Sexual conflict and the tragedy of the commons

It is widely understood that the costs and benefits of mating can affect the fecundity and survival of individuals. Sexual conflict may have profound consequences for populations as a result of the negative effects it causes males and females to have on one another's fitness. Here we present a model describing the evolution of sexual conflict, in which males inflict a direct cost on female fitness. We show that these costs can drive the entire population to extinction. To males, females are an essential but finite resource over which they have to compete. Population extinction owing to sexual conflict can therefore be seen as an evolutionary tragedy of the commons. Our model shows that a positive feedback between harassment and the operational sex ratio is responsible for the demise of females and, thus, for population extinction. We further show that the evolution of female resistance to counter harassment can prevent a tragedy of the commons. Our findings not only demonstrate that sexual conflict can drive a population to extinction but also highlight how simple mechanisms, such as harassment costs to males and females and the coevolution between harassment and resistance, can help avert a tragedy of the commons caused by sexual conflict.     

Diminishing returns in social evolution: the not-so-tragic commons

A challenge for evolutionary theory is to understand how cooperation can occur in the presence of competition and cheating, a problem known as the tragedy of commons. Here I examine how varying the fitness returns from reproductive competition or cooperation affects the negative impact of competition on a social group. Varying linear returns does not affect the impact of competition. However, diminishing returns, where additional investments in either competition or cooperation give smaller and smaller rewards, reduce the effects of competition on the group. I show that diminishing returns are common in many systems, including social vertebrates, microbes, social insects and mutualisms among species. This suggests that the tragedy of the commons is not so tragic and that the disruptive effects of competition upon social life will often be minor.     

Commons and anticommons in a simple renewable resource harvest model

We consider a model where agents harvesting from a renewable resource can impose limitations on the harvesting efforts of other agents. Obstructing the harvesting of others comes at a cost, and is viewed as regulation of resource access. Thus, the agent population comprises agents that do not obstruct (“cooperators”) and agents that obstruct (“obstructors”). As the economically better performing strategy spreads in the population, the system self-organizes at a level of obstruction which depends on the costs of obstruction, the obstruction efficiency and the history of the system. We show that commons and anticommons can be considered as the end points of a continuum of varying degrees of obstruction and we identify three regimes for the stationary state of the evolution dynamics: (i) a state where the system ends up in a tragedy of the commons, (ii) a tragedy of the anticommons state and (iii) a moderately regulated state in between both extremes. The more a policy environment in the moderately regulated state is tuned for optimality, the higher the danger that a fluctuation destabilizes the system into severe overexploitation.     

Rock-scissors-paper and the survival of the weakest.

In the children's game of rock-scissors-paper, players each choose one of three strategies. A rock beats a pair of scissors, scissors beat a sheet of paper and paper beats a rock, so the strategies form a competitive cycle. Although cycles in competitive ability appear to be reasonably rare among terrestrial plants, they are common among marine sessile organisms and have been reported in other contexts. Here we consider a system with three species in a competitive loop and show that this simple ecology exhibits two counter-intuitive phenomena. First, the species that is least competitive is expected to have the largest population and, where there are oscillations in a finite population, to be the least likely to die out. As a consequence an apparent weakening of a species leads to an increase in its population. Second, evolution favours the most competitive individuals within a species, which leads to a decline in its population. This is analogous to the tragedy of the commons, but here, rather than leading to a collapse, the 'tragedy' acts to maintain diversity.     

