A Bayesian Attractor Model for Perceptual Decision Making

Even for simple perceptual decisions, the mechanisms that the brain employs are still under debate. Although current consensus states that the brain accumulates evidence extracted from noisy sensory information, open questions remain about how this simple model relates to other perceptual phenomena such as flexibility in decisions, decision-dependent modulation of sensory gain, or confidence about a decision. We propose a novel approach of how perceptual decisions are made by combining two influential formalisms into a new model. Specifically, we embed an attractor model of decision making into a probabilistic framework that models decision making as Bayesian inference. We show that the new model can explain decision making behaviour by fitting it to experimental data. In addition, the new model combines for the first time three important features: First, the model can update decisions in response to switches in the underlying stimulus. Second, the probabilistic formulation accounts for top-down effects that may explain recent experimental findings of decision-related gain modulation of sensory neurons. Finally, the model computes an explicit measure of confidence which we relate to recent experimental evidence for confidence computations in perceptual decision tasks.     

Braving Difficult Choices Alone: Children's and Adolescents' Medical Decision Making

Objective

What role should minors play in making medical decisions? The authors examined children''s and adolescents'' desire to be involved in serious medical decisions and the emotional consequences associated with them.

Methods

Sixty-three children and 76 adolescents were presented with a cover story about a difficult medical choice. Participants were tested in one of four conditions: (1) own informed choice; (2) informed parents'' choice to amputate; (3) informed parents'' choice to continue a treatment; and (4) uninformed parents'' choice to amputate. In a questionnaire, participants were asked about their choices, preference for autonomy, confidence, and emotional reactions when faced with a difficult hypothetical medical choice.

Results

Children and adolescents made different choices and participants, especially adolescents, preferred to make the difficult choice themselves, rather than having a parent make it. Children expressed fewer negative emotions than adolescents. Providing information about the alternatives did not affect participants'' responses.

Conclusions

Minors, especially adolescents, want to be responsible for their own medical decisions, even when the choice is a difficult one. For the adolescents, results suggest that the decision to be made, instead of the agent making the decision, is the main element influencing their emotional responses and decision confidence. For children, results suggest that they might be less able than adolescents to project how they would feel. The results, overall, draw attention to the need to further investigate how we can better involve minors in the medical decision-making process.     

Human and Machine Learning in Non-Markovian Decision Making

Humans can learn under a wide variety of feedback conditions. Reinforcement learning (RL), where a series of rewarded decisions must be made, is a particularly important type of learning. Computational and behavioral studies of RL have focused mainly on Markovian decision processes, where the next state depends on only the current state and action. Little is known about non-Markovian decision making, where the next state depends on more than the current state and action. Learning is non-Markovian, for example, when there is no unique mapping between actions and feedback. We have produced a model based on spiking neurons that can handle these non-Markovian conditions by performing policy gradient descent [1]. Here, we examine the model’s performance and compare it with human learning and a Bayes optimal reference, which provides an upper-bound on performance. We find that in all cases, our population of spiking neurons model well-describes human performance.     

Bayesian LASSO,Scale Space and Decision Making in Association Genetics

Background

LASSO is a penalized regression method that facilitates model fitting in situations where there are as many, or even more explanatory variables than observations, and only a few variables are relevant in explaining the data. We focus on the Bayesian version of LASSO and consider four problems that need special attention: (i) controlling false positives, (ii) multiple comparisons, (iii) collinearity among explanatory variables, and (iv) the choice of the tuning parameter that controls the amount of shrinkage and the sparsity of the estimates. The particular application considered is association genetics, where LASSO regression can be used to find links between chromosome locations and phenotypic traits in a biological organism. However, the proposed techniques are relevant also in other contexts where LASSO is used for variable selection.

Results

We separate the true associations from false positives using the posterior distribution of the effects (regression coefficients) provided by Bayesian LASSO. We propose to solve the multiple comparisons problem by using simultaneous inference based on the joint posterior distribution of the effects. Bayesian LASSO also tends to distribute an effect among collinear variables, making detection of an association difficult. We propose to solve this problem by considering not only individual effects but also their functionals (i.e. sums and differences). Finally, whereas in Bayesian LASSO the tuning parameter is often regarded as a random variable, we adopt a scale space view and consider a whole range of fixed tuning parameters, instead. The effect estimates and the associated inference are considered for all tuning parameters in the selected range and the results are visualized with color maps that provide useful insights into data and the association problem considered. The methods are illustrated using two sets of artificial data and one real data set, all representing typical settings in association genetics.     

