Rationality in risk-sensitive foraging choices by starlings

Normative models of choice usually predict preferences between alternatives by computing their value according to some criterion, then identifying the alternative with greatest value. An important consequence of this procedure is captured in the economic concept of rationality, defined through a number of principles that are necessary for the existence of an ordinal scale of value upon which organisms base their choices. Violations of these principles, such as some recently reported breaches of transitivity and regularity in birds and honeybees, have strong implications for the understanding of decision mechanisms in humans and nonhumans alike. We investigated rationality in risky choice using European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris. Birds had to choose between two or three food sources, each associated with a different variance in delay to reward. In three experiments, starlings were strongly risk prone, showing regular and consistent preferences in binary and trinary choices. Preferences also satisfied weak and strong stochastic transitivity. Our results extend the generality of previous research in risk-sensitive foraging to situations where more than two alternatives are present and suggest that violations of rationality in risk-sensitive choices may be expressed only under restricted sets of conditions. Copyright 2002 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.      

Starlings uphold principles of economic rationality for delay and probability of reward

Rationality principles are the bedrock of normative theories of decision-making in biology and microeconomics, but whereas in microeconomics, consistent choice underlies the notion of utility; in biology, the assumption of consistent selective pressures justifies modelling decision mechanisms as if they were designed to maximize fitness. In either case, violations of consistency contradict expectations and attract theoretical interest. Reported violations of rationality in non-humans include intransitivity (i.e. circular preferences) and lack of independence of irrelevant alternatives (changes in relative preference between options when embedded in different choice sets), but the extent to which these observations truly represent breaches of rationality is debatable. We tested both principles with starlings (Sturnus vulgaris), training subjects either with five options differing in food delay (exp. 1) or with six options differing in reward probability (exp. 2), before letting them choose repeatedly one option out of several binary and trinary sets of options. The starlings conformed to economic rationality on both tests, showing strong stochastic transitivity and no violation of the independence principle. These results endorse the rational choice and optimality approaches used in behavioural ecology, and highlight the need for functional and mechanistic enquiring when apparent violations of such principles are observed.     

Social learning of novel route preferences in adult humans

Non-human animals can acquire novel route preferences by following knowledgeable individuals. Such socially learned route preferences can be stably maintained over multiple transmission episodes, sometimes forming long-lived traditions. In humans, preferences for familiar routes or heavily used worn trails over unfamiliar ones have been described in various contexts. However, social learning of route preferences has not been experimentally demonstrated in humans. Here, we demonstrate that social learning and tradition influence route choice. We led adult male and female participants into a room by one of two routes. Participants followed the demonstrated route choices, and later remembered and preferred this choice even when determinably suboptimal (i.e. longer and not preferred by control participants) or when the choice was indicated as arbitrary (the demonstrator took one route to retrieve a poster that had ostensibly fallen). Moreover, route preferences were stably maintained over multiple transmission episodes. We suggest that simple social learning processes, often neglected in human and primate research, can result in long-lived route preferences that may influence a range of additional behaviour patterns.     

Variation in primate decision-making under uncertainty and the roots of human economic behaviour

Uncertainty is a ubiquitous component of human economic behaviour, yet people can vary in their preferences for risk across populations, individuals and different points in time. As uncertainty also characterizes many aspects of animal decision-making, comparative research can help evaluate different potential mechanisms that generate this variation, including the role of biological differences or maturational change versus cultural learning, as well as identify human-unique components of economic decision-making. Here, we examine decision-making under risk across non-human primates, our closest relatives. We first review theoretical approaches and current methods for understanding decision-making in animals. We then assess the current evidence for variation in animal preferences between species and populations, between individuals based on personality, sex and age, and finally, between different contexts and individual states. We then use these primate data to evaluate the processes that can shape human decision-making strategies and identify the primate foundations of human economic behaviour.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates’.     

