Out of Control!? How Loss of Self-Control Influences Prosocial Behavior: The Role of Power and Moral Values

Lack of self-control has been suggested to facilitate norm-transgressing behaviors because of the operation of automatic selfish impulses. Previous research, however, has shown that people having a high moral identity may not show such selfish impulses when their self-control resources are depleted. In the present research, we extended this effect to prosocial behavior. Moreover, we investigated the role of power in the interaction between moral identity and self-control depletion. More specifically, we expected that power facilitates the externalization of internal states, which implies that for people who feel powerful, rather than powerless, depletion decreases prosocial behavior especially for those low in moral identity. A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study supported our predictions. The present finding that the interaction between self-control depletion and moral identity is contingent upon people’s level of power suggests that power may enable people to refrain from helping behavior. Moreover, the findings suggest that if organizations want to improve prosocial behaviors, it may be effective to situationally induce moral values in their employees.     

Sociable Weavers Increase Cooperative Nest Construction after Suffering Aggression

The major transitions in evolution rely on the formation of stable groups that are composed of previously independent units, and the stability of these groups requires both cooperation and reduced conflict. Conflict over group resources may be common, as suggested by work in both cichlids and humans that has investigated how societies resolve conflict regarding investment in group resources, i.e. public goods. We investigated whether sociable weavers (Philetairus socius) use aggressive behaviors to modulate the cooperative behavior of group mates. We find that the individuals that build the communal thatch of the nest, i.e. the individuals most at risk of exploitation, are the most aggressive individuals. We show that individuals that invest in interior chamber maintenance, possibly a more selfish behavior, suffer relatively more aggression. After suffering aggression individuals significantly increase cooperative construction of the communal nest thatch. We show that cooperative individuals target aggression towards selfish individuals, and the individuals suffering aggression perform cooperative behaviors subsequent to suffering aggression. In addition to other evolutionary mechanisms, these results suggest that aggression, possibly via the pay-to-stay mechanism, is possibly being used to maintain a public good.     

Competing selfish genetic elements in the butterfly Hypolimnas bolina

Maternally inherited selfish genetic elements are common in animals . Whereas host genetics and ecology are recognized as factors that may limit the incidence of these parasites , theory suggests one further factor-interference with other selfish elements-that could affect their prevalence . In this paper, we show that spatial heterogeneity in the occurrence of the male-killing Wolbachia wBol1 in the tropical butterfly Hypolimnas bolina is caused by a second infection that can exclude the male-killer. We first provide evidence of a second Wolbachia strain, wBol2, present in most populations that do not carry the male-killer but rare or absent when the male-killer is present. Crossing data indicate that wBol2 in males induces cytoplasmic incompatibility to both uninfected and wBol1-infected females. The wBol2 infection can therefore not only spread through uninfected populations but also resist invasion by wBol1. Thus, we provide empirical support for the hypothesis that the incidence of particular selfish genetic elements can limit the presence of competing types.     

A general model of the public goods dilemma

An individually costly act that benefits all group members is a public good. Natural selection favours individual contribution to public goods only when some benefit to the individual offsets the cost of contribution. Problems of sex ratio, parasite virulence, microbial metabolism, punishment of noncooperators, and nearly all aspects of sociality have been analysed as public goods shaped by kin and group selection. Here, I develop two general aspects of the public goods problem that have received relatively little attention. First, variation in individual resources favours selfish individuals to vary their allocation to public goods. Those individuals better endowed contribute their excess resources to public benefit, whereas those individuals with fewer resources contribute less to the public good. Thus, purely selfish behaviour causes individuals to stratify into upper classes that contribute greatly to public benefit and social cohesion and to lower classes that contribute little to the public good. Second, if group success absolutely requires production of the public good, then the pressure favouring production is relatively high. By contrast, if group success depends weakly on the public good, then the pressure favouring production is relatively weak. Stated in this way, it is obvious that the role of baseline success is important. However, discussions of public goods problems sometimes fail to emphasize this point sufficiently. The models here suggest simple tests for the roles of resource variation and baseline success. Given the widespread importance of public goods, better models and tests would greatly deepen our understanding of many processes in biology and sociality.     

Firing coincidences between neighboring retinal ganglion cells: inside information or epiphenomenon?

Retinal ganglion cells often fire impulses in synchrony; is this synchronization an irrelevant by-product of processing shared inputs, or does it encode information? We examined the rate of occurrence of coincident impulses from pairs of ganglion cells responding to stimuli that varied along several dimensions. We find that coincidences convey little if any additional information about simple static stimuli beyond what could be determined from the firing rates of the two cells considered separately. In fact, at least one of the separate cells generally provided a better information channel than the coincidence rate, implying that under these conditions ganglion cells do not employ a strategy of encoding by coincidences.     

