Suffering makes you egoist: acute pain increases acceptance rates and reduces fairness during a bilateral ultimatum game

Social preferences like interpersonal altruism, fairness, reciprocity and inequity aversion are inherently linked to departures from pure self-interest. During economic interactions, for example, defectors may be punished even if this implies a cost for the punishers. This violation of canonical assumptions in economics indicates that socially oriented decisions may predominate over self-centred stances. Here we explore whether the personal experience of pain changes the balance between self-gain and socially based choices. We used laser stimulation to induce pain or a warm sensation in subjects playing a modified version of the Ultimatum Game (UG) both in the role of responder and proposer. After each shot, responders evaluated the fairness of the offer. Moreover, responders and proposers rated the intensity and unpleasantness of the sensation evoked by the laser stimulation. Results show that suffering proposers decrease fair offers and suffering responders increase their acceptance rate irrespective of economic offer. Crucially, the intensity of painful stimulation has a predictive role on Moderately Unfair offers' acceptance rates. Thus the personal experience of pain may favour the emergence of a self-centered perspective aimed at maximizing self-gain. The results suggest that bodily states play a fundamental role in higher-order interpersonal negotiations and interactions.     

The Relationship between Trait Emotional Intelligence and Interaction with Ostracized Others' Retaliation

Background

Regulation of emotions in others is distinct from other activities related to trait emotional intelligence in that only such behavior can directly change other people''s psychological states. Although emotional intelligence has generally been associated with prosociality, emotionally intelligent people may manipulate others'' behaviors to suit their own interests using high-level capabilities to read and manage the emotions of others. This study investigated how trait emotional intelligence was related to interacting with ostracized others who attempt retaliation.

Method

We experimentally manipulated whether two people were simultaneously ostracized or not by using an online ball-tossing game called Cyberball. Eighty university students participated in Cyberball for manipulating ostracism and a “recommendation game,” a variation of the ultimatum game for assessing how to interact with others who attempt retaliation, with four participants. After the recommendation game, participants rated their intention to retaliate during the game.

Results

People with higher interpersonal emotional intelligence were more likely to recommend that the ostracized other should inhibit retaliation and maximize additional rewards when they have a weaker intention to retaliate. However, they were more likely to recommend that the ostracized other should retaliate against the ostracizers when they have a stronger intention to retaliate.

Conclusion

This is the first laboratory study that empirically reveals that people with high interpersonal emotional intelligence influence others'' emotions based on their own goals contrary to the general view. Trait emotional intelligence itself is neither positive nor negative, but it can facilitate interpersonal behaviors for achieving goals. Our study offers valuable contributions for the refinement of the trait emotional intelligence concept in the respect of its social function.     

A selective emotional decision-making bias elicited by facial expressions

Emotional and social information can sway otherwise rational decisions. For example, when participants decide between two faces that are probabilistically rewarded, they make biased choices that favor smiling relative to angry faces. This bias may arise because facial expressions evoke positive and negative emotional responses, which in turn may motivate social approach and avoidance. We tested a wide range of pictures that evoke emotions or convey social information, including animals, words, foods, a variety of scenes, and faces differing in trustworthiness or attractiveness, but we found only facial expressions biased decisions. Our results extend brain imaging and pharmacological findings, which suggest that a brain mechanism supporting social interaction may be involved. Facial expressions appear to exert special influence over this social interaction mechanism, one capable of biasing otherwise rational choices. These results illustrate that only specific types of emotional experiences can best sway our choices.     

Human Wagering Behavior Depends on Opponents' Faces

Research in competitive games has exclusively focused on how opponent models are developed through previous outcomes and how peoples'' decisions relate to normative predictions. Little is known about how rapid impressions of opponents operate and influence behavior in competitive economic situations, although such subjective impressions have been shown to influence cooperative decision-making. This study investigates whether an opponent''s face influences players'' wagering decisions in a zero-sum game with hidden information. Participants made risky choices in a simplified poker task while being presented opponents whose faces differentially correlated with subjective impressions of trust. Surprisingly, we find that threatening face information has little influence on wagering behavior, but faces relaying positive emotional characteristics impact peoples'' decisions. Thus, people took significantly longer and made more mistakes against emotionally positive opponents. Differences in reaction times and percent correct were greatest around the optimal decision boundary, indicating that face information is predominantly used when making decisions during medium-value gambles. Mistakes against emotionally positive opponents resulted from increased folding rates, suggesting that participants may have believed that these opponents were betting with hands of greater value than other opponents. According to these results, the best “poker face” for bluffing may not be a neutral face, but rather a face that contains emotional correlates of trustworthiness. Moreover, it suggests that rapid impressions of an opponent play an important role in competitive games, especially when people have little or no experience with an opponent.     