Learning What to Want: Context-Sensitive Preference Learning

We have developed a method for learning relative preferences from histories of choices made, without requiring an intermediate utility computation. Our method infers preferences that are rational in a psychological sense, where agent choices result from Bayesian inference of what to do from observable inputs. We further characterize conditions on choice histories wherein it is appropriate for modelers to describe relative preferences using ordinal utilities, and illustrate the importance of the influence of choice history by explaining all major categories of context effects using them. Our proposal clarifies the relationship between economic and psychological definitions of rationality and rationalizes several behaviors heretofore judged irrational by behavioral economists.     

The evolution of altruistic social preferences in human groups

In this paper, we consider three hypotheses to account for the evolution of the extraordinary capacity for large-scale cooperation and altruistic social preferences within human societies. One hypothesis is that human cooperation is built on the same evolutionary foundations as cooperation in other animal societies, and that fundamental elements of the social preferences that shape our species'' cooperative behaviour are also shared with other closely related primates. Another hypothesis is that selective pressures favouring cooperative breeding have shaped the capacity for cooperation and the development of social preferences, and produced a common set of behavioural dispositions and social preferences in cooperatively breeding primates and humans. The third hypothesis is that humans have evolved derived capacities for collaboration, group-level cooperation and altruistic social preferences that are linked to our capacity for culture. We draw on naturalistic data to assess differences in the form, scope and scale of cooperation between humans and other primates, experimental data to evaluate the nature of social preferences across primate species, and comparative analyses to evaluate the evolutionary origins of cooperative breeding and related forms of behaviour.     

Colour choices of naive bumble bees and their implications for colour perception

The innate preferences of inexperienced bumble bees, Bombus terrestris, for floral colour stimuli were studied using artificial flowers. The artificial flowers provided a colour pattern and consisted of a star-shaped corolla and of central colour patches similar to the nectar guide of natural flowers. The innate choice behaviour was assessed in terms of the number of approach flights from some distance towards the artificial flowers and the percentage of approach flights terminating in antennal contact with the floral guide. The colours of the floral guide, the corolla and the background were varied. It was shown that the innate flower colour preference in bumble bees has two components. 1. The frequency of approaches from a distance is correlated with the colour difference between the corolla and the background against which it is presented. If the corolla colour was constant but its background colour varied, the relative attractiveness of the corolla increased with its colour difference to the background. The colour difference assessment underlying this behaviour on a perceptual basis can be attained by means of colour opponent coding, a system well-established in Hymenoptera. 2. The frequency of antennal contacts with the floral guides relative to that of approach flights cannot be accounted for by colour opponent coding alone. Whether the approach flights are interrupted, or whether they end in an antennal contact with the nectar guide is strongly dependent on the direction (sign) of the colour difference, not only its magnitude. The choice behaviour requires a unique perceptual dimension, possibly that of colour saturation or that of hue perception comparable to components of colour perception in humans.     

Comparative evaluation and its implications for mate choice

Experiments on decision making by humans show that the choices that we make can be very labile. The magnitude of our preferences, and even our rank ordering of options, can vary according to the number and type of alternatives available for comparison. This apparent irrationality has been argued to result from our use of decision heuristics that have evolved to enable us to choose quickly and efficiently between options differing in multiple attributes. Here, we argue that, because there is also selective pressure for animals to make mating decisions quickly, and because potential mates also differ in multiple attributes, similar decision heuristics might have evolved for mate choice. Following this reasoning, the attractiveness of a given mate will depend on the others with whom he or she is being compared, rather than being an absolute function of his or her underlying quality. We describe some of the ramifications of such comparative evaluation, and argue that it could offer new insights into some of the biggest outstanding problems in mate choice and sexual selection.     

