The friendship model of physician/patient relationship and patient autonomy

A model of the physician patient relationship based on friendship is evaluated in terms of how it serves the interests of patients. The author maintains that this model violates the autonomy of patients who do not want to be friends with their physicians and also diminishes the autonomy of those who seek friendship with their physicians because such a desire is based on "psychological oppression," that is, the "internalization of intimations of inferiority." Ilingworth concludes that an autonomy enhancing model would be one that is open-ended, that accommodates individual patient preferences, and that embraces patient participation.     

Sick autonomy

Complex social and economic forces have placed patient autonomy at the center of medical ethics, and thereby displaced an older ethic of physician beneficence. This development arose, and is sustained, by waning trust in the traditional doctor-patient relationship. As patients have increasingly become clients and consumers, a contract basis for medical care has put the ancient covenant of care in jeopardy. Here, a philosophical approach to harmonize the apparent conflicting claims of patient autonomy and physician beneficence is offered by demonstrating that autonomy need not be understood as protecting a threatened identity. If persons are regarded as atomistic, certain defensive notions of individualistic rights-based autonomy prevail; if a relational construction of personal identity is employed instead, then respect for autonomy becomes part of a wider morality of relationship and care. By reconfiguring trust within this latter understanding of personhood, bioethics better balances its concerns over choices and actions with those of relationship and responsibility. Neither atomistic autonomy nor the ethics of responsibility can claim hegemony, for they are mutually interdependent, and a complete account of medicine's moral axis requires that they be integrated. This reorientation is crucial for reasserting the ethos of clinical medicine, whose fundamental mandate remains the care of others.     

Autonomy in the Obstetrician/Gynecologist-Patient Relationship as a Predictor of Patient Satisfaction

A considerable amount of recent medical research focuses on factors involving patient satisfaction. This study attempts to examine the role of autonomy in the gynecologist-patient relationship as it relates to patient satisfaction. Fifty-five patients at a women’s clinic completed measures assessing autonomy preference (API) before the medical visit and patient-perceived autonomy support (HCCQ) and patient satisfaction (MISS) after the visit. Analyses revealed patients prefer a more equal level of decision making with their doctor (a medium level of autonomy) when asked general questions about medical decisions but preferred less autonomy when presented with actual scenarios. Results show a significant relationship between scenario-based autonomy preference level and visit satisfaction for both satisfaction measures. A significant relationship between perceived autonomy support and visit satisfaction was also found for both satisfaction measures. The findings of this study suggest autonomy is important to the gynecologist-patient relationship and worthy of future study.     

WHAT DOES RESPECT FOR THE PATIENT'S AUTONOMY REQUIRE?

Personal autonomy presupposes the notion of rationality. What is not so clear is whether, and how, a compromise of rationality to various degrees will diminish a person's autonomy. In bioethical literature, three major types of threat to the rationality of a patient's medical decision are identified: insufficient information, irrational beliefs/desires, and influence of different framing effects. To overcome the first problem, it is suggested that patients be provided with information about their diseases and treatment choices according to the objective standard. I shall explain how this should be finessed. Regarding the negative impact of irrational beliefs/desires, some philosophers have argued that holding irrational beliefs can still be an expression of autonomy. I reject this argument because the degree of autonomy of a decision depends on the degree of rationality of the beliefs or desires on which the decision is based. Hence, to promote patient autonomy, we need to eliminate irrational beliefs by the provision of evidence and good arguments. Finally, I argue that the way to smooth out the framing effects is to present the same information in different perspectives: it is too often assumed that medical information can always be given in a complete and unadorned manner. This article concludes with a cautionary note that the protection of patient autonomy requires much more time and effort than the current practice usually allows.     

