The Evolutionary Relevance of Abstraction and Representation

This paper investigates the roles that abstraction and representation have in activities associated with language. Activities such as associative learning and counting require both the abilities to abstract from and accurately represent the environment. These activities are successfully carried out among vocal learners aside from humans, thereby suggesting that nonhuman animals share something like our capacity for abstraction and representation. The identification of these capabilities in other species provides additional insights into the development of language.     

Core systems of geometry in animal minds

Research on humans from birth to maturity converges with research on diverse animals to reveal foundational cognitive systems in human and animal minds. The present article focuses on two such systems of geometry. One system represents places in the navigable environment by recording the distance and direction of the navigator from surrounding, extended surfaces. The other system represents objects by detecting the shapes of small-scale forms. These two systems show common signatures across animals, suggesting that they evolved in distant ancestral species. As children master symbolic systems such as maps and language, they come productively to combine representations from the two core systems of geometry in uniquely human ways; these combinations may give rise to abstract geometric intuitions. Studies of the ontogenetic and phylogenetic sources of abstract geometry therefore are illuminating of both human and animal cognition. Research on animals brings simpler model systems and richer empirical methods to bear on the analysis of abstract concepts in human minds. In return, research on humans, relating core cognitive capacities to symbolic abilities, sheds light on the content of representations in animal minds.     

Thinking Big or Small: Does Mental Abstraction Affect Social Network Organization?

Four studies examined how mental abstraction affects how people perceive their relationships with other people, specifically, how these relationships may be categorized in social groups. We expected that individuals induced to think abstractly would report fewer more global social groups, compared to those induced to think concretely, who would report more specific groups. However, induced abstract mindset did not affect how people structured their social groups (Study 2–4), despite evidence that the mindset manipulation changed the level of abstraction in their thoughts (Study 3) and evidence that it changed how people structured groups for a control condition (household objects, Study 4). Together, these studies suggest that while the way people organize their relationships into groups is malleable; cognitive abstraction does not seem to affect how people categorize their relationships into social groups.     

Neural signatures for sustaining object representations attributed to others in preverbal human infants

A major feat of social beings is to encode what their conspecifics see, know or believe. While various non-human animals show precursors of these abilities, humans perform uniquely sophisticated inferences about other people''s mental states. However, it is still unclear how these possibly human-specific capacities develop and whether preverbal infants, similarly to adults, form representations of other agents'' mental states, specifically metarepresentations. We explored the neurocognitive bases of eight-month-olds'' ability to encode the world from another person''s perspective, using gamma-band electroencephalographic activity over the temporal lobes, an established neural signature for sustained object representation after occlusion. We observed such gamma-band activity when an object was occluded from the infants'' perspective, as well as when it was occluded only from the other person (study 1), and also when subsequently the object disappeared, but the person falsely believed the object to be present (study 2). These findings suggest that the cognitive systems involved in representing the world from infants'' own perspective are also recruited for encoding others'' beliefs. Such results point to an early-developing, powerful apparatus suitable to deal with multiple concurrent representations, and suggest that infants can have a metarepresentational understanding of other minds even before the onset of language.     

Abstraction in mathematics

Some current interpretations of abstraction in mathematical settings are examined from different perspectives, including history and learning. It is argued that abstraction is a complex concept and that it cannot be reduced to generalization or decontextualization only. In particular, the links between abstraction processes and the emergence of new objects are shown. The role that representations have in abstraction is discussed, taking into account both the historical and the educational perspectives. As languages play a major role in mathematics, some ideas from functional linguistics are applied to explain to what extent mathematical notations are to be considered abstract. Finally, abstraction is examined from the perspective of mathematics education, to show that the teaching ideas resulting from one-dimensional interpretations of abstraction have proved utterly unsuccessful.     