Posterior Probability Matching and Human Perceptual Decision Making

Probability matching is a classic theory of decision making that was first developed in models of cognition. Posterior probability matching, a variant in which observers match their response probabilities to the posterior probability of each response being correct, is being used increasingly often in models of perception. However, little is known about whether posterior probability matching is consistent with the vast literature on vision and hearing that has developed within signal detection theory. Here we test posterior probability matching models using two tools from detection theory. First, we examine the models’ performance in a two-pass experiment, where each block of trials is presented twice, and we measure the proportion of times that the model gives the same response twice to repeated stimuli. We show that at low performance levels, posterior probability matching models give highly inconsistent responses across repeated presentations of identical trials. We find that practised human observers are more consistent across repeated trials than these models predict, and we find some evidence that less practised observers more consistent as well. Second, we compare the performance of posterior probability matching models on a discrimination task to the performance of a theoretical ideal observer that achieves the best possible performance. We find that posterior probability matching is very inefficient at low-to-moderate performance levels, and that human observers can be more efficient than is ever possible according to posterior probability matching models. These findings support classic signal detection models, and rule out a broad class of posterior probability matching models for expert performance on perceptual tasks that range in complexity from contrast discrimination to symmetry detection. However, our findings leave open the possibility that inexperienced observers may show posterior probability matching behaviour, and our methods provide new tools for testing for such a strategy.     

Evidence Accumulation and Choice Maintenance Are Dissociated in Human Perceptual Decision Making

Perceptual decision making in monkeys relies on decision neurons, which accumulate evidence and maintain choices until a response is given. In humans, several brain regions have been proposed to accumulate evidence, but it is unknown if these regions also maintain choices. To test if accumulator regions in humans also maintain decisions we compared delayed and self-paced responses during a face/house discrimination decision making task. Computational modeling and fMRI results revealed dissociated processes of evidence accumulation and decision maintenance, with potential accumulator activations found in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, right inferior frontal gyrus and bilateral insula. Potential maintenance activation spanned the frontal pole, temporal gyri, precuneus and the lateral occipital and frontal orbital cortices. Results of a quantitative reverse inference meta-analysis performed to differentiate the functions associated with the identified regions did not narrow down potential accumulation regions, but suggested that response-maintenance might rely on a verbalization of the response.     

Human Decision Making Based on Variations in Internal Noise: An EEG Study

Perceptual decision making is prone to errors, especially near threshold. Physiological, behavioural and modeling studies suggest this is due to the intrinsic or ‘internal’ noise in neural systems, which derives from a mixture of bottom-up and top-down sources. We show here that internal noise can form the basis of perceptual decision making when the external signal lacks the required information for the decision. We recorded electroencephalographic (EEG) activity in listeners attempting to discriminate between identical tones. Since the acoustic signal was constant, bottom-up and top-down influences were under experimental control. We found that early cortical responses to the identical stimuli varied in global field power and topography according to the perceptual decision made, and activity preceding stimulus presentation could predict both later activity and behavioural decision. Our results suggest that activity variations induced by internal noise of both sensory and cognitive origin are sufficient to drive discrimination judgments.     

Social Influences in Sequential Decision Making

People often make decisions in a social environment. The present work examines social influence on people’s decisions in a sequential decision-making situation. In the first experimental study, we implemented an information cascade paradigm, illustrating that people infer information from decisions of others and use this information to make their own decisions. We followed a cognitive modeling approach to elicit the weight people give to social as compared to private individual information. The proposed social influence model shows that participants overweight their own private information relative to social information, contrary to the normative Bayesian account. In our second study, we embedded the abstract decision problem of Study 1 in a medical decision-making problem. We examined whether in a medical situation people also take others’ authority into account in addition to the information that their decisions convey. The social influence model illustrates that people weight social information differentially according to the authority of other decision makers. The influence of authority was strongest when an authority''s decision contrasted with private information. Both studies illustrate how the social environment provides sources of information that people integrate differently for their decisions.     

The Human Factor: Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Humanized Perception in Moral Decision Making

The extent to which people regard others as full-blown individuals with mental states (“humanization”) seems crucial for their prosocial motivation towards them. Previous research has shown that decisions about moral dilemmas in which one person can be sacrificed to save multiple others do not consistently follow utilitarian principles. We hypothesized that this behavior can be explained by the potential victim’s perceived humanness and an ensuing increase in vicarious emotions and emotional conflict during decision making. Using fMRI, we assessed neural activity underlying moral decisions that affected fictitious persons that had or had not been experimentally humanized. In implicit priming trials, participants either engaged in mentalizing about these persons (Humanized condition) or not (Neutral condition). In subsequent moral dilemmas, participants had to decide about sacrificing these persons’ lives in order to save the lives of numerous others. Humanized persons were sacrificed less often, and the activation pattern during decisions about them indicated increased negative affect, emotional conflict, vicarious emotions, and behavioral control (pgACC/mOFC, anterior insula/IFG, aMCC and precuneus/PCC). Besides, we found enhanced effective connectivity between aMCC and anterior insula, which suggests increased emotion regulation during decisions affecting humanized victims. These findings highlight the importance of others’ perceived humanness for prosocial behavior - with aversive affect and other-related concern when imagining harming more “human-like” persons acting against purely utilitarian decisions.     

