Charles Darwin's views of classification in theory and practice

It has long been argued that Charles Darwin was the founder of the school of "evolutionary taxonomy" of the Modern Synthesis and, accordingly, that he recognized genealogy and similarity as dual, synergistic criteria for classification. This view is based on three questionable interpretations: first, of isolated passages in the 13th chapter of the Origin of Species; second, of one phrase in a letter that Darwin wrote about the work of an author he had partly misunderstood; and third, of his taxonomic practice in the barnacle monographs, which only implicitly embody his philosophy of classification, if at all. These works, seen in fuller context and with the perspective of extensive correspondence, are consistent with the view that Darwin advocated only genealogy as the basis of classification, and that similarity was merely a tool for discovering evolutionary relationships. Darwin was neither a Mayrian taxonomist nor a cladist, and he did not approach systematic issues in the same terms that we do in the late 20th century.     

The Creativity of Natural Selection? Part I: Darwin,Darwinism, and the Mutationists

This is the first of a two-part essay on the history of debates concerning the creativity of natural selection, from Darwin through the evolutionary synthesis and up to the present. Here I focus on the mid-late nineteenth century to the early twentieth, with special emphasis on early Darwinism and its critics, the self-styled “mutationists.” The second part focuses on the evolutionary synthesis and some of its critics, especially the “neutralists” and “neo-mutationists.” Like Stephen Gould, I consider the creativity of natural selection to be a key component of what has traditionally counted as “Darwinism.” I argue that the creativity of natural selection is best understood in terms of (1) selection initiating evolutionary change, and (2) selection being responsible for the presence of the variation it acts upon, for example by directing the course of variation. I consider the respects in which both of these claims sound non-Darwinian, even though they have long been understood by supporters and critics alike to be virtually constitutive of Darwinism.     

Nietzsche's aesthetic critique of Darwin

Despite his position as one of the first philosophers to write in the "post-Darwinian" world, the critique of Darwin by Friedrich Nietzsche is often ignored for a host of unsatisfactory reasons. I argue that Nietzsche's critique of Darwin is important to the study of both Nietzsche's and Darwin's impact on philosophy. Further, I show that the central claims of Nietzsche's critique have been broadly misunderstood. I then present a new reading of Nietzsche's core criticism of Darwin. An important part of Nietzsche's response can best be understood as an aesthetic critique of Darwin, reacting to what he saw as Darwin having drained life of an essential component of objective aesthetic value. For Nietzsche, Darwin's theory is false because it is too intellectual, because it searches for rules, regulations, and uniformity in a realm where none of these are to be found - and, moreover, where they should not be found. Such a reading goes furthest toward making Nietzsche's criticism substantive and relevant. Finally, I attempt to relate this novel explanation of Nietzsche's critique to topics in contemporary philosophy of biology, particularly work on the evolutionary explanation of culture.     

Ecological aspects of the evolutionary processes

Darwin in his On the Origin of species made it clear that evolutionary change depends on the combined action of two different causes, the first being the origin of genetically based phenotypic variation in the individual organisms comprising the population and the second being the action of selective agents of the external environment placing demands on the individual organisms. For over a century following Darwin, most evolutionists focused on the origin of inherited variation and its transmission; many workers continue to regard genetics to be the core of evolutionary theory. Far less attention has been given to the exact nature of the selective agents with most evolutionists still treating this cause imprecisely to the detriment of our understanding of both nomological and historical evolutionary theory. Darwin was vague in the meaning of his new concept of "Natural Selection," using it interchangeably as one of the causes for evolutionary change and as the final outcome (= evolutionary change). In 1930, natural selection was defined clearly as "non-random, differential reproduction of genes" by R. Fisher and J.B.S. Haldane which is a statement of the outcome of evolutionary process and which omits mention of the causes bringing about this change. Evolutionists quickly accepted this outcome definition of natural selection, and have used interchangeably selection both as a cause and as the result of evolutionary change, causing great confusion. Herein, the details will be discussed of how the external environment (i.e., the environment-phenotype interaction) serves as selective agents and exerts demands on the phenotypic organisms. Included are the concepts of fitness and of the components of fitness (= adaptations) which are respectively (a) survival, (b) direct reproductive and (c) indirect reproductive features. Finally, it will be argued that historical-narrative analyses of organisms, including classification and phylogenetic history, are possible only with a full understanding of nomological evolutionary theory and with functional/adaptive studies of the employed taxonomic features in addition to the standard comparative investigations.     

