Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies

Observation of leadership in small-scale societies offers unique insights into the evolution of human collective action and the origins of sociopolitical complexity. Using behavioural data from the Tsimane forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia and Nyangatom nomadic pastoralists of Ethiopia, we evaluate the traits of leaders and the contexts in which leadership becomes more institutional. We find that leaders tend to have more capital, in the form of age-related knowledge, body size or social connections. These attributes can reduce the costs leaders incur and increase the efficacy of leadership. Leadership becomes more institutional in domains of collective action, such as resolution of intragroup conflict, where collective action failure threatens group integrity. Together these data support the hypothesis that leadership is an important means by which collective action problems are overcome in small-scale societies.     

How law can help solve the collective action problem of antimicrobial resistance

Antimicrobial resistance is a global collective action problem with dire consequences for human health. This article considers how domestic and international legal mechanisms can be used to address antimicrobial resistance and overcome the governance and political economy challenges that accelerate it.     

The neural and cognitive correlates of aimed throwing in chimpanzees: a magnetic resonance image and behavioural study on a unique form of social tool use

It has been hypothesized that neurological adaptations associated with evolutionary selection for throwing may have served as a precursor for the emergence of language and speech in early hominins. Although there are reports of individual differences in aimed throwing in wild and captive apes, to date there has not been a single study that has examined the potential neuroanatomical correlates of this very unique tool-use behaviour in non-human primates. In this study, we examined whether differences in the ratio of white (WM) to grey matter (GM) were evident in the homologue to Broca's area as well as the motor-hand area of the precentral gyrus (termed the KNOB) in chimpanzees that reliably throw compared with those that do not. We found that the proportion of WM in Broca's homologue and the KNOB was significantly higher in subjects that reliably throw compared with those that do not. We further found that asymmetries in WM within both brain regions were larger in the hemisphere contralateral to the chimpanzee's preferred throwing hand. We also found that chimpanzees that reliably throw show significantly better communication abilities than chimpanzees that do not. These results suggest that chimpanzees that have learned to throw have developed greater cortical connectivity between primary motor cortex and the Broca's area homologue. It is suggested that during hominin evolution, after the split between the lines leading to chimpanzees and humans, there was intense selection on increased motor skills associated with throwing and that this potentially formed the foundation for left hemisphere specialization associated with language and speech found in modern humans.     

Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: a volunteer's dilemma

Social control and the enforcement of social norms glue a society together. It has been shown theoretically and empirically that informal punishment of wrongdoers fosters cooperation in human groups. Most of this research has focused on voluntary and uncoordinated punishment carried out by individual group members. However, as punishment is costly, it is an open question as to why humans engage in the punishment of wrongdoers even in one-time-only encounters. While evolved punitive preferences have been advocated as proximate explanations for such behaviour, the strategic nature of the punishment situation has remained underexplored. It has been suggested to conceive of the punishment situation as a volunteer''s dilemma (VOD), where only one individual''s action is necessary and sufficient to punish the wrongdoer. Here, we show experimentally that implementing the punishment situation as a VOD sustains cooperation in an environment where punishers and non-punishers coexist. Moreover, we show that punishment-cost heterogeneity allows individuals to tacitly agree on only the strongest group member carrying out the punishment, thereby increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of social norm enforcement. Our results corroborate that costly peer punishment can be explained without assuming punitive preferences and show that centralized sanctioning institutions can emerge from arbitrary individual differences.     

Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences

Models of collective action infrequently account for differences across individuals beyond a limited set of strategies, ignoring variation in endowment (e.g. physical condition, wealth, knowledge, personality, support), individual costs of effort, or expected gains from cooperation. However, behavioural research indicates these inter-individual differences can have significant effects on the dynamics of collective action. The papers contributed to this theme issue evaluate how individual differences affect the propensity to cooperate, and how they can catalyse others’ likelihood of cooperation (e.g. via leadership). Many of the papers emphasize the relationship between individual decisions and socio-ecological context, particularly the effect of group size. All together, the papers in this theme issue provide a more complete picture of collective action, by embracing the reality of inter-individual variation and its multiple roles in the success or failure of collective action.     

