A perspective on Darwinian psychology: The importance of domain-general mechanisms,plasticity, and individual differences

In this paper a theory of Darwinian psychological adaptations as motive dispositions with an affective core is developed, and it is argued that 1) there is significant plasticity in these mechanisms; 2) in addition to domain-specific evolved motive dispositions, there are a variety of domain-general cognitive and emotional mechanisms; 3) humans are capable of developing motive dispositions which are not adaptations; 4) the relationship between evolved motive dispositions and behavior is very tenuous so that the explanatory power of Darwinian psychology is very weak; 5) individual differences in human psychological characteristics are evolutionarily meaningful and are linked to mechanisms which assess the resource value of intraspecific genetic and phenotypic diversity.     

GETTING MORAL ENHANCEMENT RIGHT: THE DESIRABILITY OF MORAL BIOENHANCEMENT

We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral bioenhancement should be sought and applied. We argue that cognitive enhancement and technological progress raise acute problems because it is easier to harm than to benefit. We address objections to this argument. We also respond to objections that moral bioenhancement: (1) interferes with freedom; (2) cannot be made to target immoral dispositions precisely; (3) is redundant, since cognitive enhancement by itself suffices.     

Meat made us moral: a hypothesis on the nature and evolution of moral judgment

In the first part of the article, an account of moral judgment in terms of emotional dispositions is given. This account provides an expressivist explanation of three important features of moral demands: inescapability, authority independence and meriting. In the second part of the article, some ideas initially put forward by Christopher Boehm are developed and modified in order to provide a hypothesis about the evolution of the ability to token moral judgments. This hypothesis makes evolutionary sense of inescapability, authority independence and meriting. It does so by referring to the selection pressures generated in the Late Pleistocene by large-game hunting. If the hypothesis is correct, we can say that, in a sense, meat made us moral.     

Perspective taking and decision-making in educational game play: A mixed-methods study

Video games have the potential to be contexts for moral learning. We investigated whether Quandary, a video game designed to promote ethical thinking and moral considerations for decision-making, would help promote positive skills such as perspective taking and empathy in adolescents. We examined the effect of playing Quandary on 131 middle school students on self-reported measures of moral thinking via mixed-method randomized control trials. In addition, we conducted qualitative analyses of one-on-one participant interviews and short-answer responses to capture experiences and reflections from playing Quandary, as well as the depth in which students across conditions responded to the interview questions. We found that short-term quantitative indicators did not show change across conditions; however, qualitative analyses revealed thematic responses that are consistent with the core components of the Quandary game, and that students in the Quandary condition showed a greater depth of response to interview questions. This work is a first step in exploring the potential for virtual game play on children’s social, emotional, and cognitive development.     

Neural Correlates of Post-Conventional Moral Reasoning: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study

Going back to Kohlberg, moral development research affirms that people progress through different stages of moral reasoning as cognitive abilities mature. Individuals at a lower level of moral reasoning judge moral issues mainly based on self-interest (personal interests schema) or based on adherence to laws and rules (maintaining norms schema), whereas individuals at the post-conventional level judge moral issues based on deeper principles and shared ideals. However, the extent to which moral development is reflected in structural brain architecture remains unknown. To investigate this question, we used voxel-based morphometry and examined the brain structure in a sample of 67 Master of Business Administration (MBA) students. Subjects completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT-2) which measures moral development in terms of cognitive schema preference. Results demonstrate that subjects at the post-conventional level of moral reasoning were characterized by increased gray matter volume in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex, compared with subjects at a lower level of moral reasoning. Our findings support an important role for both cognitive and emotional processes in moral reasoning and provide first evidence for individual differences in brain structure according to the stages of moral reasoning first proposed by Kohlberg decades ago.     