Basic math in monkeys and college students

Adult humans possess a sophisticated repertoire of mathematical faculties. Many of these capacities are rooted in symbolic language and are therefore unlikely to be shared with nonhuman animals. However, a subset of these skills is shared with other animals, and this set is considered a cognitive vestige of our common evolutionary history. Current evidence indicates that humans and nonhuman animals share a core set of abilities for representing and comparing approximate numerosities nonverbally; however, it remains unclear whether nonhuman animals can perform approximate mental arithmetic. Here we show that monkeys can mentally add the numerical values of two sets of objects and choose a visual array that roughly corresponds to the arithmetic sum of these two sets. Furthermore, monkeys' performance during these calculations adheres to the same pattern as humans tested on the same nonverbal addition task. Our data demonstrate that nonverbal arithmetic is not unique to humans but is instead part of an evolutionarily primitive system for mathematical thinking shared by monkeys.     

Basic Math in Monkeys and College Students

Adult humans possess a sophisticated repertoire of mathematical faculties. Many of these capacities are rooted in symbolic language and are therefore unlikely to be shared with nonhuman animals. However, a subset of these skills is shared with other animals, and this set is considered a cognitive vestige of our common evolutionary history. Current evidence indicates that humans and nonhuman animals share a core set of abilities for representing and comparing approximate numerosities nonverbally; however, it remains unclear whether nonhuman animals can perform approximate mental arithmetic. Here we show that monkeys can mentally add the numerical values of two sets of objects and choose a visual array that roughly corresponds to the arithmetic sum of these two sets. Furthermore, monkeys' performance during these calculations adheres to the same pattern as humans tested on the same nonverbal addition task. Our data demonstrate that nonverbal arithmetic is not unique to humans but is instead part of an evolutionarily primitive system for mathematical thinking shared by monkeys.     

A neuroscientific grasp of concepts: from control to representation

Abstraction denotes the cognitive process by means of which general concepts are formed. The dominant view of abstraction considers it not only as a complex and sophisticated cognitive activity, but also as a distinctive hallmark of mankind. The distinctiveness of abstract thought has indeed been closely related to another feature peculiar to our species: language. Following this perspective, the possibility to entertain conceptual representations is thus precluded to animals devoid of full-blown language. I challenge this view and propose that the representational dynamic of the brain is conceivable as a type of self-organization, in which action plays a crucial part. My aim will be to investigate whether, and to what extent, conceptual knowledge can be attributed to non-linguistic animal species, with particular emphasis on nonhuman primates. I therefore introduce the notion of semantic content as a type of 'relational specification'. A review of recent neurophysiological data on the neural underpinnings of action end-states in the macaque monkey brain is presented. On the basis of this evidence, I propose that conceptual representations can be conceived as the expression of a coherent internal world model. This model decomposes the 'outer' space inhabited by things in a meaningful way only to the extent that it accords to biologically constrained, embodied invariance. Finally, I discuss how the 'comparative' neuroscientific approach to abstraction proposed here may shed some light on its nature and its evolutionary origin.     

Creating abstract topographic representations: Implications for coding,learning and reasoning

Topographic maps are a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the sensory and motor regions of the brain. There is less evidence for the existence of conventional topographic maps in associational areas of the brain such as the prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex. The existence of topographically arranged anatomical projections is far more widespread and occurs in associational regions of the brain as well as sensory and motor regions: this points to a more widespread existence of topographically organised maps within associational cortex than currently recognised. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that abstract topographic representations may also occur in these regions. For example, a topographic mnemonic map of visual space has been described in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and topographically arranged visuospatial attentional signals have been described in parietal association cortex. This article explores how abstract representations might be extracted from sensory topographic representations and subsequently code abstract information. Finally a simple model is presented that shows how abstract topographic representations could be integrated with other information within the brain to solve problems or form abstract associations. The model uses correlative firing to detect associations between different types of stimuli. It is flexible because it can produce correlations between information represented in a topographic or non-topographic coordinate system. It is proposed that a similar process could be used in high-level cognitive operations such as learning and reasoning.     

Neural correlates of categories and concepts

The ability to readily adapt to novel situations requires something beyond storing specific stimulus-response associations. Instead, many animals can detect basic characteristics of events and store them as generalized classes. Because these representations are abstracted beyond specific details of sensory inputs and motor outputs, they can be easily generalized and adapted to new circumstances. Explorations of neural mechanisms of sensory processing and motor output have progressed to the point where studies can begin to address the neural basis of abstract, categorical representations. Recent studies have revealed their neural correlates in various cortical areas of the non-human primate brain.     