Why mutual helping in most natural systems is neither conflict-free nor based on maximal conflict

Mutual helping for direct benefits can be explained by various game theoretical models, which differ mainly in terms of the underlying conflict of interest between two partners. Conflict is minimal if helping is self-serving and the partner benefits as a by-product. In contrast, conflict is maximal if partners are in a prisoner''s dilemma with both having the pay-off-dominant option of not returning the other''s investment. Here, we provide evolutionary and ecological arguments for why these two extremes are often unstable under natural conditions and propose that interactions with intermediate levels of conflict are frequent evolutionary endpoints. We argue that by-product helping is prone to becoming an asymmetric investment game since even small variation in by-product benefits will lead to the evolution of partner choice, leading to investments by the chosen class. Second, iterated prisoner''s dilemmas tend to take place in stable social groups where the fitness of partners is interdependent, with the effect that a certain level of helping is self-serving. In sum, intermediate levels of mutual helping are expected in nature, while efficient partner monitoring may allow reaching higher levels.     

Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N-person stag hunt dilemmas

In the animal world, collective action to shelter, protect and nourish requires the cooperation of group members. Among humans, many situations require the cooperation of more than two individuals simultaneously. Most of the relevant literature has focused on an extreme case, the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma. Here we introduce a model in which a threshold less than the total group is required to produce benefits, with increasing participation leading to increasing productivity. This model constitutes a generalization of the two-person stag hunt game to an N-person game. Both finite and infinite population models are studied. In infinite populations this leads to a rich dynamics that admits multiple equilibria. Scenarios of defector dominance, pure coordination or coexistence may arise simultaneously. On the other hand, whenever one takes into account that populations are finite and when their size is of the same order of magnitude as the group size, the evolutionary dynamics is profoundly affected: it may ultimately invert the direction of natural selection, compared with the infinite population limit.     

Crossing scales,crossing disciplines: collective motion and collective action in the Global Commons

Two conflicting tendencies can be seen throughout the biological world: individuality and collective behaviour. Natural selection operates on differences among individuals, rewarding those who perform better. Nonetheless, even within this milieu, cooperation arises, and the repeated emergence of multicellularity is the most striking example. The same tendencies are played out at higher levels, as individuals cooperate in groups, which compete with other such groups. Many of our environmental and other global problems can be traced to such conflicts, and to the unwillingness of individual agents to take account of the greater good. One of the great challenges in achieving sustainability will be in understanding the basis of cooperation, and in taking multicellularity to yet a higher level, finding the pathways to the level of cooperation that is the only hope for the preservation of the planet.     

Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games

The production of public goods by the contribution of individual volunteers is a social dilemma because an individual that does not volunteer can benefit from the public good produced by the contributions of others. Therefore it is generally believed that public goods can be produced only in the presence of repeated interactions (which allow reciprocation, reputation effects and punishment) or relatedness (kin selection). Cooperation, however, often occurs in the absence of iterations and relatedness. We show that when the production of a public good is a Volunteer's Dilemma, in which a fixed number of cooperators is necessary to produce the public good, cooperators and defectors persist in a mixed equilibrium, without iterations and without relatedness. This mixed equilibrium is absent in the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the public good is a linear function of the individual contributions. We also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Volunteer's Dilemma are the two opposite extremes of a general public goods game, and that all intermediate cases can have a mixed equilibrium like the Volunteer's Dilemma. The coexistence of cooperators and defectors, therefore, is a typical outcome of most social dilemmas, which requires neither relatedness nor iterations.     

Wernicke's area homologue in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and its relation to the appearance of modern human language

Human language is distinctive compared with the communication systems of other species. Yet, several questions concerning its emergence and evolution remain unresolved. As a means of evaluating the neuroanatomical changes relevant to language that accompanied divergence from the last common ancestor of chimpanzees, bonobos and humans, we defined the cytoarchitectonic boundaries of area Tpt, a component of Wernicke''s area, in 12 common chimpanzee brains and used design-based stereologic methods to estimate regional volumes, total neuron number and neuron density. In addition, we created a probabilistic map of the location of area Tpt in a template chimpanzee brain coordinate space. Our results show that chimpanzees display significant population-level leftward asymmetry of area Tpt in terms of neuron number, with volume asymmetry approaching significance. Furthermore, asymmetry in the number of neurons in area Tpt was positively correlated with asymmetry of neuron numbers in Brodmann''s area 45, a component of Broca''s frontal language region. Our findings support the conclusion that leftward asymmetry of Wernicke''s area originated prior to the appearance of modern human language and before our divergence from the last common ancestor. Moreover, this study provides the first evidence of covariance between asymmetry of anterior and posterior cortical regions that in humans are important to language and other higher order cognitive functions.     

