Kant's concept of natural purpose and the reflecting power of judgement

This paper examines how in the 'Critique of teleological judgment' Kant characterized the concept of natural purpose in relation to and in distinction from the concepts of nature and the concept of purpose he had developed in his other critical writings. Kant maintained that neither the principles of mechanical science nor the pure concepts of the understanding through which we determine experience in general provide adequate conceptualizations of the unique capacities of organisms. He also held that although the concept of natural purpose was derived through reflection upon an analogy to human purposive activity in artistic production and moral action, it articulates a unique notion of intrinsic purposiveness. Kant restricted his critical reflections on organisms to phenomena that can be given to us in experience, criticizing speculations on their first origins or final purpose. But I argue that he held that the concept of natural purpose is a product of the reflecting power of judgment, rather than an empirical concept, and represents only the relation of things to our power of judgment. Yet it is necessary for the identification of organisms as organized and self-organizing, and as subject to unique norms and causal relations between parts and whole.     

Naturalising purpose: from comparative anatomy to the 'adventure of reason'

Kant's analysis of the concept of natural purpose in the Critique of judgment captured several features of organisms that he argued warranted making them the objects of a special field of study, in need of a special regulative teleological principle. By showing that organisms have to be conceived as self-organizing wholes, epigenetically built according to the idea of a whole that we must presuppose, Kant accounted for three features of organisms conflated in the biological sciences of the period: adaptation, functionality and conservation of forms. Kant's unitary concept of natural purpose was subsequently split in two directions: first by Cuvier's comparative anatomy, that would draw on the idea of adaptative functions as a regulative principle for understanding in reconstituting and classifying organisms; and then by Goethe's and Geoffroy's morphology, a science of the general transformations of living forms. However, such general transformations in nature, objects of an alleged 'archaeology of nature', were thought impossible by Kant in section paragraph 80 of the Critique of judgment. Goethe made this 'adventure of reason' possible by changing the sense of 'explanation': scientific explanation was shifted from the investigation of the mechanical processes of generation of individual organisms to the unveiling of some ideal transformations of types instantiated by those organisms.     

Naturalising purpose: From comparative anatomy to the ‘adventure of reason’

Kant’s analysis of the concept of natural purpose in the Critique of judgment captured several features of organisms that he argued warranted making them the objects of a special field of study, in need of a special regulative teleological principle. By showing that organisms have to be conceived as self-organizing wholes, epigenetically built according to the idea of a whole that we must presuppose, Kant accounted for three features of organisms conflated in the biological sciences of the period: adaptation, functionality and conservation of forms. Kant’s unitary concept of natural purpose was subsequently split in two directions: first by Cuvier’s comparative anatomy, that would draw on the idea of adaptative functions as a regulative principle for understanding in reconstituting and classifying organisms; and then by Goethe’s and Geoffroy’s morphology, a science of the general transformations of living forms. However, such general transformations in nature, objects of an alleged ‘archaeology of nature’, were thought impossible by Kant in §80 of the Critique of judgment. Goethe made this ‘adventure of reason’ possible by changing the sense of ‘explanation’: scientific explanation was shifted from the investigation of the mechanical processes of generation of individual organisms to the unveiling of some ideal transformations of types instantiated by those organisms.     

Kant on biological teleology: Towards a two-level interpretation

According to Kant's Critique of the power of judgment, teleological considerations are unavoidable for conceptualizing organisms. Does this mean that teleology is more than merely heuristic? Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological science, teleology is taken as constitutive, though it is merely regulative on the philosophical meta level. This distinction also concerns the place of Aristotelian teleology in Kant: on the object level, the Aristotelian view is accepted, whereas on the meta level, an agnostic stance is taken concerning teleology.     

