Protecting elderly people: flaws in ageist arguments.

Some form of rationing is necessary in medicine, and to use age as a criterion for rationing seems initially appealing. Many of the criteria currently being used for deciding the distribution of funds depend on subjective judgments. Age, however, is objective and therefore negates the need for value judgments. Justice and fairness, it is sometimes suggested, require that finite resources should be directed at young people, who have not had a chance to live their lives, rather than at elderly people, who have already lived most of theirs. The adoption of ageist policies, however, may not result in the implied savings unless care is also withdrawn. Furthermore, ageist policies, which deny elderly people treatment on the sole grounds of their age, are both unfair and discriminatory and should therefore be resisted.     

Saving the young before the old -- a reply to John Harris

For a distribution of health care resources to be fair, it should consider the consequences for the whole lives of the affected persons and not just how badly off they are at the present moment. Since, other things being equal, a person is worse off if he dies young than if he dies old, it is fair to give scarce vital health care resources to young rather than to old persons. In the paper this ageist view is restated and defended against a number of objections raised by John Harris. According to Harris' so-called anti-ageist argument the only relevant consideration in the distribution of vital health care resources is people's desire to go on living. On reflection, this is highly counterintuitive. Instead, it is argued that both present desires to go on living and possible future happiness should weigh together with considerations of fairness. Both fairness and possible future happiness will in most cases speak in favour of saving the young before the old. A number of other problems for the ageist view are discussed, and solutions are suggested.     

Utilitarianism and the disabled: distribution of resources

Utilitarianism is more convincing than resource egalitarianism or welfare egalitarianism as a theory of how resources should be distributed between disabled people and nondisabled people. Unlike resource egalitarianism, utilitarianism can redistribute resources to the disabled when they would benefit more from those resources than nondisabled people. Unlike welfare egalitarianism, utilitarianism can halt redistribution when the disabled would no longer benefit more than the nondisabled from additional resources.
The author considers one objection to this view: it has been argued, by Sen and others, that there are circumstances under which utilitarianism would unfairly distribute fewer resources to the physically disabled than to nondisabled people, on the ground that the disabled would derive less benefit from those resources. In response, the author claims that critics of utilitarianism have fallaciously exaggerated the circumstances under which the disabled would benefit less than the nondisabled from additional resources. In those limited circumstances in which the disabled really would benefit less from resources, the author argues, it does not seem unfair to distribute fewer resources to them.     

DOES JUSTICE REQUIRE THAT WE BE AGEIST?

This paper restates some of the principal arguments against an automatic preference for the young as advocated by Kappel and Sandøe, arguments many of which have been extant for over a decade but which Kappel and Sandøe largely ignore. It then goes on to demonstrate that Kappel and Sandøe's "indifference test" fails to do the work required of it because it can be met by unacceptable conceptions of justice. The paper develops a number of new arguments against what I have called "ageist" preferences for the young or for those with long life expectancy. Finally I show that Kappel and Sandøe must believe that murdering older people is less morally wrong than murdering the young and that people relying on arguments such as theirs will have to accept the moral respectability of killing the innocent in order to maximise units of lifetime.     

The claim from adoption

In this article several justifications of what I call 'the claim from adoption' are examined. The claim from adoption is that, instead of expending resources on bringing new children into the world using reproductive technology and then caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children.
Arguments trading on the idea that resources should be directed to adoption instead of assisted reproduction because already existing people can benefit from such a use of resources whereas we cannot benefit individuals by bringing them into existence are rejected. It is then argued that a utilitarian argument proposed by Christian Munthe that supports the claim from adoption in some situations should be rejected because the support it offers does not extend to certain situations in which it seems morally obvious that resources should be expended on adoption rather than assisted reproduction. A version of the Priority View improves upon Munthe's utilitarianism by supporting the claim from adoption in the cases in which Munthe's argument failed. Some allegedly counterintuitive implications of the Priority View are then discussed, and it is concluded that the Priority View is more plausible than utilitarianism.
n a concluding section on policy issues it is argued that, even though the claim from adoption can be justified in a variety of situations, it does not follow that, in these situations, governments should direct resources away from assisted reproduction and towards adoption.     