具有Allee效应的合作进化

Allee效应对物种的续存是潜在的干扰因素,在很大程度上将增加种群局部甚至全局灭绝的可能性。对许多物种,尤其是濒临物种更容易受其影响。将Allee效应引入囚徒困境博弈模型,通过理论分析与数值模拟相结合的方法分析讨论了Allee效应对合作进化的影响。研究结果表明:在恶劣的环境条件下,Allee效应极易使物种灭绝,不利于合作进化;在相对优越的环境条件下(死亡率较低),Allee效应促进合作进化,且Allee效应强度越强,更有利于合作进化,不过种群的空间斑块占有率也会随着Allee效应强度的增强而降低,使物种最终灭绝。     

Communal range defence in primates as a public goods dilemma

Classic socio-ecological theory holds that the occurrence of aggressive range defence is primarily driven by ecological incentives, most notably by the economic defendability of an area or the resources it contains. While this ecological cost–benefit framework has great explanatory power in solitary or pair-living species, comparative work on group-living primates has always found economic defendability to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition to account for the distribution of effective range defence across the taxon. This mismatch between theory and observation has recently been ascribed to a collective action problem among group members in, what is more informatively viewed as, a public goods dilemma: mounting effective defence of a communal range against intrusions by outgroup conspecifics. We here further develop this framework, and report on analyses at three levels of biological organization: across species, across populations within a single lineage and across groups and individuals within a single population. We find that communal range defence in primates very rarely involves collective action sensu stricto and that it is best interpreted as the outcome of opportunistic and strategic individual-level decisions. Whether the public good of a defended communal range is produced by solitary, joint or collective action is thus the outcome of the interplay between the unique characteristics of each individual, local and current socio-ecological conditions, and fundamental life-history traits of the species.     

The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

Reciprocal altruism describes a situation in which an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness while increasing another organism''s fitness, but there is an ultimate fitness benefit based on an expectation that the other organism will act in a similar manner at a later time. It creates the obvious dilemma in which there is always a short-term benefit to cheating, therefore cooperating individuals must avoid being exploited by non-cooperating cheaters. This is achieved by following various decision rules, usually variants of the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy. The strength of TFT, however, is also its weakness—mistakes in implementation or interpretation of moves, or the inability to cooperate, lead to a permanent breakdown in cooperation. We show that pied flycatchers (Ficedula hypoleuca) use a TFT with an embedded ‘excuse principle’ to forgive the neighbours that were perceived as unable to cooperate during mobbing of predators. The excuse principle dramatically increases the stability of TFT-like behavioural strategies within the Prisoner''s Dilemma game.     

Female cleaner fish cooperate more with unfamiliar males

Joint group membership is of major importance for cooperation in humans, and close ties or familiarity with a partner are also thought to promote cooperation in other animals. Here, we present the opposite pattern: female cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus, behave more cooperatively (by feeding more against their preference) when paired with an unfamiliar male rather than with their social partner. We propose that cooperation based on asymmetric punishment causes this reversed pattern. Males are larger than and dominant to female partners and are more aggressive to unfamiliar than to familiar female partners. In response, females behave more cooperatively with unfamiliar male partners. Our data suggest that in asymmetric interactions, weaker players might behave more cooperatively with out-group members than with in-group members to avoid harsher punishment.     

Cooperation and the evolution of intelligence

The high levels of intelligence seen in humans, other primates, certain cetaceans and birds remain a major puzzle for evolutionary biologists, anthropologists and psychologists. It has long been held that social interactions provide the selection pressures necessary for the evolution of advanced cognitive abilities (the 'social intelligence hypothesis'), and in recent years decision-making in the context of cooperative social interactions has been conjectured to be of particular importance. Here we use an artificial neural network model to show that selection for efficient decision-making in cooperative dilemmas can give rise to selection pressures for greater cognitive abilities, and that intelligent strategies can themselves select for greater intelligence, leading to a Machiavellian arms race. Our results provide mechanistic support for the social intelligence hypothesis, highlight the potential importance of cooperative behaviour in the evolution of intelligence and may help us to explain the distribution of cooperation with intelligence across taxa.     

