Innovativeness, population size and cumulative cultural evolution

Henrich [Henrich, J., 2004. Demography and cultural evolution: how adaptive cultural processes can produce maladaptive losses—the Tasmanian case. Am. Antiquity 69, 197-214] proposed a model designed to show that larger population size facilitates cumulative cultural evolution toward higher skill levels. In this model, each newborn attempts to imitate the most highly skilled individual of the parental generation by directly-biased social learning, but the skill level he/she acquires deviates probabilistically from that of the exemplar (cultural parent). The probability that the skill level of the imitator exceeds that of the exemplar can be regarded as the innovation rate. After reformulating Henrich’s model rigorously, we introduce an overlapping-generations analog based on the Moran model and derive an approximate formula for the expected change per generation of the highest skill level in the population. For large population size, our overlapping-generations model predicts a much larger effect of population size than Henrich’s discrete-generations model. We then investigate by way of Monte Carlo simulations the case where each newborn chooses as his/her exemplar the most highly skilled individual from among a limited number of acquaintances. When the number of acquaintances is small relative to the population size, we find that a change in the innovation rate contributes more than a proportional change in population size to the cumulative cultural evolution of skill level.     

The agential perspective: Countermapping the modern synthesis

We compare and contrast two theoretical perspectives on adaptive evolution—the orthodox Modern Synthesis perspective, and the nascent Agential Perspective. To do so, we develop the idea from Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther of a ‘countermap’, as a means for comparing the respective ontologies of different scientific perspectives. We conclude that the modern Synthesis perspective achieves an impressively comprehensive view of a universal set of dynamical properties of populations, but at the considerable cost of radically distorting the nature of the biological processes that contribute to evolution. For its part, the Agential Perspective offers the prospect of representing the biological processes of evolution with much greater fidelity, but at the expense of generality. Trade-offs of this sort are endemic to science, and inevitable. Recognizing them helps us to avoid the pitfalls of ‘illicit reification’, i.e. the mistake of interpreting a feature of a scientific perspective as a feature of the non-perspectival world. We argue that much of the traditional Modern Synthesis representation of the biology of evolution commits this illicit reification.     

The value of teaching increases with tool complexity in cumulative cultural evolution

Human cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) is recognized as a powerful ecological and evolutionary force, but its origins are poorly understood. The long-standing view that CCE requires specialized social learning processes such as teaching has recently come under question, and cannot explain why such processes evolved in the first place. An alternative, but largely untested, hypothesis is that these processes gradually coevolved with an increasing reliance on complex tools. To address this, we used large-scale transmission chain experiments (624 participants), to examine the role of different learning processes in generating cumulative improvements in two tool types of differing complexity. Both tool types increased in efficacy across experimental generations, but teaching only provided an advantage for the more complex tools. Moreover, while the simple tools tended to converge on a common design, the more complex tools maintained a diversity of designs. These findings indicate that the emergence of cumulative culture is not strictly dependent on, but may generate selection for, teaching. As reliance on increasingly complex tools grew, so too would selection for teaching, facilitating the increasingly open-ended evolution of cultural artefacts.     

By genes alone: a model selectionist argument for genetical explanations of cooperation in non-human organisms

I distinguish two versions of kin selection theory—a purely genetic version (GKST) and a version that also appeals to cultural (i.e. non-genetically-derived) forms of cooperation (WKST)—and present an argument in favor of using the former when it comes to accounting for the evolution of cooperation in non-human organisms. Specifically, I first show that both GKST and WKST are equally mathematically coherent—they can both be derived from the Price equation—but not necessarily equally empirically plausible, as they are based on different assumptions about the inheritance system underlying the cooperative phenotype. Given this, I then, second, present a model selection theoretic argument in favor of GKST over WKST. This argument is based on the fact that, in non-human cases, the former theory is likely to be as empirically successful as WKST, while containing fewer degrees of freedom. I end by defending both the intrinsic importance of this argument and its relevance to the discussion surrounding the “gene’s eye view of evolution.”     

