Autopoiesis, Life, Mind and Cognition: Bases for a Proper Naturalistic Continuity

The strong version of the life-mind continuity thesis claims that mind can be understood as an enriched version of the same functional and organizational properties of life. Contrary to this view, in this paper I argue that mental phenomena offer distinctive properties, such as intentionality or representational content, that have no counterpart in the phenomenon of life, and that must be explained by appealing to a different level of functional and organizational principles. As a strategy, and following Maturana’s autopoietic theory of cognition, I introduce a conceptual distinction between mind and cognition. I argue that cognition corresponds to the natural behaviour that every living being exhibits in the realization of its existence, and that, viewed in that way, cognition is a dynamic process of structural coupling that, unlike mental phenomena, involves no representational contents. On the basis of this distinction, I try to show that while life suffices for cognition, it does not suffice for mind. That is, that the strong continuity is not between life and mind but between life and cognition.     

Holobionts and the ecology of organisms: Multi-species communities or integrated individuals?

It is now widely accepted that microorganisms play many important roles in the lives of plants and animals. Every macroorganism has been shaped in some way by microorganisms. The recognition of the ubiquity and importance of microorganisms has led some to argue for a revolution in how we understand biological individuality and the primary units of natural selection. The term “holobiont” was introduced as a name for the biological unit made up by a host and all of its associated microorganisms, and much of this new debate about biological individuality has focused on whether holobionts are integrated individuals or communities. In this paper, I show how parts of the holobiont can span both characterizations. I argue that most holobionts share more affinities with communities than they do with organisms, and that, except for maybe in rare cases, holobionts do not meet the criteria for being organisms, evolutionary individuals, or units of selection.     

Science, sentience, and animal welfare

I sketch briefly some of the more influential theories concerned with the moral status of nonhuman animals, highlighting their biological/physiological aspects. I then survey the most prominent empirical research on the physiological and cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals, focusing primarily on sentience, but looking also at a few other morally relevant capacities such as self-awareness, memory, and mindreading. Lastly, I discuss two examples of current animal welfare policy, namely, animals used in industrialized food production and in scientific research. I argue that even the most progressive current welfare policies lag behind, are ignorant of, or arbitrarily disregard the science on sentience and cognition.     

Animals,disease, and man: making connections

The intricate causal relationships between disease in man and disease in animals first began to be elucidated in the mid-19th century. Although the connections between animal and human disease are now generally understood, individuals as well as societies remain slow to act on this knowledge. This paper examines the gradual recognition of these disease connections and explores the parallel theme of man's reluctance to appreciate the implications of these connections. It identifies factors that have inhibited the realization of the links between disease in man and animals, and discusses several milestones in the scientific elucidation of these links. Beginning with emerging concerns over the relationship between bovine and human tuberculosis in the 1860s, it follows the discovery of insect vectors, animal reservoirs, and the links between animals, influenza, and man. Despite warnings of the potential significance for human disease of patterns of changes in the relationship with animals and the natural world, scientists have continued to treat human and animal health as largely independent disciplines, while historians too have neglected this important aspect of human disease.     

Biosymbols: Symbols in Life and Mind

The strong continuity thesis postulates that the properties of mind are an enriched version of the properties of life, and thus that life and mind differ in degree and not kind. A philosophical problem for this view is the ostensive discontinuity between humans and other animals in virtue of our use of symbols—particularly the presumption that the symbolic nature of human cognition bears no relation to the basic properties of life. In this paper, we make the case that a genuine account of strong continuity requires the identification of some sort of correlate of symbol-use in basic life properties. Our strategy is three-fold: 1) we argue that examples of proto-symbolism in simple living systems would be consistent with an evolutionary trajectory that ultimately produced symbolic cognition in humans; 2) we introduce Gordon Tomkins’ biological notion of ‘symbol’ as something that represents to the organism a feature of its environment that is significant to its survival; and 3) we employ this biological understanding of symbol-use to suggest that the symbolic nature of human cognition can be understood as an enriched version of the basic symbolic properties of life, thus preserving life-mind continuity in this context.     