Charles Darwin's debt to malthus and Edward Blyth

Conclusion It is not justifiable to accuse Darwin of conscious or unconscious plagiarism. This charge is contrary to the historical evidence and to the extensive information that we have about his character. When Darwin listed the writers on the origin of species by natural selection before himself, he did not mention Blyth, and this omission did not disturb the cordial relations between Darwin and Blyth. Blyth continued to supply Darwin with information which Darwin used in his later publications with due acknowledgment to Blyth. For example, in The Descent of Man, Darwin cited Blyth: Mr. Blyth, as he informs me, saw Indian crows feeding two or three of their companions which were blind.⁶³ Blyth felt no resentment. If he did, he would have so informed Darwin. Blyth did not regard himself as in any sense a predecessor of Darwin and he certainly did not resent Darwin as a plagiarizer of himself. Moreover, Darwin went to a great deal of trouble to find his own predecessors and to give them proper credit.⁶⁴ After Darwin had completed his work on natural selection, he wrote a letter to the Reverend Baden Powell in which he clearly showed recognition of the contribution of others to his own work:No educated person, not even the most ignorant, could suppose I mean to arrogate to myself the origination of the doctrine that species had not been independently created. The only novelty in my work is the attempt to explain how species became modified, and to a certain extent how the theory of descent explains certain large classes of facts; and in these respects I received no assistance from my predecessors.⁶⁵ *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402011 00002     

What would have happened if Darwin had known Mendel (or Mendel's work)?

The question posed by the title is usually answered by saying that the "synthesis" between the theory of evolution by natural selection and classical genetics, which took place in 1930s-40s, would have taken place much earlier if Darwin had been aware of Mendel and his work. What is more, it nearly happened: it would have been enough if Darwin had cut the pages of the offprint of Mendel's work that was in his library and read them! Or, if Mendel had come across Darwin in London or paid him a visit at his house in the outskirts! (on occasion of Mendel's trip in 1862 to that city). The aim of the present paper is to provide elements for quite a different answer, based on further historical evidence, especially on Mendel's works, some of which mention Darwins's studies.     

Darwin and the linguists: the coevolution of mind and language, part 2. The language-thought relationship

This paper examines Charles Darwin's idea that language-use and humanity's unique cognitive abilities reinforced each other's evolutionary emergence-an idea Darwin sketched in his early notebooks, set forth in his Descent of man (1871), and qualified in Descent's second (1874) edition. Darwin understood this coevolution process in essentially Lockean terms, based on John Locke's hints about the way language shapes thinking itself. Ironically, the linguist Friedrich Max Müller attacked Darwin's human descent theory by invoking a similar thesis, the German romantic notion of an identity between language and thought. Although Darwin avoided outright contradiction, when he came to defend himself against Müller's attacks, he undercut some of his own argumentation in favor of the coevolution idea. That is, he found it difficult to counter Müller's argument while also making a case for coevolution. Darwin's efforts in this area were further complicated by British and American writers who held a naturalistic view of speech origins yet still taught that language had been invented by fully evolved homo sapiens, thus denying coevolution.     

Darwin's biogeography

The year 2009 marks the 150th anniversary of the publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species. This book was so influential that it is often considered to be the most important scientific work ever written. Many volumes have been published about the Origin and its lasting effects on religion and society, but few have examined its influence on biogeography. However, it was Darwin’s initial interest in comparing the natural history of different regions during the voyage of the Beagle that led him to propose natural selection as an evolutionary force. He had visited the Cape Verde Islands and saw the similarity of their biota to that of Africa, and then noted the South American relationships of the Galapagos fauna and flora. But the island plants and animals were different from their mainland relatives, and, in the Galapagos, each island appeared to have its own endemic forms. It was these biogeographical observations that were critical to Darwin’s formulation of a theory to account for them. His subsequent conclusions on the evolutionary importance of centres of origin and dispersal were generally well accepted for the next 100 years, until the advent of vicarianism, which began in the early 1970s. That vicarianist movement received an impetus from two sources: (1) the works of Leon Croizat, who did not believe that living organisms could disperse overseas by themselves; and (2) the development of plate tectonics and its causation of continental drift. Vicarianists believed that primitive species were originally widespread over the Earth’s surface but were rafted to different parts of the world by continental fractionation and movement. However, continental drift in the Mesozoic could not have involved contemporary species or genera as many vicarianists claimed. The development of phylogeography, beginning in the 1980s, and improved knowledge of the fossil record soon demonstrated that multitudes of living species, and even many genera and families, underwent long‐distance dispersal during the Cenozoic. This resulted in a decline of vicarianism and a vindication of Darwin’s conclusions on centres of origin and dispersal.     

