Immigrant generation,religiosity and civic engagement in Britain

Abstract

Immigrant integration appears to be generational in the USA, and further facilitated by religious involvement. We examine whether similar patterns exist in Britain. We find evidence for secularization across ethnic minority groups, measured by private religious practice and religious salience. Communal religious practice appears robust to generational decline. Ethnic minority members of the second generation exhibit lower social trust; for the 1.5 generation, being more religious is associated with lower trust. However, members of the 1.5 and second generation are more civically involved than the first and religiosity further increases civic involvement. While anecdotal accounts suggest that religiosity has a particularly dissociative effect on the second generation, we find no evidence for this. In sum, successive generations of ethnic minority respondents appear to be secularizing; successive generations are more civically involved than the arriving generation, although less trusting; and immigrant religiosity promotes civic integration.     

Explaining religious differences in immigrants' gender role attitudes: the changing impact of origin country and individual religiosity

Religion is often perceived as one of the main barriers to immigrant integration in Europe. By focusing on the contested area of immigrants' gender role attitudes, this study analyses data of first- and second-generation immigrants from multiple origin countries and of different religious affiliations in comparison to the native population. It shows that higher levels of religiosity can explain immigrants' more traditional attitudes to some extent, but that origin country socialization acts as an important additional determinant of attitudes of the first generation. Among second-generation migrants, only Muslims continue to hold more traditional attitudes. Acculturation for longer-staying migrants is partly explained by declining religiosity, with some evidence for a decoupling of attitudes from religious beliefs among female migrants in particular. Intergenerational change, on the other hand, cannot be attributed to a decline in the role of religiosity.     

Testing theories of secularization and religious belief in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Several theoretical approaches have been proposed to explain variation in religiosity, including versions of secularization hypotheses, evolved cognitive biases, and cultural transmission. In this paper we test several theories that aim to explain variation in religiosity and compare them in a representative sample collected in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (N = 2022). These two countries represent a natural experiment in religiosity; despite their high level of historical, institutional and cultural similarity, their populations differ markedly in the rate of religious belief. We examine the predictive power of cognitive biases (anthropomorphism, dualism, teleology, mentalizing, and analytic thinking); institutional insecurity; and exposure to credibility displays of belief in childhood on various factors of religious belief. We find that individual differences in cognitive biases predicted 8% of the variance belief in God, but predicted 21% of the variance in paranormal beliefs and almost no variance in religious participation. Perceived institutional insecurity explains little variance in any of these variables, but cultural transmission, measured as exposure to credibility enhancing displays (CREDs) and church attendance in childhood, predicted 17% of the variance in belief in God and 30% of religious participation, and mediated 70% of the difference between these two countries in belief in God and 80% of the difference in religious practice. These findings suggest cognitive biases may explain the existence of belief in the supernatural generally, but cultural transmission through credible belief displays is a more plausible explanation for why people adopt and maintain a specific set of religious beliefs and practices.     

How the religious context affects the relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards immigration

This article approaches two shortcomings in previous research on religiosity and prejudice: (1) the lack of cross-country comparative studies; and (2) a failure to consider any moderating effects of religious contexts. We examine whether the relationship between religiosity and anti-immigration attitudes varies depending on religious contexts in Europe, and we find two things. First, strongly religious people are on average less likely to oppose immigration than non-religious people. Second, different religious contexts moderate the religiosity–attitude relationship in that religious people in Protestant countries and in countries with a low proportion of majority adherents are more tolerant than religious people in Catholic countries and in religiously homogenous countries. State policies also matter in that religious people are more negative where the government favours the majority religion. This calls into question the taken-for-granted understanding of religiosity and out-group attitudes found in the USA.     

Why aren’t we all hutterites?