The many faces of biological individuality

Biological individuality is a major topic of discussion in biology and philosophy of biology. Recently, several objections have been raised against traditional accounts of biological individuality, including the objections of monism (the tendency to focus on a single individuality criterion and/or a single biological field), theory-centrism (the tendency to discuss only theory-based individuation), ahistoricity (the tendency to neglect what biologists of the past and historians of biology have said about biological individuality), disciplinary isolationism (the tendency to isolate biological individuality from other scientific and philosophical domains that have investigated individuality), and the multiplication of conceptual uncertainties (the lack of a precise definition of “biological individual” and related terms). In this introduction, I will examine the current philosophical landscape about biological individuality, and show how the contributions gathered in this special issue address these five objections. Overall, the aim of this issue is to offer a more diverse, unifying, and scientifically informed conception of what a biological individual is.     

‘The importance of symbiosis in philosophy of biology: an analysis of the current debate on biological individuality and its historical roots’

Symbiosis plays a fundamental role in contemporary biology, as well as in recent thinking in philosophy of biology. The discovery of the importance and universality of symbiotic associations has brought new light to old debates in the field, including issues about the concept of biological individuality. An important aspect of these debates has been the formulation of the hologenome concept of evolution, the notion that holobionts are units of natural selection in evolution. This review examines the philosophical assumptions that underlie recent proposal of the hologenome concept of evolution, and traces those debates back in time to their historical origins, to the moment when the connection between the topics of symbiosis and biological individuality first caught the attention of biologists. The review is divided in two parts. The first part explores the historical origins of the connection between the notion of symbiosis and the concept of biological individuality, and emphasizes the role of A. de Bary, R. Pound, A. Schneider and C. Merezhkowsky in framing the debate. The second part examines the hologenome concept of evolution and explores four parallelisms between contemporary debates and the debates presented in the first part of the essay, arguing that the different debates raised by the hologenome concept were already present in the literature. I suggest that the novelty of the hologenome concept of evolution lies in the wider appreciation of the importance of symbiosis for maintaining life on Earth as we know it. Finally, I conclude by suggesting the importance of exploring the connections among contemporary biology, philosophy of biology and history of biology in order to gain a better understanding of contemporary biology.     

The individuality thesis (3 ways)

I spell out and update the individuality thesis, that species are individuals, and not classes, sets, or kinds. I offer three complementary presentations of this thesis. First, as a way of resolving an inconsistent triad about natural kinds; second, as a phylogenetic systematics theoretical perspective; and, finally, as a novel recursive account of an evolved character (individuality). These approaches do different sorts of work, serving different interests. Presenting them together produces a taxonomy of the debates over the thesis, and isolates ways it has been (and may continue to be) productive. This goes to the larger point of this paper: a defense of the individuality thesis in terms of its utility, and an update of it in light of recent theoretical developments and empirical work in biology.     

Organisms or biological individuals? Combining physiological and evolutionary individuality

The definition of biological individuality is one of the most discussed topics in philosophy of biology, but current debate has focused almost exclusively on evolution-based accounts. Moreover, several participants in this debate consider the notions of a biological individual and an organism as equivalent. In this paper, I show that the debates would be considerably enriched and clarified if philosophers took into account two elements. First, physiological fields are crucial for the understanding of biological individuality. Second, the category of biological individuals should be divided into two subcategories: physiological individuals and evolutionary individuals, which suggests that the notions of organism and biological individual should not be used interchangeably. I suggest that the combination of an evolutionary and a physiological perspective will enable biologists and philosophers to supply an account of biological individuality that will be both more comprehensive and more in accordance with scientific practices.     

Genes,genomes and identity. Projections on matter

This paper aims to show that references to genes and genomes are counterproductive in legal and political understandings of what it is to be human and a unique individual. To support this claim, I will give a brief overview of the many incompatible meanings the term ‘identity’ has gathered in reference to genes or genome in the contexts of biology and family ancestry, personal identity, species identity. One finds various and incompatible understandings of these expressions. While genetics is usually considered to deliver definitive knowledge about history and the future, genomics seems to work with more complicated relations between DNA, inheritance and phenotype. In genomics, ‘identity’ is no longer about identification and status markers but about individualization. Regulatory and legal documents project from traits to genomes, implying that the individuality is at least represented, if not created, in a unique genome. Boundaries between humans and other animals, between different ‘kinds’ of humans, and between all individual humans are re‐established via reference to the chemical matter of DNA. My analysis will show how this trend is a reactionary response to modern understandings of identities as social products and that it ignores new biomedical understandings of human bodies.     