Beneficial Coercion in Psychiatric Care: Insights from African Ethico‐Cultural System

There is a ‘catch 22’ situation about applying coercion in psychiatric care. Autonomous choices undeniably are rights of patients. However, emphasizing rights for a mentally‐ill patient could jeopardize the chances of the patient receiving care or endanger the public. Conversely, the beneficial effects of coercion are difficult to predict. Thus, applying coercion in psychiatric care requires delicate balancing of individual‐rights, individual well‐being and public safety, which has not been achieved by current frameworks. Two current frameworks may be distinguished: the civil liberty approach and the Stone model. Both frameworks are restrictive, and not respectful of human dignity. In a civil liberty approach, individuals who are severely mentally‐ill but not dangerous would be denied care because they do not meet the dangerousness threshold or because the use of coercion will not lead to rebirthing of autonomy. This is unsatisfactory. Albeit involuntary interventions such as talk therapies, peer‐support etc., may not always lead to rebirthing of autonomy or free patients from mental illness; they can however help to maintain the dignity of each mentally ill patient. In place of these frameworks, this study proposes a new ethical framework for applying coercion in psychiatric care that is respectful of human dignity. Specifically, it draws on insights from the African ethico‐cultural system by using the Yoruba concept Omo‐olu‐iwabi to develop this new framework. This way, the study shows that only a more respectful approach for applying coercion in psychiatric care can lead to the careful balancing of the competing interests of individual's rights, individual's well‐being and public safety.     

Prenatal testing: Does reproductive autonomy succeed in dispelling eugenic concerns?

Traditionally, two main rationales for the provision of prenatal testing and screening are identified: the expansion of women’s reproductive choices and the reduction of the burden of disease on society. With the number of prenatal tests available and the increasing potential for their widespread use, it is necessary to examine whether the reproductive autonomy model remains useful in upholding the autonomy of pregnant women or whether it allows public health considerations and even eugenic aims to be smuggled in under the smokescreen of autonomy. In this article I argue that if we are serious about upholding women’s autonomy in the context of prenatal testing, what is needed is a model based on a more robust conception of reproductive autonomy, such as the one defended by Josephine Johnston and Rachel Zacharias as ‘reproductive autonomy worth having’. While Johnston and Zacharias put forward a basic outline of this conception, I apply it to the specific case of prenatal testing and show how it responds to objections levelled against the reproductive autonomy model. I argue that adopting this kind of conception is necessary to avoid fundamental challenges to women’s autonomy when it comes to prenatal screening and testing.     

The friendship model: a reply to Illingworth

Patricia M.L. Illingworth, in an article in the January 1988 issue of Bioethics, maintained that a friendship model of the physician patient relationship violates the autonomy of patients who do not want to be friends with their physicians and diminishes the autonomy of patients who seek such friendship based on "psychological oppression" stemming from internalization of feelings of inferiority. James contends in this reply that much of Illingworth's critique of the model was beside the point. He argues that trust between doctor and patient is a moral good in the therapeutic relationship and that this trust has enough similarities to trust between friends to make a model which develops these similarities well worth exploring.     

Market Liberalism in Health Care: A Dysfunctional View of Respecting “Consumer” Autonomy

The unfortunately vast history of paternalism in both medicine and clinical research has resulted in perpetually increasing respect for patient autonomy and free choice in Western health care systems. Beginning with the negative right to informed consent, the principle of respect for autonomy has for many patients evolved into a positive right to request treatments and expect accommodation. This evolution of patient autonomy has mirrored a more general social attitude of market liberalism where increasing numbers of patients have come to embody the role of the “consumer.” This paper explores this transformation and critiques the current way in which respect for patient autonomy is put into practice. Ultimately, this paper concludes that the consumer view of patient autonomy is dysfunctional. Moreover, this paper argues that, based on the inherent goals of medicine, some form of paternalism is required in any meaningfully therapeutic relationship.     

