Cognitive cooperation

Cooperation can evolve in the context of cognitive activities such as perception, attention, memory, and decision making, in addition to physical activities such as hunting, gathering, warfare, and childcare. The social insects are well known to cooperate on both physical and cognitive tasks, but the idea of cognitive cooperation in humans has not received widespread attention or systematic study. The traditional psychological literature often gives the impression that groups are dysfunctional cognitive units, while evolutionary psychologists have so far studied cognition primarily at the individual level. We present two experiments that demonstrate the superiority of thinking in groups, but only for tasks that are sufficiently challenging to exceed the capacity of individuals. One of the experiments is in a brain-storming format, where advantages of real groups over nominal groups have been notoriously difficult to demonstrate. Cognitive cooperation might often operate beneath conscious awareness and take place without the need for overt training, as evolutionary psychologists have stressed for individual-level cognitive adaptations. In general, cognitive cooperation should be a central subject in human evolutionary psychology, as it already is in the study of the social insects. David Sloan Wilson is an evolutionary biologist interested in a broad range of issues relevant to human behavior. He has published in psychology, anthropology, and philosophy journals in addition to his mainstream biological research. He is author of Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society (University of Chicago Press, 2002) and co-author with philosopher Elliott Sober of Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Harvard University Press, 1998). John J. Timmel received his Ph.D. from Binghamton University in 2001. Ralph R. Miller is Distinguished Professor of Psychology at Binghamton University. His research interests include information processing in animals, with an emphasis on elementary, evolutionarily derived, fundamentals of learning and memory that might be expected to generalize across species, including humans.     

Signaling without cooperation

Ethological theories usually attribute semantic content to animal signals. To account for this fact, many biologists and philosophers appeal to some version of teleosemantics. However, this picture has recently came under attack: while mainstream teleosemantics assumes that representational systems must cooperate, some biologists and philosophers argue that in certain cases signaling can evolve within systems lacking common interest. In this paper I defend the standard view from this objection.     

Evolution of cooperation: cooperation defeats defection in the cornfield model

"Cooperation" defines any behavior that enhances the fitness of a group (e.g. a community or species), but which, by its nature, can be exploited by selfish individuals, meaning, firstly, that selfish individuals derive an advantage from exploitation which is greater than the average advantage that accrues to unselfish individuals. Secondly, exploitation has no intrinsic fitness value except in the presence of the "cooperative behavior". The mathematics is described by the simple Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). It has previously been shown that koinophilia (the avoidance of sexual mates displaying unusual or atypical phenotypic features, such as mutations) stabilizes any inherited strategy in the simple or iterated PDG, meaning that it cannot be displaced by rare forms of alternative behavior which arise through mutation or occasional migration. In the present model equal numbers of cooperators and defectors (in the simple PDG) were randomly spread in a two-dimensional "cornfield" with uniformly distributed resources. Every individual was koinophilic, and interacted (sexually and in the PDG tournaments) only with individuals from within its immediate neighborhood. This model therefore tested whether cooperation can outcompete defection or selfishness in a straight, initially equally matched, evolutionary battle. The results show that in the absence of koinophilia cooperation was rapidly driven to extinction. With koinophilia there was a very rapid loss of cooperators in the first few generations, but thereafter cooperation slowly spread, ultimately eliminating defection completely. This result was critically dependent on sampling effects of neighborhoods. Small samples (resulting from low population densities or small neighborhood sizes) increase the probability that a chance neighborhood comes to consist predominantly of cooperators. A sexual preference for the most common phenotype in the neighborhood then makes that phenotype more common still. Once this occurs cooperation's spread becomes almost inevitable.     

Evolutionary explanations for cooperation

Natural selection favours genes that increase an organism's ability to survive and reproduce. This would appear to lead to a world dominated by selfish behaviour. However, cooperation can be found at all levels of biological organisation: genes cooperate in genomes, organelles cooperate to form eukaryotic cells, cells cooperate to make multicellular organisms, bacterial parasites cooperate to overcome host defences, animals breed cooperatively, and humans and insects cooperate to build societies. Over the last 40 years, biologists have developed a theoretical framework that can explain cooperation at all these levels. Here, we summarise this theory, illustrate how it may be applied to real organisms and discuss future directions.     

Spatial invasion of cooperation

The evolutionary puzzle of cooperation describes situations where cooperators provide a fitness benefit to other individuals at some cost to themselves. Under Darwinian selection, the evolution of cooperation is a conundrum, whereas non-cooperation (or defection) is not. In the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperators perform poorly and decrease in abundance. Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework to address the problem of cooperation using the prisoner's dilemma. One well-studied possibility to maintain cooperation is to consider structured populations, where each individual interacts only with a limited subset of the population. This enables cooperators to form clusters such that they are more likely to interact with other cooperators instead of being exploited by defectors. Here we present a detailed analysis of how a few cooperators invade and expand in a world of defectors. If the invasion succeeds, the expansion process takes place in two stages: first, cooperators and defectors quickly establish a local equilibrium and then they uniformly expand in space. The second stage provides good estimates for the global equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors. Under hospitable conditions, cooperators typically form a single, ever growing cluster interspersed with specks of defectors, whereas under more hostile conditions, cooperators form isolated, compact clusters that minimize exploitation by defectors. We provide the first quantitative assessment of the way cooperators arrange in space during invasion and find that the macroscopic properties and the emerging spatial patterns reveal information about the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.     

The evolution of cooperation

Darwin recognized that natural selection could not favor a trait in one species solely for the benefit of another species. The modern, selfish-gene view of the world suggests that cooperation between individuals, whether of the same species or different species, should be especially vulnerable to the evolution of noncooperators. Yet, cooperation is prevalent in nature both within and between species. What special circumstances or mechanisms thus favor cooperation? Currently, evolutionary biology offers a set of disparate explanations, and a general framework for this breadth of models has not emerged. Here, we offer a tripartite structure that links previously disconnected views of cooperation. We distinguish three general models by which cooperation can evolve and be maintained: (i) directed reciprocation--cooperation with individuals who give in return; (ii) shared genes--cooperation with relatives (e.g., kin selection); and (iii) byproduct benefits--cooperation as an incidental consequence of selfish action. Each general model is further subdivided. Several renowned examples of cooperation that have lacked explanation until recently--plant-rhizobium symbioses and bacteria-squid light organs--fit squarely within this framework. Natural systems of cooperation often involve more than one model, and a fruitful direction for future research is to understand how these models interact to maintain cooperation in the long term.     

Non-kin cooperation in bats

Many bats are extremely social. In some cases, individuals remain together for years or even decades and engage in mutually beneficial behaviours among non-related individuals. Here, we summarize ways in which unrelated bats cooperate while roosting, foraging, feeding or caring for offspring. For each situation, we ask if cooperation involves an investment, and if so, what mechanisms might ensure a return. While some cooperative outcomes are likely a by-product of selfish behaviour as they are in many other vertebrates, we explain how cooperative investments can occur in several situations and are particularly evident in food sharing among common vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus) and alloparental care by greater spear-nosed bats (Phyllostomus hastatus). Fieldwork and experiments on vampire bats indicate that sharing blood with non-kin expands the number of possible donors beyond kin and promotes reciprocal help by strengthening long-term social bonds. Similarly, more than 25 years of recapture data and field observations of greater spear-nosed bats reveal multiple cooperative investments occurring within stable groups of non-kin. These studies illustrate how bats can serve as models for understanding how cooperation is regulated in social vertebrates.