The evolution of prestige: freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission

This paper advances an “information goods” theory that explains prestige processes as an emergent product of psychological adaptations that evolved to improve the quality of information acquired via cultural transmission. Natural selection favored social learners who could evaluate potential models and copy the most successful among them. In order to improve the fidelity and comprehensiveness of such ranked-biased copying, social learners further evolved dispositions to sycophantically ingratiate themselves with their chosen models, so as to gain close proximity to, and prolonged interaction with, these models. Once common, these dispositions created, at the group level, distributions of deference that new entrants may adaptively exploit to decide who to begin copying. This generated a preference for models who seem generally “popular.” Building on social exchange theories, we argue that a wider range of phenomena associated with prestige processes can more plausibly be explained by this simple theory than by others, and we test its predictions with data from throughout the social sciences. In addition, we distinguish carefully between dominance (force or force threat) and prestige (freely conferred deference).     

The evolution of costly acquired immune memory

A key feature of the vertebrate adaptive immune system is acquired immune memory, whereby hosts launch a faster and heightened response when challenged by previously encountered pathogens, preventing full infection. Here, we use a mathematical model to explore the role of ecological and epidemiological processes in shaping selection for costly acquired immune memory. Applying the framework of adaptive dynamics to the classic SIR (Susceptible‐Infected‐Recovered) epidemiological model, we focus on the conditions that may lead hosts to evolve high levels of immunity. Linking our work to previous theory, we show how investment in immune memory may be greatest at long or intermediate host lifespans depending on whether immunity is long lasting. High initial costs to gain immunity are also found to be essential for a highly effective immune memory. We also find that high disease infectivity and sterility, but intermediate virulence and immune period, increase selection for immunity. Diversity in host populations through evolutionary branching is found to be possible but only for a limited range of parameter space. Our model suggests that specific ecological and epidemiological conditions have to be met for acquired immune memory to evolve.     

The genetic implications of biological and cultural structuring processes during hominid evolution

Human populations are genetically structured through biological reproduction but reproduction is socially structured through culturally expressed systems of marriage, hence the need to take into account the cultural dimension of human societies when considering the genetic structure of modern human populations. The interplay between these two structuring processes is examined through the implications of a biologically based primate form of social organization versus a culturally based foraging form of social organization for an anomaly between the genetic differentiation implied by micro-evolutionary genetic models versus the species-wide pattern of morphological change implied by hominid fossil evidence. Simulation is used to derive the pattern for genetic differentiation at the level of the living group for both forms of social organization and a competition model is added to the genetic model as a way to resolve the anomaly. The importance of the competition model for the transition from a biologically based to a culturally based form of social organization is discussed.     

The evolution of cultural evolution

Humans are unique in their range of environments and in the nature and diversity of their behavioral adaptations. While a variety of local genetic adaptations exist within our species, it seems certain that the same basic genetic endowment produces arctic foraging, tropical horticulture, and desert pastoralism, a constellation that represents a greater range of subsistence behavior than the rest of the Primate Order combined. The behavioral adaptations that explain the immense success of our species are cultural in the sense that they are transmitted among individuals by social learning and have accumulated over generations. Understanding how and when such culturally evolved adaptations arise requires understanding of both the evolution of the psychological mechanisms that underlie human social learning and the evolutionary (population) dynamics of cultural systems.     

A hierarchical model of the evolution of cooperation in cultural systems

In this paper the following problem is addressed: "Under what conditions can a collection of individual organisms learn to cooperate when cooperation appears to outwardly degrade individual performance at the outset. In order to attempt a theoretical solution to this problem, data from a real world problem in anthropology is used. A distributed simulation model of this system was developed to assess its long term behavior using using an approach suggested by Zeigler (Zeigler, B.P., 1984, Multifaceted Modelling and Discrete Event Simulation (Academic Press, London)). The results of the simulation are used to show that although cooperation degrades the performance potential of each individual, it enhances the persistence of the individual's partial solution to the problem in certain situations."     

The evolution of cooperation

Darwin recognized that natural selection could not favor a trait in one species solely for the benefit of another species. The modern, selfish-gene view of the world suggests that cooperation between individuals, whether of the same species or different species, should be especially vulnerable to the evolution of noncooperators. Yet, cooperation is prevalent in nature both within and between species. What special circumstances or mechanisms thus favor cooperation? Currently, evolutionary biology offers a set of disparate explanations, and a general framework for this breadth of models has not emerged. Here, we offer a tripartite structure that links previously disconnected views of cooperation. We distinguish three general models by which cooperation can evolve and be maintained: (i) directed reciprocation--cooperation with individuals who give in return; (ii) shared genes--cooperation with relatives (e.g., kin selection); and (iii) byproduct benefits--cooperation as an incidental consequence of selfish action. Each general model is further subdivided. Several renowned examples of cooperation that have lacked explanation until recently--plant-rhizobium symbioses and bacteria-squid light organs--fit squarely within this framework. Natural systems of cooperation often involve more than one model, and a fruitful direction for future research is to understand how these models interact to maintain cooperation in the long term.     

