Demography, altruism, and the benefits of budding

It is now widely appreciated that competition between kin inhibits the evolution of altruism. In standard population genetics models, it is difficult for indiscriminate altruism towards social partners to be favoured at all. The reason is that while limited dispersal increases the kinship of social partners it also intensifies local competition. One solution that has received very little attention is if individuals disperse as groups (budding dispersal), as this relaxes local competition without reducing kinship. Budding behaviour is widespread through all levels of biological organization, from early protocellular life to cooperatively breeding vertebrates. We model the effects of individual dispersal, budding dispersal, soft selection and hard selection to examine the conditions under which altruism is favoured. More generally, we examine how these various demographic details feed into relatedness and scale of competition parameters that can be included into Hamilton's rule.     

Friendship, cliquishness, and the emergence of cooperation

The evolution of cooperation is a central problem in biology and the social sciences. While theoretical work using the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) has shown that cooperation among non-kin can be sustained among reciprocal strategies (i.e. tit-for-tat), these results are sensitive to errors in strategy execution, cyclical invasions by free riders, and the specific ecology of strategies. Moreover, the IPD assumes that a strategy's probability of playing the PD game with other individuals is independent of the decisions made by others. Here, we remove the assumption of independent pairing by studying a more plausible cooperative dilemma in which players can preferentially interact with a limited set of known partners and also deploy longer-term accounting strategies that can counteract the effects of random errors. We show that cooperative strategies readily emerge and persist in a range of noisy environments, with successful cooperative strategies (henceforth, cliquers) maintaining medium-term memories for partners and low thresholds for acceptable cooperation (i.e. forgiveness). The success of these strategies relies on their cliquishness-a propensity to defect with strangers if they already have an adequate number of partners. Notably, this combination of medium-term accounting, forgiveness, and cliquishness fits with empirical studies of friendship and other long-term relationships among humans.     

Culture and the evolution of human cooperation

The scale of human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. All of the available evidence suggests that the societies of our Pliocene ancestors were like those of other social primates, and this means that human psychology has changed in ways that support larger, more cooperative societies that characterize modern humans. In this paper, we argue that cultural adaptation is a key factor in these changes. Over the last million years or so, people evolved the ability to learn from each other, creating the possibility of cumulative, cultural evolution. Rapid cultural adaptation also leads to persistent differences between local social groups, and then competition between groups leads to the spread of behaviours that enhance their competitive ability. Then, in such culturally evolved cooperative social environments, natural selection within groups favoured genes that gave rise to new, more pro-social motives. Moral systems enforced by systems of sanctions and rewards increased the reproductive success of individuals who functioned well in such environments, and this in turn led to the evolution of other regarding motives like empathy and social emotions like shame.     

Local competition sparks concerns for fairness in the ultimatum game

Humans reject uneven divisions of resources, even at personal cost. This is observed in countless experiments using the ultimatum game, where a proposer offers to divide a resource with a responder who either accepts the division or rejects it (whereupon both earn zero). Researchers debate why humans evolved a psychology that is so averse to inequity within partnerships. We suggest that the scale of competition is crucial: under local competition with few competitors, individuals reject low offers, because they cannot afford to be disadvantaged relative to competitors. If one competes against the broader population (i.e. global competition), then it pays to accept low offers to increase one''s absolute pay-off. We support this intuition with an illustrative game-theoretical model. We also conducted ultimatum games where participants received prizes based on pay-offs relative to immediate partners (local competition) versus a larger group (global competition). Participants demanded higher offers under local competition, suggesting that local competition increases people''s demands for fairness and aversion to inequality.     

Ravens judge competitors through experience with play caching

Complex social behavior builds on the mutual judgment of individuals as cooperation partners and competitors [1]. Play can be used for assessing the others' dispositions in humans and nonhuman mammals [2], whereas little is known about birds. Recently, food-caching corvids have been found to rival primates in their ability to judge the behaviors and intentions of others in competition for hidden food [3]. Here, we show that ravens Corvus corax quickly learn to assess the competitive strategies of unfamiliar individuals through interactions with them over caches with inedible items and subsequently apply this knowledge when caching food. We confronted birds with two human experimenters who acted differently when birds cached plastic items: the pilferer stole the cached objects, whereas the onlooker did not. Birds responded to the actions of both experimenters with changing the location of their next object caches, either away from or toward the humans, as if they were testing their pilfering dispositions. In contrast, ravens instantly modified their caching behavior with food, preventing only the competitive human from finding the caches. Playful object caching in a social setting could thus aid ravens in evaluating others' pilfering skills.     

