Art in global context: An evolutionary/functionalist perspective for the 21<Superscript>st</Superscript> century

Regarding the arts as something peopledo — as behaviors, rather than the residue or artifacts of behavior — makes possible a theoretical grounding about their nature and importance, an endeavor that current anthropology of art has largely abandoned. A reconsideration of the suspect and largely discarded terms “functionalism” and “evolutionism” is presented in light of current evolutionary thinking. It is suggested that a contemporary reformulation of these concepts, illustrated by the author's Darwinian or “adaptationist” perspective on art, supports aims and claims of current anthropology of art, and contributes new focus and direction to its endeavors.     

Engineering Human Cooperation

In a laboratory experiment, we use a public goods game to examine the hypothesis that human subjects use an involuntary eye-detector mechanism for evaluating the level of privacy. Half of our subjects are “watched” by images of a robot presented on their computer screen. The robot—named Kismet and invented at MIT—is constructed from objects that are obviously not human with the exception of its eyes. In our experiment, Kismet produces a significant difference in behavior that is not consistent with existing economic models of preferences, either self- or other-regarding. Subjects who are “watched” by Kismet contribute 29% more to the public good than do subjects in the same setting without Kismet.     

A reexamination of Gilligan’s analysis of the female moral system

Gilligan’s (1982) refinement of Kohlberg’s theory on moral development operates on two theses: (1) females, more so than males, reach moral decisions based on the personalities of the relevant individuals; and (2) female behaviors stemming from moral decisions are based upon “care” and “responsibility for others.” This article accepts the first thesis but argues that the second is incorrect. That is, self-interest—i.e., aiding “blood” kin and/or carefully monitoring reciprocity—rather than “altruism” is argued to be the operant dynamic in forging distaff morality and resultant behavior. Six empirical examples are presented as contraindicative of Gilligan’s second thesis. Finally, it is suggested that selection for the psychological traits of independence and the mastery of subtle social chess yielded ancestral females who had more descendants—us—than did females with alternative profiles. Nancy S. Coney is a professor at Western Illinois University and is interested in both clinical and nonclinical aspects of women’s psychology. Wade C. Mackey is interested in biocultural anthropology and has authored two books on fathering:Fathering Behaviors (Plenum, 1995) andThe American Father (Plenum, 1996).     

I/We Narratives Among African American Families Raising Children with Special Needs

This paper examines a statistics debate among African American caregivers raising children with disabilities for insights into the work of “African American mothering.” Using ethnographic, narrative and discourse analyses, we delineate the work that African American mothers do—in and beyond this conversation—to cross ideological and epistemological boundaries around race and disability. Their work entails choosing to be an “I” and, in some cases, actively resisting being seen as a “they” and/or part of a collective “we” in order to chart alternative futures for themselves and their children.     

Subtropical coral-reef associated sedimentary facies characterized by molluscs (Northern Bay of Safaga, Red Sea, Egypt)

Summary The shallow marine subtropical Northern Bay of Safaga is composed of a complex pattern of sedimentary facies that are generally rich in molluscs. Thirteen divertaken bulk-samples from various sites (reef slopes, sand between coral patches, muddy sand, mud, sandy seagrass, muddy seagrass, mangrove channel) at water depths ranging from shallow subtidal to 40m were investigated with regard to their mollusc fauna >1mm, which was separated into fragments and whole individuals. Fragments make up more than 88% of the total mollusc remains of the samples, and their proportions correspond to characteristics of the sedimentary facies. The whole individuals were differentiated into 622 taxa. The most common taxon,Rissoina cerithiiformis, represented more than 5% of the total mollusc content in the samples. The main part of the fauna consists of micromolluscs, including both small adults and juveniles. Based on the results of cluster-, correspondence-, and factor analyses the fauna was grouped into several associations, each characterizing a sedimentary facies: (1) “Rhinoclavis sordidula—Corbula erythraeensis-Pseudominolia nedyma association” characterizes mud. (2) “Microcirce sp.—Leptomyaria sp. association” characterizes muddy sand. (3)”Smaragdia spp.-Perrinia stellata—Anachis exilis—assemblage” characterizes sandy seagrass. (4) “Crenella striatissima—Rastafaria calypso—Cardiates-assemblage” characterizes muddy seagrass. (5) “Glycymeris spp.-Parvicardium sueziensis-Diala spp.-assemblage” characterizes sand between coral patches. (6) “Rissoina spp.-Triphoridae —Ostreoidea-assemblage” characterizes reef slopes. (7) “Potamides conicus—Siphonaria sp. 2—assemblage” characterizes the mangrove. The seagrass fauna is related to those of sand between coral patches and reef slopes with respect to gastropod assemblages, numbers of taxa and diversity indices, and to the muddy sand fauna on the basis of bivalve assemblages and feeding strategies of bivalves. The mangrove assemblage is related to those of sand between coral patches and the reef slope with respect to taxonomic composition and feeding strategies of bivalves, but has a strong relationship to those of the fine-grained sediments when considering diversity indices. Reef slope assemblages are closely related to that of sand between coral patches in all respects, except life habits of bivalves, which distincly separates the reef slope facies from all others.     