Competition over Personal Resources Favors Contribution to Shared Resources in Human Groups

Members of social groups face a trade-off between investing selfish effort for themselves and investing cooperative effort to produce a shared group resource. Many group resources are shared equitably: they may be intrinsically non-excludable public goods, such as vigilance against predators, or so large that there is little cost to sharing, such as cooperatively hunted big game. However, group members'' personal resources, such as food hunted individually, may be monopolizable. In such cases, an individual may benefit by investing effort in taking others'' personal resources, and in defending one''s own resources against others. We use a game theoretic “tug-of-war” model to predict that when such competition over personal resources is possible, players will contribute more towards a group resource, and also obtain higher payoffs from doing so. We test and find support for these predictions in two laboratory economic games with humans, comparing people''s investment decisions in games with and without the options to compete over personal resources or invest in a group resource. Our results help explain why people cooperatively contribute to group resources, suggest how a tragedy of the commons may be avoided, and highlight unifying features in the evolution of cooperation and competition in human and non-human societies.     

Persistent cooperators in nature

The evolution and maintenance of cooperation fascinated researchers for several decades. Recently, theoretical models and experimental evidence show that costly punishment may facilitate cooperation in human societies. The puzzle how the costly punishment behaviour evolves can be solved under voluntary participation. Could the punishers emerge if participation is compulsory? Is the punishment inevitably a selfish behaviour or an altruistic behaviour? The motivations behind punishment are still an enigma. Based on public goods interactions, we present a model in which just a certain portion of the public good is divided equally among all members. The other portion is distributed to contributors when paying a second cost. The contributors who are willing to pay a second cost are called the persistent cooperators (PC), indicating their desire to retrieve the proportion of the payoff derived from their own contributions with persistent efforts. We show that the persistent cooperators can be costly punishers, which may account for the origin of human costly punishment behaviour under compulsory participation. In this sense our models may show theoretically that the original motivation behind punishment is to retrieve deserved payoff from their own contributions, a selfish incentive. But the persistent cooperators can also flourish or dominate the population in other situations. We list many real examples in which contributors are the persistent cooperators, and they benefit. This indicates a simple norm promoting cooperation: contributing more and gaining more.     

Health care and the principle of fair equality of opportunity: a report from The Netherlands

In The Netherlands, the public funding of a number of health care services is controversial. What can we learn from this about the moral concerns that underlie these judgements? And, if there is anything to learn, can we use this improved understanding to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions concerning the public funding of health care services? In the present paper, I will analyse three cases: corrective surgey, In Vitro Fertilisation and liver transplantation. I will summarise the arguments that have been used to support or to challenge the public funding of these services. I will then assess the merits of Daniels’fair equality of opportunity account of justice in health care. Can this account improve our understanding of the moral concerns underlying our judgements about the public funding of these services? Can it serve to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions that are made concerning the public funding of health care services? My answer to both questions will be a qualified yes. Daniels’account can provide guidance, but not because we can deductively infer from it what is right and what is wrong. Instead, I will argue for a more casuistic use of the concept of fair equality of opportunity.     

Observing others give & take: A computational account of bystanders’ feelings and actions

Social interactions influence people’s feelings and behavior. Here, we propose that a person’s well-being is influenced not only by interactions they experience themselves, but also by those they observe. In particular, we test and quantify the influence of observed selfishness and observed inequality on a bystanders’ feelings and non-costly punishment decisions. We developed computational models that relate others’ (un)selfish acts to observers’ emotional reactions and punishment decisions. These characterize the rules by which others’ interactions are transformed into bystanders’ reactions, and successfully predict those reactions in out-of-sample participants. The models highlight the impact of two social values—‘selfishness aversion’ and ‘inequality aversion’. As for the latter we find that even small violations from perfect equality have a disproportionately large impact on feelings and punishment. In this age of internet and social media we constantly observe others’ online interactions, in addition to in-person interactions. Quantifying the consequences of such observations is important for predicting their impact on society.     

Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games

It is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences how to maintain high levels of cooperation among selfish individuals. Theorists present an effective mechanism promoting cooperation by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. But Nash's theory predicts that no one can do better or worse than loners (players unwilling to join the public goods game) in the long run, and that the frequency of participants is independent of loners’ payoff. In this paper, we introduce a degree of rationality and investigate the model by means of an approximate best response dynamics. Our research shows that the payoffs of the loners have a significant effect in anonymous voluntary public goods games by this introduction and that the dynamics will drive the system to a fixed point, which is different from the Nash equilibrium. In addition, we also qualitatively explain the existing experimental results.     