In this paper I explore the psychology of ritual performance and present a simple graphical model that clarifies several issues in William Irons’s theory of religion as a “hard-to-fake” sign of commitment. Irons posits that religious behaviors or rituals serve as costly signals of an individual’s commitment to a religious group. Increased commitment among members of a religious group may facilitate intra-group cooperation, which is argued to be the primary adaptive benefit of religion. Here I propose a proximate explanation for how individuals are able to pay the short-term costs of ritual performance to achieve the long-term fitness benefits offered by religious groups. The model addresses three significant problems raised by Irons’s theory. First, the model explains why potential free-riders do not join religious groups even when there are significant net benefits that members of religious groups can achieve. Second, the model clarifies how costly a ritual must be to achieve stability and prevent potential free-riders from joining the religious group. Third, the model suggests why religious groups may require adherents to perform private rituals that are not observed by others. Several hypotheses generated from the model are also discussed. Richard Sosis is an assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Connecticut. His research interests include the evolution of cooperation, utopian societies, and the behavioral ecology of religion. In collaboration with Bradley Ruffle (Ben Gurion University) he is currently investigating the impact of privatization and religiosity on intra-group trust within Israeli Kibbutzim.     

THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED RELIGIOUS SIMILARITY IN THE QUALITY OF MOTHER-CHILD RELATIONS IN LATER-LIFE: DIFFERENCES WITHIN FAMILIES AND BETWEEN RACES

Despite evidence of the importance of value similarity in predicting parent-adult child relations, little attention has been given to the unique role of religious similarity. Using 1,407 dyads nested within 390 families, we examine whether religious similarity predicts the quality of mother-child relations in later life, and whether the strength of this association differs by race. Consistent with our hypotheses, religious similarity was found to be an important factor in predicting both closeness and conflict, particularly in Black families. These findings suggest that it may be important to give greater attention to religion when studying patterns of interaction and support in the later years, especially among Black families.     

Religion, fertility and genes: a dual inheritance model

Religious people nowadays have more children on average than their secular counterparts. This paper uses a simple model to explore the evolutionary implications of this difference. It assumes that fertility is determined entirely by culture, whereas subjective predisposition towards religion is influenced by genetic endowment. People who carry a certain 'religiosity' gene are more likely than average to become or remain religious. The paper considers the effect of religious defections and exogamy on the religious and genetic composition of society. Defections reduce the ultimate share of the population with religious allegiance and slow down the spread of the religiosity gene. However, provided the fertility differential persists, and people with a religious allegiance mate mainly with people like themselves, the religiosity gene will eventually predominate despite a high rate of defection. This is an example of 'cultural hitch-hiking', whereby a gene spreads because it is able to hitch a ride with a high-fitness cultural practice. The theoretical arguments are supported by numerical simulations.     

Spiritual Aroma: Religion and Politics

Anthropological studies of religion have been largely concerned with belief, with ritual, and with the general integrative significance of religious institutions for society. But many issues in the power relations of religious affiliation are still not clear. The political implications of religion involve grave practical as well as theoretical problems. Abstractly, religion and politics are often conceived as opposed; concretely, they interact. While religion can be a powerful political instrument, it can also adapt to political ends and generate its own political structures. In contrast to the broadly affirmative role assigned by anthropologists to religion in society is Karl Marx's thesis of religion as political ideology. Reasons for granting some validity to this position but also for questioning its basic assumptions are given. The whole analysis is illustrated by a wide range of examples, from Polynesian ethnography to the history of Christianity and of Islam, and the situation of religion in modem socialist states .     

Symbolic ethnicity and symbolic religiosity: Towards a comparison of ethnic and religious acculturation

This article begins with a brief section updating my 1979 Ethnic and Racial Studies article ‘Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America’. However, its main aim is to describe and develop the somewhat parallel concept of symbolic religiosity, which I conceive as the consumption of religious symbols apart from regular participation in a religious culture or in religious organizations, for the purpose of expressing feelings of religiosity and religious identification. Since I assume that symbolic religiosity develops mainly among the acculturating descendants of immigrants, I also explore the possibility of separating and then comparing ethnic and religious acculturation. I assume further that among religio‐ethnic groups like the Jews, and ethno‐religious groups such as Russian, Greek and other Orthodox Catholics, ethnic and religious acculturation proceed in divergent ways. This raises a number of interesting empirical questions about the differences between and similarities of ethnicity and religion among these groups and in general. The article concludes with speculations about what might happen to ethnicity and religiosity in the future. Most of my illustrative data in this article are drawn from studies and observations about American Jewry.     