Instruments of Judgment: Inscribing Organic Processes in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany

The paper argues for the importance to Kant's critique of judgment of epistemological reflections upon the problematics of experimentation on organic processes. It examines the investigations of generation by Wolff and Blumenbach, demonstrating how their experimental practices mediated reflectively between organic phenomena and their conceptualisation, acting as instruments of their judgments of these processes. It then reads Kant's ‘Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft’ in light of these experimental investigations, arguing that Kant highlights how the problematic relation between organic phenomena and their conceptualisation manifested in such investigations is opened up as a space for reflection, thus making this act of judgment conscious. The relation between Kant's critiques of judgment in his first and third critiques are then discussed, and it is argued that the reflective character of judgment highlighted in the judgment of organic processes draws into focus the problematic aspects of all judgments of natural phenomena, by making conscious the synthetic process of judgment effected by unconscious acts of the imagination in the first critique. Finally, the paper examines Humboldt's galvanic experiments, showing how they were informed by Kant's critical philosophy, but also how they contributed to the blurring of the boundaries between the judgment of organic and inorganic processes. Thus it is claimed that the reflections upon judgment in the Kritik der Urteilskraft problematized rather than clarified Kant's treatment of judgment in the first critique.     

The Lenoir thesis revisited: Blumenbach and Kant

Timothy Lenoir launched the historical study of German life science at the end of the 18th century with the claim that J. F. Blumenbach’s approach was shaped by his reception of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant: a ‘teleomechanism’ that adopted a strictly ‘regulative’ approach to the character of organisms. It now appears that Lenoir was wrong about Blumenbach’s understanding of Kant, for Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb entailed an actual empirical claim. Moreover, he had worked out the decisive contours of his theory and he had exerted his maximal influence on the so-called ‘Göttingen School’ before 1795, when Lenoir posits the main influence of Kant’s thought took hold. This has crucial significance for the historical reconstruction of the German life sciences in the period. The Lenoir thesis can no longer serve as the point of departure for that reconstruction.     

Mechanical explanation of nature and its limits in Kant's Critique of judgment

In this paper I discuss two questions. What does Kant understand by mechanical explanation in the Critique of judgment? And why does he think that mechanical explanation is the only type of the explanation of nature available to us? According to the interpretation proposed, mechanical explanations in the Critique of judgment refer to a particular species of empirical causal laws. Mechanical laws aim to explain nature by reference to the causal interaction between the forces of the parts of matter and the way in which they form into complex material wholes. Just like any other empirical causal law, however, mechanical laws can never be known with full certainty. The conception according to which we can explain all of nature by means of mechanical laws, it turns out, is based on what Kant calls 'regulative' or 'reflective' considerations about nature. Nothing in Kant's Critique of judgment suggests that these considerations can ever be justified by reference to how the natural world really is. I suggest that what, upon first consideration, appears to be a thoroughly mechanistic conception of nature in Kant is much more limited than one might have expected.     

From Anomaly to Unification: Tracy Sonneborn and the Species Problem in Protozoa, 1954--1957

This article examines the critique of the biological species concept advanced by protozoan geneticist Tracy Sonneborn at the 1955 AAAS symposium on “the species problem,” published subsequently in 1957. Although Sonneborn was a strong proponent of a population genetical conception of species, he became critical of the biological species concept for its failure to incorporate asexual and obligatory inbreeding organisms. It is argued that Sonneborn's intimate knowledge of the ciliate protozoan Paramecium aurelia species complex brought him into conflict with a growing pressure in the biological sciences to emphasize universal principles of life. Faced with the need to defend the value of P. aurelia as an investigative tool, Sonneborn argued that the sharp break in nature between sexual and asexual organisms posited by proponents of the biological species concept was not an existential feature of the living world, but rather the misleading consequence of an operational definition of species based only upon sexual organisms. Drawing upon his knowledge of the immense variability of P. aurelia, he proposed instead a continuum of breeding systems from obligatory outbreeding to asexual organisms, and a more broadly unifying definition of species that incorporated asexual as well as sexual organisms. Paradoxically, the push for unification that then characterized the evolutionary synthesis served to debar critical consideration of Sonneborn's more unificatory alternative, and his underlying contention that biological anomaly could serve as an important source of conceptual unification. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Charles Darwin and the Origin of Life

When Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species 150 years ago he consciously avoided discussing the origin of life. However, analysis of some other texts written by Darwin, and of the correspondence he exchanged with friends and colleagues demonstrates that he took for granted the possibility of a natural emergence of the first life forms. As shown by notes from the pages he excised from his private notebooks, as early as 1837 Darwin was convinced that “the intimate relation of Life with laws of chemical combination, & the universality of latter render spontaneous generation not improbable”. Like many of his contemporaries, Darwin rejected the idea that putrefaction of preexisting organic compounds could lead to the appearance of organisms. Although he favored the possibility that life could appear by natural processes from simple inorganic compounds, his reluctance to discuss the issue resulted from his recognition that at the time it was possible to undertake the experimental study of the emergence of life.     

Darwin's principles of divergence and natural selection: Why Fodor was almost right

Darwin maintained that the principles of natural selection and divergence were the “keystones” of his theory. He introduced the principle of divergence to explain a fundamental feature of living nature: that organisms cluster into hierarchical groups, so as to be classifiable in the Linnaean taxonomic categories of variety, species, genus, and so on. Darwin’s formulation of the principle of divergence, however, induces many perplexities. In his Autobiography, he claimed that he had neglected the problem of divergence in his Essay of 1844 and only solved it in a flash during a carriage ride in the 1850s; yet he does seem to have stated the problem in the Essay and provided the solution. This initial conundrum sets three questions I wish to pursue in this essay: (1) What is the relationship of the principle of divergence to that of natural selection? Is it independent of selection, derivative of selection, or a type of selection, perhaps comparable to sexual selection? (2) What is the advantage of divergence that the principle implies—that is, why is increased divergence beneficial in the struggle for life? And (3) What led Darwin to believe he had discovered the principle only in the 1850s? The resolution of these questions has implications for Darwin’s other principle, natural selection, and permits us to readjust the common judgment made about Jerry Fodor’s screed against that latter principle.     

The interface of natural theology and science in the ethology of W. H. Thorpe

Conclusion It should be clear by now the extent to which many features of Thorpe's interpretation of animal behavior and of the animal mind rested, at bottom, not simply on conventional scientific proofs but on interpretive inferences, which in turn rested on a willingress to make extensions of human experience to animals. This, in turn, rested on his view of evolution and his view of reality. And these were governed by his natural theology, which was the fundamental stratum of his intellectual experience.Contrary to the scientific ethos, which restricts theory choice to scientific issues alone, Thorpe's career suggests that the actual reasons for theory choice among scientists often are not limited to science, but are multiple and may sometimes be difficult to discover. It is largely because Thorpe took a public part in the natural theology enterprise that we can know something about his religious beliefs and so can see their probable influence on his scientific decisions. Similar beliefs of other scientists are sometimes harder to get at. Most may be practically beyond discovery, for the ethos of science has discouraged public professions of personal belief in relation to scientific work.¹⁰¹ Yet does it seem plausible that, for example, the restriction of self-consciousness to humans by some scientists is a purely scientific decision?¹⁰² Surely not, any more than that the strong influence of natural theology on Thorpe's thought means that he was not a good scientist. His natural theology may have led him into incautious enthusiasms regarding the animal mind — such as the potential if unrealizable linguistic ability of chimpanzees — through a bias in favor of the continuity of emergents in a progressive evolutionary system, just as it led him to advocate animal consciousness long before the recent upsurge of interest, but the scientific integrity of his work overall is unimpeachable. And yet, that work is not comprehensible historically as science alone. Personal philosophy must not be discounted in writing the history of recent science. This somewhat obvious conclusion (obvious to historians of science) needs emphasis, for we are still prone to think that the sciences of our own time provide their own internal dynamic that is in itself sufficient to account for their content and development.     