Hippocampus: cognitive processes and neural representations that underlie declarative memory

The hippocampus serves a critical role in declarative memory--our capacity to recall everyday facts and events. Recent studies using functional brain imaging in humans and neuropsychological analyses of humans and animals with hippocampal damage have revealed some of the elemental cognitive processes mediated by the hippocampus. In addition, recent characterizations of neuronal firing patterns in behaving animals and humans have suggested how neural representations in the hippocampus underlie those elemental cognitive processes in the service of declarative memory.     

Effects of development and enculturation on number representation in the brain

A striking way in which humans differ from non-human primates is in their ability to represent numerical quantity using abstract symbols and to use these 'mental tools' to perform skills such as exact calculations. How do functional brain circuits for the symbolic representation of numerical magnitude emerge? Do neural representations of numerical magnitude change as a function of development and the learning of mental arithmetic? Current theories suggest that cultural number symbols acquire their meaning by being mapped onto non-symbolic representations of numerical magnitude. This Review provides an evaluation of this contention and proposes hypotheses to guide investigations into the neural mechanisms that constrain the acquisition of cultural representations of numerical magnitude.     

From theory to data: Representing neurons in the 1940s

Recent literature on the role of pictorial representation in the life sciences has focused on the relationship between detailed representations of empirical data and more abstract, formal representations of theory. The standard argument is that in both a historical and epistemic sense, this relationship is a directional one: beginning with raw, unmediated images and moving towards diagrams that are more interpreted and more theoretically rich. Using the neural network diagrams of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts as a case study, I argue that while in the empirical sciences, pictorial representation tends to move from data to theory, in areas of the life sciences that are predominantly theoretical, when abstraction occurs at the outset, the relationship between detail and abstraction in pictorial representations can be of a different character.     

The Time-Course of Visual Categorizations: You Spot the Animal Faster than the Bird

Background

Since the pioneering study by Rosch and colleagues in the 70s, it is commonly agreed that basic level perceptual categories (dog, chair…) are accessed faster than superordinate ones (animal, furniture…). Nevertheless, the speed at which objects presented in natural images can be processed in a rapid go/no-go visual superordinate categorization task has challenged this “basic level advantage”.

Principal Findings

Using the same task, we compared human processing speed when categorizing natural scenes as containing either an animal (superordinate level), or a specific animal (bird or dog, basic level). Human subjects require an additional 40–65 ms to decide whether an animal is a bird or a dog and most errors are induced by non-target animals. Indeed, processing time is tightly linked with the type of non-targets objects. Without any exemplar of the same superordinate category to ignore, the basic level category is accessed as fast as the superordinate category, whereas the presence of animal non-targets induces both an increase in reaction time and a decrease in accuracy.

Conclusions and Significance

These results support the parallel distributed processing theory (PDP) and might reconciliate controversial studies recently published. The visual system can quickly access a coarse/abstract visual representation that allows fast decision for superordinate categorization of objects but additional time-consuming visual analysis would be necessary for a decision at the basic level based on more detailed representations.     

Cognitive abilities - the result of selective pressures on food acquisition?

Locating and capturing food are suggested as significant selection pressures for the evolution of various cognitive abilities in mammals and birds. The hypothesis is proposed that aspects of food procuring behaviour should be strongly indicative of particular cognitive abilities.Experimental data concerning higher mental abilities in mammals and birds are reviewed. These data deal with self-recognition studies, rule-learning experiments, number concept, deceptive abilities, tool-use and observational learning.A Darwinian approach reveals: (1) the adaptiveness of particular abilities for particular niches, (2) that in complex foraging environments, increases in foraging efficiencies in animals should result from the evolution of particular cognitive abilities, (3) that phenomena such as convergent mental evolution should be expected to have taken place across taxonomic groups for species exploiting similar niches, (4) that divergence in mental ability should also have taken place where related species have exploited dissimilar niches.Experimental data of higher mental abilities in animals concur with a Darwinian explanation for the distribution of these cognitive abilities and no anomalies have been found.There are, as a consequence, significant implications for the welfare of animals subject to training when training methodology gives little or no consideration to the various mental abilities of species.     