Knowing,understanding and practising democratic citizenship: an investigation of the role of religion among Muslim,Christian and non-religious adolescents

The aim of this study is to examine the relation between religiosity and civic competences required to practise democratic citizenship. We compare non-religious, Christian and Muslim adolescents in the Netherlands to see whether (a) there is a relation between religion and civic competences, and (b) whether this differs depending on religious denomination. In the public debate, the reconcilability of Islamic beliefs and democratic citizenship is often questioned, but the relation between the two lacks empirical support. Results from analyses on data of 364 adolescents in the Netherlands indicate that religious adolescents have more developed democratic competences than non-religious adolescents. This is the case both for Christian and Muslim adolescents. The strength of religiosity does not play a role in predicting civic competences. Importantly, no differences are found between the civic competences of Muslim and Christian youth.     

Trans-Kemalism: the politics of the Turkish state in the diaspora

Abstract

In contrast to the huge amount of research on Turkish migration and migrants, the diasporic politics of the Turkish Kemalist state constitutes a neglected research subject in the scholarship on Turkish diaspora. How does the Turkish state reach out to its nationals and expatriates abroad? In what ways does the Turkish Republic seek to make Islam (as it does in Turkey) into an instrument legitimizing its politicizing and mobilizing enterprises? To explore these questions, this article investigates the long-distance Kemalism engaged in by the Turkish state to Turkify and secularize its nationals in the diaspora, using its activities in Australia as its case study. In sketching out trans-Kemalism's dimensions, the analysis directs attention to the intimate relationship between the political and religious fields of transnationalism manufactured by the state. The paper concludes that the intense political polarization in Turkey in the present makes the future of trans-Kemalism abroad somewhat uncertain.     

Science, religion, and society: the problem of evolution in america

American resistance to accepting evolution is uniquely high among First World countries. This is due largely to the extreme religiosity of the United States, which is much higher than that of comparably advanced nations, and to the resistance of many religious people to the facts and supposed implications of evolution. The prevalence of religious belief in the United States suggests that outreach by scientists alone will not have a huge effect in increasing the acceptance of evolution, nor will the strategy of trying to convince the faithful that evolution is compatible with their religion. Because creationism is a symptom of religion, another strategy to promote evolution involves loosening the grip of faith on America. This is easier said than done, for recent sociological surveys show that religion is highly correlated with the dysfunctionality of a society, and various measures of societal health show that the United States is one of the most socially dysfunctional First World countries. Widespread acceptance of evolution in America, then, may have to await profound social change.     

Religiosity and Support for Killing Animals: Evidence of a Curvilinear Relationship

ABSTRACT

Prior research shows that the correlation between religiosity and support for animal rights can be positive, negative, or zero. We hypothesized that this relationship may actually be curvilinear, where a moderate degree of religiosity may reduce support for killing animals (compared with non-religiosity or atheism), but a very high degree of religiosity (e.g., fundamentalism) might increase support for killing animals. We tested this hypothesis in a large sample of American undergraduate students, using a correlational study design with self-report measures of religiosity and of support for killing animals in different domains. The results indicated that, in support of our hypothesis, the relationship between religiosity and support for killing animals is curvilinear, as moderate levels of religiosity were related to less support for killing animals. People who were either not religious at all or very religious were the ones who most supported the killing of animals. Belief in God in itself was related to less support for killing animals. We then replicated the curvilinear relationship between religiosity and support for killing animals using data from four experiments from a previously published article on support for killing animals. We briefly consider possible explanations for these findings, the limitations of the study, and propose directions for future research. Overall, we believe that this study helps clarify the complex relationship between religiosity and support for killing animals, and advances the scientific understanding of the psychological forces that motivate people to support or object to the killing of animals.     

Neuroanatomical Variability of Religiosity

We hypothesized that religiosity, a set of traits variably expressed in the population, is modulated by neuroanatomical variability. We tested this idea by determining whether aspects of religiosity were predicted by variability in regional cortical volume. We performed structural magnetic resonance imaging of the brain in 40 healthy adult participants who reported different degrees and patterns of religiosity on a survey. We identified four Principal Components of religiosity by Factor Analysis of the survey items and associated them with regional cortical volumes measured by voxel-based morphometry. Experiencing an intimate relationship with God and engaging in religious behavior was associated with increased volume of R middle temporal cortex, BA 21. Experiencing fear of God was associated with decreased volume of L precuneus and L orbitofrontal cortex BA 11. A cluster of traits related with pragmatism and doubting God''s existence was associated with increased volume of the R precuneus. Variability in religiosity of upbringing was not associated with variability in cortical volume of any region. Therefore, key aspects of religiosity are associated with cortical volume differences. This conclusion complements our prior functional neuroimaging findings in elucidating the proximate causes of religion in the brain.     