The Effect of Positive and Negative Feedback on Risk-Taking across Different Contexts

Preferences for risky choices have often been shown to be unstable and context-dependent. Though people generally avoid gambles with mixed outcomes, a phenomenon often attributed to loss aversion, contextual factors can impact this dramatically. For example, people typically prefer risky options after a financial loss, while generally choosing safer options after a monetary gain. However, it is unclear what exactly contributes to these preference shifts as a function of prior outcomes, as these gain/loss outcomes are usually confounded with participant performance, and therefore it is unclear whether these effects are driven purely by the monetary gains or losses, or rather by success or failure at the actual task. Here, we experimentally separated the effects of monetary gains/losses from performance success/failure prior to a standard risky choice. Participants performed a task in which they experienced contextual effects: 1) monetary gain or loss based directly on performance, 2) monetary gain or loss that was randomly awarded and was, crucially, independent from performance, and 3) success or failure feedback based on performance, but without any monetary incentive. Immediately following these positive/negative contexts, participants were presented with a gain-loss gamble that they had to decide to either play or pass. We found that risk preferences for identical sets of gambles were biased by positive and negative contexts containing monetary gains and losses, but not by contexts containing performance feedback. This data suggests that the observed framing effects are driven by aversion for monetary losses and not simply by the positive or negative valence of the context, or by potential moods resulting from positive or negative contexts. These results highlight the specific context dependence of risk preferences.     

Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses

An altruistic individual has to gamble on cooperation to a stranger because it does not know whether the stranger is trustworthy before direct interaction. Nowak and Sigmund (Nature 393 (1998a) 573; J. Theor. Biol. 194 (1998b) 561) presented a new theoretical framework of indirect reciprocal altruism by image scoring game where all individuals are informed about a partner's behavior from its image score without direct interaction. Interestingly, in a simplified version of the image scoring game, the evolutionarily stability condition for altruism became a similar form of Hamilton's rule, i.e. inequality that the probability of getting correct information is more than the ratio of cost to benefit. Since the Hamilton's rule was derived by evolutionarily stable analysis, the evolutionary meaning of the probability of getting correct information has not been clearly examined in terms of kin and group selection. In this study, we applied covariance analysis to the two-score model for deriving the Hamilton's rule. We confirmed that the probability of getting correct information was proportional to the bias of altruistic interactions caused by using information about a partner's image score. The Hamilton's rule was dependent on the number of game bouts even though the information reduced the risk of cooperation to selfish one at the first encounter. In addition, we incorporated group structure to the two-score model to examine whether the probability of getting correct information affect selection for altruism by group selection. We calculated a Hamilton's rule of group selection by contextual analysis. Group selection is very effective when either the probability of getting correct information or that of future interaction, or both are low. The two Hamilton's rules derived by covariance and contextual analyses demonstrated the effects of information and group structure on the evolution of altruism. We inferred that information about a partner's behavior and group structure can produce flexible pathways for the evolution of altruism.     

Feedback Valence Affects Auditory Perceptual Learning Independently of Feedback Probability

Previous studies have suggested that negative feedback is more effective in driving learning than positive feedback. We investigated the effect on learning of providing varying amounts of negative and positive feedback while listeners attempted to discriminate between three identical tones; an impossible task that nevertheless produces robust learning. Four feedback conditions were compared during training: 90% positive feedback or 10% negative feedback informed the participants that they were doing equally well, while 10% positive or 90% negative feedback informed them they were doing equally badly. In all conditions the feedback was random in relation to the listeners’ responses (because the task was to discriminate three identical tones), yet both the valence (negative vs. positive) and the probability of feedback (10% vs. 90%) affected learning. Feedback that informed listeners they were doing badly resulted in better post-training performance than feedback that informed them they were doing well, independent of valence. In addition, positive feedback during training resulted in better post-training performance than negative feedback, but only positive feedback indicating listeners were doing badly on the task resulted in learning. As we have previously speculated, feedback that better reflected the difficulty of the task was more effective in driving learning than feedback that suggested performance was better than it should have been given perceived task difficulty. But contrary to expectations, positive feedback was more effective than negative feedback in driving learning. Feedback thus had two separable effects on learning: feedback valence affected motivation on a subjectively difficult task, and learning occurred only when feedback probability reflected the subjective difficulty. To optimize learning, training programs need to take into consideration both feedback valence and probability.     