Cooperation and conflict between women in the family

Here I review recent research on reproductive conflict between females in families and how it influences their reproductive behaviour. Kin selection can favor cooperation between parent and offspring, siblings, or unrelated co‐residents who share interests in other family members such as grand‐offspring. However, these are also the individuals most likely to be sharing resources, and so conflict can also emerge. While substantial interest has arisen in evolutionary anthropology, especially over the last two decades, in the possibility of cooperative breeding in humans, less attention has been paid to reproductive conflict among female kin. Communal breeding in animals is generally understood as emerging from competition over the resources needed to breed. Competition for household resources is a problem that also faces human families. Models suggest that in some circumstances, inclusive fitness can be maximized by sharing reproduction rather than harming relatives by fighting with them, even if the shares that emerge are not equal. Thus, competition and cooperation turn out to be strongly related to each other. Reproductive competition within and between families may have underpinned the biological evolution of fertility patterns (such as menopause) and the cultural evolution of marriage, residence, and inheritance norms (such as late male marriage or primogeniture), which can enhance cooperation and minimize the observed incidence of such conflicts.     

INDIRECT GENETIC EFFECTS INFLUENCE ANTIPREDATOR BEHAVIOR IN GUPPIES: ESTIMATES OF THE COEFFICIENT OF INTERACTION PSI AND THE INHERITANCE OF RECIPROCITY

How and why cooperation evolves, particularly among nonrelatives, remains a major paradox for evolutionary biologists and behavioral ecologists. Although much attention has focused on fitness consequences associated with cooperating, relatively little is known about the second component of evolutionary change, the inheritance of cooperation or reciprocity. The genetics of behaviors that can only be expressed in the context of interactions are particularly difficult to describe because the relevant genes reside in multiple social partners. Indirect genetic effects (IGEs) describe the influence of genes carried in social partners on the phenotype of a focal individual and thus provide a novel approach to quantifying the genetics underlying interactions such as reciprocal cooperation. We used inbred lines of guppies and a novel application of IGE theory to describe the dual genetic control of predator inspection and social behavior, both classic models of reciprocity. We identified effects of focal strain, social group strain, and interactions between focal and group strains on variation in focal behavior. We measured ψ, the coefficient of the interaction, which describes the degree to which an individual's phenotype is influenced by the phenotype of its social partners. The genetic identity of social partners substantially influences inspection behavior, measures of threat assessment, and schooling and does so in positively reinforcing manner. We therefore demonstrate strong IGEs for antipredator behavior that represent the genetic variation necessary for the evolution of reciprocity.     

Spite and the scale of competition

In recent years there has been a large body of theoretical work examining how local competition can reduce and even remove selection for altruism between relatives. However, it is less well appreciated that local competition favours selection for spite, the relatively neglected ugly sister of altruism. Here, we use extensions of social evolution theory that were formulated to deal with the consequences for altruism of competition between social partners, to illustrate several points on the evolution of spite. Specifically, we show that: (i) the conditions for the evolution of spite are less restrictive than previously assumed; (ii) previous models which have demonstrated selection for spite often implicitly assumed local competition; (iii) the scale of competition must be allowed for when distinguishing different forms of spite (Hamiltonian vs. Wilsonian); (iv) local competition can enhance the spread of spiteful greenbeards; and (v) the theory makes testable predictions for how the extent of spite should vary dependent upon population structure and average relatedness.     

From local interactions to population dynamics in site-based models of ecology

A central problem in ecology is relating the interactions of individuals-described in terms of competition, predation, interference, etc.-to the dynamics of the populations of these individuals-in terms of change in numbers of individuals over time. Here, we address this problem for a class of site-based ecological models, where local interactions between individuals take place at a finite number of discrete resource sites over non-overlapping generations and, between generations, individuals move randomly between sites over the entire system. Such site-based models have previously been applied to a wide range of ecological systems: from those involving contest or scramble competition for resources to host-parasite interactions and meta-populations. We show how the population dynamics of site-based models can be accurately approximated by and understood through deterministic and stochastic difference equations. Conversely, we use the inverse of this approximation to show what implicit assumptions are made about individual interactions by modelling of population dynamics in terms of difference equations. To this end, we prove a useful and general theorem: that any model in our class of site-based models has a corresponding stochastic difference equation population model, by which it can be approximated. This theorem allows us to calculate long-term population dynamics, evolutionary stable strategies and, by extending our theory to account for large deviations, extinction probabilities for a wide range of site-based systems. Our methodology is then illustrated to various examples of between species competition, predator-prey interactions and co-operation.     