Sacred Conceptions: Clinical Theodicies, Uncertain Science, And Technologies Of Procreation In India

This article argues that the rapid transfer of assisted conception technologies, such as in vitro fertilization, to India is not restricted merely to the modalities of offering potential biomedical resolution of infertility but includes, more crucially, how clinicians and infertile consumers assimilate the “Western technoscience” of conception. The article draws on a larger multisite ethnographic study of infertility and assisted conception in India’s five major cities and is principally based on narratives of clinicians and infertile couples and on clinic-based ethnographic observations. In this article I contend that the success or failure of assisted conception, when situated in the universe of Hindu faith, becomes a powerful critique of the “incompleteness” of the “Western” science of conception. Situating this contention in the broader context of a clinician’s faith, I assert that assisted conception—by conjoining seemingly disparate domains of the traditional and the modern, the sacred and the profane, the human and the superhuman, science and religion—produces clinical theodicies that help explain and contain the tentativeness permeating the conception technologies. The article concludes by arguing that this enchanted version of a thoroughly disenchanted worldview of biomedicine is part of a larger cultural process of indigenization of biomedicine in India.     

A minimal principle in biomechanics

Expenditure of energy under several simultaneous forms (mechanical, chemical, etc.) is associated with all muscular activity. The energy is directly related to what is commonly called exertion or effort. This paper defines “muscular effort” quantitatively in terms of some of the elements of the dynamics of the human (and animal) body. It postulates that in all likelihood the individual will, consciously or otherwise, determine his motion (or his posture, if at rest) in such a manner as to reduce his total muscular effort to a minimum consistent with imposed conditions, or “constraints”. The principle, formulated in mathematical terms, is sufficient to ascribe to the moments at all body joints—a matter generally of free choice on the part of the individual—their most likely magnitudes. It therefore renders the equations of human (and animal) motion determinate within this context. The paper also describes briefly an iteration method for the solution of these equations, once they have been made determinate. A simple illustrative application of the principle is included.     

A longitudinal investigation of gestural communication in young chimpanzees

A longitudinal study of chimpanzee gestural communication is reported. Subjects were seven 5- to 8-year-old members of a semi-natural group at the Yerkes Field Station. These were the same individuals observed byTomasello et al. (1985) four years previously. Nearly identical operational definitions and observational procedures were used in the two studies. Longitudinal comparisons between the two observation periods revealed that the development of chimpanzee gestural communication is best characterized as a series of ontogenetic adaptations: as particular social functions (e.g., nursing, playing, grooming, etc.) arise, decline, or change, gestural communication follows suit. Most gestures seem to be conventionalized by individuals in direct social interaction with conspecifics. Some gestures may be learned by “second-person imitation”—an individual copying a behavior directed to it by another individual. No evidence was found for “third-person imitation”—an individual copying a gesture used between two other individuals. Implications for the concept of chimpanzee “culture” are discussed. This research was supported in part by NIH Grant RR-00165 from the Division of Research Resources to the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center. The Yerkes Center is fully accredited by the American Association for the Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care.     

