Naturalising purpose: from comparative anatomy to the 'adventure of reason'

Kant's analysis of the concept of natural purpose in the Critique of judgment captured several features of organisms that he argued warranted making them the objects of a special field of study, in need of a special regulative teleological principle. By showing that organisms have to be conceived as self-organizing wholes, epigenetically built according to the idea of a whole that we must presuppose, Kant accounted for three features of organisms conflated in the biological sciences of the period: adaptation, functionality and conservation of forms. Kant's unitary concept of natural purpose was subsequently split in two directions: first by Cuvier's comparative anatomy, that would draw on the idea of adaptative functions as a regulative principle for understanding in reconstituting and classifying organisms; and then by Goethe's and Geoffroy's morphology, a science of the general transformations of living forms. However, such general transformations in nature, objects of an alleged 'archaeology of nature', were thought impossible by Kant in section paragraph 80 of the Critique of judgment. Goethe made this 'adventure of reason' possible by changing the sense of 'explanation': scientific explanation was shifted from the investigation of the mechanical processes of generation of individual organisms to the unveiling of some ideal transformations of types instantiated by those organisms.     

Kant on biological teleology: Towards a two-level interpretation

According to Kant's Critique of the power of judgment, teleological considerations are unavoidable for conceptualizing organisms. Does this mean that teleology is more than merely heuristic? Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological science, teleology is taken as constitutive, though it is merely regulative on the philosophical meta level. This distinction also concerns the place of Aristotelian teleology in Kant: on the object level, the Aristotelian view is accepted, whereas on the meta level, an agnostic stance is taken concerning teleology.     

Kant on epigenesis, monogenesis and human nature: the biological premises of anthropology

The aim of this paper is to show that for Kant, a combination of epigenesis and monogenesis is the condition of possibility of anthropology as he conceives of it and that moreover, this has crucial implications for the biological dimension of his account of human nature. More precisely, I begin by arguing that Kant's conception of mankind as a natural species is based on two premises: firstly the biological unity of the human species (monogenesis of the human races); and secondly the existence of 'seeds' which may or may not develop depending on the environment (epigenesis of human natural predispositions). I then turn to Kant's account of man's natural predispositions and show that far from being limited to the issue of races, it encompasses unexpected human features such as gender, temperaments and nations. These predispositions, I argue, are means to the realisation of Nature's overall purpose for the human species. This allows me to conclude that man's biological determinism leads to the species' preservation, cultivation and civilisation.     

Organisms as natural purposes: the contemporary evolutionary perspective

Kant's conception of organisms as natural purposes raises a challenge to the adequacy of mechanistic explanation in biology. Certain features of organisms appear to be inexplicable by appeal to mechanical law alone. Some biological phenomena, it seems, can only be accounted for teleologically. Contemporary evolutionary biology has by and large ignored this challenge. It is widely held that Darwin's theory of natural selection gives us an adequate, wholly mechanical account of the nature of organisms. In contemporary biology, the category of the organism plays virtually no explanatory role. Contemporary evolutionary biology is a science of sub-organismal entities-replicators. I argue that recent advances in developmental biology demonstrate the inadequacy of sub-organismal mechanism. The category of the organism, construed as a 'natural purpose' should play an ineliminable role in explaining ontogenetic development and adaptive evolution. According to Kant the natural purposiveness of organisms cannot be demonstrated to be an objective principle in nature, nor can purposiveness figure in genuine explain. I attempt to argue, by appeal to recent work on self-organization, that the purposiveness of organisms is a natural phenomenon, and, by appeal to the apparatus of invariance explanation, that biological purposiveness provides genuine, ineliminable biological explanations.     