Reassessing insurers' access to genetic information: genetic privacy, ignorance, and injustice

Many countries have imposed strict regulations on the genetic information to which insurers have access. Commentators have warned against the emerging body of legislation for different reasons. This paper demonstrates that, when confronted with the argument that genetic information should be available to insurers for health insurance underwriting purposes, one should avoid appeals to rights of genetic privacy and genetic ignorance. The principle of equality of opportunity may nevertheless warrant restrictions. A choice-based account of this principle implies that it is unfair to hold people responsible for the consequences of the genetic lottery, since we have no choice in selecting our genotype or the expression of it. However appealing, this view does not take us all the way to an adequate justification of inaccessibility of genetic information. A contractarian account, suggesting that health is a condition of opportunity and that healthcare is an essential good, seems more promising. I conclude that if or when predictive medical tests (such as genetic tests) are developed with significant actuarial value, individuals have less reason to accept as fair institutions that limit access to healthcare on the grounds of risk status. Given the assumption that a division of risk pools in accordance with a rough estimate of people's level of (genetic) risk will occur, fairness and justice favour universal health insurance based on solidarity.     

Matching and ideal free distributions

Ideal free distributions characterise how a group of animals should be distributed between sources of food. In a simple case, the ratio of the number of animals matches the ratio of input rates, a result known as input matching. The matching law characterises how an animal should allocate responses to sources of food. If matching holds then the ratio of behaviour allocated to the sources matches the ratio of rewards obtained. Several authors have drawn attention to the analogy between input matching and the matching law. I present a critical review of this topic, and go on to investigate the claim that the distribution of animals should be analyzed in the same way that the generalized matching law is analyzed. This involves assuming that the relationship between the ratio of animals and the ratio of resources obeys a power law with two parameters, one corresponding to bias and the other to sensitivity. On this view, a plot of the log of the ratio of animals against the log of the ratio of input rates will be a straight line and its intercept and slope will provide estimates of bias and sensitivity. I show that this approach can give a good fit even when the underlying model does not result in a power law. A consequence is that the parameters estimated cannot be interpreted as bias and sensitivity. I conclude that there are no compelling reasons for analyzing the distribution of animals using log-log plots, and the method has the disadvantage of encouraging the mistaken view that deviations from input matching follow a power law.     

HARD PATERNALISM,FAIRNESS AND CLINICAL RESEARCH: WHY NOT?

Jansen and Wall suggest a new way of defending hard paternalism in clinical research. They argue that non‐therapeutic research exposing people to more than minimal risk should be banned on egalitarian grounds: in preventing poor decision‐makers from making bad decisions, we will promote equality of welfare. We argue that their proposal is flawed for four reasons. First, the idea of poor decision‐makers is much more problematic than Jansen and Wall allow. Second, pace Jansen and Wall, it may be practicable for regulators to uncover the values that a potential research participant holds when agreeing to enter a research project, so their claim that we must ban such research projects for all if we are to ban them for poor decision‐makers looks to be unmotivated. Third, there seem to be cases where the liberty to enter the sort of research project Jansen and Wall discuss is morally weighty, and arguably should outweigh concerns of egalitarian distribution. Fourth, banning certain types of research, which seem on the face of it to offer an unfavourable risk‐benefit ratio, would have unwelcome consequences for all clinical research, which Jansen and Wall do not recognize.     

Ageism in cardiology

This article supports the argument that ageism exists in health care, particularly on the equity of access to cardiological services. Rates of use of potentially life saving and life promoting interventions and investigations decline as the patient gets older. Higher rates of cardiological interventions occur among younger people, despite the high incidence of the condition among older individuals. Any ageism in clinical medicine and policy is simply a reflection of the presence of ageist attitudes in wider society, where the youth receives a higher priority over age. Ageism in medicine needs to be addressed to preserve or recapture this trust within an aging population. A wide ranging approach is necessary if equity in the provision of health care services is to be ensured which includes improvement of clinical guidelines and more specific monitoring of health care. Educational efforts to raise awareness that age stereotyping and ageist attitudes are unethical should be initiated. Research initiatives, which cover large numbers of older people, should be developed and older people should be empowered to influence choices and standards of treatments. Finally, legislation may be required to eradicate ageism in society.     

"Not clinically indicated": patients' interests or resource allocation?

The decision that a particular intervention is not clinically indicated may conceal two quite different ethical assumptions. The first assumption is that the intervention is not of overall benefit to this patient. The second is that limited resources should not be used for this patient. These issues are discussed with reference to cardiac surgery in elderly patients with reference to the main theories of allocation: QALYs, needs theories, the sanctity of life theory, the lottery theory, and market forces.     