Shifting to structures in physics and biology: a prophylactic for promiscuous realism

Within the philosophy of science, the realism debate has been revitalised by the development of forms of structural realism. These urge a shift in focus from the object oriented ontologies that come and go through the history of science to the structures that remain through theory change. Such views have typically been elaborated in the context of theories of physics and are motivated by, first of all, the presence within such theories of mathematical equations that allow straightforward representation of the relevant structures; and secondly, the implications of such theories for the individuality and identity of putative objects. My aim in this paper is to explore the possibility of extending such views to biological theories. An obvious concern is that within the context of the latter it is typically insisted that we cannot find the kinds of highly mathematised structures that structural realism can point to in physics. I shall indicate how the model-theoretic approach to theories might help allay such concerns. Furthermore, issues of identity and individuality also arise within biology. Thus Dupré has recently noted that there exists a 'General Problem of Biological Individuality' which relates to the issue of how one divides 'massively integrated and interconnected' systems into discrete components. In response Dupré advocates a form of 'Promiscuous Realism' that holds, for example, that there is no unique way of dividing the phylogenetic tree into kinds. Instead I shall urge serious consideration of those aspects of the work of Dupré and others that lean towards a structuralist interpretation. By doing so I hope to suggest possible ways in which a structuralist stance might be extended to biology.     

Biological individuality: the case of biofilms

This paper examines David Hull’s and Peter Godfrey-Smith’s accounts of biological individuality using the case of biofilms. Biofilms fail standard criteria for individuality, such as having reproductive bottlenecks and forming parent-offspring lineages. Nevertheless, biofilms are good candidates for individuals. The nature of biofilms shows that Godfrey-Smith’s account of individuality, with its reliance on reproduction, is too restrictive. Hull’s interactor notion of individuality better captures biofilms, and we argue that it offers a better account of biological individuality. However, Hull’s notion of interactor needs more precision. We suggest some ways to make Hull’s notion of interactor and his account of individuality more precise. Generally, we maintain that biofilms are a good test case for theories of individuality, and a careful examination of biofilms furthers our understanding of biological individuality.     

Cellular differentiation and individuality in the ‘minor’ multicellular taxa

Biology needs a concept of individuality in order to distinguish organisms from parts of organisms and from groups of organisms, to count individuals and compare traits across taxa, and to distinguish growth from reproduction. Most of the proposed criteria for individuality were designed for ‘unitary’ or ‘paradigm’ organisms: contiguous, functionally and physiologically integrated, obligately sexually reproducing multicellular organisms with a germ line sequestered early in development. However, the vast majority of the diversity of life on Earth does not conform to all of these criteria. We consider the issue of individuality in the ‘minor’ multicellular taxa, which collectively span a large portion of the eukaryotic tree of life, reviewing their general features and focusing on a model species for each group. When the criteria designed for unitary organisms are applied to other groups, they often give conflicting answers or no answer at all to the question of whether or not a given unit is an individual. Complex life cycles, intimate bacterial symbioses, aggregative development, and strange genetic features complicate the picture. The great age of some of the groups considered shows that ‘intermediate’ forms, those with some but not all of the traits traditionally associated with individuality, cannot reasonably be considered ephemeral or assumed transitional. We discuss a handful of recent attempts to reconcile the many proposed criteria for individuality and to provide criteria that can be applied across all the domains of life. Finally, we argue that individuality should be defined without reference to any particular taxon and that understanding the emergence of new kinds of individuals requires recognizing individuality as a matter of degree.     

A part‐dependent account of biological individuality: why holobionts are individuals and ecosystems simultaneously

Given one conception of biological individuality (evolutionary, physiological, etc.), can a holobiont – that is the host + its symbiotic (mutualistic, commensalist and parasitic) microbiome – be simultaneously a biological individual and an ecological community? Herein, we support this possibility by arguing that the notion of biological individuality is part‐dependent. In our account, the individuality of a biological ensemble should not only be determined by the conception of biological individuality in use, but also by the biological characteristics of the part of the ensemble under investigation. In the specific case of holobionts, evaluations of their individuality should be made either host‐relative or microbe‐relative. We support the claim that biological individuality is part‐dependent by drawing upon recent empirical evidence regarding the physiology of hosts and microbes, and the recent characterization of the ‘demibiont’. Our account shows that contemporary disagreements about the individuality of the holobiont derive from an incorrect understanding of the ontology of biological individuality. We show that collaboration between philosophers and biologists can be very fruitful in attempts to solve some contemporary biological debates.     