Cooperation under indirect reciprocity and imitative trust

Indirect reciprocity, a key concept in behavioral experiments and evolutionary game theory, provides a mechanism that allows reciprocal altruism to emerge in a population of self-regarding individuals even when repeated interactions between pairs of actors are unlikely. Recent empirical evidence show that humans typically follow complex assessment strategies involving both reciprocity and social imitation when making cooperative decisions. However, currently, we have no systematic understanding of how imitation, a mechanism that may also generate negative effects via a process of cumulative advantage, affects cooperation when repeated interactions are unlikely or information about a recipient's reputation is unavailable. Here we extend existing evolutionary models, which use an image score for reputation to track how individuals cooperate by contributing resources, by introducing a new imitative-trust score, which tracks whether actors have been the recipients of cooperation in the past. We show that imitative trust can co-exist with indirect reciprocity mechanisms up to a threshold and then cooperation reverses -revealing the elusive nature of cooperation. Moreover, we find that when information about a recipient's reputation is limited, trusting the action of third parties towards her (i.e. imitating) does favor a higher collective cooperation compared to random-trusting and share-alike mechanisms. We believe these results shed new light on the factors favoring social imitation as an adaptive mechanism in populations of cooperating social actors.     

The neurobiology of social decision-making

Humans live in highly complex social environments and some of our most important decisions are made in the context of social interactions. Research that probes the neural basis of decision-making in the context of social interactions combines behavioral paradigms from game theory with a variety of methods from neuroscience. The neural correlates of decision making in reciprocal exchange and bargaining games have been probed with functional neuroimaging, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and pharmacological manipulations. These studies have begun to elucidate a set of brain regions and neurotransmitter systems involved in decision-making in social interactions.     

Projecting species’ vulnerability to climate change: Which uncertainty sources matter most and extrapolate best?

Species distribution models (SDMs) are commonly used to assess potential climate change impacts on biodiversity, but several critical methodological decisions are often made arbitrarily. We compare variability arising from these decisions to the uncertainty in future climate change itself. We also test whether certain choices offer improved skill for extrapolating to a changed climate and whether internal cross‐validation skill indicates extrapolative skill. We compared projected vulnerability for 29 wetland‐dependent bird species breeding in the climatically dynamic Prairie Pothole Region, USA. For each species we built 1,080 SDMs to represent a unique combination of: future climate, class of climate covariates, collinearity level, and thresholding procedure. We examined the variation in projected vulnerability attributed to each uncertainty source. To assess extrapolation skill under a changed climate, we compared model predictions with observations from historic drought years. Uncertainty in projected vulnerability was substantial, and the largest source was that of future climate change. Large uncertainty was also attributed to climate covariate class with hydrological covariates projecting half the range loss of bioclimatic covariates or other summaries of temperature and precipitation. We found that choices based on performance in cross‐validation improved skill in extrapolation. Qualitative rankings were also highly uncertain. Given uncertainty in projected vulnerability and resulting uncertainty in rankings used for conservation prioritization, a number of considerations appear critical for using bioclimatic SDMs to inform climate change mitigation strategies. Our results emphasize explicitly selecting climate summaries that most closely represent processes likely to underlie ecological response to climate change. For example, hydrological covariates projected substantially reduced vulnerability, highlighting the importance of considering whether water availability may be a more proximal driver than precipitation. However, because cross‐validation results were correlated with extrapolation results, the use of cross‐validation performance metrics to guide modeling choices where knowledge is limited was supported.     

