative transactional models. "Concession" models predict the degree to which parentage is shared assuming that a single dominant is in complete control of reproduction. Alternatively, "restraint" models predict reproductive sharing assuming that the dominant controls only whether subordinates remain in the group but does not control its share of reproduction. Reproductive skew is high among males: on average, the most successful male sires more than three times as many offspring as the next most successful male. Females share parentage equally and have lower constraints on dispersal and lower survival rates compared with males, which is consistent with predictions from the concessions model. Also as predicted by the concessions model, yearly variation in opportunities for dispersal before the breeding season correlates positively with skew. However, in contrast to concessions but consistent with the restraint model, skew decreases with relatedness. Thus, neither model consistently predicts patterns of reproductive skew in this species. We suggest that models of reproductive skew will need to include competitive interactions among potential breeders and mate choice before they will adequately predict patterns of reproductive partitioning in most vertebrate societies.     

Reproductive control via eviction (but not the threat of eviction) in banded mongooses

Considerable research has focused on understanding variation in reproductive skew in cooperative animal societies, but the pace of theoretical development has far outstripped empirical testing of the models. One major class of model suggests that dominant individuals can use the threat of eviction to deter subordinate reproduction (the ‘restraint’ model), but this idea remains untested. Here, we use long-term behavioural and genetic data to test the assumptions of the restraint model in banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), a species in which subordinates breed regularly and evictions are common. We found that dominant females suffer reproductive costs when subordinates breed, and respond to these costs by evicting breeding subordinates from the group en masse, in agreement with the assumptions of the model. We found no evidence, however, that subordinate females exercise reproductive restraint to avoid being evicted in the first place. This means that the pattern of reproduction is not the result of a reproductive ‘transaction’ to avert the threat of eviction. We present a simple game theoretical analysis that suggests that eviction threats may often be ineffective to induce pre-emptive restraint among multiple subordinates and predicts that threats of eviction (or departure) will be much more effective in dyadic relationships and linear hierarchies. Transactional models may be more applicable to these systems. Greater focus on testing the assumptions rather than predictions of skew models can lead to a better understanding of how animals control each other''s reproduction, and the extent to which behaviour is shaped by overt acts versus hidden threats.     

Reproductive skew in cooperative breeding: Environmental variability,antagonistic selection,choice, and control

A multitude of factors may determine reproductive skew among cooperative breeders. One explanation, derived from inclusive fitness theory, is that groups can partition reproduction such that subordinates do at least as well as noncooperative solitary individuals. The majority of recent data, however, fails to support this prediction; possibly because inclusive fitness models cannot easily incorporate multiple factors simultaneously to predict skew. Notable omissions are antagonistic selection (across generations, genes will be in both dominant and subordinate bodies), constraints on the number of sites suitable for successful reproduction, choice in which group an individual might join, and within‐group control or suppression of competition. All of these factors and more are explored through agent‐based evolutionary simulations. The results suggest the primary drivers for the initial evolution of cooperative breeding may be a combination of limited suitable sites, choice across those sites, and parental manipulation of offspring into helping roles. Antagonistic selection may be important when subordinates are more frequent than dominants. Kinship matters, but its main effect may be in offspring being available for manipulation while unrelated individuals are not. The greater flexibility of evolutionary simulations allows the incorporation of species‐specific life histories and ecological constraints to better predict sociobiology.     

Sex ratios and skew models: the special case of evolution of cooperation in polistine wasps

Cooperative breeding often involves reproductive dominance hierarchies. Such hierarchies have been proposed to form and to be maintained through an equitable skew in reproduction for both dominants and subordinates. The general form of skew models also predicts that cooperation can be stable only if cooperation greatly increases group reproductive success or subordinates are greatly constrained in their reproductive prospects relative to dominants. Neither, however, seems to be generally present in the colony initiation phase of temperate polistine wasps, although the behaviors of individuals within such groups are often consistent with skew model predictions. This apparent contradiction can be resolved in the context of a special case of the skew models that incorporate mother-offspring conflicts over sex ratios. Data suggest that all the needed preconditions are present for cooperating foundresses to gain an added benefit through producing male-biased investment ratios. Therefore, the special case model predicts that cooperation can evolve in Hymenoptera with both the observed high skews and reduced per capita group productivity. Further predictions of the special case model (e.g., mixed populations of single and multifoundresses) are also supported. Because the special case model is applicable only to haplodiploids, this may explain why cooperation in vertebrates rarely occurs without significant ecological or physiological constraints. Finally, comparisons to other social Hymenoptera taxa suggest that factors stabilizing cooperation between colony-initiating females may simultaneously constrain the evolution of morphologically specialized worker castes.     

Social queuing in animal societies: a dynamic model of reproductive skew

Previously developed models of reproductive skew have overlooked one of the main reasons why subordinates might remain in a group despite restricted opportunities to breed: the possibility of social queuing, i.e. acquiring dominant status in the future. Here, we present a dynamic ESS model of skew in animal societies that incorporates both immediate and future fitness consequences of the decisions taken by group members, based on their probability of surviving from one season to the next (when post-breeding survival probabilities drop to zero, our analysis reduces to the model produced by Reeve and Ratnieks in 1993, which considered only a single breeding season). This allows us to compare the delayed benefits of philopatry and the immediate opportunities for independent breeding. We show that delayed benefits greatly reduce the need for dominants to offer reproductive concessions to retain subordinates peacefully in the group. Moreover, this effect is strong enough that differences in survival have a much greater impact on the group structure than differences in other parameters, such as relatedness. When the possibility of acceding to dominant status is taken into account, groups where the dominant completely monopolizes reproduction can be stable, even if they consist of unrelated individuals, and even if subordinates have a reasonably high probability of winning a fight for dominance. Finally, we show that stable groups are possible even if association leads to a decrease in current productivity. Subordinates may still stand to gain from group membership under these circumstances, as acquiring breeding positions by queuing may be more efficient than the attempt to establish a new territory. At the same time, the dominant may be unable to exclude unwelcome subordinates, may enjoy increased survival when they are present, or may gain indirect benefits from allowing relatives to stay and queue for dominance. We conclude that reproductive skew in animal groups, ranging from eusocial insect colonies to mating aggregations (leks), will be strongly influenced by the future prospects of group members.