African communal basis for autonomy and life choices

I argue that the metaphysical capacity of autonomy is not intrinsically valuable; it is valuable only when used in relation to a community's values and instrumentally for making the proper choices that will promote one's own and the community's well‐being. I use the example of the choice to take one's life by suicide to illuminate this view. I articulate a plausible African conception of personhood as a basis for the idea of relational autonomy. I argue that this conception is better understood as a social‐moral thesis, and not a metaphysical thesis. A metaphysical thesis gives an account of the abstract nature of an atomic individual, his agency, and rational choice. The social‐moral thesis indicates that personhood and autonomy are positive and relational to the life plans, well‐being, material conditions, and the best means for achieving them that are made available and possible by harmonious living in a community. This idea of autonomy is not just having the capacity of freewill; it also involves how such freewill is used, in terms of how an individual's choices are guided by internalized communal values.     

Instilling hope and respecting patient autonomy: reconciling apparently conflicting duties

In contemporary American medical practice, certain physicians are critical and wary of the current emphasis on patient autonomy in medicine, questioning whether it really serves the complex needs of severely ill patients. Physicians such as Eric Cassell and Thomas Duffy argue that the duty of beneficence should override the duty to respect autonomy when conflicts arise in clinical situations. After evaluating their claim that severe illness robs patients of their autonomy, I will argue that this perceived conflict between beneficence and autonomy is ill-conceived, resting on misperceptions about both the capacity for autonomy and the meaning of hope. Considering insights on hope from phenomenologist Gabriel Marcel and theologian William Lynch, as well as drawing upon a case study involving a bone marrow patient, I claim that respecting and nurturing patients' capacity for autonomy is a necessary condition for acting beneficently and fostering authentic hope.     

The concept of precedent autonomy

Does respect for autonomy imply respect for precedent autonomy? The principle of respect for autonomy requires us to respect a competent patient’s treatment preference, but not everyone agrees that it requires us to respect preferences formed earlier by a now‐incapacitated patient, such as those expressed in an advance directive. The concept of precedent autonomy, which concerns just such preferences, is problematic because it is not clear that we can still attribute to a now‐incapacitated patient a preference which that patient never disaffirmed but can no longer understand. If we cannot make that attribution, then perhaps we should not respect precedent autonomy – after all, how can you respect patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer want, even if they never disaffirmed those wants? I argue that whether an earlier preference can still be attributed to a now‐incapacitated patient depends on the reasons behind the preference, for a preference includes (and is not merely supported by) the reasons behind it. When the considerations that served as reasons no longer exist, neither does the preference which included those reasons. In particular, if the considerations that served as reasons for the patient exist only under conditions where the patient retains full mental capacity, then once that capacity is lost, so are those reasons and the preference based upon them. I use this analysis of precedent autonomy to ascertain the merits of various approaches to advance medical decisionmaking, including Nancy Rhoden’s approach, approaches based on a Parfitian personal identity analysis, approaches based on soft paternalism, and approaches based on the stability and longevity of preferences. Despite the apparent absurdity of respecting patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer prefer but have never disaffirmed, I conclude with some programmatic remarks on when and why respect for (precedent) autonomy nonetheless requires us to respect former preferences.     

What Makes a Good Home-Based Nocturnal Seizure Detector? A Value Sensitive Design

A device for the in-home detection of nocturnal seizures is currently being developed in the Netherlands, to improve care for patients with severe epilepsy. It is recognized that the design of medical technology is not value neutral: perspectives of users and developers are influential in design, and design choices influence these perspectives. However, during development processes, these influences are generally ignored and value-related choices remain implicit and poorly argued for. In the development process of the seizure detector we aimed to take values of all stakeholders into consideration. Therefore, we performed a parallel ethics study, using “value sensitive design.” Analysis of stakeholder communication (in meetings and e-mail messages) identified five important values, namely, health, trust, autonomy, accessibility, and reliability. Stakeholders were then asked to give feedback on the choice of these values and how they should be interpreted. In a next step, the values were related to design choices relevant for the device, and then the consequences (risks and benefits) of these choices were investigated. Currently the process of design and testing of the device is still ongoing. The device will be validated in a trial in which the identified consequences of design choices are measured as secondary endpoints. Value sensitive design methodology is feasible for the development of new medical technology and can help designers substantiate the choices in their design.     