Inferring on the Intentions of Others by Hierarchical Bayesian Learning

Inferring on others'' (potentially time-varying) intentions is a fundamental problem during many social transactions. To investigate the underlying mechanisms, we applied computational modeling to behavioral data from an economic game in which 16 pairs of volunteers (randomly assigned to “player” or “adviser” roles) interacted. The player performed a probabilistic reinforcement learning task, receiving information about a binary lottery from a visual pie chart. The adviser, who received more predictive information, issued an additional recommendation. Critically, the game was structured such that the adviser''s incentives to provide helpful or misleading information varied in time. Using a meta-Bayesian modeling framework, we found that the players'' behavior was best explained by the deployment of hierarchical learning: they inferred upon the volatility of the advisers'' intentions in order to optimize their predictions about the validity of their advice. Beyond learning, volatility estimates also affected the trial-by-trial variability of decisions: participants were more likely to rely on their estimates of advice accuracy for making choices when they believed that the adviser''s intentions were presently stable. Finally, our model of the players'' inference predicted the players'' interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) scores, explicit ratings of the advisers'' helpfulness and the advisers'' self-reports on their chosen strategy. Overall, our results suggest that humans (i) employ hierarchical generative models to infer on the changing intentions of others, (ii) use volatility estimates to inform decision-making in social interactions, and (iii) integrate estimates of advice accuracy with non-social sources of information. The Bayesian framework presented here can quantify individual differences in these mechanisms from simple behavioral readouts and may prove useful in future clinical studies of maladaptive social cognition.     

Effect of Social Influence on Effort-Allocation for Monetary Rewards

Though decades of research have shown that people are highly influenced by peers, few studies have directly assessed how the value of social conformity is weighed against other types of costs and benefits. Using an effort-based decision-making paradigm with a novel social influence manipulation, we measured how social influence affected individuals’ decisions to allocate effort for monetary rewards during trials with either high or low probability of receiving a reward. We found that information about the effort-allocation of peers modulated participant choices, specifically during conditions of low probability of obtaining a reward. This suggests that peer influence affects effort-based choices to obtain rewards especially under conditions of risk. This study provides evidence that people value social conformity in addition to other costs and benefits when allocating effort, and suggests that neuroeconomic studies that assess trade-offs between effort and reward should consider social environment as a factor that can influence decision-making.     

Reduced Personal Space in Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder

Maintaining an appropriate distance from others is important for establishing effective communication and good interpersonal relations. Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder associated with social difficulties, and it is thus worth examining whether individuals with ASD maintain typical or atypical degrees of social distance. Any atypicality of social distancing may impact daily social interactions. We measured the preferred distances when individuals with ASD and typically developing (TD) individuals approached other people (a male experimenter) and objects (a coat rack with clothes) or when other people approached them. Individuals with ASD showed reduced interpersonal distances compared to TD individuals. The same tendency was found when participants judged their preferred distance from objects. In addition, when being approached by other people, both individuals with ASD and TD individuals maintained larger interpersonal distances when there was eye contact, compared to no eye contact. These results suggest that individuals with ASD have a relatively small personal space, and that this atypicality exists not only for persons but also for objects.     

Wood warblers copy settlement decisions of poor quality conspecifics: support for the tradeoff between the benefit of social information use and competition avoidance

Social information use in songbird habitat selection commonly involves a conspecific attraction strategy. Individuals copy the breeding‐site choices of conspecifics, that is, bias their own settlement decisions towards sites (tracts of spatially limited habitat with similar structure) already occupied by others. In order to be adaptive, social information use has to be discriminative. Especially the decisions of good quality individuals, i.e. measuring high at observable fitness correlates, should be copied more frequently than those of poor quality individuals. It is unknown, however, whether songbirds discriminatively use conspecific presence by evaluating the quality of information providers in habitat selection. We experimentally tested whether wood warblers Phylloscopus sibilatrix selectively copied settlement decisions of conspecifics in relation to the quality of observed individuals. We also tested whether the use of social cues was influenced by the population density at a particular site in the preceding year. We found that wood warblers selectively used intraspecific social information, but in a pattern opposite to that expected based on existing hypotheses. Wood warblers copied breeding‐site choices of poor quality conspecifics and despite temporary attraction to sites where the presence of good quality individuals was simulated, they did not ultimately settle near these individuals. Population density in the preceding year did not influence settlement patterns. We argue that when making settlement decisions, wood warblers assessed the expected level of local intraspecific competition and selectively copied breeding‐site choices of conspecifics or refused to settle, depending on competitive abilities of observed individuals. This adds a novel aspect to the patterns and processes of social information use proposed thus far, and provides support for the predicted negative effect of intraspecific competition on benefit of information. Moreover, it seems that habitat selection in wood warblers is a complex decision‐making process, in which initial decisions are adjusted after acquiring more accurate information. Synthesis Social information use in songbird habitat selection commonly involves copying the breeding‐site choices of conspecifics (so‐called conspecific attraction). To be adaptive, this strategy has to be discriminative, but almost no empirical studies have tested this assertion. Our study shows that birds may selectively use social information by copying settlement decisions of poor quality conspecifics, but avoid settling near good quality individuals, likely because of their high competitive abilities. This decision‐making pattern supports the predicted, yet not experimentally tested, tradeoff between information value and cost of competition in social information use. Our study highlights also that the use of social cues in settlement decisions may be both positively and negatively biased.     