The development of contingent reciprocity in children

Cooperation between nonrelatives is common in humans. Reciprocal altruism is a plausible evolutionary mechanism for cooperation within unrelated pairs, as selection may favor individuals who selectively cooperate with those who have cooperated with them in the past. Reciprocity is often observed in humans, but there is only limited evidence of reciprocal altruism in other primate species, raising questions about the origins of human reciprocity. Here, we explore how reciprocity develops in a sample of American children ranging from 3 to 7.5 years of age, and also compare children's behavior to that of chimpanzees in prior studies to gain insight into the phylogeny of human reciprocity. Children show a marked tendency to respond contingently to both prosocial and selfish acts, patterns that have not been seen among chimpanzees in prior studies. Our results show that reciprocity increases markedly with age in this population of children, and by about 5.5 years of age children consistently match the previous behavior of their partners.     

Sex-biased dispersal of adults mediates the evolution of altruism among juveniles

Population viscosity has been proposed as an important mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The idea is that if individuals do not disperse far during the course of their lives, they will tend to interact with their genealogical relatives, which may give kin-selected benefits for cooperation. However, in the simplest model of population structure, the evolution of cooperation is unaffected by the rate of dispersal, owing to dispersal also mediating competition between social partners. This surprising result has generated much research interest in recent years. Here I show that dispersal does matter if there is a sex difference in dispersal rate, even when the expression of cooperation is not conditional upon the actor's dispersal status or sex. In particular, I show that cooperation among juveniles is relatively favoured when there is a small sex bias in adult dispersal in favour of the sex with the greatest variance in reproductive success, and is relatively disfavoured when this sex bias is large or in the opposite direction. This is because dispersal by individuals of each sex can have different consequences for the genetic structure of the population.     

Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans

Reciprocal altruism has been the backbone of research on the evolution of altruistic behaviour towards non-kin, but recent research has begun to apply costly signalling theory to this problem. In addition to signalling resources or abilities, public generosity could function as a costly signal of cooperative intent, benefiting altruists in terms of (i) better access to cooperative relationships and (ii) greater cooperation within those relationships. When future interaction partners can choose with whom they wish to interact, this could lead to competition to be more generous than others. Little empirical work has tested for the possible existence of this 'competitive altruism'. Using a cooperative monetary game with and without opportunities for partner choice and signalling cooperative intent, we show here that people actively compete to be more generous than others when they can benefit from being chosen for cooperative partnerships, and the most generous people are correspondingly chosen more often as cooperative partners. We also found evidence for increased scepticism of altruistic signals when the potential reputational benefits for dishonest signalling were high. Thus, this work supports the hypothesis that public generosity can be a signal of cooperative intent, which people sometimes 'fake' when conditions permit it.     

Cooperation in humans: competition between groups and proximate emotions

Understanding the ultimate and proximate mechanisms that favour cooperation remains one of the greatest challenges in the biological and social sciences. A number of theoretical studies have suggested that competition between groups may have played a key role in the evolution of cooperation within human societies, and similar ideas have been discussed for other organisms, especially cooperative breeding vertebrates. However, there is a relative lack of empirical work testing these ideas. Our experiment found, in public goods games with humans, that when groups competed with other groups for financial rewards, individuals made larger contributions within their own groups. In such situations, participants were more likely to regard their group mates as collaborators rather than competitors. Variation in contribution among individuals, either with or without intergroup competition, was positively correlated with individuals' propensity to regard group mates as collaborators. We found that the levels of both guilt and anger individuals experienced were a function of their own contributions and those of their group mates. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that the level of cooperation can be influenced by proximate emotions, which vary with the degree of intergroup competition.     

LIMITED DISPERSAL, BUDDING DISPERSAL, AND COOPERATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

Numerous theoretical studies have investigated how limited dispersal may provide an explanation for the evolution of cooperation, by leading to interactions between relatives. However, despite considerable theoretical attention, there has been a lack of empirical tests. In this article, we test how patterns of dispersal influence the evolution of cooperation, using iron-scavenging in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa as our cooperative trait. We found that relatively limited dispersal does not favor cooperation. The reason for this is that although limited dispersal increases the relatedness between interacting individuals, it also leads to increased local competition for resources between relatives. This result supports Taylor's prediction that in the simplest possible scenario, the effects of increased relatedness and local competition exactly cancel out. In contrast, we show that one way for cooperation to be favored is if individuals disperse in groups (budding dispersal), because this maintains high relatedness while reducing local competition between relatives (relatively global competition).     

