Pro-community altruism and social status in a Shuar village

Reciprocity theory (RT) and costly signaling theory (CST) provide different explanations for the high status of pro-community altruists: RT proposes that altruists are positively and negatively sanctioned by others, whereas CST proposes that altruists are attractive to others. Only RT, however, is beset by first- and higher-order free rider problems, which must be solved in order for RT to explain status allocations. In this paper, several solutions to RT’s free rider problems are proposed, and data about status allocations to Ecuadorian Shuar pro-community altruists are analyzed in light of RT and CST. These data confirm that perceived pro-community altruists are indeed high status and suggest that (1) community residents skillfully monitor the altruism of coresidents, (2) residents who engage in opportunities to broadcast desirable qualities are high status only to the extent that they are considered altruistic, and (3) individuals who sanction coresidents based on coresidents’ contributions to the community are themselves relatively high status. To a greater extent than CST, RT straightforwardly predicts all of these results.     

Altruism Can Be Assessed Correctly Based on Impression

Detection of genuine altruists could be a solution to the problem of subtle cheating. Brown et al. (Evol Psychol 1:42–69, 2003) found that humans could detect altruists using nonverbal cues. However, their experiments can be improved upon in several ways, and further investigation is needed to determine whether altruist-detection abilities are human universals. In our experiment, we used video clips of natural conversations as the stimulus. We asked a sample of Japanese undergraduates to rate their own level of altruism and then to estimate the videotaped targets’ altruism using the same scale. The perceivers were able to estimate the targets’ altruism levels accurately. Perceivers’ altruism score did not affect their ability to discriminate between altruists and non-altruists. Perceivers’ impressions of the altruist and non-altruist targets were also found to be different. Coding of nonverbal behavior of the targets revealed that altruists exhibited more “felt smiles” than non-altruists, which also supports the results of the previous study.     

Spotting altruistic dictator game players and mingling with them: the elective assortation of classmates

Altruism can evolve through assortation if the selfish advantage of egoistic individuals is outcompeted by the benefits of mutual cooperation between altruists. This selection process is possible if (a) individuals can distinguish altruists from egoists and (b) altruists cooperate electively with other altruists, leaving egoists no chance but to mingle with each other. This study investigates whether these two conditions are fulfilled in a natural setting. One hundred twenty-two students of six secondary school classes (age 10 to 19 years) played an anonymous dictator game, which functioned as a measure of altruism. Afterwards and unannounced, the students had to estimate their classmates' decisions and did so better than chance. Sociometry revealed that the accuracy of predictions depended on social closeness. Friends and disliked classmates were judged more accurately than liked classmates or those met with indifference. Moreover, altruists were friends with more altruistic persons than were egoists. The results confirm the existence of the two prerequisites for the evolution of altruism through assortation: the predictability of altruistic behavior and the association of altruists.     

Green beards in the light of indirect genetic effects

The green‐beard effect is one proposed mechanism predicted to underpin the evolution of altruistic behavior. It relies on the recognition and the selective help of altruists to each other in order to promote and sustain altruistic behavior. However, this mechanism has often been dismissed as unlikely or uncommon, as it is assumed that both the signaling trait and altruistic trait need to be encoded by the same gene or through tightly linked genes. Here, we use models of indirect genetic effects (IGEs) to find the minimum correlation between the signaling and altruistic trait required for the evolution of the latter. We show that this correlation threshold depends on the strength of the interaction (influence of the green beard on the expression of the altruistic trait), as well as the costs and benefits of the altruistic behavior. We further show that this correlation does not necessarily have to be high and support our analytical results by simulations.     