Beyond Contagion: Reality Mining Reveals Complex Patterns of Social Influence

Contagion, a concept from epidemiology, has long been used to characterize social influence on people’s behavior and affective (emotional) states. While it has revealed many useful insights, it is not clear whether the contagion metaphor is sufficient to fully characterize the complex dynamics of psychological states in a social context. Using wearable sensors that capture daily face-to-face interaction, combined with three daily experience sampling surveys, we collected the most comprehensive data set of personality and emotion dynamics of an entire community of work. From this high-resolution data about actual (rather than self-reported) face-to-face interaction, a complex picture emerges where contagion (that can be seen as adaptation of behavioral responses to the behavior of other people) cannot fully capture the dynamics of transitory states. We found that social influence has two opposing effects on states: adaptation effects that go beyond mere contagion, and complementarity effects whereby individuals’ behaviors tend to complement the behaviors of others. Surprisingly, these effects can exhibit completely different directions depending on the stable personality or emotional dispositions (stable traits) of target individuals. Our findings provide a foundation for richer models of social dynamics, and have implications on organizational engineering and workplace well-being.     

Why Do You Believe in God? Relationships between Religious Belief,Analytic Thinking,Mentalizing and Moral Concern

Prior work has established that analytic thinking is associated with disbelief in God, whereas religious and spiritual beliefs have been positively linked to social and emotional cognition. However, social and emotional cognition can be subdivided into a number of distinct dimensions, and some work suggests that analytic thinking is in tension with some aspects of social-emotional cognition. This leaves open two questions. First, is belief linked to social and emotional cognition in general, or a specific dimension in particular? Second, does the negative relationship between belief and analytic thinking still hold after relationships with social and emotional cognition are taken into account? We report eight hypothesis-driven studies which examine these questions. These studies are guided by a theoretical model which focuses on the distinct social and emotional processing deficits associated with autism spectrum disorders (mentalizing) and psychopathy (moral concern). To our knowledge no other study has investigated both of these dimensions of social and emotion cognition alongside analytic thinking. We find that religious belief is robustly positively associated with moral concern (4 measures), and that at least part of the negative association between belief and analytic thinking (2 measures) can be explained by a negative correlation between moral concern and analytic thinking. Using nine different measures of mentalizing, we found no evidence of a relationship between mentalizing and religious or spiritual belief. These findings challenge the theoretical view that religious and spiritual beliefs are linked to the perception of agency, and suggest that gender differences in religious belief can be explained by differences in moral concern. These findings are consistent with the opposing domains hypothesis, according to which brain areas associated with moral concern and analytic thinking are in tension.     

The Role of Cognitive and Affective Empathy in Spouses' Support Interactions: An Observational Study

The present study examined how support providers’ empathic dispositions (dispositional perspective taking, empathic concern, and personal distress) as well as their situational empathic reactions (interaction-based perspective taking, empathic concern, and personal distress) relate to the provision of spousal support during observed support interactions. Forty-five committed couples provided questionnaire data and participated in two ten-minute social support interactions designed to assess behaviors when partners are offering and soliciting social support. A video-review task was used to assess situational forms of perspective taking (e.g., empathic accuracy), empathic concern and personal distress. Data were analyzed by means of the multi-level Actor-Partner Interdependence Model. Results revealed that providers scoring higher on affective empathy (i.e., dispositional empathic concern), provided lower levels of negative support. In addition, for male partners, scoring higher on cognitive empathy (i.e., situational perspective taking) was related to lower levels of negative support provision. For both partners, higher scores on cognitive empathy (i.e., situational perspective taking) correlated with more instrumental support provision. Male providers scoring higher on affective empathy (i.e., situational personal distress) provided higher levels of instrumental support. Dispositional perspective taking was related to higher scores on emotional support provision for male providers. The current study furthers our insight into the empathy-support link, by revealing differential effects (a) for men and women, (b) of both cognitive and affective empathy, and (c) of dispositional as well as situational empathy, on different types of support provision.     

Equity or equality? Moral judgments follow the money

Previous research emphasizes people''s dispositions as a source of differences in moral views. We investigate another source of moral disagreement, self-interest. In three experiments, participants played a simple economic game in which one player divides money with a partner according to the principle of equality (same payoffs) or the principle of equity (payoffs proportional to effort expended). We find, first, that people''s moral judgment of an allocation rule depends on their role in the game. People not only prefer the rule that most benefits them but also judge it to be more fair and moral. Second, we find that participants'' views about equality and equity change in a matter of minutes as they learn where their interests lie. Finally, we find limits to self-interest: when the justification for equity is removed, participants no longer show strategic advocacy of the unequal division. We discuss implications for understanding moral debate and disagreement.     