An effect of inter-trial duration on the gambler's fallacy choice bias

The gambler's fallacy is defined as the avoidance of a winning outcome in a stochastic environment with a constant probability. We tested the possibility that the gambler's fallacy in humans is responsive to the amount of time between choice allocations. Two groups of subjects were placed in a six-choice betting game in which the choices were clustered into two “patches.” Groups were defined by the length of time - 2 s or 6 s - between trials. On any given trial subjects allocated six points among the alternatives, and retained any points that were bet on the winning alternative. Both groups showed evidence of the gambler's fallacy bias. However, the bias was stronger in the 6-s ITI group than in the 2-s ITI group. This difference was found primarily to be due to differences in the number of subjects showing an opposing bias to the gambler's fallacy, namely a preference for the most recent winning alternative. This choice bias is termed the hot hand fallacy. Our findings contradict predictions derived from a foraging heuristic and from traditional accounts of the gambler's fallacy.     

Irrational decision-making in an amoeboid organism: transitivity and context-dependent preferences

Most models of animal foraging and consumer choice assume that individuals make choices based on the absolute value of items and are therefore ‘economically rational’. However, frequent violations of rationality by animals, including humans, suggest that animals use comparative valuation rules. Are comparative valuation strategies a consequence of the way brains process information, or are they an intrinsic feature of biological decision-making? Here, we examine the principles of rationality in an organism with radically different information-processing mechanisms: the brainless, unicellular, slime mould Physarum polycephalum. We offered P. polycephalum amoebas a choice between food options that varied in food quality and light exposure (P. polycephalum is photophobic). The use of an absolute valuation rule will lead to two properties: transitivity and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Transitivity is satisfied if preferences have a consistent, linear ordering, while IIA states that a decision maker''s preference for an item should not change if the choice set is expanded. A violation of either of these principles suggests the use of comparative rather than absolute valuation rules. Physarum polycephalum satisfied transitivity by having linear preference rankings. However, P. polycephalum''s preference for a focal alternative increased when a third, inferior quality option was added to the choice set, thus violating IIA and suggesting the use of a comparative valuation process. The discovery of comparative valuation rules in a unicellular organism suggests that comparative valuation rules are ubiquitous, if not universal, among biological decision makers.     

Monkeys Are More Patient in a Foraging Task than in a Standard Intertemporal Choice Task

Studies of animal impulsivity generally find steep subjective devaluation, or discounting, of delayed rewards – often on the order of a 50% reduction in value in a few seconds. Because such steep discounting is highly disfavored in evolutionary models of time preference, we hypothesize that discounting tasks provide a poor measure of animals’ true time preferences. One prediction of this hypothesis is that estimates of time preferences based on these tasks will lack external validity, i.e. fail to predict time preferences in other contexts. We examined choices made by four rhesus monkeys in a computerized patch-leaving foraging task interleaved with a standard intertemporal choice task. Monkeys were significantly more patient in the foraging task than in the intertemporal choice task. Patch-leaving behavior was well fit by parameter-free optimal foraging equations but poorly fit by the hyperbolic discount parameter obtained from the intertemporal choice task. Day-to-day variation in time preferences across the two tasks was uncorrelated with each other. These data are consistent with the conjecture that seemingly impulsive behavior in animals is an artifact of their difficulty understanding the structure of intertemporal choice tasks, and support the idea that animals are more efficient rate maximizers in the multi-second range than intertemporal choice tasks would suggest.     

Evaluating options in LCA: The emergence of conflicting paradigms for impact assessment and evaluation

LCA aims to help direct decisions in an environmentally sustainable direction. It indicates the environmental effects of choices and evaluates these against this background. Approaches to evaluation in LCA differ substantially, related to the way of modelling environmental effects and to the way these effects are combined into an overall judgement on alternative options. Several approaches are now operational, which are linked to different paradigms in decision making. It is shown that the choice of paradigm is quite decisive on the outcome of the analysis. Also within similar paradigms, different methods now operational may lead to different outcomes. These latter differences may be alleviated more easily than those related to paradigmatic choices, as they are partly a matter of refinement, and they partly result from legitimate differences in subjective priorities. The more basic paradigmatic differences can hardly be bridged. The practical relevancy of the subject is proven by applying different operational methods to one case, showing widely differing outcomes. The paradigm behind evaluating environmental effects is either values based, directly or through policy decisions, or economics based, as individual preferences measured in the monetary terms of willingness-to-pay. Accordingly, the different methods are “policy-oriented” or “monetary”. It may be doubted if the differences between these can be overcome in standardisation.     