‘Islamophobia never stands still’: race,religion, and culture

Abstract

Islamophobia bundles religious, ethnic and cultural prejudices together even though a narrow definition of the term flags religion as playing the central part. Calls for decoupling religion from ethnicity and culture appear justifiable: religions are increasingly disconnected from the cultures in which they have been embedded. But established political discourse infrequently makes such distinctions and may go further to racialize cultural and religious attributes of non-Europeans through essentialist framing. Islamophobia becomes a cryptic articulation of race and racism even if overtly it appears as religiously-based prejudice. Islam has been culturalized and racialized by its adherents and antagonists alike. Survey data on attitudes towards Muslims confirm such framing: the most common grounds given for experiencing discrimination was race or ethnic origin; religion and belief system were cited less often. Racialization, race and differential racism have become more endemic to Islamophobesã stigmatizing of Muslims, but to categorize Islamophobes as racists is bad politics.     

Scientific reasoning ability does not predict scientific views on evolution among religious individuals

Background

Acceptance of evolutionary theory varies widely and is often associated with religious background. Some have suggested there exists an additional relationship between scientific reasoning ability and the acceptance of evolutionary theory. In this study, we used structural equation modeling to test whether scientific reasoning ability predicts religiosity, acceptance of creationist views, or acceptance of evolution. We administered internet-based surveys to 724 individuals nationwide who self-describe as being religious and built a structural-equation model to test predictive abilities.

Results

We found that while religiosity positively predicts the acceptance of creationist views and negatively predicts the acceptance of evolution, scientific reasoning ability does not predict religiosity, acceptance of creationist views, or acceptance of evolutionary theory.

Conclusions

With a lack of any relationship between scientific reasoning ability and acceptance, an approach to evolution education that focuses on appealing to scientific reasoning may prove fruitless in changing student attitudes toward evolution; alternative teaching approaches regarding evolution are warranted.

     

Testing major evolutionary hypotheses about religion with a random sample

Theories of religion that are supported with selected examples can be criticized for selection bias. This paper evaluates major evolutionary hypotheses about religion with a random sample of 35 religions drawn from a 16-volume encyclopedia of world religions. The results are supportive of the group-level adaptation hypothesis developed in Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society (Wilson 2002). Most religions in the sample have what Durkheim called secular utility. Their otherworldly elements can be largely understood as proximate mechanisms that motivate adaptive behaviors. Jainism, the religion in the sample that initially appeared most challenging to the group-level adaptation hypothesis, is highly supportive upon close examination. The results of the survey are preliminary and should be built upon by a multidisciplinary community as part of a field of evolutionary religious studies. This research was supported by a grant from the Institute for Research on Unlimited Love. David Sloan Wilson is an evolutionary biologist interested in a broad range of issues relevant to human behavior. He has published in psychology, anthropology, and philosophy journals in addition to his mainstream biological research. He is co-author with the philosopher Elliott Sober of Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Harvard University Press, 1998).     

Veiled Nannies and Secular Futures in France

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on recent French efforts to expand legal regulation of religious symbols to childcare. Controversies over ‘veiled nannies’ serve as points of departure for investigating laïcité – French secularism – through which religion is regulated. The investigation is based on fieldwork among Muslim women in Marseille and on the analysis of legal decisions, official documents, and media. The debates on whether to legislate on religious symbols in the domain of childcare reveal how the line between religion and politics, and private and public is continuously redrawn through state efforts to cultivate and govern (secular) Republican selves. Drawing on Agrama’s [2012a. Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty and the Rule of Law in Egypt. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press] conceptualisation of secularism as a ‘problem-space’, I argue that legal regulation of religious symbols institutionalises a ‘secular suspicion’ at the heart of efforts to imagine and govern French society and its future, a future in which Muslims increasingly find it difficult to imagine themselves.