“Green water” microalgae: the leading sector in world aquaculture

Freshwater fish culture is generally considered the largest sector in world aquaculture. Several of the leading species consume “green water” plankton. This plankton—mostly microalgae (phytoplankton) and also bacteria, protozoa and zooplankton—grows in man-made fertilized water impoundments. The quantity of “green water” microalgae consumed by fish and shrimp is estimated here at a quarter billion ton fresh weight a year, about three and a half times as much as the entire recognized aquaculture. This estimate is based on the quantities of the microalgae consumed and the efficiencies of their use for growth by the main species in aquaculture. The cost of producing “green water” microalgae by the aquaculturists—mostly in SE Asia—is low. The populations in “green water” are biologically managed by the cultured fish themselves. The fish with their different feeding habits help “manage” the composition of the plankton and the overall water quality as they grow. The aquaculturists further manage “green water” through simple means, including water exchange and fertilization. Cost is remunerated partially by the income from sales of the fish and partially by bio mitigation services that “green water” polyculture ponds provide the aquaculturists in treating farm and household waste. A comprehension of the scale and importance of the microalgae sector to world aquaculture should lead to more research to improve understanding of algal population dynamics, growth factors, and efficiency of food chains. The consequent improved control of the plankton’s interaction with fish and shrimp production in “green water” will undoubtedly contribute much to the expansion in production of seafood.     

The Poetics of Purpose

Hackles have been raised in biosemiotic circles by T. L. Short’s assertion that semiosis, as defined by Peirce, entails “acting for purposes” and therefore is not found below the level of the organism (2007a:174–177). This paper examines Short’s teleology and theory of purposeful behavior and offers a remedy to the disagreement. Remediation becomes possible when the issue is reframed in the terms of the complexity sciences, which allows intentionality to be understood as the interplay between local and global aspects of a system within a system. What is called “acting for purposes” is not itself a type of behavior so much as a relationship between a dynamic system that “exists for a purpose” and its microprocesses that “serve purposes.” The “intentional object” of philosophy is recast here as the holistic self-organized dynamics of a system, which exists for the purpose of self-maintenance, and that constrains the parts’ behaviors, which serve the purpose of forming the system. (A “system” can be any emergent, e.g. an abiotic form, an adapted species, a self, a conditioned response, thought, or a set of ideas.) The self-organized whole, which is represented to the parts in their own constrained behaviors, assumes the guiding function so long attributed to the mysterious “intentional object.” If emergent self-causation is not disallowed, creative originality, as well as directionality, becomes part of the definition of purposeful behavior. Thus, key tools used here, required for understanding emergence, come from poetics rather than semoitics. In the microprocesses of self-organization, I find what I call “accidental” indices and icons — which are poetic in the sense that they involve mere metonymic contiguity and metaphoric similarity — and which are preferentially selected under constrained conditions allowing radically new connections to habituate into an “intentional” self-organized system that, not coincidentally, has some of the emergent characteristics of a conventional symbolic system.

Don’t Call it “Darwinism”

Evolutionary biology owes much to Charles Darwin, whose discussions of common descent and natural selection provide the foundations of the discipline. But evolutionary biology has expanded well beyond its foundations to encompass many theories and concepts unknown in the 19th century. The term “Darwinism” is, therefore, ambiguous and misleading. Compounding the problem of “Darwinism” is the hijacking of the term by creationists to portray evolution as a dangerous ideology—an “ism”—that has no place in the science classroom. When scientists and teachers use “Darwinism” as synonymous with evolutionary biology, it reinforces such a misleading portrayal and hinders efforts to present the scientific standing of evolution accurately. Accordingly, the term “Darwinism” should be abandoned as a synonym for evolutionary biology.     

Consciousness is Cheap, Even if Symbols are Expensive; Metabolism and the Brain’s Dark Energy

Use of symbols, the key to the biosemiotics field as to many others, required bigger brains which implied a promissory note for greater energy consumption; symbols are obviously expensive. A score years before the current estimate of 18–20% for the human brain’s metabolic demand on the organism, it was known that neural tissue is metabolically dear. This paper first discusses two evolutionary responses to this demand, on both of which there is some consensus. The first, assigning care of altricial infants with burgeoning brains (and in human infants the metabolic demand peaks at 65% of the total) to “allomothers” is not unique to humans. The second, using relatively small neurons as primates do, risks misfires past a certain minimal value. Moreover, in apparent paradox, there is an increasing consensus that large “Von Economo” neurons are critical for communication. This paper’s main contribution is the discussion of two further evolutionary tricks. The first is the use of self-similarity in the cortex, both in structure and process, to allow the cortex readily—and in energetic terms, parsimoniously—to shift between states in a high-dimensional space. This leads to discussion of the kind of formalism appropriate to model these shifts, a formalism which—it is tentatively suggested—may do double duty for the modeling of symbolic thought. The second trick is the superimposition on the background “white noise” of neural firing of EEG-detected waves like gamma. The paper describes a method, using the Hilbert transform, of calculating the dips in energy consumption as the brain is transitioned by gamma waves. It is hypothesized that consciousness may be a spandrel, the incidental result of a neurodynamic imperative that the brain enter a maximally sensitive (in sensory terms) “zero power” state a few times a second. If that is the case, then there are obvious benefits for health in meditation, which can be viewed as a state of consciousness extended over time by limiting afferent stimuli.     