Mechanical explanation of nature and its limits in Kant's Critique of judgment

In this paper I discuss two questions. What does Kant understand by mechanical explanation in the Critique of judgment? And why does he think that mechanical explanation is the only type of the explanation of nature available to us? According to the interpretation proposed, mechanical explanations in the Critique of judgment refer to a particular species of empirical causal laws. Mechanical laws aim to explain nature by reference to the causal interaction between the forces of the parts of matter and the way in which they form into complex material wholes. Just like any other empirical causal law, however, mechanical laws can never be known with full certainty. The conception according to which we can explain all of nature by means of mechanical laws, it turns out, is based on what Kant calls 'regulative' or 'reflective' considerations about nature. Nothing in Kant's Critique of judgment suggests that these considerations can ever be justified by reference to how the natural world really is. I suggest that what, upon first consideration, appears to be a thoroughly mechanistic conception of nature in Kant is much more limited than one might have expected.     

Naturalising purpose: From comparative anatomy to the ‘adventure of reason’

Kant’s analysis of the concept of natural purpose in the Critique of judgment captured several features of organisms that he argued warranted making them the objects of a special field of study, in need of a special regulative teleological principle. By showing that organisms have to be conceived as self-organizing wholes, epigenetically built according to the idea of a whole that we must presuppose, Kant accounted for three features of organisms conflated in the biological sciences of the period: adaptation, functionality and conservation of forms. Kant’s unitary concept of natural purpose was subsequently split in two directions: first by Cuvier’s comparative anatomy, that would draw on the idea of adaptative functions as a regulative principle for understanding in reconstituting and classifying organisms; and then by Goethe’s and Geoffroy’s morphology, a science of the general transformations of living forms. However, such general transformations in nature, objects of an alleged ‘archaeology of nature’, were thought impossible by Kant in §80 of the Critique of judgment. Goethe made this ‘adventure of reason’ possible by changing the sense of ‘explanation’: scientific explanation was shifted from the investigation of the mechanical processes of generation of individual organisms to the unveiling of some ideal transformations of types instantiated by those organisms.     

Kant's concept of natural purpose and the reflecting power of judgement

This paper examines how in the 'Critique of teleological judgment' Kant characterized the concept of natural purpose in relation to and in distinction from the concepts of nature and the concept of purpose he had developed in his other critical writings. Kant maintained that neither the principles of mechanical science nor the pure concepts of the understanding through which we determine experience in general provide adequate conceptualizations of the unique capacities of organisms. He also held that although the concept of natural purpose was derived through reflection upon an analogy to human purposive activity in artistic production and moral action, it articulates a unique notion of intrinsic purposiveness. Kant restricted his critical reflections on organisms to phenomena that can be given to us in experience, criticizing speculations on their first origins or final purpose. But I argue that he held that the concept of natural purpose is a product of the reflecting power of judgment, rather than an empirical concept, and represents only the relation of things to our power of judgment. Yet it is necessary for the identification of organisms as organized and self-organizing, and as subject to unique norms and causal relations between parts and whole.     

Kant’s concept of natural purpose and the reflecting power of judgement

This paper examines how in the ‘Critique of teleological judgment’ Kant characterized the concept of natural purpose in relation to and in distinction from the concepts of nature and the concept of purpose he had developed in his other critical writings. Kant maintained that neither the principles of mechanical science nor the pure concepts of the understanding through which we determine experience in general provide adequate conceptualizations of the unique capacities of organisms. He also held that although the concept of natural purpose was derived through reflection upon an analogy to human purposive activity in artistic production and moral action, it articulates a unique notion of intrinsic purposiveness. Kant restricted his critical reflections on organisms to phenomena that can be given to us in experience, criticizing speculations on their first origins or final purpose. But I argue that he held that the concept of natural purpose is a product of the reflecting power of judgment, rather than an empirical concept, and represents only the relation of things to our power of judgment. Yet it is necessary for the identification of organisms as organized and self-organizing, and as subject to unique norms and causal relations between parts and whole.     