Putting Children Front and Center: Building Coordinated Social Policy for America's Children

In this article, we argue that policymakers in America should reference a coherent, comprehensive, and child-centered framework for children. That is, based on an extensive review of the empirical literature on the first two decades of life, we conclude that policies should address the needs of young people throughout the first two decades of life. In addition, public policies should address the multiple contexts within which young people develop, and the multiple domains that represent positive development, such as cognitive, psychological, physical, social, emotional, and civic domains. By referencing such a framework, we posit that public policies would be more effective and efficient. We conclude with multiple recommendations that would be first steps to putting this framework into practice.     

Anorexia nervosa and refusal of naso-gastric treatment: a response to Heather Draper

Imposing artificial feeding on people with anorexia nervosa may be unethical. This seems to be Heather Draper's suggestion in her article, 'Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging Therapy: A Limited Justification.' Although this is an important point, I shall show that the arguments supporting this point are flawed. Draper should have made a brave claim: she should have claimed that people with anorexia nervosa, who competently decide not to be artificially fed, should be respected because everybody is entitled to exercise their autonomy, not only 'in the middle' of their life, but also at the end of it, or when their own life is at stake, because autonomy also extends to the most difficult moments of our life, and, ultimately, 'stretches [.*T*.*T*.] far out into the distance' at the end of it. I explain why Draper should have made the brave claim, and why she has not made it. I conclude that a defence of people's entitlement to competently refuse artificial feeding cannot rest upon the arguments developed by Draper. Whether or not we should respect competent refusal of artificial feeding depends on the normative strength that we are ready to ascribe to the principle of autonomy, to the moral relevance that we ascribe to the circumstances in which a person's autonomy is exercised, and, perhaps, eventually, on our sense of compassion.     

Unformed minds: Juveniles,neuroscience, and the law

Recently, the question of adolescent culpability has been brought before the Supreme Court of the United States for reconsideration. Neuroscience, adolescent advocates claim, is teaching us that young people cannot be found fully responsible for their actions. The reason: their brains are not fully formed. Here I consider the history of the use of scientific evidence in the courtroom, a number of adolescent murder cases, and the data now emerging from neuroscience, and argue that when it comes to brains, judges, just like the rest of us, are unnecessarily impressed. Ultimately, how we determine culpability should rest on normative and ethical considerations rather than on scientific ones.     

Does dishonesty really invite third-party punishment? Results of a more stringent test

Many experiments have demonstrated that people are willing to incur cost to punish norm violators even when they are not directly harmed by the violation. Such altruistic third-party punishment is often considered an evolutionary underpinning of large-scale human cooperation. However, some scholars argue that previously demonstrated altruistic third-party punishment against fairness-norm violations may be an experimental artefact. For example, envy-driven retaliatory behaviour (i.e. spite) towards better-off unfair game players may be misidentified as altruistic punishment. Indeed, a recent experiment demonstrated that participants ceased to inflict third-party punishment against an unfair player once a series of key methodological problems were systematically controlled for. Noticing that a previous finding regarding apparently altruistic third-party punishment against honesty-norm violations may have been subject to methodological issues, we used a different and what we consider to be a more sound design to evaluate these findings. Third-party punishment against dishonest players withstood this more stringent test.     

To permute or not to permute

Permutation test is a popular technique for testing a hypothesis of no effect, when the distribution of the test statistic is unknown. To test the equality of two means, a permutation test might use a test statistic which is the difference of the two sample means in the univariate case. In the multivariate case, it might use a test statistic which is the maximum of the univariate test statistics. A permutation test then estimates the null distribution of the test statistic by permuting the observations between the two samples. We will show that, for such tests, if the two distributions are not identical (as for example when they have unequal variances, correlations or skewness), then a permutation test for equality of means based on difference of sample means can have an inflated Type I error rate even when the means are equal. Our results illustrate permutation testing should be confined to testing for non-identical distributions. CONTACT: calian@raunvis.hi.is.     