Responses to non-locomotive prey models by the praying mantis,Tenodera angustipennis Saussure

Adult females of the praying mantisTenodera angustipennis were presented with computer-generated images, and the attractiveness of “non-locomotive” prey models was examined. Mantises fixated and struck the “body and leg” model (consisting of an immobile black square on a white background with 2 black lines oscillating randomly at its sides) more frequently than the “leg” model (only oscillating lines) or the “body” model (static square only). This indicates that the model consisting of a static object and moving lines effectively elicits mantis strike behavior, although it is “non-locomotive.”     

A study on the social structure and dispersal patterns of hamadryas baboons living in a commensal group at Taif,Saudi Arabia

Three levels of hamadryas social structure—the one male unit (OMU), the band, and the troop—have been observed at all sites studied, but a fourth—the clan—has been observed at only one site, Erer-Gota, Ethiopia, during a longitudinal check of the dispersion of identified individuals. The clan is important since it appears to provide the basis for male philopatry, although comparative data is needed from other sites to confirm this. We studied a huge commensal group of hamadryas baboons (over 600 animals) in Saudi Arabia. We put ear tags on baboons between 1998 and 2004 and analyzed social structure, relying on the interactions of these tagged animals by focusing especially on their dispersal patterns from OMUs. OMU membership tended to be looser than that of the Ethiopian hamadryas. Females tended to shift between OMUs on an individual basis in our study group, whereas the collapse of an OMU was a major occasion of adult female transfer in Ethiopia. We found neither stable bands (a “band” in our study group was defined as a regional assemblage of OMUs) nor clans that lasted for several years. Some OMUs moved and transferred into neighboring areas over both the short and long term. Further, some post-adolescent males appeared to move out of the study area. The ratio of adult females in an OMU in our study group was larger than for any other documented study site, and this may be the reason for enhanced female transfer between OMUs. A large proportion of the adolescent females showed no clear membership to OMUs, and no “initial units” (commonly observed in Ethiopia) were discernible. The ease with which young males acquired adult females at the study site must have disrupted the formation of a clan, a “male-bonded society.”     

Evolutionary biology and feminism

Evolutionary biology and feminism share a variety of philosophical and practical concerns. I have tried to describe how a perspective from both evolutionary biology and feminism can accelerate the achievement of goals for both feminists and evolutionary biologists. In an early section of this paper I discuss the importance of variation to the disciplines of evolutionary biology and feminism. In the section entitled “Control of Female Reproduction” I demonstrate how insight provided by participation in life as woman and also as a feminist suggests testable hypotheses about the evolution of social behavior—hypotheses that are applicable to our investigations of the evolution of social behavior in nonhuman animals. In the section on “Deceit, Self-deception, and Patriarchal Reversals” I have overtly conceded that evolutionary biology, a scientific discipline, also represents a human cultural practice that, like other human cultural practices, may in parts and at times be characterized by deceit and self-deception. In the section on “Femininity” I have indicated how questions cast and answered and hypotheses tested from an evolutionary perspective can serve women and men struggling with sexist oppression. Patricia Adair Gowaty studies the evolution of social behavior, particularly mating systems and sex allocation, primarily in birds. She is most well-known for her long-term studies of eastern bluebirds, which began in 1977 and are on-going. She was an undergraduate at H. Sophie Newcomb College of Tulane University (1963–1967). In the late sixties and early seventies, while employed at the Bronx Zoo (New York Zoological Society), she belonged to a feminist “consciousness-raising” group. She started graduate school in 1974 at the University of Georgia and received her Ph.D. from Clemson University (1980). She had a postdoctoral position at the University of Oklahoma (1982–1983) and a visiting faculty position at Cornell University through the Visiting Professorships for Women NSF program (1983–1984) before returning to her bluebird study sites at Clemson in 1985. She has supported herself and her research efforts throughout her academic career on a series of awards and grants. She is currently (1990–1995) supported by a Research Scientist Development Award from The National Institute of Mental Health.     