Reasons to be fussy about cultural evolution

This discussion paper responds to two recent articles in Biology and Philosophy that raise similar objections to cultural attraction theory, a research trend in cultural evolution putting special emphasis on the fact that human minds create and transform their culture. Both papers are sympathetic to this idea, yet both also regret a lack of consilience with Boyd, Richerson and Henrich’s models of cultural evolution. I explain why cultural attraction theorists propose a different view on three points of concern for our critics. I start by detailing the claim that cultural transmission relies not chiefly on imitation or teaching, but on cognitive mechanisms like argumentation, ostensive communication, or selective trust, whose evolved or habitual function may not be the faithful reproduction of ideas or behaviours. Second, I explain why the distinction between context biases and content biases might not always be the best way to capture the interactions between culture and cognition. Lastly, I show that cultural attraction models cannot be reduced to a model of guided variation, which posits a clear separation between individual and social learning processes. With cultural attraction, the same cognitive mechanisms underlie both innovation and the preservation of traditions.     

Increased understanding of metabolism of secondary plant products frequently generates sketchy and incorrect statements concerning their evolution and function

Secondary plant products perform important functions within the complex interactions between plants and their environment, e.g. as protective agents against pathogens and herbivores, or as attractants for potential pollinators. We are all aware that the enormous diversity of these natural products resulted from evolutionary processes driven by the selection of advantageous properties. However, when these nexuses are mentioned, very often we incline to formulate ‘Plants have acquired the ability to synthesize secondary plant products in order to …’ without realising that such a statement contradicts the Darwinian principles of evolution and corresponds to a Lamarckian view of teleological evolution. One of the major reasons for these automatic and unconscious misapprehensions is because of the ambiguous usage of the term ‘biological function’, which is very often thought to comprise an intention or a special purpose.     

Review. Studying cumulative cultural evolution in the laboratory

Cumulative cultural evolution is the term given to a particular kind of social learning, which allows for the accumulation of modifications over time, involving a ratchet-like effect where successful modifications are maintained until they can be improved upon. There has been great interest in the topic of cumulative cultural evolution from researchers from a wide variety of disciplines, but until recently there were no experimental studies of this phenomenon. Here, we describe our motivations for developing experimental methods for studying cumulative cultural evolution and review the results we have obtained using these techniques. The results that we describe have provided insights into understanding the outcomes of cultural processes at the population level. Our experiments show that cumulative cultural evolution can result in adaptive complexity in behaviour and can also produce convergence in behaviour. These findings lend support to ideas that some behaviours commonly attributed to natural selection and innate tendencies could in fact be shaped by cultural processes.     

Cultural evolution of cooperation: The interplay between forms of social learning and group selection

The role of cultural group selection in the evolution of human cooperation is hotly debated. It has been argued that group selection is more effective in cultural evolution than in genetic evolution, because some forms of cultural transmission (conformism and/or the tendency to follow a leader) reduce intra-group variation while creating stable cultural variation between groups. This view is supported by some models, while other models lead to contrasting and sometimes opposite conclusions. A consensus view has not yet been achieved, partly because the modelling studies differ in their assumptions on the dynamics of cultural transmission and the mode of group selection. To clarify matters, we created an individual-based model allowing for a systematic comparison of how different social learning rules governing cultural transmission affect the evolution of cooperation in a group-structured population. We consider two modes of group selection (selection by group replacement or by group contagion) and systematically vary the frequency and impact of group-level processes. From our simulations we conclude that the outcome of cultural evolution strongly reflects the interplay of social learning rules and the mode of group selection. For example, conformism hampers or even prevents the evolution of cooperation if group selection acts via contagion; it may facilitate the evolution of cooperation if group selection acts via replacement. In contrast, leader-imitation promotes the evolution of cooperation under a broader range of conditions.     

Meaning in Nature: Organic Manufacture?

The paper examines Marcello Barbieri’s (2007) Introduction to Biosemiotics. Highlighting debate within the biosemiotic community, it focuses on what the volume offers to those who explain human intellect in relation to what Turing called our ‘physical powers.’ In scrutinising the basis of world-modelling, parallels and contrasts are drawn with other work on embodied-embedded cognition. Models dominate biology. Is this a qualitative fact or does it point to biomechanisms? In evaluating the 18 contributions, it is suggested that the answers will shape the field. First, they will decide if biochemistry and explanatory reduction can be synergised by biosemantics. Second, they will show if our intellectual powers arise from biology. Does thinking use—not a language faculty—but what Marko? and colleagues call semiosis by the living? Resolution of such issues, it is suggested, can change how we view cognition. Above all, if the biomechanists win the day, cultural models can be regarded as extending natural meaning. On such a view, biomechanisms prompt us to act and perceive as we model our own natural models. This fits Craik’s vision: intellect gives us the alphanumerical ‘symbols’ that allow thoughts to have objective validity. For the biomechanist, this is explained—not by brains alone—but, rather, by acting under the constraints of historically extended sensoria.     