Do Babies Resemble Their Fathers More Than Their Mothers? A Failure to Replicate Christenfeld and Hill (1995)

Contrary to Christenfeld and Hill (1995), we find that children aged 1, 3, and 5 do not appear to resemble their fathers significantly more than their mothers. We provide an explanation as to why this should be. In addition, we note that any father–child resemblance that does exist, although better than chance, is far from overwhelming.     

Weaving carpets, weaving lives: Childhood and ethnicity in downtown Kathmandu

In the developing metropolis public perceptions about caste and ethnicity are influenced by historical trends in decisions about occupations; but what does this mean for children whose families decide they work? In Kathmandu's carpet industry, a large percentage of workers are Tamang, an ethnic group who represent a small percentage of the country's population. Organisations working with Tamang child labourers have predominantly used quantitative research data to construct their intervention strategies. This has left many factors unexamined. This paper discusses qualitative and quantitative research data generated by a team of Nepali practitioners striving to address child labour issues. The purpose of their study was to examine the social and cultural factors influencing child migration and the quality of life for children in the carpet industry. The methodology included participatory indicators of children's social, economic, physical and psychological well-being. The paper will draw on children's perspectives to highlight the role of ethnicity in opportunity and exploitation.     

Genetic Architecture Promotes the Evolution and Maintenance of Cooperation

When cooperation has a direct cost and an indirect benefit, a selfish behavior is more likely to be selected for than an altruistic one. Kin and group selection do provide evolutionary explanations for the stability of cooperation in nature, but we still lack the full understanding of the genomic mechanisms that can prevent cheater invasion. In our study we used Aevol, an agent-based, in silico genomic platform to evolve populations of digital organisms that compete, reproduce, and cooperate by secreting a public good for tens of thousands of generations. We found that cooperating individuals may share a phenotype, defined as the amount of public good produced, but have very different abilities to resist cheater invasion. To understand the underlying genetic differences between cooperator types, we performed bio-inspired genomics analyses of our digital organisms by recording and comparing the locations of metabolic and secretion genes, as well as the relevant promoters and terminators. Association between metabolic and secretion genes (promoter sharing, overlap via frame shift or sense-antisense encoding) was characteristic for populations with robust cooperation and was more likely to evolve when secretion was costly. In mutational analysis experiments, we demonstrated the potential evolutionary consequences of the genetic association by performing a large number of mutations and measuring their phenotypic and fitness effects. The non-cooperating mutants arising from the individuals with genetic association were more likely to have metabolic deleterious mutations that eventually lead to selection eliminating such mutants from the population due to the accompanying fitness decrease. Effectively, cooperation evolved to be protected and robust to mutations through entangled genetic architecture. Our results confirm the importance of second-order selection on evolutionary outcomes, uncover an important genetic mechanism for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation, and suggest promising methods for preventing gene loss in synthetically engineered organisms.     

Population biology of a selfish sex ratio distorting element in a booklouse (Psocodea: Liposcelis)

Arthropods harbour a variety of selfish genetic elements that manipulate reproduction to be preferentially transmitted to future generations. A major ongoing question is to understand how these elements persist in nature. In this study, we examine the population dynamics of an unusual selfish sex ratio distorter in a recently discovered species of booklouse, Liposcelis sp. (Psocodea: Liposcelididae) to gain a better understanding of some of the factors that may affect the persistence of this element. Females that carry the selfish genetic element only ever produce daughters, although they are obligately sexual. These females also only transmit the maternal half of their genome. We performed a replicated population cage experiment, varying the initial frequency of females that harbour the selfish element, and following female frequencies for 20 months. The selfish genetic element persisted in all cages, often reaching very high (and thus severely female‐biased) frequencies. Surprisingly, we also found that females that carry the selfish genetic element had much lower fitness than their nondistorter counterparts, with lower lifetime fecundity, slower development and a shorter egg‐laying period. We suggest that differential fitness plays a role in the maintenance of the selfish genetic element in this species. We believe that the genetic system in this species, paternal genome elimination, which allows maternal control of offspring sex ratio, may also be important in the persistence of the selfish genetic element, highlighting the need to consider species with diverse ecologies and genetic systems when investigating the effects of sex ratio manipulators on host populations.     

Participation of Children in Medical Decision-Making: Challenges and Potential Solutions

Participation in healthcare decision-making is considered to be an important right of minors, and is highlighted in both international legislation and public policies. However, despite the legal recognition of children’s rights to participation, and also the benefits that children experience by their involvement, there is evidence that legislation is not always translated into healthcare practice. There are a number of factors that may impact on the ability of the child to be involved in decisions regarding their medical care. Some of these factors relate to the child, including their capacity to be actively involved in these decisions. Others relate to the family situation, sociocultural context, or the underlying beliefs and practices of the healthcare provider involved. In spite of these challenges to including children in decisions regarding their clinical care, we argue that it is an important factor in their treatment. The extent to which children should participate in this process should be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking all of the potential barriers into account.     