Do polyphenols enter the brain and does it matter? Some theoretical and practical considerations

Although several epidemiological and intervention studies suggest that polyphenols (PPs) and PP-rich foods may improve memory and cognition in animals and humans, PPs' mode of action is only poorly understood. To help distinguish between the different modes of action that have been proposed for PPs, it is obviously important to know how much PPs can accumulate in the brain, if any at all. However, reliable data on PP uptake into the brain of animals are limited as many studies failed to report important control procedures during data acquisition. In this paper, we summarize published data on the penetration of PPs into animal brain and review some hypotheses to explain the biological basis of potentially health-beneficial effects of PPs to the brain. Finally, we highlight promising new approaches, especially those of a hormetic dose-response and gut microbiota-brain interaction, which may allow a better understanding of PPs' mode of action in animals and humans.     

A guide to practical babooning: Historical,social, and cognitive contingency

As ecologically adaptable animals, baboons are distributed widely across Africa, and display a variety of morphological and behavioral differences that reflect both local ecology and a complex evolutionary history. As long‐lived, slowly reproducing animals, baboons face numerous ecological challenges to survival and successful reproduction. As group‐living animals, the social world presents an equally diverse array of challenges that require the negotiation of individual needs within the constraints imposed by others. Understanding how all these facets of baboon evolutionary history, life history, ecology, sociality, and cognition fit together is an enormous but engaging challenge, and despite one hundred years of study, it is clear there is a still much to learn about the various natural histories of baboons. What also is clear, however, is that an appreciation of contingency holds the key to understanding all these facets of baboon evolution and behavior. In what follows, I hope to illustrate exactly what I mean by this, highlighting along the way that history is not to be ignored, variability is information and not merely “noise”, and that behavioral and cognitive complexity can be two very different things.     

The role of vocal individuality in conservation

Identifying the individuals within a population can generate information on life history parameters, generate input data for conservation models, and highlight behavioural traits that may affect management decisions and error or bias within census methods. Individual animals can be discriminated by features of their vocalisations. This vocal individuality can be utilised as an alternative marking technique in situations where the marks are difficult to detect or animals are sensitive to disturbance. Vocal individuality can also be used in cases were the capture and handling of an animal is either logistically or ethically problematic. Many studies have suggested that vocal individuality can be used to count and monitor populations over time; however, few have explicitly tested the method in this role. In this review we discuss methods for extracting individuality information from vocalisations and techniques for using this to count and monitor populations over time. We present case studies in birds where vocal individuality has been applied to conservation and we discuss its role in mammals.     

Is sympathetic activation by stressful memories linked to the occurrence of hypertension and metabolic syndrome?

This paper is based on reported links between dementia and hypotension. Large clinical studies report that patients with Alzheimer's disease normalize previously elevated blood pressure. Among previously hypertensive, elderly persons, an unexpected minority of hypotensive elderly patients with cognitive decline has been found. A possible interpretation is that patients of both groups, instead of having cognition problems due to arterial hypotension, might have become hypotensive because they can no longer remember and worry about stress-inducing problems that have vanished from their memories.I propose that memory induced stress reactions increase the resting sympathetic tone, vascular resistance, secretion of renin and contrainsulary hormones. Dementia reduces this source of chronic stress reaction, and hence reduction on sympathetic activation could explain both the reduction in blood pressure and relief from insulin resistance. This might explain how is it possible that blocking of sympathetic activity and renin–angiotensin system prolongs human life, despite importance of these mechanisms in maintaining circulatory homeostasis in all mammals.     

Friendship,bitching, and the making of ethical selves: what it means to be a good friend among girls in a London school

This article explores the relationship between friendship, personhood, and ethics among girls in a London school. While a Western ideal of friendship is posited as a personal, private, and spontaneous relationship between autonomous individuals, I argue that girls’ friendships are a complex entanglement and interaction between forensic and mimetic dimensions of the self. Girls’ ideals of friendship, and practices of making friends, suggest forensic pre‐constituted selves acting with volition in order to become closer to other selves. However, bitching, exclusion, and breaking friendships foreground mimetic dimensions as girls shape each other and themselves according to gendered ethical criteria. Examining these analytical strands offers insight into how individuality is produced through sociality in everyday life.