Beyond learning fixed rules and social cues: abstraction in the social arena

Abstraction is a central idea in many areas of physical comparative cognition such as categorization, numerical competence or problem solving. This idea, however, has rarely been applied to comparative social cognition. In this paper, I propose that the notion of abstraction can be applied to the social arena and become an important tool to investigate the social cognition and behaviour processes in animals. To make this point, I present recent evidence showing that chimpanzees know about what others can see and about what others intend. These data do not fit either low-level mechanisms based on stimulus-response associations or high-level explanations based on metarepresentational mechanisms such as false belief attribution. Instead, I argue that social abstraction, in particular the development of concepts such as seeing in others, is key to explaining the behaviour of our closest relative in a variety of situations.     

Rights, indirect harms and the non-identity problem

The non‐identity problem is the problem of grounding moral wrongdoing in cases in which an action affects who will exist in the future. Consider a woman who intentionally conceives while on medication that is harmful for a fetus. If the resulting child is disabled as a result of the medication, what makes the woman's action morally wrong? I argue that an explanation in terms of harmful rights violations fails, and I focus on Peter Markie's recent rights‐based defense. Markie's analysis rests on the notion of an indirect harm, and I show that the calculation of an indirect harm relies on an improper baseline for the determination of whether or not an action adversely affects a patient's interests. I also defend an impersonal duty‐based analysis of the wrongdoing in non‐identity cases against an objection by Markie. I close by arguing that the rights‐based analysis is insensitive to context and that context is morally relevant in the determination of the moral valence of actions in cases of non‐identity. This failure provides a pro tanto reason to favor an impersonal duty‐based analysis of the wrongdoing in non‐identity cases.     

The debate over risk-related standards of competence

This discussion paper continues the debate over risk-related standards of mental competence which appears in Bioethics 5. Dan Brock there defends an approach to mental competence in patients which defines it as being relative to differing standards, more or less rigorous depending on the degree of risk involved in proposed treatments. But Mark Wicclair raises a problem for this approach: if significantly different levels of risk attach, respectively, to accepting and refusing the same treatment, then it is possible, on this account, for a patient to be considered competent to accept, but not refuse, the treatment, or vice versa. I argue that this puzzle does not constitute a genuine problem for a risk-related standard.
To this end I focus on the situation where, of two mutually exclusive options, one is riskier, but offering more pronounced benefit, while the other is safer, but offering less benefit. I argue for this proposition: it can take far less insight to know that the safe option is good than to know that the risky option is better. Now say one is actually informed enough to know that the safe option is good, but not enough to know whether the risky option is better; in such a case one is competent to say yes to that first option (the safe one), but not to say yes to the other. (I argue in passing that Pascal's Wager can be interpreted as having precisely this deliberative structure.)
I thus conclude that cases do indeed exist where one can be competent to say yes but not no, or vice versa; and that it is thus not an anomaly in the risk-related standard that it entails the existence of such cases.     

COMPETENCE,PRACTICAL RATIONALITY AND WHAT A PATIENT VALUES

According to the principle of patient autonomy, patients have the right to be self‐determining in decisions about their own medical care, which includes the right to refuse treatment. However, a treatment refusal may legitimately be overridden in cases where the decision is judged to be incompetent. It has recently been proposed that in assessments of competence, attention should be paid to the evaluative judgments that guide patients' treatment decisions. In this paper I examine this claim in light of theories of practical rationality, focusing on the difficult case of an anorexic person who is judged to be competent and refuses treatment, thereby putting themselves at risk of serious harm. I argue that the standard criteria for competence assess whether a treatment decision satisfies the goals of practical decision‐making, and that this same criterion can be applied to a patient's decision‐guiding commitments. As a consequence I propose that a particular understanding of practical rationality offers a theoretical framework for justifying involuntary treatment in the anorexia case.     

ADAPTIONISM—30 YEARS AFTER GOULD AND LEWONTIN

Gould and Lewontin's 30-year-old critique of adaptionism fundamentally changed the discourse of evolutionary biology. However, with the influx of new ideas and scientific traditions from genomics into evolutionary biology, the old adaptionist controversies are being recycled in a new context. The insight gained by evolutionary biologists, that functional differences cannot be equated to adaptive changes, has at times not been appreciated by the genomics community. In this comment, I argue that even in the presence of both functional data and evidence for selection from DNA sequence data, it is still difficult to construct strong arguments in favor of adaptation. However, despite the difficulties in establishing scientific arguments in favor of specific historic evolutionary events, there is still much to learn about evolution from genomic data.     