The historical context of natural selection: The case of Patrick Matthew

Conclusions It should be evident from the foregoing discussion that one man's natural selection is not necessarily the same as another man's. Why should this be so? How can two theories, which both Matthew and Darwin believed to be nearly identical, be so dissimilar? Apparently, neither Matthew nor Darwin understood the other's theory. Each man's viewpoint was colored by his own intellectual background and philosophical assumptions, and each read these into the other's ideas. The words sounded the same, so they assumed the concepts must als be the same.¹²³ As Ghiselin has pointed out, historians attempting to evaluate Darwin's predecessors have been similarly blinded by a preoccupation with words, without regard to their proper context.¹²⁴ In the case of Matthew, the practice of quoting only brief passages from the appendix to Naval Timber and Arboriculture, without relating them to the rest of his work, has suggested a greater resemblance to Darwin's theory than actually exists.It is clear, both from the use which Matthew made of his ideas and from the philosophical roots of his natural world view, that he could not have arrived at the concept of natural selection by the same thought process which Darwin employed. His discussion of natural selection is presented not as an argument, but as an axiom. No theory is proposed, no evidence marshaled to support it. Natural selection is stated as a fact, a Law of Nature, unquestioned, and presumably, unquestionable.Despite his clamor for recognition as the discoverer of natural selection, Matthew recognized and acknowledged this very fundamental difference between Darwin and himself. In a letter to the Gardener's Chronicle of May 12, 1860, he wrote:To me the conception of this law of Nature came intuitively as a self-evident fact, almost without an effort of concentrated thought. Mr. Darwin here seems to have more merit in the discovery than I have had—to me it did not appear a discovery. He seems to have worked it out by inductive reason, slowly and with due caution to have made his way synthetically from fact to fact onwards; while with me it was by a general glance at the scheme of Nature that I estimated this select production of species as an a priori recognisable fact—an axiom, requiring only to be pointed out to be admitted by unprejudiced minds of sufficient grasp.¹²⁵ In the same letter, Matthew maintained that his ideas had not been accepted because the age was not ripe for such ideas.¹²⁶ Nor, he said, was the present age. He considered the inability of most of Darwin's critics to grasp his theory to be incurable. Yet he did not argue that natural selection should be accepted because of the evidence, but rather, that it should be accepted on faith:Belief here requires a certain grasp of mind. No direct proof of phenomena embracing so long a period of time is within the compass of short-lived man. To attempt to satisfy a school of ultra skeptics, who have a wonderfully limited power of perception of means to ends... would be labour in vain.... They could not be brought to conceive the purpose of a handsaw though they saw its action, if the whole individual building it assisted to construct were not presented complete before their eyes... Like a child looking upon the motion of a wheel in an engine they would only perceive and admire... without noticing its agency in... affecting the purposed end.¹²⁷ Here, then, is the final irony. In a passage urging acceptance of Darwin's theory, a theory which was to banish design and purpose from the natural world, we find echoes of Paley and of Providence.Loren Eiseley has lamented the fact that Matthew did not bring his views into the open, because the amount of ground he was able to cover in a few paragraphs suggests that he might have been able to sustain a longer treatise.¹²⁸ Now that the intellectual and historical context of Matthew's ideas are known, this statement is no longer tenable. Matthew was not a scientist, and his books were not written as biological treatises. His discussions of natural selection were not attempts to cover ground in advancing a particular scientific theory, but were simply reflections of his own assumptions about the natural world.Furthermore, despite Matthew's acceptance of evolution and natural selection, his biological thought was basically conservative on points where Darwin's was radical. Where Matthew saw a series of stable worlds interrupted by violent upheavals, Darwin saw a continuous process of change in an ever-fluctuating world. Where Matthew conceived of species in terms of Aristotelian classes and essences, Darwin revolutionized our concept of species by treating them as populations. Where Matthew saw a world of design and beauty functioning according to natural laws laid down by benevolent Providence, Darwin abolished design and Providence from nature and ushered in a world which cycles ever onward according to laws of chance and probability.It is not even particularly useful to point to Matthew as evidence that evolution was in the air prior to 1859.¹²⁹ His ideas did not represent the first wave of a coming revolution, but were the product of his own personal philosophical outlook, as expressed in the context of the biological thought of the 1830's. Matthew is important in the history of ideas, not simply because he accepted the concept of evolution or thought of something resembling natural selection, but because he did so without overthrowing, in his own mind, any of the basic philosophical assumptions which had underlain biological science since Aristotle. In recognizing Matthew's failure to do so, we are in a position to appreciate more fully the significance of the Darwinian Revolution.     