Mathematics and biology: a Kantian view on the history of pattern formation theory

Driesch's statement, made around 1900, that the physics and chemistry of his day were unable to explain self-regulation during embryogenesis was correct and could be extended until the year 1972. The emergence of theories of self-organisation required progress in several areas including chemistry, physics, computing and cybernetics. Two parallel lines of development can be distinguished which both culminated in the early 1970s. Firstly, physicochemical theories of self-organisation arose from theoretical (Lotka 1910-1920) and experimental work (Bray 1920; Belousov 1951) on chemical oscillations. However, this research area gained broader acceptance only after thermodynamics was extended to systems far from equilibrium (1922-1967) and the mechanism of the prime example for a chemical oscillator, the Belousov-Zhabotinski reaction, was deciphered in the early 1970s. Secondly, biological theories of self-organisation were rooted in the intellectual environment of artificial intelligence and cybernetics. Turing wrote his The chemical basis of morphogenesis (1952) after working on the construction of one of the first electronic computers. Likewise, Gierer and Meinhardt's theory of local activation and lateral inhibition (1972) was influenced by ideas from cybernetics. The Gierer-Meinhardt theory provided an explanation for the first time of both spontaneous formation of spatial order and of self-regulation that proved to be extremely successful in elucidating a wide range of patterning processes. With the advent of developmental genetics in the 1980s, detailed molecular and functional data became available for complex developmental processes, allowing a new generation of data-driven theoretical approaches. Three examples of such approaches will be discussed. The successes and limitations of mathematical pattern formation theory throughout its history suggest a picture of the organism, which has structural similarity to views of the organic world held by the philosopher Immanuel Kant at the end of the eighteenth century.     

Kant goes fishing: Kant and the right to property in environmental resources

We can observe a connection between some serious environmental problems caused by the overexploitation of environmental resources and the particular conceptions of property rights that are claimed to hold with regard to these resources. In this paper, I investigate whether Kant's conception of property rights might constitute a basis for justifying property regimes that would overcome some of these environmental problems. Kant's argument for the right to property, put forward in his Doctrine of right, is complex. In Section , I attempt an interpretation. Section works out the defining characteristics of the conception of property rights that Kant's argument establishes and investigates their implications for determining property regimes in environmental resources. Kant proposes a minimalist notion of the right to property as a triadic relation between persons with regard to an object, justified only on the condition that it is universalizable in the given circumstances. I argue that this notion offers a promising account for determining property relations with regard to environmental resources. By way of illustration, in Section , I focus on an example of Kantian property rights in one type of environmental resource: the marine fisheries.     

How was teleology eliminated in early molecular biology?

This paper approaches the issue of the status of teleological reasoning in contemporary biology through a historical examination of events of the 1930s that surrounded Niels Bohr’s efforts to introduce ‘complementarity’ into biological discussions. The paper examines responses of three theoretical physicists who engaged boundary questions between the biological and physical sciences in this period in response to Bohr—Ernst Pascual Jordan (1902–80), Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961), and Max Delbrück (1906–81). It is claimed that none of these physicists sufficiently understood Bohr’s ‘critical’ teleological arguments, which are traced to the lineage of Kant and Harald Høffding and their respective resolutions of the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment. The positions of these four historical actors are discussed in terms of Ernst Mayr’s distinction of ‘teleological,’ ‘teleomatic,’ and ‘teleonomic’ explanations. A return to some of the views articulated by Bohr, and behind him, to Høffding and Kant, is claimed to provide a framework for reintroducing a ‘critical’ teleology into biological discussions.     

On the origin of the typological/population distinction in Ernst Mayr’s changing views of species, 1942–1959

Ernst Mayr’s typological/population distinction is a conceptual thread that runs throughout much of his work in systematics, evolutionary biology, and the history and philosophy of biology. Mayr himself claims that typological thinking originated in the philosophy of Plato and that population thinking was first introduced by Charles Darwin and field naturalists. A more proximate origin of the typological/population thinking, however, is found in Mayr’s own work on species. This paper traces the antecedents of the typological/population distinction by detailing Mayr’s changing views of species between 1942 and 1955. During this period, Mayr struggles to refine the biological species concept in the face of tensions that exist between studying species locally and studying them as geographically distributed collections of variable populations. The typological/population distinction is first formulated in 1955, when Mayr generalizes from the type concept versus the population concept in taxonomy to typological versus population thinking in biology more generally. Mayr’s appeal to the more general distinction between typological and population thinking coincides with the waning status of natural history and evolutionary biology that occurs in the early 1950s and the distinction plays an important role in Mayr’s efforts to legitimate the natural historical sciences.     

