Vitalism as Pathos

This paper addresses the remarkable longevity (in spite of numerous ‘refutations’) of the idea of vitalism in the biological sciences and beyond. If there is to be a renewed vitalism today, however, we need to ask – on what kind of original conception of life should it be based? This paper argues that recent invocations of a generalized, processual variety of vitalism in the social sciences and humanities above all, however exciting in their scope, miss much of the basic originality – and interest – of the vitalist perspective itself. The paper argues that any renewed spirit of vitalism in the contemporary era would have to base itself on the normativity of the living organism rather than on any generalized conceptions of process or becoming. In the terms of the paper, such a vitalism would have to be concrete and ‘disciplinary’ rather than processual or generalized. Such a vitalism would also need to accommodate, crucially, the pathic aspects of life – pathology, sickness, error; in short everything that makes us, as living beings, potentially weak, without power, at a loss. Sources for such a pathic vitalism might be found above all in the work of Georges Canguilhem – and Friedrich Nietzsche – rather than primarily in Bergson, Whitehead or Deleuze.     

Synthetic biology and its alternatives. Descartes,Kant and the idea of engineering biological machines

The engineering-based approach of synthetic biology is characterized by an assumption that ‘engineering by design’ enables the construction of ‘living machines’. These ‘machines’, as biological machines, are expected to display certain properties of life, such as adapting to changing environments and acting in a situated way. This paper proposes that a tension exists between the expectations placed on biological artefacts and the notion of producing such systems by means of engineering; this tension makes it seem implausible that biological systems, especially those with properties characteristic of living beings, can in fact be produced using the specific methods of engineering. We do not claim that engineering techniques have nothing to contribute to the biotechnological construction of biological artefacts. However, drawing on Descartes’s and Kant’s thinking on the relationship between the organism and the machine, we show that it is considerably more plausible to assume that distinctively biological artefacts emerge within a paradigm different from the paradigm of the Cartesian machine that underlies the engineering approach. We close by calling for increased attention to be paid to approaches within molecular biology and chemistry that rest on conceptions different from those of synthetic biology’s engineering paradigm.     

Are attractors 'strange', or is life more complicated than the simple laws of physics?

Interesting and intriguing questions involve complex systems whose properties cannot be explained fully by reductionist approaches. Last century was dominated by physics, and applying the simple laws of physics to biology appeared to be a practical solution to understand living organisms. However, although some attributes of living organisms involve physico-chemical properties, the genetic program and evolutionary history of complex biological systems make them unique and unpredictable. Furthermore, there are and will be 'unobservable' phenomena in biology which have to be accounted for.     

Bridging the explanatory gaps: What can we learn from a biological agency perspective?

We begin this article by delineating the explanatory gaps left by prevailing gene-focused approaches in our understanding of phenotype determination, inheritance, and the origin of novel traits. We aim not to diminish the value of these approaches but to highlight where their implementation, despite best efforts, has encountered persistent limitations. We then discuss how each of these explanatory gaps can be addressed by expanding research foci to take into account biological agency—the capacity of living systems at various levels to participate in their own development, maintenance, and function by regulating their structures and activities in response to conditions they encounter. Here we aim to define formally what agency and agents are and—just as importantly—what they are not, emphasizing that agency is an empirical property connoting neither intention nor consciousness. Lastly, we discuss how incorporating agency helps to bridge explanatory gaps left by conventional approaches, highlight scientific fields in which implicit agency approaches are already proving valuable, and assess the opportunities and challenges of more systematically incorporating biological agency into research programs.     

Mechanism and vitalism. A history of the controversy

This is an attempt to interpret the history of mechanism vs. vitalism in relation to the changing framework of culture and to show the interrelation between both these views and experimental science. After the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, causal mechanism of classical physics provided the framework for the study of nature. The teleological and holistic properties of life, however, which are incompatible with this theory yielded — as a result both of internal developments within biology and of a general reaction against dogmatic rationalism — to a vitalistic interpretation of life which ascribed a mysterious force to living organisms. It will be shown that both mechanism and vitalism are related to the experimental climate of the time in which they were popular. The controversy has now lost its raison d'être as a result of the development of the theory of systems and of a better understanding of the chemistry and evolution of life.     