Physical law not natural selection as the major determinant of biological complexity in the subcellular realm: new support for the pre-Darwinian conception of evolution by natural law

Before Darwin many biologists considered organic forms to be immutable natural forms or types which like inorganic forms such as atoms or crystals are part of a changeless world order and determined by physical law. Adaptations were viewed as secondary modifications of these 'crystal like' abstract afunctional 'givens of physics.' We argue here that much of the emerging picture of biological order in the subcellular realm resembles closely the pre-Darwinian conception of nature. We point out that in the subcellular realm, between nano and micrometers, physical law necessarily plays a far more significant role in organizing matter than in the familiar 'Darwinian world' between millimeters and meters (where matter can be arranged into almost any contingent artifactual arrangement we choose, as witness Lego toys, watches or jumbo jets). Consequently, when deploying matter into complex structures in the subcellular realm the cell must necessarily make extensive use of natural forms-such as the protein and RNA folds, microtubular forms and tensegrity structures-which like atoms or crystals self-organize under the direction of physical law into what are essentially 'pre-Darwinian' afunctional abstract molecular architectures in which adaptations are trivial secondary modifications of what are evidently primary givens of physics.     

Celebrate Darwin Day, An Event for Education and Outreach in Evolutionary Biology

Darwin Day is an international celebration of Charles Darwin’s birthday, February 12, and is used as an occasion for education and outreach in evolutionary biology. I describe the history and structure of Darwin Day at the University of Tennessee, one of the oldest Darwin Day organizations in the world. I detail past events including speakers, themes, and advertising ideas that have worked for us and suggestions for getting a Darwin Day started. I encourage interested groups especially those at schools, museums, libraries, nature centers, and other institutions to adapt ideas from our organization to fit their own circumstances and to start planning their own Darwin Days for the celebration of Darwin’s 200th birthday in 2009.     

Darwin’s two theories, 1844 and 1859

Darwin’s first two, relatively complete, explicit articulations of his theorizing on evolution were his Essay of 1844 and On the Origin of Species published in 1859. A comparative analysis concludes that they espoused radically different theories despite exhibiting a continuity of strategy, much common structure and the same key idea. Both were theories of evolution by means of natural selection. In 1844, organic adaptation was confined to occasional intervals initiated and controlled by de-stabilization events. The modified descendants rebalanced the particular “plant and animal forms … unsettled by some alteration in their circumstances.” But by 1859, organic adaptation occurred continuously, potentially modifying the descendants of all organisms. Even natural selection, the persistent core of Darwin’s theorizing, does not prove to be a significant basis for theory similarity. Consequently, Darwin’s Origin theory cannot reasonably be considered as a mature version of the Essay. It is not a modification based on adjustments, further justifications and the integration of a Principle of Divergence. The Origin announced a new “scientific paradigm” while the Essay did little more than seemingly misconfigure the operation of a novel mechanism to extend varieties beyond their accepted bounds, and into the realm of possible new species. Two other collections of Darwin’s theorizing are briefly considered: his extensive notes of the late 1830s and his contributions to the famous meeting of 1 July 1858. For very different reasons, neither constitutes a challenge to the basis for this comparative study. It is concluded that, in addition to the much-debated social pressures, an unacknowledged further reason why Darwin did not publish his theorizing until 1859, could have been down to his perceptive technical judgement: wisely, he held back from rushing to publish demonstrably flawed theorizing.     

Darwin,Wallace, and Huxley,and Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation

Conclusion Publication of the Vestiges and the rather primitive theory of evolution it expounded thus played a significant role in the careers of Darwin and Wallace. In addition, in spite of his poor opinion of the Vestiges, it presented Huxley with a convenient topic for critical discussion and the opportunity to focus more attention on the subject of evolution. The dynamic interactions among these leading figures of nineteenth-century natural science helped spur the development of more sophisticated models of evolution.Darwin had a proper appreciation of Chambers's contribution to evolutionary thought, although he fully recognized the shortcomings of this work. He understood the importance of allowing fresh ideas about organic change to be ventilated. However, he was primarily concerned with his own theory and viewed all developments in evolutionary biology from this perspective. If he did not give full consideration to Chambers and his book early on, it was due mainly to his feeling that the concepts in the Vestiges were very different from his own; he was therefore reluctant to embrace them as the forerunners of his own theory. As a scholar, he was also troubled by the scientific errors in the book. However, the record demonstrates that he attempted to make amends for any oversight on his part. His generous letter to Chambers's daughter, and his gracious treatment of Chambers during the brief time the latter lived in London, are ample proof of that.The attacks of Huxley, Sedgwick, and other prominent natural historians and geologists at the time, the problems inherent in Chambers's evolutionary theory, and the publication of the Origin, are the major reasons why the Vestiges became a neglected work. Nevertheless, Chambers's contribution will always stand out because, together with those of other late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century predecessors of Darwin, it laid the foundations of modern evolutionary thought and, more importantly, helped prepare the scientific community for the more fully developed ideas of Darwin and Wallace.     