Capuchin monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis>) modify their own behaviors according to a conspecific’s emotional expressions

Understanding conspecifics’ emotional states is important for managing social interactions. We examined whether capuchin monkeys modify their own behaviors in response to a conspecific’s emotional expressions. Six monkeys saw a demonstrator monkey responding emotionally to an object in a container; the subject monkeys could not see the object. The subjects reached for the container more frequently when the demonstrator showed an emotionally positive expression than when she showed an emotionally neutral or negative expression. This is the first report that New World monkeys are sensitive to the emotional valence of conspecifics’ emotional expressions. The finding is consistent with the hypothesis that monkeys can recognize emotional meanings in others’ expressions, an ability previously attributed only to humans and great apes.     

The Valence of Self-Generated (Status Updates) and Other-Generated (Wall-Posts) Information Determines Impression Formation on Facebook

We examined whether self-generated (status updates) or other-generated (wall-posts) information on Facebook influenced the impression formed of the target individual. Along with examining reliance on particular types of information, we explored the valence (positive/ neutral/ negative) of the information, as reliance on self-generated or other-generated information may depend on whether self-presentation is perceived (i.e., presenting oneself positively / not negatively). Self-presentation may be perceived if the targets have positive/ neutral statuses, while negative statuses would indicate a lack of self-presentation. In line with previous research, participants should rely on other-generated information (wall-posts) to form an impression when participants are viewed to have self-presented (positive / neutral status updates), as this information could be viewed as unreliable. Forty participants rated nine Facebook profiles where statuses and wall-posts portrayed personality traits varying in valence. Each profile consisted of a neutral profile photo, three status updates (all positive, negative, or neutral) and three wall-posts (all positive, negative, or neutral). Materials were established in two pilots. Impression formation was measured as perceived social, task, and physical attractiveness of the target individual. Participants also ranked the profiles for likeability. Supporting our expectations, other-generated information (wall-posts) dominated impression formation for social attractiveness when self-generated information (status updates) was positive/ neutral. Task attractiveness was affected by information valence, regardless of source (self or other). Despite the inclusion of neutral photos, physical attractiveness was affected by self-generated information, with negative statuses lowering physical attractiveness. We suggest that these findings have implications for impression formation beyond the Facebook setting. The 557 traits analyzed in Pilot 1 are available as supporting information (S1 Dataset) and may be useful for other impression formation researchers.     

Social Interactions through the Eyes of Macaques and Humans

Group-living primates frequently interact with each other to maintain social bonds as well as to compete for valuable resources. Observing such social interactions between group members provides individuals with essential information (e.g. on the fighting ability or altruistic attitude of group companions) to guide their social tactics and choice of social partners. This process requires individuals to selectively attend to the most informative content within a social scene. It is unclear how non-human primates allocate attention to social interactions in different contexts, and whether they share similar patterns of social attention to humans. Here we compared the gaze behaviour of rhesus macaques and humans when free-viewing the same set of naturalistic images. The images contained positive or negative social interactions between two conspecifics of different phylogenetic distance from the observer; i.e. affiliation or aggression exchanged by two humans, rhesus macaques, Barbary macaques, baboons or lions. Monkeys directed a variable amount of gaze at the two conspecific individuals in the images according to their roles in the interaction (i.e. giver or receiver of affiliation/aggression). Their gaze distribution to non-conspecific individuals was systematically varied according to the viewed species and the nature of interactions, suggesting a contribution of both prior experience and innate bias in guiding social attention. Furthermore, the monkeys’ gaze behavior was qualitatively similar to that of humans, especially when viewing negative interactions. Detailed analysis revealed that both species directed more gaze at the face than the body region when inspecting individuals, and attended more to the body region in negative than in positive social interactions. Our study suggests that monkeys and humans share a similar pattern of role-sensitive, species- and context-dependent social attention, implying a homologous cognitive mechanism of social attention between rhesus macaques and humans.     