Interactions among bethylid parasitoid species attacking the coffee berry borer,Hypothenemus hampei (Coleoptera: Scolytidae)

The question of whether biological control is most likely achieved by deploying single or multiple species of biological control agents is much debated. While utilizing several natural enemies may enhance control, there is also the potential for disruptive inter-specific interactions. Such interactions may be studied in the laboratory by focusing on the details of the interactions themselves and attempting to infer population level consequences from their sum, or by focusing more directly on the overall effects on natural enemy populations: we term these approaches ‘reductionist’ and ‘holistic.’ Here we conduct a holistic laboratory study on interactions between three species of parasitoid wasps that are parasitoids of the coffee berry borer, Hypothenemus hampei (Ferrari) (Coleoptera: Scolytidae): Cephalonomia stephanoderis Betrem, C. hyalinipennis Ashmead and Prorops nasuta Waterston (all Hymenoptera: Bethylidae). We find evidence for both intra- and inter-specific resource competition. Interactions between C. stephanoderis and P. nasuta, both indigenous to Africa, appear to be approximately symmetrical, while C. hyalinipennis, naturally found in the coffee plantations of Chiapas, Mexico, may exert a disruptive influence. C. hyalinipennis also has a low population growth rate. We now consider it to be a detrimental invader of the Mexican coffee agro-ecosystem that should not be encouraged by augmentative release or introduced into other regions. Overall, the most successful species, in terms of both emergence and female production, was P. nasuta. We compare these results with those from prior reductionist and holistic studies, and with observations on patterns of establishment of these bethylid species in the field. Given that it is increasingly clear that disruptive inter-specific interactions are generally common when multiple species are deployed in biological control, screening of potential agents should consider such interactions alongside the more ‘traditional’ focus on host specificity.     

On the mechanical reduction of functional morphology

Much of the literature in functional morphology is concerned with attempts to understand the mechanical nature of evolutionary adaptations, i.e. how organisms are like machines. It is argued that a more justifiable orientation would be to evaluate the constraints which limit the mechanical efficiency of structures, in other words, why organisms are different from machines.     

A case for resurrecting lost species—review essay of Beth Shapiro’s, “How to Clone a Mammoth: The Science of De-extinction”

The title of Beth Shapiro’s ‘How to Clone a Mammoth’ contains an implicature: it suggests that it is indeed possible to clone a mammoth, to bring extinct species back from the dead. But in fact Shapiro both denies this is possible, and denies there would be good reason to do it even if it were possible. The de-extinct ‘mammoths’ she speaks of are merely ecological proxies for mammoths—elephants re-engineered for cold-tolerance by the addition to their genomes of a few mammoth genes. Shapiro’s denial that genuine species de-extinction is possible is based on her assumption that resurrected organisms would need to be perfectly indistinguishable from the creatures that died out. In this article I use the example of an extinct New Zealand wattlebird, the huia, to argue—contra Shapiro—that there are compelling reasons to resurrect certain species if it can be done. I then argue—again, contra Shapiro—that synthetically created organisms needn’t be perfectly indistinguishable from their genetic forebears in order for species de-extinction to be successful.     

Towards an Evolutionary Biosemiotics: Semiotic Selection and Semiotic Co-option

In biosemiotics, living beings are not conceived of as the passive result of anonymous selection pressures acted upon through the course of evolution. Rather, organisms are considered active participants that influence, shape and re-shape other organisms, the surrounding environment, and eventually also their own constitutional and functional integrity. The traditional Darwinian division between natural and sexual selection seems insufficient to encompass the richness of these processes, particularly in light of recent knowledge on communicational processes in the realm of life. Here, we introduce the concepts of semiotic selection and semiotic co-option which in part represent a reinterpretation of classical biological terms and, at the same time, keep explanations sensitive to semiosic processes taking place in living nature. We introduce the term ‘semiotic selection’ to emphasize the fact that actions of different semiotic subjects (selectors) will produce qualitatively different selection pressures. Thereafter, ‘semiotic co-option’ explains how semiotic selection may shape appearance in animals through remodelling existing forms and relations. Considering the event of co-option followed by the process of semiotic selection enables us to describe the evolution of semantic organs.     

Playing Darwin. Part A. Experimental Evolution in Drosophila

In 2009 we celebrate Charles Darwin’s second centenary, and 150 years since the publication of ‘The Origin of Species’. After so many years, what has changed in the way we understand Evolution? Obviously we have now a full understanding of the mechanisms underlying heritability. Many molecular tools are available, allowing among other things to reconstruct more accurately the evolutionary history of species and use a comparative approach to infer evolutionary processes. But we can also study evolution in action. Such studies—Experimental Evolution—help us to characterize in detail the evolutionary processes and patterns as a function of environmental challenges, the previous history and present state of populations, and the interactions between such factors. We have now a wide variety of organisms that have been studied with this approach, exploring a diversity of potentialities, in biological characteristics and genetic tools, and covering a variety of evolutionary questions. In this short article I will illustrate the potentialities of Experimental Evolution, focusing in three studies in Drosophila. These and other studies of Experimental Evolution illustrate that Evolution is often local, involving complex patterns and processes, which lead both to specific adaptations and to biological diversity, as Darwin already stated clearly in ‘The Origin of Species’.     