The organizer concept and modern embryology: Anglo-American perspectives

This paper analyses the origins of the Spemann-Mangold organizer concept of 1924 in relation to his earlier background and concepts. It traces the consequences and fate of the organizer, and related concepts (embryonic induction, gradients, fields) through subsequent phases in the evolution of developmental biology up to the present, primarily from a UK perspective, but also in the USA. The origins of Wolpert's concept of positional information of around 1970 are analysed; this markedly different model of embryogenesis effectively took the place of the organizer, following on from a generally assumed out-datedness of the corpus of Spemann's data and concepts. Explanations in terms of historical forces are suggested; events are seen as a historical causal chain. A crucial factor appears to have been the long-term neglect of morphogenetic cell movement as an integral component of an adequate induction-based model. The paper discusses the general inter-relation of history and science, and particularly the implications for current scientific practice, including the potential for conceptual distortions due to historical factors. It is argued that historical considerations need to be included as part of the use and critical assessment of basic concepts in science.     

Holism and Kantian teleology in C.J. Van De Klaauw's structuralization of oecology

The Dutch biologist C J. van der Klaauw (1893–1972) structuralized the epistemology of oecology using concepts which exceeded the limits of a strictly teleological interpretation of nature. This article relates to his theory of holistic oecology which van der Klaauw formulated departing from a critical confrontation with Kant's teleological view on nature. He substituted this extra-scientifically heuristic maxim by the holistic notion of network-like associations between organisms within a community. The analogous similarities between the organization of individual organisms and communities drawn up by van der Klaauw, merely remained propaedeutics for a genuine holistic oecology, which would only employ epistemological principles specifically referring to the organization of supra-individual communities of organisms. This article discusses the process of structuralizing the theory of holistic oecology by van der Klaauw in his dialogue with Kantian philosophy.     

Dynamical similarity and the theory of biological transformations

The D'Arcy Thompson concept of biological transformations is developed in a form analogous to such physical concepts as the Law of Corresponding States in thermodynamics, and the Principles of Similitude found in engineering. We find that such concepts depend on a distinction between fundamental and derived quantities, in which the values assigned to the fundamental quantities set the natural scales for the derived ones. Among other things, we see that critical phenomena, such as phase transitions, arise as an immediate consequence of this distinction. In a biological context, we explore the implications of Thompson's hypothesis that closely related organisms are phenotypically similar, assuming that the organisms we see are the result of selection processes operating on phenotypes.     

Organisms as natural purposes: the contemporary evolutionary perspective

Kant's conception of organisms as natural purposes raises a challenge to the adequacy of mechanistic explanation in biology. Certain features of organisms appear to be inexplicable by appeal to mechanical law alone. Some biological phenomena, it seems, can only be accounted for teleologically. Contemporary evolutionary biology has by and large ignored this challenge. It is widely held that Darwin's theory of natural selection gives us an adequate, wholly mechanical account of the nature of organisms. In contemporary biology, the category of the organism plays virtually no explanatory role. Contemporary evolutionary biology is a science of sub-organismal entities-replicators. I argue that recent advances in developmental biology demonstrate the inadequacy of sub-organismal mechanism. The category of the organism, construed as a 'natural purpose' should play an ineliminable role in explaining ontogenetic development and adaptive evolution. According to Kant the natural purposiveness of organisms cannot be demonstrated to be an objective principle in nature, nor can purposiveness figure in genuine explain. I attempt to argue, by appeal to recent work on self-organization, that the purposiveness of organisms is a natural phenomenon, and, by appeal to the apparatus of invariance explanation, that biological purposiveness provides genuine, ineliminable biological explanations.     

Conceptual learning in capuchin monkeys

This paper reviews concept learning in Cebus monkeys, focussing on their ability to use the identity relation, oddity and natural concepts. Capuchins are similar to other primate genera in their use of these concepts. The extant data on learning in primates generally reflect historical concerns with general processes of learning. An alternative approach which considers the tasks the animal faces in its natural environment may be better suited to the discovery of species-unique characteristics of learning. This approach has not yet been applied to Cebus.