Preventing the Tragedy of the Commons Through Punishment of Over-Consumers and Encouragement of Under-Consumers

The conditions that can lead to the exploitative depletion of a shared resource, i.e., the tragedy of the commons, can be reformulated as a game of prisoner’s dilemma: while preserving the common resource is in the best interest of the group, over-consumption is in the interest of each particular individual at any given point in time. One way to try and prevent the tragedy of the commons is through infliction of punishment for over-consumption and/or encouraging under-consumption, thus selecting against over-consumers. Here, the effectiveness of various punishment functions in an evolving consumer-resource system is evaluated within a framework of a parametrically heterogeneous system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). Conditions leading to the possibility of sustainable coexistence with the common resource for a subset of cases are identified analytically using adaptive dynamics; the effects of punishment on heterogeneous populations with different initial composition are evaluated using the reduction theorem for replicator equations. Obtained results suggest that one cannot prevent the tragedy of the commons through rewarding of under-consumers alone—there must also be an implementation of some degree of punishment that increases in a nonlinear fashion with respect to over-consumption and which may vary depending on the initial distribution of clones in the population.     

Resolving the tragedy of the commons: the feedback between intraspecific conflict and population density

Competition and conflict among individuals can favour exploitative strategies that undermine the common good. Theory suggests that this can lead to a tragedy of the commons and ultimately population extinction, a phenomenon known as evolutionary suicide. Here, I present a model of the evolutionary tragedy of the commons that explicitly considers the population dynamics where individuals invest in individually costly competitive traits. In the simplest form, this supports the notion that selection for high levels of conflict can cause evolutionary suicide. However, as competition comes with survival and fecundity costs, a feedback between the investment in competition and population density can act to reduce the level of conflict and prevent the population from going extinct. This suggests that the interaction between population ecology and the evolution of competition and conflict among individuals may be an important mechanism in resolving the level of competition and conflict among individuals.     

Competition over Personal Resources Favors Contribution to Shared Resources in Human Groups

Members of social groups face a trade-off between investing selfish effort for themselves and investing cooperative effort to produce a shared group resource. Many group resources are shared equitably: they may be intrinsically non-excludable public goods, such as vigilance against predators, or so large that there is little cost to sharing, such as cooperatively hunted big game. However, group members'' personal resources, such as food hunted individually, may be monopolizable. In such cases, an individual may benefit by investing effort in taking others'' personal resources, and in defending one''s own resources against others. We use a game theoretic “tug-of-war” model to predict that when such competition over personal resources is possible, players will contribute more towards a group resource, and also obtain higher payoffs from doing so. We test and find support for these predictions in two laboratory economic games with humans, comparing people''s investment decisions in games with and without the options to compete over personal resources or invest in a group resource. Our results help explain why people cooperatively contribute to group resources, suggest how a tragedy of the commons may be avoided, and highlight unifying features in the evolution of cooperation and competition in human and non-human societies.     

Tragedy of the commons among antibiotic resistance plasmids

As social interactions are increasingly recognized as important determinants of microbial fitness, sociobiology is being enlisted to better understand the evolution of clinically relevant microbes and, potentially, to influence their evolution to aid human health. Of special interest are situations in which there exists a "tragedy of the commons," where natural selection leads to a net reduction in fitness for all members of a population. Here, I demonstrate the existence of a tragedy of the commons among antibiotic resistance plasmids of bacteria. In serial transfer culture, plasmids evolved a greater ability to superinfect already-infected bacteria, increasing plasmid fitness when evolved genotypes were rare. Evolved plasmids, however, fell victim to their own success, reducing the density of their bacterial hosts when they became common and suffering reduced fitness through vertical transmission. Social interactions can thus be an important determinant of evolution for the molecular endosymbionts of bacteria. These results also identify an avenue of evolution that reduces proliferation of both antibiotic resistance genes and their bacterial hosts.     

The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology

Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons is an analogy that shows how individuals driven by self-interest can end up destroying the resource upon which they all depend. The proposed solutions for humans rely on highly advanced skills such as negotiation, which raises the question of how non-human organisms manage to resolve similar tragedies. In recent years, this question has promoted evolutionary biologists to apply the tragedy of the commons to a wide range of biological systems. Here, we provide tools to categorize different types of tragedy and review different mechanisms, including kinship, policing and diminishing returns that can resolve conflicts that could otherwise end in tragedy. A central open question, however, is how often biological systems are able to resolve these scenarios rather than drive themselves extinct through individual-level selection favouring self-interested behaviours.     