The evolution of resistance through costly acquired immunity

We examine the evolutionary dynamics of resistance to parasites through acquired immunity. Resistance can be achieved through the innate mechanisms of avoidance of infection and reduced pathogenicity once infected, through recovery from infection and through remaining immune to infection: acquired immunity. We assume that each of these mechanisms is costly to the host and find that the evolutionary dynamics of innate immunity in hosts that also have acquired immunity are quantitatively the same as in hosts that possess only innate immunity. However, compared with resistance through avoidance or recovery, there is less likely to be polymorphism in the length of acquired immunity within populations. Long-lived organisms that can recover at intermediate rates faced with fast-transmitting pathogens that cause intermediate pathogenicity (mortality of infected individuals) are most likely to evolve long-lived acquired immunity. Our work emphasizes that because whether or not acquired immunity is beneficial depends on the characteristics of the disease, organisms may be selected to only develop acquired immunity to some of the diseases that they encounter.     

Receiver bias for exaggerated signals in honeybees and its implications for the evolution of floral displays

Mechanistic models of animal signals posit the occurrence of biases on the part of receivers that could be potentially exploited by signallers. Such biases are most obvious when animals are confronted with exaggerated versions of signals they normally encounter. Signalling systems operating in plant-pollinator interactions are among the most highly coevolved, with plants using a variety of floral signals to attract pollinators. A number of observations suggest that pollinators preferentially visit larger floral displays although the benefit of this to either the plant or the pollinator is not always clear. We use a standard dual-choice experimental protocol to show that honeybees display a receiver bias for exaggerated size and colour contrast--two important components of floral signals--even when such signals do not indicate quality. We discuss the implications of this receiver bias for the evolution of floral displays and its possible exploitation by invading alien plants.     

Visual effects in great bowerbird sexual displays and their implications for signal design

It is often assumed that the primary purpose of a male''s sexual display is to provide information about quality, or to strongly stimulate prospective mates, but other functions of courtship displays have been relatively neglected. Male great bowerbirds (Ptilonorhynchus nuchalis) construct bowers that exploit the female''s predictable field of view (FOV) during courtship displays by creating forced perspective illusions, and the quality of illusion is a good predictor of mating success. Here, we present and discuss two additional components of male courtship displays that use the female''s predetermined viewpoint: (i) the rapid and diverse flashing of coloured objects within her FOV and (ii) chromatic adaptation of the female''s eyes that alters her perception of the colour of the displayed objects. Neither is directly related to mating success, but both are likely to increase signal efficacy, and may also be associated with attracting and holding the female''s attention. Signal efficacy is constrained by trade-offs between the signal components; there are both positive and negative interactions within multicomponent signals. Important signal components may have a threshold effect on fitness rather than the often assumed linear relationship.     

The tomato genome: implications for plant breeding, genomics and evolution

ABSTRACT: The genome sequence of tomato (Solanum lycopersicum), one of the most important vegetable crops, has recently been decoded. We address implications of the tomato genome for plant breeding, genomics and evolutionary studies, and its potential to fuel future crop biology research.     

Science, religion, and society: the problem of evolution in america

American resistance to accepting evolution is uniquely high among First World countries. This is due largely to the extreme religiosity of the United States, which is much higher than that of comparably advanced nations, and to the resistance of many religious people to the facts and supposed implications of evolution. The prevalence of religious belief in the United States suggests that outreach by scientists alone will not have a huge effect in increasing the acceptance of evolution, nor will the strategy of trying to convince the faithful that evolution is compatible with their religion. Because creationism is a symptom of religion, another strategy to promote evolution involves loosening the grip of faith on America. This is easier said than done, for recent sociological surveys show that religion is highly correlated with the dysfunctionality of a society, and various measures of societal health show that the United States is one of the most socially dysfunctional First World countries. Widespread acceptance of evolution in America, then, may have to await profound social change.     

The evolution of one-shot cooperation: An experiment

Can people rationally advance their own material interests by cooperating in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas, even when there is no possibility of being punished for defection? We outline a model that describes how such cooperation could evolve if the presence of a cooperative disposition can be discerned by others. We test the model's key assumption with an experiment in which we find that subjects who interacted for thirty minutes before playing one-shot prisoner's dilemmas with two others were substantially more accurate than chance in predicting their partner's decisions.     