Selection for altruism through random drift in variable size populations

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Altruistic behavior is defined as helping others at a cost to oneself and a lowered fitness. The lower fitness implies that altruists should be selected against, which is in contradiction with their widespread presence is nature. Present models of selection for altruism (kin or multilevel) show that altruistic behaviors can have 'hidden' advantages if the 'common good' produced by altruists is restricted to some related or unrelated groups. These models are mostly deterministic, or assume a frequency dependent fitness. RESULTS: Evolutionary dynamics is a competition between deterministic selection pressure and stochastic events due to random sampling from one generation to the next. We show here that an altruistic allele extending the carrying capacity of the habitat can win by increasing the random drift of "selfish" alleles. In other terms, the fixation probability of altruistic genes can be higher than those of a selfish ones, even though altruists have a smaller fitness. Moreover when populations are geographically structured, the altruists advantage can be highly amplified and the fixation probability of selfish genes can tend toward zero. The above results are obtained both by numerical and analytical calculations. Analytical results are obtained in the limit of large populations. CONCLUSIONS: The theory we present does not involve kin or multilevel selection, but is based on the existence of random drift in variable size populations. The model is a generalization of the original Fisher-Wright and Moran models where the carrying capacity depends on the number of altruists.     

Not only states but traits — Humans can identify permanent altruistic dispositions in 20 s

Humans behave altruistically in one-shot interactions under total anonymity. In search of explanations for such behavior, it has been argued that at least some individuals have a general tendency to behave altruistically independent of profitability. In fact, a stable altruistic trait would be adaptive if it were recognizable. Then, altruists could choose each other in order to retain benefits through mutual cooperation. Previous research has shown that individuals can predict the degree of altruistic behavior of strangers by reading signs of emotions evoked in significant social decisions. However, the identification of benevolent emotional states is no guarantee of the existence of permanent altruistic traits, though permanent traits are the preferable criterion for selection of good interaction partners. In this study, we tested whether individuals are able to identify altruistic traits. Judges watched 20-s silent video clips of unacquainted target persons and were asked to estimate the behavior of these target persons in a money-sharing task. As the videotapes of the target persons had been recorded in a setting unrelated to altruistic behavior, the judges could not base their estimates on situational cues related to the money-sharing task but instead had to draw on stable signals of altruism. Estimates were significantly better than chance, indicating that individuals can identify permanent altruistic traits in others. As this mechanism raises opportunities for selective interactions between altruists, our findings are discussed with respect to their relevance for explaining the evolution of altruism through assortment.     

Larger than Life: Humans' Nonverbal Status Cues Alter Perceived Size

Background

Social dominance and physical size are closely linked. Nonverbal dominance displays in many non-human species are known to increase the displayer''s apparent size. Humans also employ a variety of nonverbal cues that increase apparent status, but it is not yet known whether these cues function via a similar mechanism: by increasing the displayer''s apparent size.

Methodology/Principal Finding

We generated stimuli in which actors displayed high status, neutral, or low status cues that were drawn from the findings of a recent meta-analysis. We then conducted four studies that indicated that nonverbal cues that increase apparent status do so by increasing the perceived size of the displayer. Experiment 1 demonstrated that nonverbal status cues affect perceivers'' judgments of physical size. The results of Experiment 2 showed that altering simple perceptual cues can affect judgments of both size and perceived status. Experiment 3 used objective measurements to demonstrate that status cues change targets'' apparent size in the two-dimensional plane visible to a perceiver, and Experiment 4 showed that changes in perceived size mediate changes in perceived status, and that the cue most associated with this phenomenon is postural openness.

Conclusions/Significance

We conclude that nonverbal cues associated with social dominance also affect the perceived size of the displayer. This suggests that certain nonverbal dominance cues in humans may function as they do in other species: by creating the appearance of changes in physical size.     

Population viscosity and the evolution of altruism

The term population viscosity refers to limited dispersal, which increases the genetic relatedness of neighbors. This effect both supports the evolution of altruism by focusing the altruists' gifts on relatives of the altruist, and also limits the extent to which altruism may emerge by exposing clusters of altruists to stiffer local competition. Previous analyses have emphasized the way in which these two effects can cancel, limiting the viability of altruism. These papers were based on models in which total population density was held fixed. We present here a class of models in which population density is permitted to fluctuate, so that patches of altruists are supported at a higher density than patches of non-altruists. Under these conditions, population viscosity can support the selection of both weak and strong altruism.     