The second wave of evolutionary economics in biology

Several core issues in economics and biology overlap substantially. At the theoretical level, these include analogies and differences among rational choice, learning, genetic evolution and cultural evolution. At the empirical level, they include the structure of decision making, its neural basis and, more generally, human nature. We illustrate here the increasingly important collaboration between economics and biology with several characteristic examples, including signaling, markets, statistical reasoning, cooperation, punishment, reputation and social norms. In contrast to the mutual borrowing of ideas during the 1970s and 1980s, we now see the joint exploration of empirical and theoretical issues by biologists and economists that constitutes a second wave of interactions between the two disciplines.     

Female mate choice in convict cichlids is transitive and consistent with a self-referent directional preference

Introduction

One of the most important decisions that an animal has to make in its life is choosing a mate. Although most studies in sexual selection assume that mate choice is rational, this assumption has not been tested seriously. A crucial component of rationality is that animals exhibit transitive choices: if an individual prefers option A over B, and B over C, then it also prefers A over C.

Results

We assessed transitivity in mate choice: 40 female convict cichlids had to make a series of binary choices between males of varying size. Ninety percent of females showed transitive choices. The mean preference index was significantly higher when a female chose between their most preferred and least preferred male (male 1 vs. male 3) compared to when they chose between males of adjacent ranks (1 vs. 2 or 2 vs. 3). The results are consistent with a simple underlying preference function leading to transitive choice: females preferred males about one third larger than themselves. This rule of thumb correctly predicted which male was preferred in 67% of the cases and the ordering in binary choices in 78% of cases.

Conclusions

This study provides the first evidence for strong stochastic transitivity in a context of mate choice. The females exhibited ordinal preferences and the direction and magnitude of these preferences could be predicted from a simple rule. The females do not necessarily compare two males to choose the best; it is sufficient to use a self-referent evaluation. Such a simple decision rule has important implications for the evolution of the mating strategies and it is consistent with patterns of assortative mating repeatedly observed at population level.

     

Striatal activity underlies novelty-based choice in humans

The desire to seek new and unfamiliar experiences is a fundamental behavioral tendency in humans and other species. In economic decision making, novelty seeking is often rational, insofar as uncertain options may prove valuable and advantageous in the long run. Here, we show that, even when the degree of perceptual familiarity of an option is unrelated to choice outcome, novelty nevertheless drives choice behavior. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we show that this behavior is specifically associated with striatal activity, in a manner consistent with computational accounts of decision making under uncertainty. Furthermore, this activity predicts interindividual differences in susceptibility to novelty. These data indicate that the brain uses perceptual novelty to approximate choice uncertainty in decision making, which in certain contexts gives rise to a newly identified and quantifiable source of human irrationality.     

Darwin's apes and “savages”

Since his visit to Tierra del Fuego in the 1830s, Darwin had been fascinated by the “savages” that succeeded in surviving on such a “broken beach”, and because they were certainly similar in behaviour to our ancestors. However, he was also fascinated by baboons’ behaviour, according to Brehm's accounts: hamadryas baboons showed a strong altruism to the point of risking their own lives in order to save their infants from attack by dogs. In 1871, he mentions he would rather have descended from brave baboons than from “savages”, considered egoistic. We study the two sources of these ideas and try to show how Darwin's comparative reflections on apes and “savages” made him the first evolutionist anthropologist.     