Genetic perspectives on the natural history of fish mating systems

Molecular analyses of bird and mammal populations have shown that social mating systems must be distinguished from genetic mating systems. This distinction is important in fishes also, where the potential for extrapair spawning and intraspecific brood parasitism is especially great. We review studies on fishes that have used molecular markers to document biological parentage and genetic mating systems in nature, particularly in species with extended parental care of offspring. On average, nest-guarding adults parented about 70-95% of their custodial offspring, and approximately one-third of the nests were cuckolded to some extent. Furthermore, nearly 10% of the assayed nests contained offspring tended by foster fathers either because of nest takeovers or egg thievery. On average, fish that provide parental care on nests spawned with more mates than did fish with internal fertilization and pregnancy. Overall, genetic markers have both confirmed and quantified the incidence of several reproductive and other social behaviors of fishes, and have thereby enhanced our knowledge of piscine natural history.     

Interpretation of life history pattern in the Digenea

The nature of secondary multiplication in the Digenea, especially in the molluscan host is reviewed. The concepts of alternation of generations and polyembryony are examined and discarded as unhelpful. In the absence of both meiosis and recognizable ovaries in miracidia, sporocysts and rediae, there are no criteria for distinguishing diploid ameiotic ‘eggs’ from other diploid cells, and thus no clear distinction is possible between ameiotic parthenogenesis and budding from a single cell. Comparison with other groups, especially the coelenterates, suggests budding and metamorphosis of larval stages as the explanation of digenean life histories. Functional equivalents of the digenean larval stages are indicated in other groups.The germinal lineage possibly preserves a line of totipotential cells, which by avoiding differentiation retain an unrestricted range of phenotypic responses. By dividing as infrequently as possible, consistent with the production of an adequate number of germinal cells, the lineage is, to a degree, preserved from the creation and incorporation of molecular errors, and thus the subsequent life history stages are protected from the incorporation of ‘senescence’ acquired at an earlier stage in the life history. Restriction of sexuality to the fluke stage usually promotes outbreeding between genetically diverse adults, each with the proven capacity to complete successfully all life history phases.     

Natural history of model organisms: The secret (group) life of Drosophila melanogaster larvae and why it matters to developmental ecology

1. Model organisms such as Drosophila melanogaster have been key tools for advancing our fundamental and applied knowledge in biological and biomedical sciences. However, model organisms have become intertwined with the idea of controlled and stable laboratory environments, and their natural history has been overlooked.
2. In holometabolous insects, lack of natural history information on larval ecology has precluded major advances in the field of developmental ecology, especially in terms of manipulations of population density early in life (i.e., larval density). This is because of relativistic and to some extent, arbitrary methodologies employed to manipulate larval densities in laboratory studies. As a result, these methodologies render comparisons between species impossible, precluding our understanding of macroevolutionary responses to population densities during development that can be derived from comparative studies.
3. We recently proposed a new conceptual framework to address this issue, and here, we provide the first natural history investigation of Drosophila melanogaster larval density under such framework. First, we characterized the distribution of larval densities in a wild population of D. melanogaster using rotting apples as breeding substrate in a suburban area in Sweden.
4. Next, we compiled the commonly used methodologies for manipulating larval densities in laboratory studies from the literature and found that the majority of laboratory studies identified did not manipulate larval densities below or above the densities observed in nature, suggesting that we have yet to study true life history and physiological responses to low and high population densities during D. melanogaster development.
5. This is, to our knowledge, the first direct natural history account of larval density in nature for this model organism. Our study paves the way for a more integrated view of organismal biology which re‐incorporates natural history of model organisms into hypothesis‐driven research in developmental ecology.

     

Franz Boas: cultural history for the present, or obsolete natural history?