What’s the matter with technology? Long (and short) yams,materialisation and technology in Nyamikum village,Maprik district,Papua New Guinea

Things are not just consumable, they are made so. They acquire their ‘materiality’ not only through engagements with them as finished products, but also through processes that make them material, i.e. technical activities. This field of study in anthropology, rejected by dominant trends because of its deterministic connotations, is a useful way to explore processes of materialisation and to investigate the ‘inbuilt’ relationality of things and activities. This paper focuses on yam gardening in Nyamikum, an Abelam village of the East Sepik. Once harvested, long (and short) yams emerge not solely as phallic symbols, but also as artefacts, representations, living beings, ancestors, artworks, valuables and, mostly, food. Starting observations at the beginning of the operational sequences (‘chaînes opératoire’, Lemonnier 1992 ) within gardening techniques, a combination of gestures, body, materials, energy, tools, knowledge and behaviours takes us across domains of experience (embodiments, transformations, sociality, narratives) to illuminate how yams are made into ‘relational’ entities. They demonstrate that techniques create a web that materialises social and cultural values, condensing networks of relations into things. As the results of these (known or imagined) processes, things can demonstrate the material validities of representational—or ideological—components of technological phenomena and may be used to generate sociality.     

Grist and mills: on the cultural origins of cultural learning

Cumulative cultural evolution is what 'makes us odd'; our capacity to learn facts and techniques from others, and to refine them over generations, plays a major role in making human minds and lives radically different from those of other animals. In this article, I discuss cognitive processes that are known collectively as 'cultural learning' because they enable cumulative cultural evolution. These cognitive processes include reading, social learning, imitation, teaching, social motivation and theory of mind. Taking the first of these three types of cultural learning as examples, I ask whether and to what extent these cognitive processes have been adapted genetically or culturally to enable cumulative cultural evolution. I find that recent empirical work in comparative psychology, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience provides surprisingly little evidence of genetic adaptation, and ample evidence of cultural adaptation. This raises the possibility that it is not only 'grist' but also 'mills' that are culturally inherited; through social interaction in the course of development, we not only acquire facts about the world and how to deal with it (grist), we also build the cognitive processes that make 'fact inheritance' possible (mills).     

Towards an Evolutionary Biosemiotics: Semiotic Selection and Semiotic Co-option

In biosemiotics, living beings are not conceived of as the passive result of anonymous selection pressures acted upon through the course of evolution. Rather, organisms are considered active participants that influence, shape and re-shape other organisms, the surrounding environment, and eventually also their own constitutional and functional integrity. The traditional Darwinian division between natural and sexual selection seems insufficient to encompass the richness of these processes, particularly in light of recent knowledge on communicational processes in the realm of life. Here, we introduce the concepts of semiotic selection and semiotic co-option which in part represent a reinterpretation of classical biological terms and, at the same time, keep explanations sensitive to semiosic processes taking place in living nature. We introduce the term ‘semiotic selection’ to emphasize the fact that actions of different semiotic subjects (selectors) will produce qualitatively different selection pressures. Thereafter, ‘semiotic co-option’ explains how semiotic selection may shape appearance in animals through remodelling existing forms and relations. Considering the event of co-option followed by the process of semiotic selection enables us to describe the evolution of semantic organs.     

Global Mapping of Ecosystem Disservices: The Unspoken Reality that Nature Sometimes Kills us

Increasingly, we view nature through a utilitarian lens that leads us to attempt to measure and manage the services that species, habitats and ecosystems provide. Surprisingly, we have tended to consider only the positive values of ecosystems, their ecosystem services. In addition to providing our food and water, Nature also kills us, primarily through disease. If we are to effectively manage the terrestrial Earth, we need to also manage species, habitats and ecosystems so as to minimize such ‘ecosystem disservices’. I consider what we know about the spatial pattern of one disservice, pathogen prevalence and how changes in habitat influence it. I consider the effects of habitat changes on pathogen prevalence and, consequently, ecosystem disservices. In the end, we need to weigh both the costs and the benefits of particular ecosystems, habitats and species – to consider the bad with the good. Doing so requires that we learn much more about the biota than we currently know.     