The sleeping policeman: understanding issues of enforcement and compliance in conservation

Rules governing human behaviour are at the heart of every system of natural resource management. Without compliance, however, rules are meaningless so effective enforcement is essential if conservation is to be successful. There is a large body of theory concerning enforcement and compliance with rules spread over several disciplines, including psychology, economics and sociology. However, there have been few attempts to extend this theory to conservation applications and there is little practical guidance for managers and conservation planners on the optimal design of enforcement programmes. We review approaches to understanding why individuals break rules and how optimal policy choices can reduce rule-breaking, highlighting research which has specifically dealt with natural resources. Because of the difficulty of studying rule-breaking behaviour directly, modelling approaches have been particularly important and have been used to explore behaviour at the individual, group and institutional levels. We illustrate the application of models of enforcement and compliance to conservation using the African elephant Loxodonta africana as a case study. Further work is needed to create practical tools which can be applied to the design of enforcement measures in conservation. Particular challenges include understanding the importance of violations of rationality assumptions and incorporating intertemporal choice in models of decision making. In conclusion, we argue that a new field of robust theory and practice is urgently needed to ensure that issues of enforcement and compliance do not undermine conservation initiatives.     

The Impact of Menstrual Cycle Phase on Economic Choice and Rationality

It is well known that hormones affect both brain and behavior, but less is known about the extent to which hormones affect economic decision-making. Numerous studies demonstrate gender differences in attitudes to risk and loss in financial decision-making, often finding that women are more loss and risk averse than men. It is unclear what drives these effects and whether cyclically varying hormonal differences between men and women contribute to differences in economic preferences. We focus here on how economic rationality and preferences change as a function of menstrual cycle phase in women. We tested adherence to the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), the standard test of economic rationality. If choices satisfy GARP then there exists a well-behaved utility function that the subject’s decisions maximize. We also examined whether risk attitudes and loss aversion change as a function of cycle phase. We found that, despite large fluctuations in hormone levels, women are as technically rational in their choice behavior as their male counterparts at all phases of the menstrual cycle. However, women are more likely to choose risky options that can lead to potential losses while ovulating; during ovulation women are less loss averse than men and therefore more economically rational than men in this regard. These findings may have market-level implications: ovulating women more effectively maximize expected value than do other groups.     

Rationality in collective decision-making by ant colonies

Economic models of animal behaviour assume that decision-makers are rational, meaning that they assess options according to intrinsic fitness value and not by comparison with available alternatives. This expectation is frequently violated, but the significance of irrational behaviour remains controversial. One possibility is that irrationality arises from cognitive constraints that necessitate short cuts like comparative evaluation. If so, the study of whether and when irrationality occurs can illuminate cognitive mechanisms. We applied this logic in a novel setting: the collective decisions of insect societies. We tested for irrationality in colonies of Temnothorax ants choosing between two nest sites that varied in multiple attributes, such that neither site was clearly superior. In similar situations, individual animals show irrational changes in preference when a third relatively unattractive option is introduced. In contrast, we found no such effect in colonies. We suggest that immunity to irrationality in this case may result from the ants’ decentralized decision mechanism. A colony''s choice does not depend on site comparison by individuals, but instead self-organizes from the interactions of multiple ants, most of which are aware of only a single site. This strategy may filter out comparative effects, preventing systematic errors that would otherwise arise from the cognitive limitations of individuals.     

The economic approach to ‘theory of mind’

Theory of mind (ToM) is a great evolutionary achievement. It is a special intelligence that can assess not only one''s own desires and beliefs, but also those of others. Whether it is uniquely human or not is controversial, but it is clear that humans are, at least, significantly better at ToM than any other animal. Economists and game theorists have developed sophisticated and powerful models of ToM and we provide a detailed summary of this here. This economic ToM entails a hierarchy of beliefs. I know my preferences, and I have beliefs (a probabilistic distribution) about your preferences, beliefs about your beliefs about my preferences, and so on. We then contrast this economic ToM with the theoretical approaches of neuroscience and with empirical data in general. Although this economic view provides a benchmark and makes useful suggestions about empirical tendencies, it does not always generate a close fit with the data. This provides an opportunity for a synergistic interdisciplinary production of a falsifiable theory of bounded rationality. In particular, a ToM that is founded on evolutionary biology might well be sufficiently structured to have predictive power, while remaining quite general. We sketch two papers that represent preliminary steps in this direction.