Autonomy is a Right,Not a Feat: How Theoretical Misconceptions have Muddled the Debate on Dynamic Consent to Biobank Research

Should people be involved as active participants in longitudinal medical research, as opposed to remaining passive providers of data and material? We argue in this article that misconceptions of ‘autonomy’ as a kind of feat rather than a right are to blame for much of the confusion surrounding the debate of dynamic versus broad consent. Keeping in mind two foundational facts of human life, freedom and dignity, we elaborate three moral principles – those of autonomy, integrity and authority – to better see what is at stake. Respect for autonomy is to recognize the other's right to decide in matters that are important to them. Respect for integrity is to meet, in one's relationship with the other, their need to navigate the intersection between private and social life. Respect for authority is to empower the other – to help them to cultivate their responsibility as citizens. On our account, to force information onto someone who does not want it is not to respect that person's autonomy, but to violate integrity in the name of empowerment. Empowerment, not respect for autonomy, is the aim that sets patient‐centred initiatives employing a dynamic consent model apart from other consent models. Whether this is ultimately morally justified depends on whether empowerment ought to be a goal of medical research, which is questionable.     

Microbial selection strategies that enhance the likelihood of developing commercial biological control products

Research interest in utilizing microorganisms to create a microbial environment suppressive to plant pathogens has increased exponentially in recent years. Despite intense interest in developing biological control agents, relatively few antagonists have achieved ‘commercial product’ status. The fact that such a small proportion of active laboratory antagonists are developed into biological control products is partly due to several features common to microbial selection strategies that are widely utilized to obtain putative biological control agents: (a) relatively few candidate microorganisms are tested; (b) microbes are selected based on the results of an assay that does not replicate field conditions; and (c) the amenability of microbes to commercial development is excluded as a selection criterion. Selection strategies that enhance the likelihood of developing commercial biological control products are described. These include making appropriate choices regarding the pathosystem for biological control, the method of microbe isolation, and the method of isolate characterization and performance evaluation. A model system of developing a biological control product active against Gibberella pulicaris (Fries) Sacc. (anamorph: Fusarium sambucinum Fuckel), the primary causal agent of Fusarium dry rot of stored potatoes, is used to illustrate the proposed selection strategy concepts. The crucial importance and methodology is described, of selecting strains with enhanced potential for commercial development based on a strain exhibiting both favorable growth kinetics and bioefficacy when grown in commercially feasible liquid media. Received 06 February 1997/ Accepted in revised form 29 May 1997     

A care perspective on coercion and autonomy

In the Netherlands there is a growing debate over the possibility of introducting 'compassionate interference' as a form of good psychiatric care. Instead of respecting the autonomy of the patient by adopting an attitude of non-interference, professional carers should take a more active and commited role. There was a great deal of hostile reaction to this suggestion, the most commonly voiced criticism being that it smacked of 'modern paternalism'. Still, the current conception of care leaves us with a paradox. On the one hand patients are regarded as individuals who have a strong interest in ( and a right to) freedom and non-interference; on the other hand many of them have a desperate need for flourishing, viable relationships. In fact, part of their problem is that they cannot relate very well with other people. This creates a dichotomy, because respecting patients' autonomy often means that they cannot be given the help they so desperately need. In this respect current care practices do not answer the caring needs of these patients.The criticism on care practices is to be considerd as important. It invites us to reexamine and reevaluate the current conception of caring relationships and its main values. In line with this reexamination an alternative perspective on care is introduced in this paper, a perspective in which `compassionate interference' is not so much a threat to autonomy, but a means of attaining autonomy. For this we need a different definition of autonomy than that commonly used in current care practice.     