Demography and the tragedy of the commons

Individual success in group‐structured populations has two components. First, an individual gains by outcompeting its neighbours for local resources. Second, an individual's share of group success must be weighted by the total productivity of the group. The essence of sociality arises from the tension between selfish gains against neighbours and the associated loss that selfishness imposes by degrading the efficiency of the group. Without some force to modulate selfishness, the natural tendencies of self interest typically degrade group performance to the detriment of all. This is the tragedy of the commons. Kin selection provides the most widely discussed way in which the tragedy is overcome in biology. Kin selection arises from behavioural associations within groups caused either by genetical kinship or by other processes that correlate the behaviours of group members. Here, I emphasize demography as a second factor that may also modulate the tragedy of the commons and favour cooperative integration of groups. Each act of selfishness or cooperation in a group often influences group survival and fecundity over many subsequent generations. For example, a cooperative act early in the growth cycle of a colony may enhance the future size and survival of the colony. This time‐dependent benefit can greatly increase the degree of cooperation favoured by natural selection, providing another way in which to overcome the tragedy of the commons and enhance the integration of group behaviour. I conclude that analyses of sociality must account for both the behavioural associations of kin selection theory and the demographic consequences of life history theory.     

Maintenance affects the stability of a two-tiered microbial 'food chain'?

Recent studies have shown that constraints on available resources may play an important role in the evolution of cooperation, especially when individuals do not posses the capacity to recognize other individuals, memory or other developed abilities, as it is the case of most unicellular organisms, algae or even plants. We analyze the evolution of cooperation in the case of a limiting resource, which is necessary for reproduction and survival. We show that, if the strategies determine a prisoner's dilemma, the outcome of the interactions may be modified by the limitation of resources allowing cooperators to invade the entire population. Analytic expressions for the region of cooperation are provided. Furthermore we derive expressions for the connection between fitness, as understood in evolutionary game theory, and resource exchanges, which may be of help to link evolutionary game theoretical results with resource based models.     

A common evolutionary pathway for maintaining quorum sensing in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pseudomonas aeruginosa</Emphasis>

In the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, the synthesis and secretion of extracellular protease is a typical cooperative behavior regulated by quorum sensing. However, this type of cooperative behavior is easily exploited by other individuals who do not synthesize public goods, which is known as the “tragedy of the commons”. Here P. aeruginosa was inoculated into casein media with different nitrogen salts added. In casein broth, protease (a type of public good) is necessary for bacterial growth. After 30 days of sequential transfer, some groups propagated stably and avoided “tragedy of the commons”. The evolved cooperators who continued to synthesize protease were isolated from these stable groups. By comparing the characteristics of quorum sensing in these cooperators, an identical evolutionary pattern was found. A variety of cooperative behaviors regulated by quorum sensing, such as the synthesis and secretion of protease and signals, were significantly reduced during the process of evolution. Such reductions improved the efficiency of cooperation, helping to prevent cheating. In addition, the production of pyocyanin, which is regulated by the RhlIR system, increased during the process of evolution, possibly due to its role in stabilizing the cooperation. This study contributes towards our understanding of the evolution of quorum sensing of P. aeruginosa.     

Open Access, Open Systems: Pastoral Management of Common-Pool Resources in the Chad Basin

The discussion about the impact of pastoralists on ecosystems has been profoundly shaped by Hardin’s tragedy of the commons that held pastoralists responsible for overgrazing the range. Research has shown that grazing ecosystems are much more complex and dynamic than was previously assumed and that they can be managed adaptively as commons. However, proponents and critics of Hardin’s thesis continue to argue that open access to common-pool resources inevitably leads to a tragedy of the commons. A longitudinal study that we conducted of pastoral mobility and primary production in the Logone floodplain in the Far North Region of Cameroon suggest that open access does not have to lead to a tragedy of the commons. We argue that this pastoral system is best conceptualized as an open system, in which a combination of individual decision-making and coordination of movements leads to an ideal-free type of distribution of mobile pastoralists. We explain how this self-organizing system of open access works and its implications for theories of management of common-pool resources and our understanding of pastoral systems.     