Life history theory and human reproductive behavior

The purpose of this article is to develop a model of life history theory that incorporates environmental influences, contextual influences, and heritable variation. I argue that physically or psychologically stressful environments delay maturation and the onset of reproductive competence. The social context is also important, and here I concentrate on the opportunity for upward social mobility as a contextual influence that results in delaying reproduction and lowering fertility in the interest of increasing investment in children. I also review evidence that variation in life history strategies is influenced by genetic variation as well. Finally, I show that cultural shifts in the social control of sexual behavior have had differential effects on individuals predisposed to high- versus low-investment reproductive strategies.     

Ambiguities and Asymmetries in Consent and Refusal: Reply to Manson

John Harris claims that is it ‘palpable nonsense’ to suggest that ‘a child (or anyone) might competently consent to a treatment but not be competent to refuse it.’ In ‘Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative Powers Give Rise to the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal’ Neil Manson aims to explain away the apparent oddness of this asymmetry of consent and refusal, by appealing to the idea of shared normative powers, presenting joint bank accounts as an example. In this article, I will argue that Manson's account fails to explain away the oddness. Rather, I will argue that there are ambiguities to which Manson has not paid sufficient attention. In fact, as odd as it may sound, I argue that Manson actually agrees with Harris (at least in relation to the asymmetry of competence). He fails to recognize that he agrees with Harris because he is not careful enough to distinguish between different asymmetries, which I have labelled the asymmetries of choice, permissibility and competence.     

Generating and testing predictions about community structure: Which theory is relevant and can it be tested with observational data?

Three issues are discussed relevant to the controversy over using null models and observational data on guild structure to test community-level predictions based on limiting similarity theory. First, I argue that most limiting similarity theory is not based on reasonable assumptions for plants and that the theory that is relevant does not generate any predictions about expected guild proportionality on a small spatial scale. Therefore, regardless of adequacy of the statistical methods, the predictions being tested by the body of literature using null models to test for niche limitation are unlikely to be relevant in most plant comunities. Second, assuming that the predictions are after all worth being tested, I argue that most tests using the guild approach do not provide adequate explanations of how the defined guilds could lead to greater competition within vs. between guilds. If this is not true for the particular guilds used, the predictions of guild proportionality or size constancy will not be valid. Third, I address the controversy over whether field experiments can provide more solid evidence than observational data about the role of competition in determining community structure by (1) suggesting methods of dealing with potential drawbacks of field experiments, and (2) suggesting alternative experimental approaches for directly addressing issues about community structure.     

Cultural longevity: Morin on cultural lineages

Morin has written a rich and valuable book. Its main aim is to isolate the factors involved in maintaining behavioural lineages over time, and to understand how these factors might interact. In doing so, it takes issue with the abstract and idealised models and arguments of dual-inheritance theorists, which are alleged in this account to rely on an overly simplistic notion of imitative learning. Morin’s book is full of ethnographic, anthropological, and psychological research, and there is much to commend in it. However, Morin’s arguments against the dual-inheritance theorists are less convincing when put under scrutiny, and his positive picture which includes appeals to ostensive communication, intrinsic appeal and cultural attraction has some difficulties. I argue that when we contrast dual-inheritance theorists and Morin, we find that there may be fewer differences and greater commonalities than Morin’s book might suggest.     

Risk-related standards of competence: continuing the debate over risk-related standards of competence

This discussion paper addresses Ian Wilks' defence of the risk-related standard of competence that appears in Bioethics 11 . Wilks there argues that the puzzle posed by Mark Wicclair in Bioethics 5 against Dan Brock's argument in favour of a risk-related standard of competence — namely that Brock's argument allows for situations of asymmetrical competence — is not a genuine problem for a risk-related standard of competence. To show this, Wilks presents what he believes to be two examples of real situations in which asymmetrical competence arises.
I argue that insofar as Wilks equivocates two senses of competence in his examples — namely, competence to perform a task and competence in performing a task — Wilks is unable to illustrate the existence of real situations of asymmetrical competence. By examining the way in which Wilks equivocates two senses of competence in his examples, and by applying the results of this examination to the problem of patient competency within the medical field, I argue that not only does Wilks fail to show that situations of asymmetrical competence exist, but he is also unable to provide a foundation for understating how the risk-related standard of competence can strike a balance between an individual's autonomy and benevolent intervention.
I thus conclude that insofar as Wilks fails to answer the objections raised by Wicclair and others against the risk-related standard of competence, the risk-related standard of competence continues to be undermined by the problem of asymmetrical competence.     