Vitalism and the Resistance to Experimentation on Life in the Eighteenth Century

There is a familiar opposition between a ‘Scientific Revolution’ ethos and practice of experimentation, including experimentation on life, and a ‘vitalist’ reaction to this outlook. The former is often allied with different forms of mechanism – if all of Nature obeys mechanical laws, including living bodies, ‘iatromechanism’ should encounter no obstructions in investigating the particularities of animal-machines – or with more chimiatric theories of life and matter, as in the ‘Oxford Physiologists’. The latter reaction also comes in different, perhaps irreducibly heterogeneous forms, ranging from metaphysical and ethical objections to the destruction of life, as in Margaret Cavendish, to more epistemological objections against the usage of instruments, the ‘anatomical’ outlook and experimentation, e.g. in Locke and Sydenham. But I will mainly focus on a third anti-interventionist argument, which I call ‘vitalist’ since it is often articulated in the writings of the so-called Montpellier Vitalists, including their medical articles for the Encyclopédie. The vitalist argument against experimentation on life is subtly different from the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological arguments, although at times it may borrow from any of them. It expresses a Hippocratic sensibility – understood as an artifact of early modernity, not as some atemporal trait of medical thought – in which Life resists the experimenter, or conversely, for the experimenter to grasp something about Life, it will have to be without torturing or radically intervening in it. I suggest that this view does not have to imply that Nature is something mysterious or sacred; nor does the vitalist have to attack experimentation on life in the name of some ‘vital force’ – which makes it less surprising to find a vivisectionist like Claude Bernard sounding so close to the vitalists.     

The missing link between neurobiology and behavior in Aplysia conditioning

Over the past decades, a wealth of findings has led to a substantial change in the assumed complexity of classical conditioning. The combined evidence indicates that temporal pairing is neither necessary nor sufficient for the formation of an associative connection. At the same time, studies of model invertebrate nervous systems have allowed us to ask a series of questions about the molecular basis of associative conditioning. The discovery of a pairing-sensitive mechanism in the gill-withdrawal circuitry of Aplysia is regarded as the hallmark of the reductionist approach. This review outlines the insights gathered from behavioral and neurobiological studies. Furthermore, the conceptual frameworks guiding research at the ‘what’ and ‘how’ levels of analysis are compared and contrasted. I argue that a rich cognitive view of conditioning has emerged at the ‘what’ level, whereas the traditional notion of temporal pairing still drives research at the ‘how’ level. A complete account of classical conditioning has to await the resolving of this discordance.     

Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio: Biological autonomy: a philosophical and theoretical enquiry

The essay review summarizes the intention as well as some of the major topics from the book of A. Moreno and M. Mossio and discusses them against the background of recent considerations on the general understanding of organisms. The authors see themselves in the organicist tradition in biology and propose that a new understanding of living beings can be developed around the notion of organismic autonomy, which enables biological systems to maintain themselves in an environment through directed behavior.     

Millennial musings on molecular motors

In a universe that is dominated by increasing entropy, living organisms are a curious anomaly. The organization that distinguishes living organisms from their inanimate surroundings relies upon their ability to execute vectorial processes, such as directed movements and the assembly of macromolecules and organelle systems. Many of these phenomena are executed by molecular motors that harness chemical potential energy to perform mechanical work and unidirectional motion. This article explores how these remarkable protein machines might have evolved and what roles they could play in biological and medical research in the coming decades.     

Millennial musings on molecular motors

In a universe that is dominated by increasing entropy, living organisms are a curious anomaly. The organization that distinguishes living organisms from their inanimate surroundings relies upon their ability to execute vectorial processes, such as directed movements and the assembly of macromolecules and organelle systems. Many of these phenomena are executed by molecular motors that harness chemical potential energy to perform mechanical work and unidirectional motion. This article explores how these remarkable protein machines might have evolved and what roles they could play in biological and medical research in the coming decades.     

Millennial musings on molecular motors

In a universe that is dominated by increasing entropy, living organisms are a curious anomaly. The organization that distinguishes living organisms from their inanimate surroundings relies upon their ability to execute vectorial processes, such as directed movements and the assembly of macromolecules and organelle systems. Many of these phenomena are executed by molecular motors that harness chemical potential energy to perform mechanical work and unidirectional motion. This article explores how these remarkable protein machines might have evolved and what roles they could play in biological and medical research in the coming decades.     