WHEN HAWKS GIVE RISE TO DOVES: THE EVOLUTION AND TRANSITION OF ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES

The question of how altruism can evolve despite its local disadvantage to selfishness has produced a wealth of theoretical and empirical research capturing the attention of scientists across disciplines for decades. One feature that has remained consistent through this outpouring of knowledge has been that researchers have looked to the altruists themselves for mechanisms by which altruism can curtail selfishness. An alternative perspective may be that just as altruists want to limit selfishness in the population, so may the selfish individuals themselves. These alternative perspectives have been most evident in the fairly recent development of enforcement strategies. Punishment can effectively limit selfishness in the population, but it is not free. Thus, when punishment evolves among altruists, the double costs of exploitation from cheaters and punishment make the evolution of punishment problematic. Here we show that punishment can more readily invade selfish populations when associated with selfishness, whereas altruistic punishers cannot. Thereafter, the establishment of altruism because of enforcement by selfish punishers provides the ideal invasion conditions for altruistic punishment, effectively creating a transition of punishment from selfishness to altruistic. Thus, from chaotic beginnings, a little hypocrisy may go a long way in the evolution and maintenance of altruism.     

Altruism and mental disorders

Data suggest that the theories of kin selection and reciprocal altruism are viable working models to explain altruistic behavior. It remains to be demonstrated if these models can explain the behavior of persons with mentaL disorders for whom altruistic behavior is reported to be reduced. This paper addresses this issue. Part I reviews proximate factors that are thought to influence both altruistic decision making and interindividual variation in altruistic behavior. The focus is on trait signaling by potential beneficiaries and the evaluation of signals and altruistic decision making by potential altruists. In Part II, points developed in Part I are combined with clinical and empirical findings to analyze data on personality disorders and dysthymic disorder. The analysis leads to three causal hypotheses: Reduced altruistic behavior may be an evolved strategy, a consequence of dysfunctional recognition systems or algorithms, and/or a secondary response to an increase in symptoms. Different disorders and features of disorders are explained by each hypothesis.     

Neoproterozoic 'snowball Earth' glaciations and the evolution of altruism

We hypothesize that a demographic and ecological effect of Neoproterozoic ‘snowball Earth’ glaciations was to increase the fitness of group‐level traits and consequently the likelihood of the evolution of macroscopic form. Extreme and repeated founder effects raised genetic relatedness – and therefore the influence of kin selection on the individuals within a group. This was permissive for the evolution of some highly costly altruistic traits, including those for macroscopic differentiation. In some eukaryotic species, the harsh and fluctuating abiotic conditions made a macroscopic physiology advantageous, perhaps necessary, for collective survival. This caused population‐wide group viability selection, whereby non‐altruist ‘cheat’ genotypes killed the groups they were in, and therefore themselves, by reaching fixation. Furthermore, dispersal between refugia would reach zero under anything near a ‘hard snowball’, which would protect altruists at high local frequency from the influx of cheats from neighbouring groups. We illustrate our hypothesis analytically and with a simple spatial model. We show how removal of between‐group dispersal, in a population with initial between‐group variation in cheat frequency, causes the relative frequency of altruists to increase while the population as a whole decreases in size, as a result of group death caused by cheat invasion. This may be of particular relevance to animal multicellularity because irreversible differentiation (highly altruistic in that it imposes a high fitness cost on the individual cell) is more prevalent than in other multicellular eukaryotes. The relevance of our hypothesis should be scaled by any future consensus on the severity of snowball Earth, but it is theoretically plausible that global‐scale glaciations had a systematic influence on the level of selection during Earth history.     