The evolution of costly mate choice against segregation distorters

The evolution of female preference for male genetic quality remains a controversial topic in sexual selection research. One well‐known problem, known as the lek paradox, lies in understanding how variation in genetic quality is maintained in spite of natural selection and sexual selection against low‐quality alleles. Here, we theoretically investigate a scenario where females pay a direct fitness cost to avoid males carrying an autosomal segregation distorter. We show that preference evolution is greatly facilitated under such circumstances. Because the distorter is transmitted in a non‐Mendelian fashion, it can be maintained in the population despite directional sexual selection. The preference helps females avoid fitness costs associated with the distorter. Interestingly, we find that preference evolution is limited if the choice allele induces a very strong preference or if distortion is very strong. Moreover, the preference can only persist in the presence of a signal that reliably indicates a male's distorter genotype. Hence, even in a system where the lek paradox does not play a major role, costly preferences can only spread under specific circumstances. We discuss the importance of distorter systems for the evolution of costly female choice and potential implications for the use of artificial distorters in pest control.     

The evolution of function-valued traits for conditional cooperation

In this paper we study the evolution of function-valued traits for cooperation in environments that display varying degrees of population viscosity. Traits measure an individual's intrinsic propensity to cooperate in a standard bilateral Prisoner's dilemma and can be increasing, decreasing or constant functions of the probability to interact with individuals of ones own genotype. We first analyse adaptation to homogenous environments (with constant degree of viscosity). Comparing environments characterized by different degrees of viscosity, we find that the relation between viscosity and the equilibrium type distribution is not monotone. In fact, it is possible that in fluid populations (no viscosity) there is more cooperation in equilibrium than in populations with intermediate degrees of viscosity. In a second step we analyse heterogenous environments (with varying degrees of viscosity). We find that under very weak assumptions on the distribution of the viscosity parameter strictly increasing functions are always selected and under some parameter constellations they are uniquely so.     

Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games

Cooperation and spiteful behavior are still evolutionary puzzles. Costly punishment, for which the game payoff is the same as that of spiteful behavior, is one mechanism for promoting the evolution of cooperation. A spatially structured population facilitates the evolution of either cooperation or spite/punishment if cooperation is linked explicitly or implicitly with spite/punishment; a cooperator cooperates with another cooperator and punishes/spites the other type of player. Different updating rules in the evolutionary game produce different evolutionary outcomes: with one updating rule—the score-dependent viability model, in which a player dies with a probability inversely proportional to the game score and the resulting unoccupied site is colonized by one player chosen randomly—the evolution of spite/punishment is promoted more than with the other updating rule—the score-dependent fertility model, in which, after a player dies randomly, the site is colonized by a player with a higher game score. If the population has empty sites, spiteful players or punishers should have less chance to interact with others and then spite/punish others. Thus the presence of empty sites would affect the evolutionary dynamics of spite/punishment. Here, we investigated whether the presence of empty sites discourages the evolution of spite/punishment in both a lattice-structured population and a completely mixing population where players interact with others randomly, especially when the score-dependent viability model is adopted. In the lattice-structured population adopting this viability model, the presence of empty sites promoted the evolution of cooperation and did not reduce the effect of spite/punishment. In the completely mixing population, the presence of empty sites did not promote evolution of cooperation by punishment. The evolutionary dynamics of the score-dependent viability model with empty sites were close to those of the score-dependent fertility model.     

The importance of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation

Studies aimed at explaining the evolution of phenotypic traits have often solely focused on fitness considerations, ignoring underlying mechanisms. In recent years, there has been an increasing call for integrating mechanistic perspectives in evolutionary considerations, but it is not clear whether and how mechanisms affect the course and outcome of evolution. To study this, we compare four mechanistic implementations of two well-studied models for the evolution of cooperation, the Iterated Prisoner''s Dilemma (IPD) game and the Iterated Snowdrift (ISD) game. Behavioural strategies are either implemented by a 1 : 1 genotype–phenotype mapping or by a simple neural network. Moreover, we consider two different scenarios for the effect of mutations. The same set of strategies is feasible in all four implementations, but the probability that a given strategy arises owing to mutation is largely dependent on the behavioural and genetic architecture. Our individual-based simulations show that this has major implications for the evolutionary outcome. In the ISD, different evolutionarily stable strategies are predominant in the four implementations, while in the IPD each implementation creates a characteristic dynamical pattern. As a consequence, the evolved average level of cooperation is also strongly dependent on the underlying mechanism. We argue that our findings are of general relevance for the evolution of social behaviour, pleading for the integration of a mechanistic perspective in models of social evolution.     

Inter- and intra-genomic homology of the Brassica genomes: implications for their origin and evolution

In order to determine the homologous regions shared by the cultivated Brassica genomes, linkage maps of the diploid cultivated B. rapa (A genome, n = 10), B. nigra (B genome, n = 8) and B. oleracea (C genome, n = 9), were compared. We found intergenomic conserved regions but with extensitve reordering among the genomes. Eighteen linkage groups from all three species could be associated on the basis of homologous segments based on at least three common markers. Intragenomic homologous conservation was also observed for some of the chromosomes of the A, B and C genomes. A possible chromosome phylogenetic pathway based on an ancestral genome of at least five, and no more than seven chromosomes, was drawn from the chromosomal inter-relationships observed. These results demonstrate that extensive duplication and rearrangement have been involved in the formation of the Brassica genomes from a smaller ancestral genome.