Social class differences in infant mortality: the problem of competing hypotheses

The authors acknowledge there is no agreed upon explanation of the social class gradient in infant mortality. Some individuals favor explanations based on natural or social selection; some stress the influence of environmental circumstances. Often, theories are presented in articles in such a way that implies an absolute choice is needed. The authors critically examine such a controversial article to point out that erroneous conclusions may be reached and attention may be diverted away from the basic concern of improving infant survival. The controversial article argues that maternal competence is responsible for infant survival. This competence comes from the attributes of intelligence, education, and initiative, which are genetically determined. The attributes are distributed differently between social classes, as evidenced by the social mobility of women in marriage. Class differences in genetically determined maternal competence, therefore, explain the social class gradient in infant mortality. The authors argue that the article is based on the assumption that the issues can be analyzed as mutually exclusive alternatives. For example, the 1st dichotomy is that socially mobile women are either swamped or uplifted by their new environment, or that the women are stratified socially through marriage, on the basis of certain personal attributes such as intelligence, education, health, and height. The 1st option is ignored on the basis that evidence is cited to support the 2nd option, and no allowance is made for the possibility that both explanations may play a part. The differences in opinions about the hypotheses reflect varying political implications. Much well-founded evidence about environmental health risks, for example, are dangerously ignored, such as poor housing or inadequate housing.     

Phenotypic plasticity and diversity in insects

Phenotypic plasticity in general and polyphenic development in particular are thought to play important roles in organismal diversification and evolutionary innovation. Focusing on the evolutionary developmental biology of insects, and specifically that of horned beetles, I explore the avenues by which phenotypic plasticity and polyphenic development have mediated the origins of novelty and diversity. Specifically, I argue that phenotypic plasticity generates novel targets for evolutionary processes to act on, as well as brings about trade-offs during development and evolution, thereby diversifying evolutionary trajectories available to natural populations. Lastly, I examine the notion that in those cases in which phenotypic plasticity is underlain by modularity in gene expression, it results in a fundamental trade-off between degree of plasticity and mutation accumulation. On one hand, this trade-off limits the extent of plasticity that can be accommodated by modularity of gene expression. On the other hand, it causes genes whose expression is specific to rare environments to accumulate greater variation within species, providing the opportunity for faster divergence and diversification between species, compared with genes expressed across environments. Phenotypic plasticity therefore contributes to organismal diversification on a variety of levels of biological organization, thereby facilitating the evolution of novel traits, new species and complex life cycles.     

Professional Hubris and its Consequences: Why Organizations of Health‐Care Professions Should Not Adopt Ethically Controversial Positions

In this article, I argue that professional healthcare organizations such as the AMA and ANA ought not to take controversial stances on professional ethics. I address the best putative arguments in favor of taking such stances, and argue that none are convincing. I then argue that the sort of stance‐taking at issue has pernicious consequences: it stands to curb critical thought in social, political, and legal debates, increase moral distress among clinicians, and alienate clinicians from their professional societies. Thus, because there are no good arguments in favor of stance‐taking and at least some risks in doing so, professional organizations should refrain from adopting the sort of ethically controversial positions at issue.     

Assisted migration within species range ignores biotic interactions and lacks evidence

In the context of climate change, many plant species may have problems adapting or dispersing rapidly enough to keep pace with changing environmental conditions. Given these potential problems, some experts argue against using local plant ecotypes for ecosystem restoration. Instead, they propose to use foreign ecotypes that are adapted to the predicted climate in an approach called assisted migration within species range or predictive provenancing. I argue that such actions may cause a mismatch in biotic interactions and have negative effects on other organisms. As such, assisted migration should only be considered in cases when the local ecotypes would fail to ensure ecosystem services. In fact, there is little experimental evidence on the assisted migration approach so far, and what little there is does not seem to support its use. Even in altered climates, local ecotypes mostly performed equally well or better than foreign ones selected for their adaptations to these climates. The reason is that even if adaptation to climate plays a role, this factor may be overridden by other drivers of local adaptation, such as soil or biotic interactions. Despite assisted migration being a popular concept that is repeatedly commended in scientific literature and propagated among practitioners, it should not be considered a universal tool to improve restoration outcomes during climate change. Given the lack of hard experimental data, I call for large‐scale multispecies experimental studies that will provide the necessary evidence to derive general guidelines and recommendations for management of ecosystems during climate change.     

Withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration for patients in a permanent vegetative state: changing tack

In the United States, the decision of whether to withdraw or continue to provide artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) for patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) is placed largely in the hands of surrogate decision-makers, such as spouses and immediate family members. This practice would seem to be consistent with a strong national emphasis on autonomy and patient-centered healthcare. When there is ambiguity as to the patient's advanced wishes, the presumption has been that decisions should weigh in favor of maintaining life, and therefore, that it is the withdrawal rather than the continuation of ANH that requires particular justification. I will argue that this default position should be reversed. Instead, I will argue that the burden of justification lies with those who would continue artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH), and in the absence of knowledge as to the patient's advanced wishes, it is better to discontinue ANH. In particular, I will argue that among patients in PVS, there is not a compelling interest in being kept alive; that in general, we commit a worse violation of autonomy by continuing ANH when the patient's wishes are unknown; and that more likely than not, the maintenance of ANH as a bridge to a theoretical future time of recovery goes against the best interests of the patient.     