Source-sink dynamics of virulence evolution

To understand the evolution of genetic diversity within species--bacterial and others--we must dissect the first steps of genetic adaptation to novel habitats, particularly habitats that are suboptimal for sustained growth where there is strong selection for adaptive changes. Here, we present the view that bacterial human pathogens represent an excellent model for understanding the molecular mechanisms of the adaptation of a species to alternative habitats. In particular, bacterial pathogens allow us to develop analytical methods to detect genetic adaptation using an evolutionary 'source-sink' model, with which the evolution of bacterial pathogens can be seen from the angle of continuous switching between permanent (source) and transient (sink) habitats. The source-sink model provides a conceptual framework for understanding the population dynamics and molecular mechanisms of virulence evolution.     

Five Misunderstandings About Cultural Evolution

Recent debates about memetics have revealed some widespread misunderstandings about Darwinian approaches to cultural evolution. Drawing from these debates, this paper disputes five common claims: (1) mental representations are rarely discrete, and therefore models that assume discrete, gene-like particles (i.e., replicators) are useless; (2) replicators are necessary for cumulative, adaptive evolution; (3) content-dependent psychological biases are the only important processes that affect the spread of cultural representations; (4) the “cultural fitness” of a mental representation can be inferred from its successful transmission; and (5) selective forces only matter if the sources of variation are random. We close by sketching the outlines of a unified evolutionary science of culture.

Cultural Evolution: A Review of Theory,Findings and Controversies

The last two decades have seen an explosion in research analysing cultural change as a Darwinian evolutionary process. Here I provide an overview of the theory of cultural evolution, including its intellectual history, major theoretical tenets and methods, key findings, and prominent criticisms and controversies. ‘Culture’ is defined as socially transmitted information. Cultural evolution is the theory that this socially transmitted information evolves in the manner laid out by Darwin in The Origin of Species, i.e. it comprises a system of variation, differential fitness and inheritance. Cultural evolution is not, however, neo-Darwinian, in that many of the details of genetic evolution may not apply, such as particulate inheritance and random mutation. Following a brief history of this idea, I review theoretical and empirical studies of cultural microevolution, which entails both selection-like processes wherein some cultural variants are more likely to be acquired and transmitted than others, plus transformative processes that alter cultural information during transmission. I also review how phylogenetic methods have been used to reconstruct cultural macroevolution, including the evolution of languages, technology and social organisation. Finally, I discuss recent controversies and debates, including the extent to which culture is proximate or ultimate, the relative role of selective and transformative processes in cultural evolution, the basis of cumulative cultural evolution, the evolution of large-scale human cooperation, and whether social learning is learned or innate. I conclude by highlighting the value of using evolutionary methods to study culture for both the social and biological sciences.     

Playing Darwin. Part A. Experimental Evolution in Drosophila

In 2009 we celebrate Charles Darwin’s second centenary, and 150 years since the publication of ‘The Origin of Species’. After so many years, what has changed in the way we understand Evolution? Obviously we have now a full understanding of the mechanisms underlying heritability. Many molecular tools are available, allowing among other things to reconstruct more accurately the evolutionary history of species and use a comparative approach to infer evolutionary processes. But we can also study evolution in action. Such studies—Experimental Evolution—help us to characterize in detail the evolutionary processes and patterns as a function of environmental challenges, the previous history and present state of populations, and the interactions between such factors. We have now a wide variety of organisms that have been studied with this approach, exploring a diversity of potentialities, in biological characteristics and genetic tools, and covering a variety of evolutionary questions. In this short article I will illustrate the potentialities of Experimental Evolution, focusing in three studies in Drosophila. These and other studies of Experimental Evolution illustrate that Evolution is often local, involving complex patterns and processes, which lead both to specific adaptations and to biological diversity, as Darwin already stated clearly in ‘The Origin of Species’.     

Replicate after reading: on the extraction and evocation of cultural information

Does cultural evolution happen by a process of copying or replication? And how exactly does cultural transmission compare with that paradigmatic case of replication, the copying of DNA in living cells? Theorists of cultural evolution are divided on these issues. The most important objection to the replication model has been leveled by Dan Sperber and his colleagues. Cultural transmission, they argue, is almost always reconstructive and transformative, while strict ‘replication’ can be seen as a rare limiting case at most. By means of some thought experiments and intuition pumps, I clear up some confusion about what qualifies as ‘replication’. I propose a distinction between evocation and extraction of cultural information, applying these concepts at different levels of resolution. I defend a purely abstract and information-theoretical definition of replication, while rejecting more material conceptions. In the end, even after taking Sperber’s valuable and important points on board, the notion of cultural replication remains a valid and useful one. This is fortunate, because we need it for certain explanatory projects (e.g., understanding cumulative cultural adaptations).