Low Levels of Empathic Concern Predict Utilitarian Moral Judgment

Is it permissible to harm one to save many? Classic moral dilemmas are often defined by the conflict between a putatively rational response to maximize aggregate welfare (i.e., the utilitarian judgment) and an emotional aversion to harm (i.e., the non-utilitarian judgment). Here, we address two questions. First, what specific aspect of emotional responding is relevant for these judgments? Second, is this aspect of emotional responding selectively reduced in utilitarians or enhanced in non-utilitarians? The results reveal a key relationship between moral judgment and empathic concern in particular (i.e., feelings of warmth and compassion in response to someone in distress). Utilitarian participants showed significantly reduced empathic concern on an independent empathy measure. These findings therefore reveal diminished empathic concern in utilitarian moral judges.     

Neuroelectric Correlates of Pragmatic Emotional Incongruence Processing: Empathy Matters

The emotions people feel can be simulated internally based on emotional situational contexts. In the present study, we assessed the behavioral and neuroelectric effects of seeing an unexpected emotional facial expression. We investigated the correct answer rate, response times and Event-Related Potential (ERP) effects during an incongruence paradigm between emotional faces and sentential contexts allowing emotional inferences. Most of the 36 healthy participants were recruited from a larger population (1 463 subjects), based on their scores on the Empathy Questionnaire (EQ). Regression analyses were conducted on these ratings using EQ factors as predictors (cognitive empathy, emotional reactivity and social skills). Recognition of pragmatic emotional incongruence was less accurate (P < .05) and slower (P < .05) than recognition of congruence. The incongruence effect on response times was inversely predicted by social skills. A significant N400 incongruence effect was found at the centro-parietal (P < .001) and centro-posterior midline (P < .01) electrodes. Cognitive empathy predicted the incongruence effect in the left occipital region, in the N400 time window. Finally, incongruence effects were also found on the LPP wave, in frontal midline and dorso-frontal regions, (P < .05), with no modulation by empathy. Processing pragmatic emotional incongruence is more cognitively demanding than congruence (as reflected by both behavioral and ERP data). This processing shows modulation by personality factors at the behavioral (through self-reported social skills) and neuroelectric levels (through self-reported cognitive empathy).     

Autonomy reconfigured: incorporating the role of the unconscious

The principle of respect for autonomy has served as a pillar of American bioethics. Through its application in response to physician paternalism and as the basis for informed consent, it has attained preeminent status in the discipline. New challenges in health care warrant a re-examination of the origins of our autonomy. Developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and behavioral neurology all emphasize the intimate relationship between our cognitive and emotional development, and through this, our conscious and unconscious minds. Our intellectual, and particularly our moral development, are instilled in us by our moral mentors, and consequently by our community as a whole. Autonomy and community are therefore inextricably interlinked, and our emphasis on liberty, rights, and privacy without the inclusion of family, community, and social responsibility is biologically unsound. Appreciation of this reality should lead to a more balanced set of bioethical norms.     

On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and Persson

In a series of recent works, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson insist that, given the ease by which irreversible destruction is achievable by a morally wicked minority, (i) strictly cognitive bio‐enhancement is currently too risky, while (ii) moral bio‐enhancement is plausibly morally mandatory (and urgently so). This article aims to show that the proposal Savulescu and Persson advance relies on several problematic assumptions about the separability of cognitive and moral enhancement as distinct aims. Specifically, we propose that the underpinnings of Savulescu's and Persson's normative argument unravel once it is suitably clear how aiming to cognitively enhance an individual will in part require that one aim to bring about certain moral goods we show to be essential to cognitive flourishing; conversely, aiming to bring about moral enhancement in an individual must involve aiming to improve certain cognitive capacities we show to be essential to moral flourishing. After developing these points in some detail, and their implication for Savulescu's & Persson's proposal, we conclude by outlining some positive suggestions.     