Interrelations between early child development,gestational age and birth weight

Five traits of early child development were studied in 656 infants from the day of birth till 2 years of age. The infants selected for follow-up were born at 26–42 weeks of gestational age and with a birth weight accordingly ranging from 860 to 4560g. Analysis of variance was carried out for each of the following five traits which entailed the age at which a child: 1) turned himself over (turned); 2) sat unsupported for a few seconds (sat); 3) stood up (stood); 4) walked unsupported (walked); and 5) cut its first tooth (tooth). The results of this survey show no significant sex differences in the age of initial occurrence of any of the studied traits. Comparison with older siblings of the surveyed infants indicated a significant sibling resemblance component for all 5 trais, with the respective intraclass correlation coefficients ranging between 0.34 and 0.53. Gestational age and birth weight, but not “tooth”, appeared to be important messages of an infant's motor development, insofar as onset of the studied traits. The separate correlations of “turned”, “sat”, “stood” and “walked” with gestational age or weight were all negative and statistically highly significant. Research Unit — Human Population Biology, Division of Anatomy and Anthropology     

Tool-using and -making behavior in wild chimpanzees at Bossou,Guinea

The behavior of wild chimpanzees at Bossou, Guinea, was studied from November 1976 to May 1977 recognizing each chimpanzee without artificial feeding. During the study period some tool-using and tool-making behavior was observed, as follows: (1) Although water drinking using a “leaf-sponge” was not seen, that using a “leaf-spoon” was observed for taking water from the hollow of a tree. (2) “Termite fishing” was not seen in this group although there were many termite hills in the moving range of the chimpanzees. They dug termites from the hollow of a tree by pounding with a small stick. Similar use of a stick was made for digging up the resin from a tree. (3) “Aimed throwing” was frequently observed in adult males for attacking an observer, and in adolescents and juveniles as mischief against an observer or for their own play. (4) “Nut cracking” with a pair of stones was seen for removing the ovule from palm-seeds. Particular stones were repeatedly used by many chimpanzees for a long period. (5) “Branch hauling” represented difficult work. Patient and inventive manufacture of proper sticks was necessary for capturing branches which they were unable to reach normally. Local variations in the tool-using patterns and manufacturing ability of chimpanzees are discussed.     

“Less is better” and “only above threshold”: Two incompatible paradigms for human toxicity in life cycle assessment?

The absence of spatial and temporal information in the data from a typical Life Cycle Inventory puts constraints on the possibilities of subsequent Life Cycle Impact Assessment to predict actual impact. Usual methods for Life Cycle Impact Assessment (often referred to as “less is better” methods) make only limited use of spatial and temporal information, because they predict concentration increases rather than full concentrations. As a consequence it does not seem possible to evaluate whether a threshold value is surpassed. The resulting poor accordance between the predicted impact and the expected occurrence of actual impact is a major problem. This problem is particularly relevant for human toxicity assessment, since the probability of surpassing thresholds here traditionally is the main point of attention. A considerable group of practitioners suggests to follow an “only above threshold” principle by introduction of assessment tools from risk assessment and environmental impact assessment in LCA. Intensive debate is going on about possibilities and limitations of “less is better” and “only above threshold”. The debate is obscured by two underlying discussions (about no-effect-levels and about data-availability) that are partly, but not fully intertwined. Both principles tend to be given fixed positions in these discussions, and are therefore often put forward as fundamentally different and incompatible with each other. This article entwines the discussions, shows parallels between both principles, and uses these parallels to present a new method for Life Cycle Impact Assessment of human toxicity from air emissions that — with limited data requirement from Life Cycle Inventory — can take as well threshold evaluation and spatial source-differentiation into account.     

J D Bernal (1901–1971) in perspective

Conclusion We must conclude that the sub-title of Bernal’s “The Social Function of Science” — “What science does: what science could do” is still the relevant challenge and indicates Bernal’s chief contribution, besides the foundation of molecular biology to our civilization. It is manifest that resources spent on armaments are a monstrous pathological symptom of our social structure. The ancient problem of “what is property” and what may be “owned” and by whom or by what organs of society is awakening.