The Individualist Model of Autonomy and the Challenge of Disability

In recent decades, the intertwining ideas of self-determination and well-being have received tremendous support in bioethics. Discussions regarding self-determination, or autonomy, often focus on two dimensions—the capacity of the patient and the freedom from external coercion. The practice of obtaining informed consent, for example, has become a standard procedure in therapeutic and research medicine. On the surface, it appears that patients now have more opportunities to exercise their self-determination than ever. Nonetheless, discussions of patient autonomy in the bioethics literature, which focus on individual patients making particular decisions, neglect the social structure within which health-care decisions are made. Looking through the lens of disability and informed by the feminist conception of relational autonomy, this essay argues that the issue of autonomy is much more complex than the individualist model suggests. The social system and the ableist ideology impose various forms of pressure or oppressive power that can affect people’s ability to choose according to their value system. Even if such powers are not directly coercive, they influence potential parents’ decisions indirectly—they structure their alternatives in such a way that certain options are never considered as viable and other decisions must be made. This paper argues that, instead of only focusing on the individual act of decision-making, we need to pay attention to the social structure that frames people’s decision.     

Are open‐Label Placebos Ethical? Informed Consent and Ethical Equivocations

The doctor‐patient relationship is built on an implicit covenant of trust, yet it was not until the post‐World War Two era that respect for patient autonomy emerged as an article of mainstream medical ethics. Unlike their medical forebears, physicians today are expected to furnish patients with adequate information about diagnoses, prognoses and treatments. Against these dicta there has been ongoing debate over whether placebos pose a threat to patient autonomy. A key premise underlying medical ethics discussion is the notion that the placebo effect necessitates patient deception. Indeed, the American Medical Association guidelines imply that placebo treatment necessary entails a form of deception. As a consequence of this assumption, the fulcrum of debate on the use of placebo treatment has hinged on whether that deception is ever justified. Recently performed experiments with open‐label transparently prescribed placebos have begun to challenge the notion that deception is necessary in eliciting the placebo effect and such effects necessarily involve a binary distinction between autonomy and beneficence. In this article we focus on the content of disclosures in distinctive open‐label, transparently disclosed placebo studies and inquire whether they might be said to invoke deception in clinical contexts, and if so, whether the deception is unethical. We find that open placebos may be said to involve equivocation over how placebos work. However, drawing on surveys of patient attitudes we suggest that this equivocation appears to be acceptable to patients. We conclude that open placebos fulfil current American Medical Association guidelines for placebo use, and propose future research directions for harnessing the placebo effect ethically.     

Managing the Unmanageable: Elderly Russian Jewish Émigrés and the Biomedical Culture of Diabetes Care

In this article, we examine the apparent resistance of elderly Russian Jewish émigrés to the dominant U.S. biomedical model of diabetes treatment. Cultural competence on the part of medical professionals who make assumptions about Russian culture tends to be based on particularly American values of self-control and individual agency. The American consumer model of health care incorporating risk, individual responsibility, autonomy, and choice, when applied to elderly Russian Jewish émigrés, results in a reading of different values and choices as failed self-management or noncompliance. This article argues for a more reflexive understanding of U.S. biomedical culture as a replacement for the current "sound bite" model of cultural diversity.     

Managing the unmanageable: elderly Russian Jewish émigrés and the biomedical culture of diabetes care

In this article, we examine the apparent resistance of elderly Russian Jewish émigrés to the dominant U.S. biomedical model of diabetes treatment. Cultural competence on the part of medical professionals who make assumptions about Russian culture tends to be based on particularly American values of self-control and individual agency. The American consumer model of health care incorporating risk, individual responsibility, autonomy, and choice, when applied to elderly Russian Jewish émigrés, results in a reading of different values and choices as failed self-management or noncompliance. This article argues for a more reflexive understanding of U.S. biomedical culture as a replacement for the current "sound bite" model of cultural diversity.