Recently, some neo-Boasian anthropologists have portrayed Boas as an anthropologist with a deep sense of history, of the individual, and of agency. Focusing on Boas's ethnographic practice rather than his theoretical and programmatic statements, I first find an 'atomistic' (opposite of holistic) ethnographer, and a deep convergence between this atomism and Linnaean-type natural history. In Foucault and Jacob's interpretation of natural history, this means studying socio-cultural phenomena through their external manifestations, and removes historicity, and even individual cultures, from Boas's ethnography. Reviewing possible counter-evidence from the holistic Boas (his work on style, meaning, the 'genius of a people,' texts, secondary explanations, and psychology), I retrieve the same natural historian, and the same atomism. All these facets of his practice thus appear as surface manifestations of this underlying épistémè , which provides a single interpretative framework making it possible to integrate most of his ethnographic work. Overall, this worldview leaves little, or no, room for individuals and their agency.     

Evolutionary history of Caenorhabditis elegans inferred from microsatellites: evidence for spatial and temporal genetic differentiation and the occurrence of outbreeding

Although diverse biological disciplines employ the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans as a highly efficient laboratory model system, little is known about its natural history. We investigated its evolutionary past using 10 polymorphic trinucleotide and tetranucleotide microsatellites, derived from across the whole genome. These microsatellites were analyzed from the 35 previously available natural isolates from different parts of the world and also 23 new strains isolated from northwest Germany. Our results highlight that C. elegans lineages differentiate genetically with respect to geographic distance and, to a lesser extent, differences in the time of strain isolation. The latter indicates some turnover of strain genotypes at specific locations. Our data also demonstrate the coexistence of highly diverse genotypes in the population from northwest Germany, which is best explained by recent migration events. Furthermore, selfing is confirmed as the primary mode of reproduction for this hermaphroditic nematode in nature. Importantly, we also find evidence for the occurrence of occasional outbreeding. Taken together, these results support the previous notion that C. elegans is a colonizer, whereby selfing may permit rapid dispersal within new habitats even in the absence of potential mates, whereas occasional outcrossing may serve to compensate for the disadvantages of inbreeding. Such information about the natural history of C. elegans should be of great value for an in-depth understanding of the complexity of this organism, including its multifaceted developmental, neurological, or molecular genetic pathways.     

Mechanical explanation of nature and its limits in Kant’s Critique of judgment

In this paper I discuss two questions. What does Kant understand by mechanical explanation in the Critique of judgment? And why does he think that mechanical explanation is the only type of the explanation of nature available to us? According to the interpretation proposed, mechanical explanations in the Critique of judgment refer to a particular species of empirical causal laws. Mechanical laws aim to explain nature by reference to the causal interaction between the forces of the parts of matter and the way in which they form into complex material wholes. Just like any other empirical causal law, however, mechanical laws can never be known with full certainty. The conception according to which we can explain all of nature by means of mechanical laws, it turns out, is based on what Kant calls ‘regulative’ or ‘reflective’ considerations about nature. Nothing in Kant’s Critique of judgment suggests that these considerations can ever be justified by reference to how the natural world really is. I suggest that what, upon first consideration, appears to be a thoroughly mechanistic conception of nature in Kant is much more limited than one might have expected.     

Uexküll, Peirce, and Other Affinities Between Biosemiotics and Biolinguistics

The purpose of this paper is to describe some parallels and theoretical affinities between biosemiotics and biolinguistics. In particular, this paper examines the importance of Uexküll's Umwelt and Peircean abduction as foundational concepts for Sebeok's biosemiotics and Chomsky's biolinguistic program. Other affinities touched upon in this paper include references to concepts articulated by Immanuel Kant, Konrad Lorenz, Marcel Florkin, François Jacob, C.H. Waddington, D'Arcy Thomson and Ernst Haeckel. While both programs share theoretical influences and historiographical parallels in their mid-century origins continuing throughout the late twentieth century, recent articulations of biosemiotics and biolinguistics privilege different intellectual styles and methods of inquiry that define their future objectives as intellectual movements. The goal of this paper is to show that, in spite of the different scholarly agendas of biosemiotics and biolinguistics, both movements share a theoretical and philosophical core in Peirce and Uexküll.