Regional variation in pathogen prevalence predicts endorsement of group-focused moral concerns

According to Moral Foundations Theory, people endorse “individualizing” foundations (Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity) or “binding” foundations (Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, Purity/sanctity) to varying degrees. As societies with higher pathogen prevalence have been found to exhibit more pronounced antipathogen psychological tendencies and cultural practices (e.g., conformity, collectivism), we hypothesized that pathogen prevalence may predict endorsement of the binding moral foundations, which may also serve to minimize pathogen transmission. We examined associations between historical and contemporary pathogen prevalence and endorsement of the moral foundations via multilevel analyses. Country-level analyses showed that even when controlling for gross domestic product per capita, historical (but not contemporary) pathogen prevalence significantly predicted endorsement of the binding foundations, but not individualizing foundations. Multilevel analyses showed that this pattern held even when controlling for individual-level variation in political orientation, gender, education, and age. These results highlight the utility of a functional–evolutionary approach to understanding patterns of morals across societies and individuals.     

Wild justice and fair play: cooperation,forgiveness, and morality in animals

In this paper I argue that we can learn much about ‘wild justice’ and the evolutionary origins of social morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living animals, and that interdisciplinary cooperation will help immensely. In our efforts to learn more about the evolution of morality we need to broaden our comparative research to include animals other than non-human primates. If one is a good Darwinian, it is premature to claim that only humans can be empathic and moral beings. By asking the question ‘What is it like to be another animal?’ we can discover rules of engagement that guide animals in their social encounters. When I study dogs, for example, I try to be a ‘dogocentrist’ and practice ‘dogomorphism.’ My major arguments center on the following ‘big’ questions: Can animals be moral beings or do they merely act as if they are? What are the evolutionary roots of cooperation, fairness, trust, forgiveness, and morality? What do animals do when they engage in social play? How do animals negotiate agreements to cooperate, to forgive, to behave fairly, to develop trust? Can animals forgive? Why cooperate and play fairly? Why did play evolve as it has? Does ‘being fair’ mean being more fit – do individual variations in play influence an individual's reproductive fitness, are more virtuous individuals more fit than less virtuous individuals? What is the taxonomic distribution of cognitive skills and emotional capacities necessary for individuals to be able to behave fairly, to empathize, to behave morally? Can we use information about moral behavior in animals to help us understand ourselves? I conclude that there is strong selection for cooperative fair play in which individuals establish and maintain a social contract to play because there are mutual benefits when individuals adopt this strategy and group stability may be also be fostered. Numerous mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the initiation and maintenance of social play to keep others engaged, so that agreeing to play fairly and the resulting benefits of doing so can be readily achieved. I also claim that the ability to make accurate predictions about what an individual is likely to do in a given social situation is a useful litmus test for explaining what might be happening in an individual's brain during social encounters, and that intentional or representational explanations are often important for making these predictions.     

Opinion: the neural basis of human moral cognition

Moral cognitive neuroscience is an emerging field of research that focuses on the neural basis of uniquely human forms of social cognition and behaviour. Recent functional imaging and clinical evidence indicates that a remarkably consistent network of brain regions is involved in moral cognition. These findings are fostering new interpretations of social behavioural impairments in patients with brain dysfunction, and require new approaches to enable us to understand the complex links between individuals and society. Here, we propose a cognitive neuroscience view of how cultural and context-dependent knowledge, semantic social knowledge and motivational states can be integrated to explain complex aspects of human moral cognition.     

Smiles when sharing

One of the proposed functions of human smiling is to advertise cooperative dispositions and thereby increase the likelihood that a social partner would invest resources in a relationship. In particular, smiles involving an emotional component would be honest signals of altruistic dispositions because they are not easy to produce voluntarily. In this study, 60 people were covertly filmed while interacting with a friend in two conditions: control and sharing. Smiles were classified into Duchenne (spontaneous) and non-Duchenne smiles. Participants also completed a series of questionnaires, including the Altruism Scale and a self-report questionnaire of emotional state. Interestingly, Duchenne smiles were displayed at higher rates in the sharing situation as opposed to the control situation, whereas non-Duchenne smiles were unaffected by the type of interaction. Furthermore, Duchenne smiles in the sharing interaction were positively affected by a measure of altruism. Self-reported emotional states did not vary between conditions and were poorly related to smiling. This study shows that the Duchenne smile is relevant to situations that involve the sharing of material resources because it would reliably advertise altruistic intentions. The Duchenne smile could therefore be an important signal in the formation and maintenance of cooperative relationships.