Hormonal underpinnings of status conflict: Testosterone and cortisol are related to decisions and satisfaction in the hawk-dove game

A contribution to a special issue on Hormones and Human Competition.Testosterone is theorized to influence status-seeking behaviors such as social dominance and competitive behavior, but supporting evidence is mixed. The present study tested the roles of testosterone and cortisol in the hawk-dove game, a dyadic economic decision-making paradigm in which earnings depend on one's own and the other player's choices. If one person selects the hawk strategy and the other person selects the dove strategy, the player who selected hawk attains a greater financial pay-off (status differentiation). The worst financial outcome occurs when both players choose the hawk strategy (status confrontation). Ninety-eight undergraduate students (42 men) provided saliva samples and played ten rounds of the hawk-dove game with another same-sex participant. In support of the hypothesis that testosterone is related to status concern, individuals higher in basal testosterone made more hawk decisions — decisions that harmed the other player. Acute decreases in cortisol were also associated with more hawk decisions. There was some empirical support for the dual-hormone hypothesis as well: basal testosterone was positively related to satisfaction in the game among low basal-cortisol individuals but not among high basal-cortisol individuals. There were no significant sex differences in these hormonal effects. The present findings align with theories of hormones and status-seeking behavior at the individual level, but they also open up new avenues for research on hormone profiles at the collective level. Our results suggest that the presence of two or more high-testosterone members increases the likelihood of status confrontations over a limited resource that can undermine collective outcomes.     

A functional MRI study on how oxytocin affects decision making in social dilemmas: Cooperate as long as it pays off,aggress only when you think you can win

We investigate if the neuropeptide oxytocin (OT), known to moderate social behaviour, influences strategic decision making in social dilemmas by facilitating the integration of incentives and social cues. Participants (N = 29) played two economic games with different incentive structures in the fMRI scanner after receiving OT or placebo (following a double blind, within-subject design). Pictures of angry or neutral faces (the social cues) were displayed alongside the game matrices. Consistent with a priori hypotheses based on the modulatory role of OT in mesolimbic dopaminergic brain regions, the results indicate that, compared to placebo, OT significantly increases the activation of the nucleus accumbens during an assurance (coordination) game that rewards mutual cooperation. This increases appetitive motivation so that cooperative behaviour is facilitated for risk averse individuals. OT also significantly attenuates the amygdala, thereby reducing the orienting response to social cues. The corresponding change in behaviour is only apparent in the chicken (or anti-coordination) game, where aggression is incentivized but fatal if the partner also aggresses. Because of this ambiguity, decision making can be improved by additional information, and OT steers decisions in the chicken game in accordance with the valence of the facial cue: aggress when face is neutral; retreat when it is angry. Through its combined influence on amygdala and nucleus accumbens, OT improves the selection of a cooperative or aggressive strategy in function of the best match between the incentives of the game and the social cues present in the decision environment.     

Are Risky Choices Actually Guided by a Compensatory Process? New Insights from fMRI

The dominant theories about risky decision-making assume that decision conflicts are solved by a compensatory process involving a trade-off of probability against payoff, but it is unclear whether these theories actually represent the events that occur when people make a risky decision. By contrasting a preferential choice with a judgment-based choice that required a compensatory process, we explored the mechanisms underlying risky decision-making. First, using parametric analyses, we identified the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) as the specific region in charge of task-related conflict in risky decision-making tasks. We also showed that the dMPFC was activated less when judgment-based choices were being made, implying that the conflict experienced during a judgment-based choice was not as strong as the conflict that was experienced during the preferential choice. Our results provide neural evidence that preferential choice cannot be characterized solely as a compensatory process. Thus, questions were raised about whether existing compensatory theories could adequately describe individual risky decisions.