Evolution of nutrient acquisition: when adaptation fills the gap between contrasting ecological theories

Although plant strategies for acquiring nutrients have been widely studied from a functional point of view, their evolution is still not well understood. In this study, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of these strategies and determine how they influence ecosystem properties. To do so, we use a simple nutrient-limited ecosystem model in which plant ability to take up nutrients is subject to adaptive dynamics. We postulate the existence of a trade-off between this ability and mortality. We show that contrasting strategies are possible as evolutionary outcomes, depending on the shape of the trade-off and, when nitrogen is considered as the limiting nutrient, on the intensity of symbiotic fixation. Our model enables us to bridge these evolutionary outcomes to classical ecological theories such as Hardin''s tragedy of the commons and Tilman''s rule of R*. Evolution does not systematically maximize plant biomass or primary productivity. On the other hand, each evolutionary outcome leads to a decrease in the availability of the limiting mineral nutrient, supporting the work of Tilman on competition between plants for a single resource. Our model shows that evolution can be used to link different classical ecological results and that adaptation may influence ecosystem properties in contrasted ways.     

The Role of Space in the Exploitation of Resources

In order to understand the role of space in ecological communities where each species produces a certain type of resource and has varying abilities to exploit the resources produced by its own species and by the other species, we carry out a comparative study of an interacting particle system and its mean-field approximation. For a wide range of parameter values, we show both analytically and numerically that the spatial model results in predictions that significantly differ from its nonspatial counterpart, indicating that the use of the mean-field approach to describe the evolution of communities in which individuals only interact locally is invalid. In two-species communities, the disagreements between the models appear either when both species compete by producing resources that are more beneficial for their own species or when both species cooperate by producing resources that are more beneficial for the other species. In particular, while both species coexist if and only if they cooperate in the mean-field approximation, the inclusion of space in the form of local interactions may prevent coexistence even in cooperative communities. Introducing additional species, cooperation is no longer the only mechanism that promotes coexistence. We prove that, in three-species communities, coexistence results either from a global cooperative behavior, or from rock-paper-scissors type interactions, or from a mixture of these dynamics, which excludes in particular all cases in which two species compete. Finally, and more importantly, we show numerically that the inclusion of space has antagonistic effects on coexistence depending on the mechanism involved, preventing coexistence in the presence of cooperation but promoting coexistence in the presence of rock-paper-scissors interactions. Although these results are partly proved analytically for both models, we also provide somewhat more explicit heuristic arguments to explain the reason why the models result in different predictions.     

Origins of altruism diversity ii: runaway coevolution of altruistic strategies via "reciprocal niche construction"

Understanding the evolution of altruism requires knowledge of both its constraints and its drivers. Here we show that, paradoxically, ecological constraints on altruism may ultimately be its strongest driver. We construct a two-trait, coevolutionary adaptive dynamics model of social evolution in a genetically structured population with local resource competition. The intensity of local resource competition, which influences the direction and strength of social selection and which is typically treated as a static parameter, is here allowed to be an evolvable trait. Evolution of survival/fecundity altruism, which requires weak local competition, increases local competition as it evolves, creating negative environmental feedback that ultimately inhibits its further evolutionary advance. Alternatively, evolution of resource-based altruism, which requires strong local competition, weakens local competition as it evolves, also ultimately causing its own evolution to stall. When evolving independently, these altruistic strategies are intrinsically self-limiting. However, the coexistence of these two altruism types transforms the negative ecoevolutionary feedback generated by each strategy on itself into positive feedback on the other, allowing the presence of one trait to drive the evolution of the other. We call this feedback conversion "reciprocal niche construction." In the absence of constraints, this process leads to runaway coevolution of altruism types. We discuss applications to the origins and evolution of eusociality, division of labor, the inordinate ecological success of eusocial species, and the interaction between technology and demography in human evolution. Our theory suggests that the evolution of extreme sociality may often be an autocatalytic process.     