Thermometers: something for statistical geneticists to think about

In human genetics, we measure the strength of statistical evidence using a variety of maximized likelihood ratios, LODs, and empirical p values. I argue here that these statistics have highly undesirable properties as evidence measures when applied to complex disorders. Among other deficiencies, I show that when following up on an interesting finding, they will tend to erroneously indicate diminished evidence as more data are considered (e.g., the LOD will tend to go down at a linked locus as the sample size increases). This violates a fundamental assumption underlying standard linkage and association designs in which we first scan the genome for our best signals, and then follow up at those genomic positions with additional data. I argue here for a coherent theoretical approach to formalizing statistical evidence measures, and derive a set of minimal requirements that any evidence measure should meet, drawing heavily on an analogy with the thermometer. I speculate that measures of evidence that come closer to meeting these requirements will do a better job of finding and characterizing genes, and I propose an alternative evidence metric as a step in this direction.     

Evolutionary Psychology, Human Universals, and the Standard Social Science Model

Proponents of evolutionary psychology take the existence of humanuniversals to constitute decisive evidence in favor of their view. Ifthe same social norms are found in culture after culture, we have goodreason to believe that they are innate, they argue. In this paper Ipropose an alternative explanation for the existence of humanuniversals, which does not depend on them being the product of inbuiltpsychological adaptations. Following the work of Brian Skyrms, I suggestthat if a particular convention possesses even a very small advantageover competitors, whatever the reason for that advantage, we shouldexpect it to become the norm almost everywhere. Tiny advantages aretranslated into very large basins of attraction, in the language of gametheory. If this is so, universal norms are not evidence for innatepsychological adaptations at all. Having shown that the existence ofuniversals is consistent with the so-called Standard Social ScienceModel, I turn to a consideration of the evidence, to show that thisstyle of explanation is preferable to the evolutionary explanation, atleast with regard to patterns of gender inequality.     

The Central Dogma as a thesis of causal specificity

I present a reconstruction of F.H.C. Crick's two 1957 hypotheses 'Sequence Hypothesis' and 'Central Dogma' in terms of a contemporary philosophical theory of causation. Analyzing in particular the experimental evidence that Crick cited, I argue that these hypotheses can be understood as claims about the actual difference-making cause in protein synthesis. As these hypotheses are only true if restricted to certain nucleic acids in certain organisms, I then examine the concept of causal specificity and its potential to counter claims about causal parity of DNA and other cellular components. I first show that causal specificity is a special kind of invariance under interventions, namely invariance of generalizations that range over finite sets of discrete variables. Then, I show that this notion allows the articulation of a middle ground in the debate over causal parity.     

Risk and disease

The way that diseases such as high blood pressure (hypertension), high cholesterol, and diabetes are defined is closely tied to ideas about modifiable risk. In particular, the threshold for diagnosing each of these conditions is set at the level where future risk of disease can be reduced by lowering the relevant parameter (of blood pressure, low-density lipoprotein, or blood glucose, respectively). In this article, I make the case that these criteria, and those for diagnosing and treating other "risk-based diseases," reflect an unfortunate trend towards reclassifying risk as disease. I closely examine stage 1 hypertension and high cholesterol and argue that many patients diagnosed with these "diseases" do not actually have a pathological condition. In addition, though, I argue that the fact that they are risk factors, rather than diseases, does not diminish the importance of treating them, since there is good evidence that such treatment can reduce morbidity and mortality. For both philosophical and ethical reasons, however, the conditions should not be labeled as pathological. The tendency to reclassify risk factors as diseases is an important trend to examine and critique.     

Adaptation or exaptation? The case of the human hand

A controversy of relevance to the study of biological form involves the concept of adaptation. This controversy is illustrated by the structure and function of the human hand. A review of the principal definitions of adaptation points to two main problems: (1) they are qualitative and make reference to the whole structure (or substructural feature) and (2) they are based on the idea of natural selection as a moulding factor. The first problem would be solved by a definition that encompasses quantitative measures of the effects of selection, drawing on new advances in the comparative method. The second problem is deeper and presents greater conceptual difficulties. I will argue that the idea of natural selection as a moulding factor depends on the notion of a genetic program for development. But regarding the hand, experimental evidence on limb development challenges the idea of a genetic program for skeletal pattern formation, undermining a simple application of standard adaptationist concepts. These considerations lead to a revised definition of adaptation and interpretation of the evolutionary determinants of the hand’s form.