Contagion of Cooperation in Static and Fluid Social Networks

Cooperation is essential for successful human societies. Thus, understanding how cooperative and selfish behaviors spread from person to person is a topic of theoretical and practical importance. Previous laboratory experiments provide clear evidence of social contagion in the domain of cooperation, both in fixed networks and in randomly shuffled networks, but leave open the possibility of asymmetries in the spread of cooperative and selfish behaviors. Additionally, many real human interaction structures are dynamic: we often have control over whom we interact with. Dynamic networks may differ importantly in the goals and strategic considerations they promote, and thus the question of how cooperative and selfish behaviors spread in dynamic networks remains open. Here, we address these questions with data from a social dilemma laboratory experiment. We measure the contagion of both cooperative and selfish behavior over time across three different network structures that vary in the extent to which they afford individuals control over their network ties. We find that in relatively fixed networks, both cooperative and selfish behaviors are contagious. In contrast, in more dynamic networks, selfish behavior is contagious, but cooperative behavior is not: subjects are fairly likely to switch to cooperation regardless of the behavior of their neighbors. We hypothesize that this insensitivity to the behavior of neighbors in dynamic networks is the result of subjects’ desire to attract new cooperative partners: even if many of one’s current neighbors are defectors, it may still make sense to switch to cooperation. We further hypothesize that selfishness remains contagious in dynamic networks because of the well-documented willingness of cooperators to retaliate against selfishness, even when doing so is costly. These results shed light on the contagion of cooperative behavior in fixed and fluid networks, and have implications for influence-based interventions aiming at increasing cooperative behavior.     

儿童区分意图行为与自我控制能力关系的研究

目的:研究3至5岁儿童能否对主动行为、被动行为加以区分以及其控制能力的差异和两者是否相关。方法:设计两个任务:衡量儿童对主动与被动行为区分的意图实验与衡量儿童自我控制能力的七巧板任务。结果:意图实验年龄效应显著,F=48.317,P<0.001。七巧板任务年龄效应显著:F=88.123,P<0.001,意图实验与七巧板任务相关显著:r=0.79 t=8.37,P<0.01。结论:儿童对主动行为和被动行为的区分转折点为4岁;儿童的自我控制能力以坚持性为指标时转折点在4岁;儿童时意图行为的区分与自我控制能力具有相关性。     

Fairness versus favoritism in children

Children respond positively to individuals who favor them and also to individuals who are fair. The present studies examine the interaction between these two preferences by presenting children with two distributors who share resources with the child participant and another recipient. Children are asked whom they like better: the distributor who was unfair but favored the child participant or the distributor who was fair and showed no (or reduced) favoritism. In Study 1, we find that when fairness and favoritism are in conflict, children are split on whom they prefer. In Study 2, we find that placing children in a competitive context leads to a stronger preference for the distributor who favored the child participant. In Study 3, we examine whether children's preference for favoritism persists when both distributors gave the child the same number of rewards, but one distributor gave the child participant relatively more than the other recipient. In this situation, we find that children prefer the fair distributor. However, we again find that creating a competitive context reduces children's preference for the fair distributor. Finally we find that in a third-party context, children value fairness over generosity. Taken together, these results show how children balance competing concerns for fairness and favoritism.     

DNA Repair Pathway Choice Is Influenced by the Health of Drosophila melanogaster

In nature, individuals vary tremendously in condition and this may be an important source of variation in mutation rate. Condition is likely to affect cell state and thereby impact the amount of DNA damage sustained and/or the way it is repaired. Here, we focus on DNA repair. If low-condition individuals are less capable of devoting the same level of resources to accurate repair, they may suffer higher mutation rates. However, repair decisions are also governed by various aspects of cell physiology, which may render the prediction that “higher-condition individuals use better repair mechanisms” too simplistic. We use a larval diet manipulation in Drosophila melanogaster to create high- and low-condition individuals and then contrast their relative usage of three repair pathways [homologous recombination (HR), single-strand annealing (SSA), and nonhomologous end joining (NHEJ)] that differ in their mechanistic requirements and their mutational consequences. We find that low-condition flies are more likely than high-condition flies to use the most conservative of these three repair pathways, suggesting that physiological constraints on repair pathway usage may be more important than energetic costs. We also show that the repair differences between high- and low-condition flies resemble those between young and old flies, suggesting the underlying mechanisms may be similar. Finally, we observe that the effect of larval diet on adult repair increases as flies age, indicating that developmental differences early in life can have long-lasting consequences.