Trait Anxiety Has Effect on Decision Making under Ambiguity but Not Decision Making under Risk

Previous studies have reported that trait anxiety (TA) affects decision making. However, results remain largely inconsistent across studies. The aim of the current study was to further address the interaction between TA and decision making. 304 subjects without depression from a sample consisting of 642 participants were grouped into high TA (HTA), medium TA (MTA) and low TA (LTA) groups based on their TA scores from State Trait Anxiety Inventory. All subjects were assessed with the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) that measures decision making under ambiguity and the Game of Dice Task (GDT) that measures decision making under risk. While the HTA and LTA groups performed worse on the IGT compared to the MTA group, performances on the GDT between the three groups did not differ. Furthermore, the LTA and HTA groups showed different individual deck level preferences in the IGT: the former showed a preference for deck B indicating that these subjects focused more on the magnitude of rewards, and the latter showed a preference for deck A indicating significant decision making impairment. Our findings suggest that trait anxiety has effect on decision making under ambiguity but not decision making under risk and different levels of trait anxiety related differently to individual deck level preferences in the IGT.     

Separating Variability and Uncertainty in Environmental Risk Assessment—Making Choices

This article reviews some of the current guidance concerning the separation of variability and uncertainty in presenting the results of human health and ecological risk assessments. Such guidance and some of the published examples of its implementation using two-stage Monte Carlo simulation methods have not emphasized the fact that there is considerable judgment involved in determining which input parameters can be modeled as purely variable or purely uncertain, and which require explicit treatment in both dimensions. Failure to discuss these choices leads to confusion and misunderstanding of the proposed methods. We conclude with an example illustrating some of the reasoning and statistical calculations that might be used to inform such choices.     

Intergroup Conflict and Rational Decision Making

The literature has been relatively silent about post-conflict processes. However, understanding the way humans deal with post-conflict situations is a challenge in our societies. With this in mind, we focus the present study on the rationality of cooperative decision making after an intergroup conflict, i.e., the extent to which groups take advantage of post-conflict situations to obtain benefits from collaborating with the other group involved in the conflict. Based on dual-process theories of thinking and affect heuristic, we propose that intergroup conflict hinders the rationality of cooperative decision making. We also hypothesize that this rationality improves when groups are involved in an in-group deliberative discussion. Results of a laboratory experiment support the idea that intergroup conflict –associated with indicators of the activation of negative feelings (negative affect state and heart rate)– has a negative effect on the aforementioned rationality over time and on both group and individual decision making. Although intergroup conflict leads to sub-optimal decision making, rationality improves when groups and individuals subjected to intergroup conflict make decisions after an in-group deliberative discussion. Additionally, the increased rationality of the group decision making after the deliberative discussion is transferred to subsequent individual decision making.     

How Expert Advice Influences Decision Making

People often use expert advice when making decisions in our society, but how we are influenced by this advice has yet to be understood. To address this, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we provided expert and novice advice to participants during an estimation task. Participants reported that they valued expert advice more than novice advice, and activity in the ventral striatum correlated with this valuation, even before decisions with the advice were made. When using advice, participants compared their initial opinion to their advisor’s opinion. This comparison, termed the “opinion difference”, influenced advice utilization and was represented in reward-sensitive brain regions. Finally, the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex integrated both the size of the opinion difference and the advisor’s level of expertise, and average activity in this area correlated with mean advice utilization across participants. Taken together, these findings provide neural evidence for how advice engenders behavioral change during the decision-making process.     

Pupil-Linked Arousal Determines Variability in Perceptual Decision Making

Decision making between several alternatives is thought to involve the gradual accumulation of evidence in favor of each available choice. This process is profoundly variable even for nominally identical stimuli, yet the neuro-cognitive substrates that determine the magnitude of this variability are poorly understood. Here, we demonstrate that arousal state is a powerful determinant of variability in perceptual decision making. We measured pupil size, a highly sensitive index of arousal, while human subjects performed a motion-discrimination task, and decomposed task behavior into latent decision making parameters using an established computational model of the decision process. In direct contrast to previous theoretical accounts specifying a role for arousal in several discrete aspects of decision making, we found that pupil diameter was uniquely related to a model parameter representing variability in the rate of decision evidence accumulation: Periods of increased pupil size, reflecting heightened arousal, were characterized by greater variability in accumulation rate. Pupil diameter also correlated trial-by-trial with specific patterns of behavior that collectively are diagnostic of changing accumulation rate variability, and explained substantial individual differences in this computational quantity. These findings provide a uniquely clear account of how arousal state impacts decision making, and may point to a relationship between pupil-linked neuromodulation and behavioral variability. They also pave the way for future studies aimed at augmenting the precision with which people make decisions.     

Effect of Noise in Intelligent Cellular Decision Making

Similar to intelligent multicellular neural networks controlling human brains, even single cells, surprisingly, are able to make intelligent decisions to classify several external stimuli or to associate them. This happens because of the fact that gene regulatory networks can perform as perceptrons, simple intelligent schemes known from studies on Artificial Intelligence. We study the role of genetic noise in intelligent decision making at the genetic level and show that noise can play a constructive role helping cells to make a proper decision. We show this using the example of a simple genetic classifier able to classify two external stimuli.