Information,Representation, Biology

Biosemiotics contains at its core fundamental issues of naturalism: are normative properties, such as meaning, referent, and others, part of the natural world, or are they part of a second, intentional and normative, metaphysical realm — one that might be analogically applied to natural phenomena, such as within biological cells — but a realm that nevertheless remains metaphysically distinct? Such issues are manifestations of a fundamental metaphysical split between a “natural” realm and a realm of normativity and intentionality. This problematic metaphysical split derives from conceptual problems originating with the Pre-Socratics; transcending that split requires correcting those problems. In particular, transcending that split requires a model of metaphysical emergence, and, in particular, normative emergence. This paper will limn that argument regarding metaphysical emergence, but focus most strongly on an overview of a model of normative, representational emergence that overcomes that metaphysical diremption.     

Joseph Hooker Takes a “Fixed Post”: Transmutation and the “Present Unsatisfactory State of Systematic Botany”, 1844–1860

Joseph Hooker first learned that Charles Darwin believed in the transmutation of species in 1844. For the next 14 years, Hooker remained a “nonconsenter” to Darwin’s views, resolving to keep the question of species origin “subservient to Botany instead of Botany to it, as must be the true relation”. Hooker placed particular emphasis on the need for any theory of species origin to support the broad taxonomic delimitation of species, a highly contentious issue. His always provisional support for special creation waned during the 1850s as he lost faith in its expediency for coordinating the study of plant geography, systematics and physiology. In 1858, Hooker embraced Darwin’s “considerable revolution in natural history,” but only after Darwin had carefully molded his transmutationism to meet Hooker’s exacting specifications.     

Charles Robert Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace: their dispute over the units of selection

Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace independently discovered the mechanism of natural selection for evolutionary change. However, they viewed the working of selection differently. For Darwin, selection was always focused on the benefit for the individual. For Wallace, selection was as much something of benefit for the group as for the individual. This difference is traced to their different background political–economic views, with Darwin in favor of Adam Smith's view of society and Wallace following Robert Owen in being a socialist.     

The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Umwelt

This is the second article in a series of review articles addressing biosemiotic terminology. The biosemiotic glossary project is designed to integrate views of members within the biosemiotic community based on a standard survey and related publications. The methodology section describes the format of the survey conducted July–August 2014 in preparation of the current review and targeted on Jakob von Uexküll’s term ‘Umwelt’. Next, we summarize denotation, synonyms and antonyms, with special emphasis on the denotation of this term in current biosemiotic usage. The survey findings include ratings of eight citations defining or making use of the term Umwelt. We provide a summary of respondents’ own definitions and suggested term usage. Further sections address etymology, relevant contexts of use, and related terms in English and other languages. A section on the notion’s Uexküllian meaning and later biosemiotic meaning is followed by attempt at synthesis and conclusion. We conclude that the Umwelt is a centerpiece phenomenon, a phenomenon that other phenomena in the living realm are organized around. To sum up Uexküll’s view, we can characterize an Umwelt as the subjective world of an organism, enveloping a perceptual world and an effector world, which is always part of the organism itself and a key component of nature, which is held together by functional cycles connecting different Umwelten. In order to pay respect to Uexküll’s work, we must move from notion to model, from mention of Uexküll’s Umwelt term to actual application of it.     

Charles Darwin and the Origin of Life

When Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species 150 years ago he consciously avoided discussing the origin of life. However, analysis of some other texts written by Darwin, and of the correspondence he exchanged with friends and colleagues demonstrates that he took for granted the possibility of a natural emergence of the first life forms. As shown by notes from the pages he excised from his private notebooks, as early as 1837 Darwin was convinced that “the intimate relation of Life with laws of chemical combination, & the universality of latter render spontaneous generation not improbable”. Like many of his contemporaries, Darwin rejected the idea that putrefaction of preexisting organic compounds could lead to the appearance of organisms. Although he favored the possibility that life could appear by natural processes from simple inorganic compounds, his reluctance to discuss the issue resulted from his recognition that at the time it was possible to undertake the experimental study of the emergence of life.