Population Dynamics Constrain the Cooperative Evolution of Cross-Feeding

Cross-feeding is the exchange of nutrients among species of microbes. It has two potential evolutionary origins, one as an exchange of metabolic wastes or byproducts among species, the other as a form of cooperation known as reciprocal altruism. This paper explores the conditions favoring the origin of cooperative cross-feeding between two species. There is an extensive literature on the evolution of cooperation, and some of the requirements for the evolution of cooperative cross-feeding follow from this prior work–specifically the requirement that interactions be limited to small groups of individuals, such as colonies in a spatially structured environment. Evolution of cooperative cross-feeding by a species also requires that cross-feeding from the partner species already exists, so that the cooperating mutant will automatically be reciprocated for its actions. Beyond these considerations, some unintuitive dynamical constraints apply. In particular, the benefit of cooperative cross-feeding applies only in the range of intermediate cell densities. At low density, resource concentrations are too low to offset the cost of cooperation. At high density, resources shared by both species become limiting, and the two species become competitors. These considerations suggest that the evolution of cooperative cross-feeding in nature may be more challenging than for other types of cooperation. However, the principles identified here may enable the experimental evolution of cross-feeding, as born out by a recent study.     

Treaty provisions concerning marine science research

Abstract

Under the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) schemes, the economic calculations fail to reflect a just distribution of wealth and results in deprivation of the public trust of fisheries. Some “neoclassic” economists claim that ITQs cost-efficiently eliminate the tragedy of the commons. However, Norwegian cost–benefit studies indicate a financial loss for second-generation ITQ owners due to the high price of tradable quotas. The financial burden caused by ITQs creates overfishing and pressure on the fishing stocks, which puts coastal municipalities at risk. If future fisheries are given legal protection, the losses due to hazardous fishing or overexploiting stocks is the fisherman's liability. Restoration schemes within the framework of total allowable catch (TAC) are an alternative to ITQs that may prevent resource depletion and the “tragedy of the commons.”     

Shame and honour drive cooperation

Can the threat of being shamed or the prospect of being honoured lead to greater cooperation? We test this hypothesis with anonymous six-player public goods experiments, an experimental paradigm used to investigate problems related to overusing common resources. We instructed the players that the two individuals who were least generous after 10 rounds would be exposed to the group. As the natural antithesis, we also test the effects of honour by revealing the identities of the two players who were most generous. The non-monetary, reputational effects induced by shame and honour each led to approximately 50 per cent higher donations to the public good when compared with the control, demonstrating that both shame and honour can drive cooperation and can help alleviate the tragedy of the commons.     

Why cooperation is not running away

A growing number of experimental and theoretical studies show the importance of partner choice as a mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperation, especially in humans. In this paper, we focus on the question of the precise quantitative level of cooperation that should evolve under this mechanism. When individuals compete to be chosen by others, their level of investment in cooperation evolves towards higher values, a process called competitive altruism, or runaway cooperation. Using a classic adaptive dynamics model, we first show that when the cost of changing partner is low, this runaway process can lead to a profitless escalation of cooperation. In the extreme, when partner choice is entirely frictionless, cooperation even increases up to a level where its cost entirely cancels out its benefit. That is, at evolutionary equilibrium, individuals gain the same payoff than if they had not cooperated at all. Second, importing models from matching theory in economics we, however, show that when individuals can plastically modulate their choosiness in function of their own cooperation level, partner choice stops being a runaway competition to outbid others and becomes a competition to form the most optimal partnerships. In this case, when the cost of changing partner tends towards zero, partner choice leads to the evolution of the socially optimum level of cooperation. This last result could explain the observation that human cooperation seems to be often constrained by considerations of social efficiency.