Quantification of rhythm problems in disordered speech: a re-evaluation

Disordered speech can present with rhythmic problems, impacting on an individual''s ability to communicate. Effective treatment relies on the availability of sensitive methods to characterize the problem. Rhythm metrics based on segmental durations originally designed for cross-linguistic research have the potential to provide such information. However, these measures may be associated with problems that impact on their clinical usefulness. This paper aims to address the perceptual validity of cross-linguistic metrics as indicators of rhythmic disorder. Speakers with dysarthria and matched healthy participants performed a range of tasks, including syllable and sentence repetition and a spontaneous monologue. A range of rhythm metrics as well as clinical measures were applied. Results showed that none of the metrics could differentiate disordered from healthy speakers, despite clear perceptual differences, suggesting that factors beyond segment duration impacted on rhythm perception. The investigation also highlighted a number of areas where caution needs to be exercised in the application of rhythm metrics to disordered speech. The paper concludes that the underlying speech impairment leading to the perceptual and acoustic characterization of rhythmic problems needs to be established through detailed analysis of speech characteristics in order to construct effective treatment plans for individuals with speech disorders.     

Independence and interdependence in collective decision making: an agent-based model of nest-site choice by honeybee swarms

Condorcet''s jury theorem shows that when the members of a group have noisy but independent information about what is best for the group as a whole, majority decisions tend to outperform dictatorial ones. When voting is supplemented by communication, however, the resulting interdependencies between decision makers can strengthen or undermine this effect: they can facilitate information pooling, but also amplify errors. We consider an intriguing non-human case of independent information pooling combined with communication: the case of nest-site choice by honeybee (Apis mellifera) swarms. It is empirically well documented that when there are different nest sites that vary in quality, the bees usually choose the best one. We develop a new agent-based model of the bees'' decision process and show that its remarkable reliability stems from a particular interplay of independence and interdependence between the bees.     

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity

Evolutionary game theory is the study of frequency-dependent selection. The success of an individual depends on the frequencies of strategies that are used in the population. We propose a new model for studying evolutionary dynamics in games with a continuous strategy space. The population size is finite. All members of the population use the same strategy. A mutant strategy is chosen from some distribution over the strategy space. The fixation probability of the mutant strategy in the resident population is calculated. The new mutant takes over the population with this probability. In this case, the mutant becomes the new resident. Otherwise, the existing resident remains. Then, another mutant is generated. These dynamics lead to a stationary distribution over the entire strategy space. Our new approach generalizes classical adaptive dynamics in three ways: (i) the population size is finite; (ii) mutants can be drawn non-locally and (iii) the dynamics are stochastic. We explore reactive strategies in the repeated Prisoner''s Dilemma. We perform ‘knock-out experiments’ to study how various strategies affect the evolution of cooperation. We find that ‘tit-for-tat’ is a weak catalyst for the emergence of cooperation, while ‘always cooperate’ is a strong catalyst for the emergence of defection. Our analysis leads to a new understanding of the optimal level of forgiveness that is needed for the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity.     

Costs for switching partners reduce network dynamics but not cooperative behaviour

Social networks represent the structuring of interactions between group members. Above all, many interactions are profoundly cooperative in humans and other animals. In accordance with this natural observation, theoretical work demonstrates that certain network structures favour the evolution of cooperation. Yet, recent experimental evidence suggests that static networks do not enhance cooperative behaviour in humans. By contrast, dynamic networks do foster cooperation. However, costs associated with dynamism such as time or resource investments in finding and establishing new partnerships have been neglected so far. Here, we show that human participants are much less likely to break links when costs arise for building new links. Especially, when costs were high, the network was nearly static. Surprisingly, cooperation levels in Prisoner''s Dilemma games were not affected by reduced dynamism in social networks. We conclude that the mere potential to quit collaborations is sufficient in humans to reach high levels of cooperative behaviour. Effects of self-structuring processes or assortment on the network played a minor role: participants simply adjusted their cooperative behaviour in response to the threats of losing a partner or of being expelled.     

Quorum responses and consensus decision making

Animal groups are said to make consensus decisions when group members come to agree on the same option. Consensus decisions are taxonomically widespread and potentially offer three key benefits: maintenance of group cohesion, enhancement of decision accuracy compared with lone individuals and improvement in decision speed. In the absence of centralized control, arriving at a consensus depends on local interactions in which each individual''s likelihood of choosing an option increases with the number of others already committed to that option. The resulting positive feedback can effectively direct most or all group members to the best available choice. In this paper, we examine the functional form of the individual response to others'' behaviour that lies at the heart of this process. We review recent theoretical and empirical work on consensus decisions, and we develop a simple mathematical model to show the central importance to speedy and accurate decisions of quorum responses, in which an animal''s probability of exhibiting a behaviour is a sharply nonlinear function of the number of other individuals already performing this behaviour. We argue that systems relying on such quorum rules can achieve cohesive choice of the best option while also permitting adaptive tuning of the trade-off between decision speed and accuracy.