Effect of group selection on the evolution of altruistic behavior

By using a Monte Carlo simulation, we studied the effect of group selection on the altruistic trait that is controlled by a single locus. The altruistic trait is disadvantageous to the bearer but advantageous to the others. Group selection is defined as the differential reproductive rate among demes caused by genotypic difference among demes. We found that the simulation reproduced many results of former studies. Additionally, when the mutation rate and the migration rate are small enough, we observed two new phenomena: (1) When the effect of the group selection is as large as that of the individual selection, the gene frequency is quite unstable. We found two local stable states, the A- and the S-state. When the metapopulation is in the A-state, altruists are nearly fixed. When in the S-state, on the contrary, altruists are almost lost. The metapopulation shifted quickly from one state to another. We call this phenomenon as the S-A transition. (2) When the mutation rate and migration rate are small enough we found an extremely strong mechanism to stop the non-altruists from expanding no matter how strong the individual selection coefficient is. This is caused by a phenomenon, which we call SA splitting, in which most demes are fixed either by altruists or non-altruists; thus, the relatedness of the metapopulation becomes nearly equal to one. We show SA splitting plays an important role in S-A transition. We define a parameter d to see the degree of SA splitting. We found that d is roughly proportional to mutation rate and deme size.     

Altruists are trusted based on non-verbal cues

The identification of altruists based on non-verbal cues might offer a solution to the problem of subtle cheating. Previous studies have indicated that the ability to discriminate altruists from non-altruists emerges during evolution. However, behavioural differences with regard to social exchanges involving altruists and non-altruists have not been studied. We investigated differences in responses to videotaped altruists and non-altruists with the Faith Game. Participants tended to entrust real money to altruists more than to non-altruists, providing strong evidence that cognitive adaptations evolve as counter-strategies to subtle cheating.     

Inbreeding and evolution by kin selection

Because alleles associated with altruistic behaviors can increase in frequency when altruists increase the fitness of closely related individuals, it has been assumed that inbreeding presents the most favorable conditions for the evolution of altruism. Using a family-structured model of kin selection, we varied the proportion of the population mating with sibs and the proportion mating randomly to investigate the hypothesis that inbreeding facilitates the evolution of altruistic behaviors.We partitioned total gene frequency change of the altruistic allele into two components: (1) the change in gene frequency owing to selection within families, or individual selection; this component of selection is always negative and selects against altruistic social behaviors; and (2) the change in gene frequency owing to fitness differences between families, or group selection; this component of selection favors the evolution of altruistic social behaviors. Because inbreeding increases the component of group selection at the expense of individual selection by increasing the between-group variation, it facilitates the spread of the altruistic allele. Computer simulations show that even small amounts of inbreeding (within-sibship mating) significantly increase the rate of gene frequency change.     

Multilevel selection and human altruism

Views on the evolution of altruism based upon multilevel selection on structured populations pay little attention to the difference between fortuitous and deliberate processes leading to assortative grouping. Altruism may evolve when assortative grouping is fortuitously produced by forces external to the organism. But when it is deliberately produced by the same proximate mechanism that controls altruistic responses, as in humans, exploitation of altruists by selfish individuals is unlikely and altruism evolves as an individually advantageous trait. Groups formed with altruists of this sort are special, because they are not affected by subversion from within. A synergistic process where altruism is selected both at the individual and at the group level can take place.     

Effective altruists ought to be allowed to sell their kidneys

Effective altruists aim to do the most good that they can do with the resources available to them, without causing themselves or their dependents significant harm thereby. The argument presented in this paper demonstrates that there are no morally relevant dissimilarities between living kidney donation and living kidney selling for effective altruistic reasons. Thus, since the former is allowed, the latter ought to be allowed as well. And, there are important moral differences between living kidney selling for effective altruistic reasons and other reasons for kidney vending (e.g., for personal financial gain), such that standard objections against markets in human kidneys do not attach to those markets designed around principles of effective altruism. The reasonable conclusion to draw from this is that eligible effective altruist kidney donors ought to be allowed to sell (one of) their kidneys to others in need, if they so desire. Because of this, law and policy ought to be changed to allow for this exceptional case: current laws that ban kidney selling for everyone, irrespective of their reason for selling, are unjustified.     