Possible Levels of Animal Consciousness with Reference to Grey Parrots (Psittacus erithacus)

Researchers often study nonhuman abilities by assuming theirsubjects form representations about perceived stimuli and thenprocess such information; why then would consciousness be required,and, if required, at what level? Arguments about nonhuman consciousnessrange from claims of levels comparable to humans to refutationof any need to study such phenomena. We suggest that (a) speciesexhibit different levels attuned to their ecological niches,and (b) animals, within their maximum possible level, exhibitdifferent extents of awareness appropriate to particular situations,much like humans (presumably conscious) who often act withoutconscious awareness of factors controlling their behavior. Wepropose that, to engage in complex information processing, animalslikely exhibit perceptual consciousness sensu Natsoulas (1978),i.e., are aware of what is being processed. We discuss theseissues and provide examples suggesting perceptual consciousness.     

Approaches to the study of higher cognitive functions related to creativity in nonhuman animals

Fundamental to creativity is prior knowledge and learning capability. One can be creative only to the extent that one's prior knowledge and learning abilities enable. Many of the mental functions of humans that are affected by neuropathology involve levels of learning ability that supercede those used by most animal researchers. Yet there is literature showing that there are similarities in structure and function in the cerebrum within class Mammalia and that nonhuman animals are capable of higher levels of learning than those typically studied by neuroscientists. Reviews of abstracts from the 2005 meeting of the Society for Neuroscience reveal that most neurobehavioral research with animals has involved relatively low levels of learning ability. Thomas's [R.K. Thomas, Brain, Behav. Evol. 17 (1980) 452-474.] hierarchy of learning abilities has been revised here to better include Learning Set Formation which is fundamental to most forms of higher learning. This paper summarizes both the rationale and the methodologies that might be used to assess the roles of neuroanatomical structures involved in the psychological processes that serve as the bases of creativity.     

A comparative study of the performance of individuals with fragile X syndrome and Fmr1 knockout mice on Hebb-Williams mazes

Fragile X syndrome (FXS) is the most prevalent form of heritable mental retardation. It arises from a mutation in the FMR1 gene on the X chromosome that interferes with expression of fragile X mental retardation protein (FMRP) and leads to a wide range of behavioural and cognitive deficits. Previous studies have shown a deficit in basic visual perceptual processing as well as spatial abilities in FXS. How such a deficit may impact spatial navigation remains unknown. The current study extended previous research by evaluating spatial learning and memory using both virtual and physical versions of Hebb-Williams mazes, which allows for testing of humans and animals under comparable conditions. We compared the performance of individuals affected by FXS to typically developing individuals of equivalent mental age as well as the performance of Fmr1 knockout mice to wild-type control mice on the same maze problems. In human participants, performance of the comparison group improved across trials, showing expected significant decreases in both errors and latency. In contrast, the performance of the fragile X group remained at similar levels across trials. Although wild-type control mice made significantly fewer errors than the Fmr1 knockout mice, latencies were not statistically different between the groups. These findings suggest that affected humans and mice show similar spatial learning deficits attributable to the lack of FMRP. The implications of these data are discussed including the notion that Hebb-Williams mazes may represent a useful tool to examine the impact of pharmacological interventions on mitigating or reversing the symptoms associated with FXS.     

Abstract and associatively based representations in human sequence learning

We give an analysis of performance in an artificial neural network for which the claim had been made that it could learn abstract representations. Our argument is that this network is associative in nature, and cannot develop abstract representations. The network thus converges to a solution that is solely based on the statistical regularities of the training set. Inspired by human experiments that have shown that humans can engage in both associative (statistical) and abstract learning, we present a new, hybrid computational model that combines associative and more abstract, cognitive processes. To cross-validate the model we attempted to predict human behaviour in further experiments. One of these experiments reveals some evidence for the use of abstract representations, whereas the others provide evidence for associatively based performance. The predictions of the hybrid model stand in line with our empirical data.     

From humble neural beginnings comes knowledge of numbers

Following a recent report that monkey prefrontal cortex contains cells that represent number concepts, Nieder and Miller investigated the scale used to code numbers. In this issue of Neuron, they report that prefrontal cells use the same scale (Weber's Law) used by sensory neurons to code stimulus intensity, suggesting how abstract cognitive operations may arise from simpler building blocks that humans share with other animals.