Genetic differentiation and the evolution of cooperation in chimpanzees and humans

It has been proposed that human cooperation is unique among animals for its scale and complexity, its altruistic nature and its occurrence among large groups of individuals that are not closely related or are even strangers. One potential solution to this puzzle is that the unique aspects of human cooperation evolved as a result of high levels of lethal competition (i.e. warfare) between genetically differentiated groups. Although between-group migration would seem to make this scenario unlikely, the plausibility of the between-group competition model has recently been supported by analyses using estimates of genetic differentiation derived from contemporary human groups hypothesized to be representative of those that existed during the time period when human cooperation evolved. Here, we examine levels of between-group genetic differentiation in a large sample of contemporary human groups selected to overcome some of the problems with earlier estimates, and compare them with those of chimpanzees. We find that our estimates of between-group genetic differentiation in contemporary humans are lower than those used in previous tests, and not higher than those of chimpanzees. Because levels of between-group competition in contemporary humans and chimpanzees are also similar, these findings suggest that the identification of other factors that differ between chimpanzees and humans may be needed to provide a compelling explanation of why humans, but not chimpanzees, display the unique features of human cooperation.     

Why cooperation is not running away

A growing number of experimental and theoretical studies show the importance of partner choice as a mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperation, especially in humans. In this paper, we focus on the question of the precise quantitative level of cooperation that should evolve under this mechanism. When individuals compete to be chosen by others, their level of investment in cooperation evolves towards higher values, a process called competitive altruism, or runaway cooperation. Using a classic adaptive dynamics model, we first show that when the cost of changing partner is low, this runaway process can lead to a profitless escalation of cooperation. In the extreme, when partner choice is entirely frictionless, cooperation even increases up to a level where its cost entirely cancels out its benefit. That is, at evolutionary equilibrium, individuals gain the same payoff than if they had not cooperated at all. Second, importing models from matching theory in economics we, however, show that when individuals can plastically modulate their choosiness in function of their own cooperation level, partner choice stops being a runaway competition to outbid others and becomes a competition to form the most optimal partnerships. In this case, when the cost of changing partner tends towards zero, partner choice leads to the evolution of the socially optimum level of cooperation. This last result could explain the observation that human cooperation seems to be often constrained by considerations of social efficiency.     

The cancellation effect at the group level

Group selection models combine selection pressure at the individual level with selection pressure at the group level. Cooperation can be costly for individuals, but beneficial for the group, and therefore, if individuals are sufficiently much assorted, and cooperators find themselves in groups with disproportionately many other cooperators, cooperation can evolve. The existing literature on group selection generally assumes that competition between groups takes place in a well-mixed population of groups, where any group competes with any other group equally intensely. Competition between groups however might very well occur locally; groups may compete more intensely with nearby than with far-away groups. We show that if competition between groups is indeed local, then the evolution of cooperation can be hindered significantly by the fact that groups with many cooperators will mostly compete against neighboring groups that are also highly cooperative, and therefore harder to outcompete. The existing empirical method for determining how conducive a group structured population is to the evolution of cooperation also implicitly assumes global between-group competition, and therefore gives (possibly very) biased estimates.     

Partner choice creates fairness in humans

Many studies demonstrate that partner choice has played an important role in the evolution of human cooperation, but little work has tested its impact on the evolution of human fairness. In experiments involving divisions of money, people become either over-generous or over-selfish when they are in competition to be chosen as cooperative partners. Hence, it is difficult to see how partner choice could result in the evolution of fair, equal divisions. Here, we show that this puzzle can be solved if we consider the outside options on which partner choice operates. We conduct a behavioural experiment, run agent-based simulations and analyse a game-theoretic model to understand how outside options affect partner choice and fairness. All support the conclusion that partner choice leads to fairness only when individuals have equal outside options. We discuss how this condition has been met in our evolutionary history, and the implications of these findings for our understanding of other aspects of fairness less specific than preferences for equal divisions of resources.     

Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation

In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.     

Schoolchildren cooperate more successfully with non-kin than with siblings

Cooperation plays a key role in the development of advanced societies and can be stabilized through shared genes (kinship) or reciprocation. In humans, cooperation among kin occurs more readily than cooperation among non-kin. In many organisms, cooperation can shift with age (e.g. helpers at the nest); however, little is known about developmental shifts between kin and non-kin cooperation in humans. Using a cooperative game, we show that 3- to 10-year-old French schoolchildren cooperated less successfully with siblings than with non-kin children, whether or not non-kin partners were friends. Furthermore, children with larger social networks cooperated better and the perception of friendship among non-friends improved after cooperating. These results contrast with the well-established preference for kin cooperation among adults and indicate that non-kin cooperation in humans might serve to forge and extend non-kin social relationships during middle childhood and create opportunities for future collaboration beyond kin. Our results suggest that the current view of cooperation in humans may only apply to adults and that future studies should focus on how and why cooperation with different classes of partners might change during development in humans across cultures as well as other long-lived organisms.