Consequentialism, reasons, value and justice

Over the past 10 years, John Harris has made important contributions to thinking about distributive justice in health care. In his latest work, Harris controversially argues that clinicians should stop prioritising patients according to prognosis. He argues that the good or benefit of health care is providing each individual with an opportunity to live the best and longest life possible for him or her. I call this thesis, opportunism. For the purpose of distribution of resources in health care, Harris rejects welfarism (the thesis that the good of health care is well-being) and argues that utilitarianism in general may lead to de facto discrimination against groups of people needing health care. I argue that well-being is a superior theory of the good of health care to Harris' opportunism. Harris' concerns about utilitarianism can be better addressed by: (i) relating justice more closely to reasons for action; (ii) by conceptualising the relationship between reasons for action and the value of the consequences of those actions as a plateau rather than scalar relationship. Justice can be understood as satisfying as many equally rational claims on resources as possible. The rationality of a person's claim on health resources turns on the strength of that person's reasons to promote certain health-related states of affairs. I argue that the strength of that reason does not track the expected value of that state of affairs in a fully scalar fashion. Rather a person can have most reason to promote some state of affairs, even though he or she could promote other more valuable states of affairs. Thus there can be equal reason for a distributor of public resources to save either of two people, even though one will have a better and more valuable life. This approach, while addressing many of Harris' concerns about utilitarianism, does not imply that doctors should give up prioritising patients according to prognosis altogether, but it does allow that patients with lower but reasonable prognosis should have a share of public resources.     

Stability and Change in In-Group Mate Preferences among Young People in Ethiopia Are Predicted by Food Security and Gender Attitudes,but Not by Expected Pathogen Exposures

There is broad anthropological interest in understanding how people define “insiders” and “outsiders” and how this shapes their attitudes and behaviors toward others. As such, a suite of hypotheses has been proposed to account for the varying degrees of in-group preference between individuals and societies. We test three hypotheses related to material insecurity, pathogen stress, and views of gender equality among cross-sectional (n = 1896) and longitudinal (n = 1002) samples of young people in Ethiopia (aged 13–17 years at baseline) to explore stability and change in their preferences for coethnic spouses. We show that food insecurity is associated with a greater likelihood of intolerant mate preferences. We also find that young people who hold more gender equitable attitudes tended to hold more tolerant mate preferences. Finally, we find no support for the hypothesis that expected pathogen exposure is associated with intolerant mate preferences. Our results most strongly support a material insecurity hypothesis of in-group bias, which assumes that uncertainty over meeting basic needs leads people to favor those in their in-group. As such, our findings join a small but growing group of studies that highlight the importance of material insecurity for understanding tolerance, xenophobia, in-group bias, and favoritism.     

Implications of sensory ecology for species coexistence: biased perception links predator diversity to prey size distribution

Inherent to sensory systems is a discrepancy between the perceived and the actual environment. We modelled prey perception in different species of echolocating bats and show that differences in sensory systems can be important for shaping the niches of animals and for structuring animal communities. We argue that sensory specialization can lower interspecific competition by making the same world appear different. We specifically raise the claim that it is important to consider the interaction of sensory bias and the distribution of (prey) resource size. Using a modeling approach we assessed the potential contribution of sensory bias for species coexistence for the example of bat echolocation. We show that even relatively small sensory differences among coexisting species can translate into significant differences in access to food resources, if prey size distribution is skewed towards small prey. Specifically, for the prey size distribution occurring most frequently in nature, differences in sensory access to resources seem large enough to relax competition and facilitate species coexistence. Interaction between sensory bias and prey size distribution in a way that enhances species coexistence may be a general phenomenon not limited to bat echolocation.     

Bias Assessment of General Chemistry Analytes using Commutable Samples

Harmonisation of reference intervals for routine general chemistry analytes has been a goal for many years. Analytical bias may prevent this harmonisation. To determine if analytical bias is present when comparing methods, the use of commutable samples, or samples that have the same properties as the clinical samples routinely analysed, should be used as reference samples to eliminate the possibility of matrix effect. The use of commutable samples has improved the identification of unacceptable analytical performance in the Netherlands and Spain. The International Federation of Clinical Chemistry and Laboratory Medicine (IFCC) has undertaken a pilot study using commutable samples in an attempt to determine not only country specific reference intervals but to make them comparable between countries. Australia and New Zealand, through the Australasian Association of Clinical Biochemists (AACB), have also undertaken an assessment of analytical bias using commutable samples and determined that of the 27 general chemistry analytes studied, 19 showed sufficiently small between method biases as to not prevent harmonisation of reference intervals. Application of evidence based approaches including the determination of analytical bias using commutable material is necessary when seeking to harmonise reference intervals.