Evolution,reproduction and definition of life

Synthetic theory of evolution is a superior integrative biological theory. Therefore, there is nothing surprising about the fact that multiple attempts of defining life are based on this theory. One of them even has a status of NASA’s working definition. According to this definition, ‘life is a self-sustained chemical system capable of undergoing Darwinian evolution’ Luisi (Orig Life Evol Bios 28:613–622, 1998); Cleland, Chyba (Orig Life Evol Bios 32:387–393, 2002). This definition is often considered as one of the more theoretically mature definitions of life. This Darwinian definition has nonetheless provoked a lot of criticism. One of the major arguments claims that this definition is wrong due to ‘mule’s problem’. Mules (and other infertile hybrids), despite being obviously living organisms, in the light of this definition are considered inanimate objects. It is strongly counterintuitive. The aim of this article was to demonstrate that this reasoning is false. In the later part of the text, I also discuss some other arguments against the Darwinian approach to defining life.     

Hierarchies and causal relationships in interpretative models of the neoplastic process

The aim of this paper is to present a critical analysis of the kind of biological systems identified in the main explanatory theories of cancer (i.e. Somatic Mutation Theory and Tissue Organization Field Theory) and how references to the hierarchical organization of these biological systems are used in their explanatory arguments. I will discuss these aspects in terms of the isolation of the "locus of control" (Bechtel and Richardson 2010); that is, the point at which decisions are made shaping the explanatory endeavour. In fact, the current view of the neoplastic process, not as a static circumstance but as an evolving molecular and cellular process, makes it evident that the choice of the right level of analysis is not self-evident. This focus clarifies some epistemological reasons for the divergence between reductionist and organicist accounts and seems to suggest that the basis for distinctions among causal relationships that scientists sometimes make can be found in the hierarchical character of complex biological systems. I will argue that these different causal relationships reflect different levels of epistemic concern.     

Transcultural Psychiatry: Cultural Difference,Universalism and Social Psychiatry in the Age of Decolonisation

In the mid-twentieth century, in the aftermath of WWII and the Nazi atrocities and in the midst of decolonisation, a new discipline of transcultural psychiatry was being established and institutionalised. This was part and parcel of a global political project in the course of which Western psychiatry attempted to leave behind its colonial legacies and entanglements, and lay the foundation for a more inclusive, egalitarian communication between Western and non-Western concepts of mental illness and healing. In this period, the infrastructure of post-colonial global and transcultural psychiatry was set up, and leading psychiatric figures across the world embarked on identifying, debating and sometimes critiquing the universal psychological characteristics and psychopathological mechanisms supposedly shared among all cultures and civilisations. The article will explore how this psychiatric, social and cultural search for a new definition of ‘common humanity’ was influenced and shaped by the concurrent global rise of social psychiatry. In the early phases of transcultural psychiatry, a large number of psychiatrists were very keen to determine how cultural and social environments shaped the basic traits of human psychology, and ‘psy’ practitioners and anthropologist from all over the world sought to re-define the relationship between culture, race and individual psyche. Most of them worked within the universalist framework, which posited that cultural differences merely formed a veneer of symptoms and expressions while the universal core of mental illness remained the same across all cultures. The article will argue that, even in this context, which explicitly challenged the hierarchical and racist paradigms of colonial psychiatry, the founding generations of transcultural psychiatrists from Western Europe and North America tended to conceive of broader environmental determinants of mental health and pathology in the decolonising world in fairly reductionist terms—focusing almost exclusively on ‘cultural difference’ and cultural, racial and ethnic ‘traditions’, essentialising and reifying them in the process, and failing to establish some common sociological or economic categories of analysis of Western and non-Western ‘mentalities’. On the other hand, it was African and Asian psychiatrists as well as Marxist psychiatrists from Eastern Europe who insisted on applying those broader social psychiatry concepts—such as social class, occupation, socio-economic change, political and group pressures and relations etc.—which were quickly becoming central to mental health research in the West but were largely missing from Western psychiatrists’ engagement with the decolonising world. In this way, some of the leading non-Western psychiatrists relied on social psychiatry to establish the limits of psychiatric universalism, and challenge some of its Eurocentric and essentialising tendencies. Even though they still subscribed to the predominant universalist framework, these practitioners invoked social psychiatry to draw attention to universalism’s internal incoherence, and sought to revise the lingering evolutionary thinking in transcultural psychiatry. They also contributed to re-imagining cross-cultural encounters and exchanges as potentially creative and progressive (whereas early Western transcultural psychiatry primarily viewed the cross-cultural through the prism of pathogenic and traumatic ‘cultural clash’). Therefore, the article will explore the complex politics of the shifting and overlapping definitions of ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ factors in mid-twentieth century transcultural psychiatry, and aims to recover the revolutionary voices of non-Western psychiatrists and their contributions to the global re-drawing of the boundaries of humanity in the second half of the twentieth century.