"Runaway" social evolution: reinforcing selection for inbreeding and altruism.

Kin selection theory predicts that altruistic behaviors, those that decrease the fitness of the individual performing the behavior but increase the fitness of the recipient, can increase in frequency if the individuals interacting are closely related. Several studies have shown that inbreeding therefore generally increases the effectiveness of kin selection when fitnesses are linear, additive functions of the number of altruists in the family, although with extreme forms of altruism, inbreeding can actually retard the evolution of altruism. These models assume that a constant proportion of the population mates at random and a constant proportion practices some form of inbreeding. In order to investigate the effect of inbreeding on the evolution of altruistic behavior when the mating structure is allowed to evolve, we examined a two-locus model by computer simulation of a diploid case and illustrated the important qualitative features by mathematical analysis of a haploid case. One locus determines an individual's propensity to perform altruistic social behavior and the second locus determines the probability that an individual will mate within its sibship. We assumed positive selection for altruism and no direct selection at the inbreeding locus. We observed that the altruistic allele and the inbreeding allele become positively associated, even when the initial conditions of the model assume independence between these loci. This linkage disequilibrium becomes established, because the altruistic allele increases more rapidly in the inbreeding segment of the population. This association subsequently results in indirect selection on the inbreeding locus. However, the dynamics of this model go beyond a simple "hitch-hiking" effect, because high levels of altruism lead to increased inbreeding, and high degrees of inbreeding accelerate the rate of change of the altruistic allele in the entire population. Thus, the dynamics of this model are similar to those of "runaway" sexual selection, with gene frequency change at the two loci interactively causing rapid evolutionary change.     

Benevolence

This ironically titled novel depicts the ambiguity and ambivalence of making and receiving gifts. One of the main characters is a transplant psychiatrist who assesses potential living kidney donors. He struggles to understand his apparently altruistic patient and acts out this struggle in boundary violations. His wife, a psychologist, faces similar difficulties with a phobic, traumatised client and also acts out. This closely observed novel provides a valuable insight into the thoughts and feelings that therapists can have whilst with their patients/clients and of the consequences of not reflecting on them in supervision. It also raises to consciousness the many ethical issues of altruistic organ donation.     

Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans

Reciprocal altruism has been the backbone of research on the evolution of altruistic behaviour towards non-kin, but recent research has begun to apply costly signalling theory to this problem. In addition to signalling resources or abilities, public generosity could function as a costly signal of cooperative intent, benefiting altruists in terms of (i) better access to cooperative relationships and (ii) greater cooperation within those relationships. When future interaction partners can choose with whom they wish to interact, this could lead to competition to be more generous than others. Little empirical work has tested for the possible existence of this 'competitive altruism'. Using a cooperative monetary game with and without opportunities for partner choice and signalling cooperative intent, we show here that people actively compete to be more generous than others when they can benefit from being chosen for cooperative partnerships, and the most generous people are correspondingly chosen more often as cooperative partners. We also found evidence for increased scepticism of altruistic signals when the potential reputational benefits for dishonest signalling were high. Thus, this work supports the hypothesis that public generosity can be a signal of cooperative intent, which people sometimes 'fake' when conditions permit it.     

Kin recognition and the evolution of altruism

In 1964, Hamilton formalized the idea of kin selection to explain the evolution of altruistic behaviours. Since then, numerous examples from a diverse array of taxa have shown that seemingly altruistic actions towards close relatives are a common phenomenon. Although many species use kin recognition to direct altruistic behaviours preferentially towards relatives, this important aspect of social biology is less well understood theoretically. I extend Hamilton's classic work by defining the conditions for the evolution of kin-directed altruism when recognizers are permitted to make acceptance (type I) and rejection (type II) errors in the identification of social partners with respect to kinship. The effect of errors in recognition on the evolution of kin-directed altruism depends on whether the population initially consists of unconditional altruists or non-altruists (i.e. alternative forms of non-recognizers). Factors affecting the level of these error rates themselves, their evolution and their long-term stability are discussed.